S. Ganapathy and ors. Vs. V. Pandiramaiah and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/830526
SubjectService
CourtChennai High Court
Decided OnJul-03-2009
Case NumberWrit Appeal Nos. 2381 and 2382 of 2004
JudgePrabha Sridevan and ;C.T. Selvam, JJ.
Reported in(2009)6MLJ552
ActsService Rules, 1976; Constitution of India - Article 226; Service Regulations, 1989
AppellantS. Ganapathy and ors.
RespondentV. Pandiramaiah and ors.
Appellant AdvocateN.R. Chandran, Sr. Counsel for ;R. Kannan, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateRamapriya Gopalakrishnan, Adv. for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 and ;V. Selvanayagam, Adv. for Respondents Nos. 4 and 5
DispositionAppeal allowed
Cases Referred(See Ira Munn v. State of Illinois
Excerpt:
- prabha sridevan, j.1. the appellants herein have been fighting a long battle at least from 1984, when they first came to this court with a writ petition. the appellants and the contesting respondents are employees of the tamil nadu civil supplies corporation ('corporation' for short). the appellants were originally assistant quality inspectors ('aqis' for short). they were ousted from service, but re-employed in a lower grade as junior assistants, without following the last-come-first-go rule, while their juniors were retained as aqis. aqis belong to the technical wing of the corporation, while junior assistants belong to the administrative wing. therefore, they prayed for quashing the order rejecting their request to reckon their services as aqis for future promotions and other benefits. 2. their grievance was that when their juniors, who were continuing as aqis, enjoyed career advancements, they were lagging behind. writ petition nos. 2707, 2708 and 2904 of 1984 were filed by appellants 3, 4 and 9 herein respectively, and were disposed of on 23.4.1992. this court found that before dealing with the controversy, it should be ascertained whether in fact there was any discrimination and the writ petitioners were directed to file their respective representations before the chairman-cum-managing director of the corporation, who in turn, was directed to give notice to all persons concerned and after affording opportunity, and to decide the matter including the question whether there was any violation of the last-come-first-go rule and to restore the seniority properly. 3. an enquiry was duly held on 2.2.1994. at the enquiry, the writ petitioners cited the names of their juniors s. sankara pandian, k. guru rajan, p. parthiban, mohana sundaram, c. rajendran and karuppaswamy, who were retained in their services as aqis, while the writ petitioners had been ousted. they also cited the names of those mill technical assistants who were given the benefits of assistants by taking into account the service that they had rendered earlier, viz., k. ramalingam and k. shanmugam etc. the enquiry officer conducted the enquiry and submitted the enquiry report on 25.11.1993. thereupon, the chairman-cum-managing director, by proceedings in rc. no. e7/44183/92 dated 2.2.1994, considered and held that the suggestion of the enquiry officer that the services of the writ petitioners must be regularized in the cadre of assistant from the date of their first appointment was reasonable and just. therefore, there was an order that the service rendered by them in the cadre of junior assistant will be computed as assistant for the purpose of qualifying service, seniority, probation etc., but they will not be eligible for arrears of pay and allowances. this order was challenged in writ petition no. 4329 of 1997 by the tamil nadu civil supplies corporation employees union and respondents 1 to 3 (in w.a. no. 2381 of 2004). the respondent in the above writ petition was the tamil nadu civil supplies corporation, represented by the senior regional manager and eleven others, including the appellants who had filed nos. 2707, 2708 and 2904 of 1984. according to the union and the other writ petitioners, the impugned order, which gave the respondent/employees the 47th position, had superseded hundreds of persons who were senior to them by reason of having greater length of service in the administrative wing. on 31.7.1998, this writ petition was disposed of by this court, setting aside the enquiry report on the ground that the corporation had misconstrued the directions given by this court, which were not a carte blanche to the respondents to do whatever they liked, ignoring the legitimate expectation of those initially appointed to the administrative wing, in the name of rendering justice. the court directed that the corporation should again hold a fresh enquiry in terms of the order passed in w.p. no. 2707 of 1984 mentioned earlier, after giving notice to all concerned, particularly the aqis who had continued in service, though juniors, and all those in the administrative wing who are likely to be affected. thereafter, an order was passed on 9.4.1999 after an enquiry, during which more than 50 persons were heard. by this order, again the seniority of the appellants herein was fixed by taking into account their earlier service. 4. at once, a contempt application was filed by the union and the three respondents, attacking the order passed on 9.4.1999 as blatant contempt of the order dated 31.7.1998. apprehending punitive action, immediately an order was passed on 9.12.1999, by which the order dated 9.4.1999 was withdrawn and a fresh order was passed and therefore, the contempt petition was closed. by this order, the appellants were reverted with immediate effect. this order was challenged in w.p. no. 20017 of 1999. on 15.6.2000, on the request of one boominathan, a seniority list was published by the corporation. in the meantime, the corporation as well as the appellants herein, had preferred an appeal against the order passed on 31.7.1998 in w.p. no. 4239 of 1997. on 17.11.2000, the division bench heard w.a. no. 1494 of 1998 and w.a. no. 123 of 1999, which was against the order passed in w.p. no. 4329 of 1997 and w.p. no. 20017 of 1999, which was against the reversion order dated 9.12.1999. the division bench, after taking note of the chronological sequence of events and the proceedings mentioned above, found that the order dated 9.12.1999 was without notice to the appellants and therefore, the benefits, rights and advantages which they had got by the earlier order dated 9.4.1999 had been taken away. therefore, the division bench set aside the order dated 9.12.1999 and again directed the parties to put forth their respective contentions before the corporation, which was directed to pass orders within a period of four months. 5. on 15.3.2001, again an order was passed, which was in favour of the appellants herein. again, this order was challenged by respondents 1 to 3 by filing the writ petitions, out of which the present writ appeals have arisen. the learned single judge was of the opinion that the impugned order was illegal in all respects and allowed the writ petition, again setting aside the order, in favour of the appellants. therefore, the appellants are once again before us, having been thwarted repeatedly.6. it is interesting to see that every time the corporation was asked to pass an order, the order was that the appellants herein who had been ousted and had in fact been singled out for ousting and had suffered injustice and that injustice had to be set right.7. mr. n.r. chandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants initially suggested, without prejudice to the rights of the appellants, that if three respondents could come forward with some amicable solution by which their mutual rights could be adjusted, which would not in any way put the appellants to loss, the appellants were willing to consider it since at present only some of the appellants are still in service. but the counsel for the respondents submitted that the restoration of seniority to these persons would affect hundreds of employees. therefore, we decided to hear the matter on merits.8. the learned senior counsel submitted that all along, this court had decided the issue on the assumption in 1975 that the quality control and administrative wings were water tight compartments between which internal movements were impossible, but this was wrong. it is only subsequently that the service had been divided into two wings - one quality control and the other administrative wing. initially, the class of employees were divided only according to the scale of pay and therefore, there were really no such water tight divisions which prevented movement from the technical wing to the administrative wing. learned senior counsel submitted that if so, then for no fault of theirs, when they were ousted for want of vacancy and subsequently re-employed, but demoted, i.e., taken back in a lower cadre. it is to redress this injustice that the corporation had recognized the fact that they were not the juniormost to be ousted, if ouster was necessary because of lack of vacancy, and the fact that others similarly placed like k. shanmugam of thanjavur branch, had been given the benefit of taking into account his service prior to his being inducted in the administrative wing, and decided that the same treatment could be given to the appellants. learned senior counsel also submitted that no one can say that a person from the quality control wing cannot move to the administrative wing when in fact the appellants had been brought from the technical wing into the administrative wing. in fact, even the order dated 9.12.1999 did not push back the appellants to the technical wing, but it retained them in the administrative wing, although only on a lower level. learned senior counsel, therefore, submitted that the well considered order passed by the corporation could have been interfered with only if it was perverse or irrational. but if it was one of the possible or plausible and reasonable views, then interference was not warranted.9. ms. ramapriya gopalakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents submitted that it is not correct to state that there were no water tight compartments separating the technical wing and the administrative wing. in fact, on facts, the learned single judge had found that it was so and if once that fact is established, then the case of the appellants must be rejected. learned counsel produced a chart to show that the respondents had been serving in the corporation two years prior to the date of appointment of the appellants and therefore, to push the appellants above them at the 47th stage, while the respondents were to languish at the 450th stage, would really cause havoc. learned counsel submitted that once the earlier orders had been set aside as illegal by this court, the corporation cannot and shall not pass the same order repeatedly in the face of the specific directions of this court.10. the 1976 service rules of the corporation have been enclosed in the typed set of papers. in 1977, the appellants were ousted and re-appointed in 1977 and therefore, admittedly the 1976 service rules alone apply. the service rules show that the classification of staff will be graded into the following five classes:class i - employees on grades with an initial basic pay of rs. 500 and above.class ii - employees on grades with an initial basic pay of rs. 300 and above but below rs. 500.class iii - employees on grades with an initial basic pay of rs. 180 and above but below rs. 300.class iv - employees on grades with an initial basic pay of rs. 140 and above but below rs. 180.class v - employees on grades with an initial basic pay below rs. 140.though annexure-ii of the 1976 service rules shows the avenues of promotion, and from assistant quality inspector, one is promoted to quality inspector and then to assistant manager (quality control) to manager (quality control) and the manager (administration), manager (marketing) and manager (marketing control) may be promoted to senior manager and from junior assistant to office assistant, superintendent (office), assistant manager (office godown), deputy manager, manager (distribution) and manager (administration). but the stand of the corporation is that there were no water tight compartments between the technical wing and the administrative wing.11. whereas, we find that in the 1989 service regulations, while defining promotion, it is clearly stated that promotion means appointment to the next higher class or category of the same wing, but however, employees in the administrative wing and accounts wing were interchangeable. and, the 'classification of staff' in annexure-i of the 1989 service regulations, in direct contrast to the 'classification of staff' in the 1976 service rules, divides it into administrative wing, accounts wing, construction wing, quality control wing and mechanical engineering wing. therefore, it is clear that in 1976, the classification of staff was on the basis of pay and not on the basis of the nature of duties performed by them. and, clause 5 which relates to appointments in the 1976 service rules shows that appointments will be as per annexure-i. it does not speak of the individuals remaining in the same wing, if they have been appointed in one wing, as we find in the 1989 service regulations. for aqi, the scale of pay is rs. 250-10-300-15-450. the method of recruitment is by direct recruitment and the qualification is a degree in science, preferably with botany/chemistry as the main subject. the appellants were working as aqis when they were ousted. they were re-employed as junior assistants. for a junior assistant, the scale of pay is rs. 210-5-245-10-325. the appointment is by direct recruitment and the qualification is puc pass. for an assistant, the scale of pay is rs. 250-10-300-15-450, which is the same as that of aqis and for a person who is directly recruited as an assistant, the qualification is possession of first or second class degree. therefore, when they were ousted and then re-employed, the appellants should rightly have been taken as assistants, which is the scale of pay to which they belong and since they also possess the qualification required for being recruited as aqis. this is exactly the reasoning of the corporation. instead, they were appointed as junior assistants on a lower scale of pay. when they made the representation, the corporation saw the illegality and set right the error. of course, before they set it right, they ought to have heard the parties who might be aggrieved by the order giving the appellants the credit of the years that they had worked as aqis and any orders passed in the absence of such persons would necessarily have to be set aside and that is why twice this court had directed the corporation to hear all parties concerned and pass orders.12. we will again examine the orders passed by this court and the orders passed by the corporation chronologically. first, we will examine whether there is in fact a deliberate disobedience to this court's directions. the first order dated 23.4.1992 gives a direction to the chairman-cum-managing director of the corporation to give notice to 'all persons concerned' and afford opportunity of being heard to them and decide whether the action was violation of the 'last-come-first-go' rule. the learned single judge held that it is well settled that in every case of retrenchment or termination on the ground of loss of work, the last-come-first-go rule along has to be followed, for otherwise, if juniors are retained in service and seniors are removed, it shall be a discrimination. this order became final. therefore, even today, this mandate of examining whether the ousting of the appellants was in violation of the last-come-first-go rule stands. the corporation has recorded in its order and in its counter that it had in fact violated the rule and therefore, restored the seniority. so in fact, the corporation had obeyed the first order of this court. 13. on 2.2.1994, therefore, the chairman-cum- managing director ordered the service of the appellants rendered in the cadre of junior assistants to be computed as assistants for the purpose of qualifying service. we have already seen above that when they were taken in the administrative wing, they had been on the same scale of pay as assistants, which is higher than the junior assistants. on 31.7.1998, this court quashed this order and directed the corporation to hold a fresh enquiry in terms of the order mentioned earlier, i.e., on 23.4.1992 and also to hear all those in the administrative wing who are likely to be affected prejudicially by any benefit being given to the appellants in the administrative wing. then, a detailed order was passed on 9.4.1999, setting out the background of the case, giving the appellants the seniority by taking into account the services rendered by them in the quality control wing. this order was again in favour of the appellants. immediately, a contempt application was filed. on 9.12.1999, without hearing anybody, hurriedly an order was passed superseding the order dated 9.4.1999. thereupon, the contempt application was closed. on 30.1.2000, the reversion order was passed reverting the appellants. on 17.11.2000, the division bench quashed the order dated 9.12.1999 and directed the maintenance of status quo prior to 9.12.1999 and again directed the corporation to consider the contentions of the parties and to pass orders. then an order on 15.3.2001 was passed, again in favour of the appellants. this has been set aside by the learned single judge, whose judgment is challenged herein.14. we must remember one factor. when this court on 9.12.1998, directed the corporation to pass orders after hearing everybody and the corporation accordingly passed orders on 9.4.1999, which perhaps was in favour of the appellants again, that at best would have given rise to a fresh cause of action to the respondents; it is not an act of contempt. a direction to pass orders means that the authorities of the corporation shall exercise their discretion and pass orders. the corporation still had the right to decide how the seniority has to be fixed. in any event, a contempt application was filed and fearing contempt, an illegal order was passed without hearing the appellants who had been battling for over a decade. while discussing the manner in which contempt applications have to be dealt with, the supreme court in director of education v. ved prakash joshi : 2005crilj3731 , following an earlier decision in k.g. derasari v. union of india : (2001)10scc496 , observed as follows:7. while dealing with an application for contempt, the court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. it would not be permissible for a court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take a view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. a similar view was taken in k.g. derasari v. union of india. the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. if there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party concerned to approach the higher court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher court. the court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. right or wrong the order has to be obeyed. flouting an order of the court would render the party liable for contempt. while dealing with an application for contempt, the court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged. in other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. it cannot traverse beyond the order. it cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions or delete any direction. that would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. the same would be impermissible and indefensible.15. when the division bench set aside the order dated 9.12.1999 in w.p. no. 20017 of 1998, the legal consequence is that the order dated 9.4.1999 got restored. because, that was set aside by order dated 9.12.1999. now, the order dated 9.4.1999 till date has not been challenged. however, pursuant to the directions of the division bench, an order has been passed on 15.3.2001, almost on the lines of the order dated 9.4.1999. therefore, we had examined both the orders dated 15.3.2001 and 9.4.1999 and we find that cogent reasons have been given for restoring the seniority of the appellants and the relevant paragraphs will be extracted hereinbelow.16. the order passed by the corporation reveals the following facts:(a) the fact that the appellants who as technical assistants were terminated from the service of the corporation on the ground of want of vacancy in the quality control wing and that the termination would amount to retrenchment and one of the procedures to be followed in such cases of termination is the last-come-first-go rule.(b) that there was a clear violation of the last-come-first-go rule and the appellants who were seniors had been terminated, while retaining other juniors in service.(c) that one k. shanmugam who was working as aqi in thanjavur region was terminated from service for want of vacancy and he was promoted as assistant, computing his entire service from the date of first appointment in the quality control wing.(d) that there was no difference between the case of thiru. shanmugam and others and the appellants herein.(e) that the appellants as technical assistants were in the scale of pay of rs. 250-10-300-15-450, which is the same as the scale of pay of the assistants and when their services were terminated for want of vacancy in the quality control wing and they were re-appointed in the administrative wing, they should have been appointed only on the same scale of pay, and to demote them for no fault of theirs was not proper.(f) in the service rules framed on 1.6.1973, the earlier service rules were in force during the time of their re-appointment in the administrative wing, there was neither separate classified categories nor prohibition of appointment from one wing to another wing. such a right is implied and inherent in the corporation.(g) that it is only in the service rules which came into force subsequently that provided for separate avenues for promotion for persons working in the administrative wing and quality control wing and it cannot in any way stand in the way of the corporation to grant the benefit of service to those whose services were terminated for want of vacancy and re-appointed in the administrative wing.so, for the aforesaid reasons, the decision was taken. 17. it is well settled that sitting in article 226 of the constitution, we have to examine whether the decision was taken correctly and not examine whether the right decision was taken. we are not sitting in appeal. of course, we can test the correctness of the decision, if the decision is totally perverse or shocking or violative of the principles of natural justice. but, if that is one reasonable perspective of looking at things, then we cannot correct it merely because we hold a different view - vide director of education, uttaranchal v. ved prakash joshi : 2005crilj3731 . in state of uttar pradesh v. johri mal : air2004sc3800 , the supreme court held as follows:28. the scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the high court contained in article 226 of the constitution of india would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. the power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of the omnipresent. the power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the state. decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court. the limited scope of judicial review, succinctly put, is:(i) courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies.(ii) a petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds.(iii) an order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal.(iv) a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a court is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice.(v) the courts cannot be called upon to undertake the government duties and functions. the court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the state. social and economic belief of a judge should not be invoked as a substitute for the judgment of the legislative bodies. (see ira munn v. state of illinois 94 us 113 : 24 l ed 77 (1876)....32. prof. bernard schwartz in his celebrated book (administrative law, 3rd edn., little brown company, 1991) dealing with the present status of judicial review in the american context, summarised as under:if the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into little more than media for the transmission of cases to the courts. that would destroy the values of agencies, created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in the complicated fields. at the same time, court should not rubber-stamp agencies; the scope of judicial enquiry must not be so restricted that it prevents full enquiry into the action of legality. if that question cannot be properly explored by the judge, the right to review becomes meaningless ... in the final analysis, the scope of review depends on the individual judge's estimate of the justice of the case.18. the corporation has been consistently holding the view that at the relevant point of time, the two services, viz., technical service and administrative service was not divided in water tight compartments. it has consistently held that it had done injustice to these three by sending them to a lower scale of pay. we have seen the 1976 service rules and it divides the employees only according to the pay scales. the learned single judge, on a re-appreciation of evidence, had decided that the two services were divided into water tight compartments. if there had been such a division, the appellants cannot be fitted in the administrative wing even as junior assistants. the learned single judge held that the original appointment of the appellants was temporary, so they had no vested right. but we find that even pandiramaiah was appointed temporarily on a consolidated pay. but we find in the order of the corporation that they were originally appointed on a basic pay of rs. 250/- and were ousted to 'disbandment of ports' in madurai region. so, it is clear that the ports to which they had been appointed had been disbanded. the corporation, therefore, was of the opinion that when the ports were abandoned, the appellants who were seniors in the same category ought to have been accommodated and the juniors should have 'gone out'. but this basic rule was violated. the corporation was also of the opinion since at the time of their re-appointment in the administrative wing, 'neither there was any separate classified categories nor prohibition of such appointment from one wing to another wing', they were senior to the respondents. if so, giving them their seniority on the basis of the scale of pay that they were earning before the ouster cannot be said to be in any way injuring any legitimate right of the persons in the administrative wing.19. for all the reasons stated above, the writ appeals are allowed. there shall be no order as to costs. consequently, w.a.m.p. no. 4388 of 2004 is closed.
Judgment:

Prabha Sridevan, J.

1. The appellants herein have been fighting a long battle at least from 1984, when they first came to this Court with a writ petition. The appellants and the contesting respondents are employees of the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation ('Corporation' for short). The appellants were originally Assistant Quality Inspectors ('AQIs' for short). They were ousted from service, but re-employed in a lower grade as Junior Assistants, without following the last-come-first-go rule, while their juniors were retained as AQIs. AQIs belong to the Technical Wing of the Corporation, while Junior Assistants belong to the Administrative Wing. Therefore, they prayed for quashing the order rejecting their request to reckon their services as AQIs for future promotions and other benefits.

2. Their grievance was that when their juniors, who were continuing as AQIs, enjoyed career advancements, they were lagging behind. Writ Petition Nos. 2707, 2708 and 2904 of 1984 were filed by appellants 3, 4 and 9 herein respectively, and were disposed of on 23.4.1992. This Court found that before dealing with the controversy, it should be ascertained whether in fact there was any discrimination and the writ petitioners were directed to file their respective representations before the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Corporation, who in turn, was directed to give notice to all persons concerned and after affording opportunity, and to decide the matter including the question whether there was any violation of the last-come-first-go rule and to restore the seniority properly.

3. An enquiry was duly held on 2.2.1994. At the enquiry, the writ petitioners cited the names of their juniors S. Sankara Pandian, K. Guru Rajan, P. Parthiban, Mohana Sundaram, C. Rajendran and Karuppaswamy, who were retained in their services as AQIs, while the writ petitioners had been ousted. They also cited the names of those Mill Technical Assistants who were given the benefits of Assistants by taking into account the service that they had rendered earlier, viz., K. Ramalingam and K. Shanmugam etc. The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and submitted the enquiry report on 25.11.1993. Thereupon, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, by proceedings in Rc. No. E7/44183/92 dated 2.2.1994, considered and held that the suggestion of the Enquiry Officer that the services of the writ petitioners must be regularized in the cadre of Assistant from the date of their first appointment was reasonable and just. Therefore, there was an order that the service rendered by them in the cadre of Junior Assistant will be computed as Assistant for the purpose of qualifying service, seniority, probation etc., but they will not be eligible for arrears of pay and allowances. This order was challenged in Writ Petition No. 4329 of 1997 by the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Employees Union and respondents 1 to 3 (in W.A. No. 2381 of 2004). The respondent in the above writ petition was the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation, represented by the Senior Regional Manager and eleven others, including the appellants who had filed Nos. 2707, 2708 and 2904 of 1984. According to the Union and the other writ petitioners, the impugned order, which gave the respondent/employees the 47th position, had superseded hundreds of persons who were senior to them by reason of having greater length of service in the Administrative Wing. On 31.7.1998, this writ petition was disposed of by this Court, setting aside the enquiry report on the ground that the Corporation had misconstrued the directions given by this Court, which were not a carte blanche to the respondents to do whatever they liked, ignoring the legitimate expectation of those initially appointed to the Administrative Wing, in the name of rendering justice. The Court directed that the Corporation should again hold a fresh enquiry in terms of the order passed in W.P. No. 2707 of 1984 mentioned earlier, after giving notice to all concerned, particularly the AQIs who had continued in service, though juniors, and all those in the Administrative Wing who are likely to be affected. Thereafter, an order was passed on 9.4.1999 after an enquiry, during which more than 50 persons were heard. By this order, again the seniority of the appellants herein was fixed by taking into account their earlier service.

4. At once, a contempt application was filed by the Union and the three respondents, attacking the order passed on 9.4.1999 as blatant contempt of the order dated 31.7.1998. Apprehending punitive action, immediately an order was passed on 9.12.1999, by which the order dated 9.4.1999 was withdrawn and a fresh order was passed and therefore, the contempt petition was closed. By this order, the appellants were reverted with immediate effect. This order was challenged in W.P. No. 20017 of 1999. On 15.6.2000, on the request of one Boominathan, a seniority list was published by the Corporation. In the meantime, the Corporation as well as the appellants herein, had preferred an appeal against the order passed on 31.7.1998 in W.P. No. 4239 of 1997. On 17.11.2000, the Division Bench heard W.A. No. 1494 of 1998 and W.A. No. 123 of 1999, which was against the order passed in W.P. No. 4329 of 1997 and W.P. No. 20017 of 1999, which was against the reversion order dated 9.12.1999. The Division Bench, after taking note of the chronological sequence of events and the proceedings mentioned above, found that the order dated 9.12.1999 was without notice to the appellants and therefore, the benefits, rights and advantages which they had got by the earlier order dated 9.4.1999 had been taken away. Therefore, the Division Bench set aside the order dated 9.12.1999 and again directed the parties to put forth their respective contentions before the Corporation, which was directed to pass orders within a period of four months.

5. On 15.3.2001, again an order was passed, which was in favour of the appellants herein. Again, this order was challenged by respondents 1 to 3 by filing the writ petitions, out of which the present writ appeals have arisen. The learned single Judge was of the opinion that the impugned order was illegal in all respects and allowed the writ petition, again setting aside the order, in favour of the appellants. Therefore, the appellants are once again before us, having been thwarted repeatedly.

6. It is interesting to see that every time the Corporation was asked to pass an order, the order was that the appellants herein who had been ousted and had in fact been singled out for ousting and had suffered injustice and that injustice had to be set right.

7. Mr. N.R. Chandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants initially suggested, without prejudice to the rights of the appellants, that if three respondents could come forward with some amicable solution by which their mutual rights could be adjusted, which would not in any way put the appellants to loss, the appellants were willing to consider it since at present only some of the appellants are still in service. But the counsel for the respondents submitted that the restoration of seniority to these persons would affect hundreds of employees. Therefore, we decided to hear the matter on merits.

8. The learned senior counsel submitted that all along, this Court had decided the issue on the assumption in 1975 that the Quality Control and Administrative Wings were water tight compartments between which internal movements were impossible, but this was wrong. It is only subsequently that the service had been divided into two wings - one Quality Control and the other Administrative Wing. Initially, the class of employees were divided only according to the scale of pay and therefore, there were really no such water tight divisions which prevented movement from the Technical Wing to the Administrative Wing. Learned senior counsel submitted that if so, then for no fault of theirs, when they were ousted for want of vacancy and subsequently re-employed, but demoted, i.e., taken back in a lower cadre. It is to redress this injustice that the Corporation had recognized the fact that they were not the juniormost to be ousted, if ouster was necessary because of lack of vacancy, and the fact that others similarly placed like K. Shanmugam of Thanjavur Branch, had been given the benefit of taking into account his service prior to his being inducted in the Administrative Wing, and decided that the same treatment could be given to the appellants. Learned senior counsel also submitted that no one can say that a person from the Quality Control Wing cannot move to the Administrative Wing when in fact the appellants had been brought from the Technical Wing into the Administrative Wing. In fact, even the order dated 9.12.1999 did not push back the appellants to the Technical Wing, but it retained them in the Administrative Wing, although only on a lower level. Learned senior counsel, therefore, submitted that the well considered order passed by the Corporation could have been interfered with only if it was perverse or irrational. But if it was one of the possible or plausible and reasonable views, then interference was not warranted.

9. Ms. Ramapriya Gopalakrishnan, learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents submitted that it is not correct to state that there were no water tight compartments separating the Technical Wing and the Administrative Wing. In fact, on facts, the learned single Judge had found that it was so and if once that fact is established, then the case of the appellants must be rejected. Learned Counsel produced a chart to show that the respondents had been serving in the Corporation two years prior to the date of appointment of the appellants and therefore, to push the appellants above them at the 47th stage, while the respondents were to languish at the 450th stage, would really cause havoc. Learned Counsel submitted that once the earlier orders had been set aside as illegal by this Court, the Corporation cannot and shall not pass the same order repeatedly in the face of the specific directions of this Court.

10. The 1976 Service Rules of the Corporation have been enclosed in the typed set of papers. In 1977, the appellants were ousted and re-appointed in 1977 and therefore, admittedly the 1976 Service Rules alone apply. The Service Rules show that the classification of staff will be graded into the following five classes:

Class I - Employees on grades with an initial basic pay of Rs. 500 and above.

Class II - Employees on grades with an initial basic pay of Rs. 300 and above but below Rs. 500.

Class III - Employees on grades with an initial basic pay of Rs. 180 and above but below Rs. 300.

Class IV - Employees on grades with an initial basic pay of Rs. 140 and above but below Rs. 180.

Class V - Employees on grades with an initial basic pay below Rs. 140.

Though Annexure-II of the 1976 Service Rules shows the avenues of promotion, and from Assistant Quality Inspector, one is promoted to Quality Inspector and then to Assistant Manager (Quality Control) to Manager (Quality Control) and the Manager (Administration), Manager (Marketing) and Manager (Marketing Control) may be promoted to Senior Manager and from Junior Assistant to Office Assistant, Superintendent (Office), Assistant Manager (Office Godown), Deputy Manager, Manager (Distribution) and Manager (Administration). But the stand of the Corporation is that there were no water tight compartments between the Technical Wing and the Administrative Wing.

11. Whereas, we find that in the 1989 Service Regulations, while defining promotion, it is clearly stated that promotion means appointment to the next higher class or category of the same wing, but however, employees in the Administrative Wing and Accounts Wing were interchangeable. And, the 'Classification Of Staff' in Annexure-I of the 1989 Service Regulations, in direct contrast to the 'Classification Of Staff' in the 1976 Service Rules, divides it into Administrative Wing, Accounts Wing, Construction Wing, Quality Control Wing and Mechanical Engineering Wing. Therefore, it is clear that in 1976, the classification of staff was on the basis of pay and not on the basis of the nature of duties performed by them. And, Clause 5 which relates to appointments in the 1976 Service Rules shows that appointments will be as per Annexure-I. It does not speak of the individuals remaining in the same wing, if they have been appointed in one wing, as we find in the 1989 Service Regulations. For AQI, the scale of pay is Rs. 250-10-300-15-450. The method of recruitment is by direct recruitment and the qualification is a Degree in Science, preferably with Botany/Chemistry as the main subject. The appellants were working as AQIs when they were ousted. They were re-employed as Junior Assistants. For a Junior Assistant, the scale of pay is Rs. 210-5-245-10-325. The appointment is by direct recruitment and the qualification is PUC Pass. For an Assistant, the scale of pay is Rs. 250-10-300-15-450, which is the same as that of AQIs and for a person who is directly recruited as an Assistant, the qualification is possession of First or Second Class Degree. Therefore, when they were ousted and then re-employed, the appellants should rightly have been taken as Assistants, which is the scale of pay to which they belong and since they also possess the qualification required for being recruited as AQIs. This is exactly the reasoning of the Corporation. Instead, they were appointed as Junior Assistants on a lower scale of pay. When they made the representation, the Corporation saw the illegality and set right the error. Of course, before they set it right, they ought to have heard the parties who might be aggrieved by the order giving the appellants the credit of the years that they had worked as AQIs and any orders passed in the absence of such persons would necessarily have to be set aside and that is why twice this Court had directed the Corporation to hear all parties concerned and pass orders.

12. We will again examine the orders passed by this Court and the orders passed by the Corporation chronologically. First, we will examine whether there is in fact a deliberate disobedience to this Court's directions. The first order dated 23.4.1992 gives a direction to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Corporation to give notice to 'all persons concerned' and afford opportunity of being heard to them and decide whether the action was violation of the 'last-come-first-go' rule. The learned single Judge held that it is well settled that in every case of retrenchment or termination on the ground of loss of work, the last-come-first-go rule along has to be followed, for otherwise, if juniors are retained in service and seniors are removed, it shall be a discrimination. This order became final. Therefore, even today, this mandate of examining whether the ousting of the appellants was in violation of the last-come-first-go rule stands. The Corporation has recorded in its order and in its counter that it had in fact violated the rule and therefore, restored the seniority. So in fact, the Corporation had obeyed the first order of this Court.

13. On 2.2.1994, therefore, the Chairman-cum- Managing Director ordered the service of the appellants rendered in the cadre of Junior Assistants to be computed as Assistants for the purpose of qualifying service. We have already seen above that when they were taken in the Administrative Wing, they had been on the same scale of pay as Assistants, which is higher than the Junior Assistants. On 31.7.1998, this Court quashed this order and directed the Corporation to hold a fresh enquiry in terms of the order mentioned earlier, i.e., on 23.4.1992 and also to hear all those in the Administrative Wing who are likely to be affected prejudicially by any benefit being given to the appellants in the Administrative Wing. Then, a detailed order was passed on 9.4.1999, setting out the background of the case, giving the appellants the seniority by taking into account the services rendered by them in the Quality Control Wing. This order was again in favour of the appellants. Immediately, a contempt application was filed. On 9.12.1999, without hearing anybody, hurriedly an order was passed superseding the order dated 9.4.1999. Thereupon, the contempt application was closed. On 30.1.2000, the reversion order was passed reverting the appellants. On 17.11.2000, the Division Bench quashed the order dated 9.12.1999 and directed the maintenance of status quo prior to 9.12.1999 and again directed the Corporation to consider the contentions of the parties and to pass orders. Then an order on 15.3.2001 was passed, again in favour of the appellants. This has been set aside by the learned single Judge, whose judgment is challenged herein.

14. We must remember one factor. When this Court on 9.12.1998, directed the Corporation to pass orders after hearing everybody and the Corporation accordingly passed orders on 9.4.1999, which perhaps was in favour of the appellants again, that at best would have given rise to a fresh cause of action to the respondents; it is not an act of contempt. A direction to pass orders means that the authorities of the Corporation shall exercise their discretion and pass orders. The Corporation still had the right to decide how the seniority has to be fixed. In any event, a contempt application was filed and fearing contempt, an illegal order was passed without hearing the appellants who had been battling for over a decade. While discussing the manner in which contempt applications have to be dealt with, the Supreme Court in Director of Education v. Ved Prakash Joshi : 2005CriLJ3731 , following an earlier decision in K.G. Derasari v. Union of India : (2001)10SCC496 , observed as follows:

7. While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take a view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar view was taken in K.G. Derasari v. Union of India. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party concerned to approach the higher court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher court. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. Right or wrong the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt, the court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged. In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible.

15. When the Division Bench set aside the order dated 9.12.1999 in W.P. No. 20017 of 1998, the legal consequence is that the order dated 9.4.1999 got restored. Because, that was set aside by order dated 9.12.1999. Now, the order dated 9.4.1999 till date has not been challenged. However, pursuant to the directions of the Division Bench, an order has been passed on 15.3.2001, almost on the lines of the order dated 9.4.1999. Therefore, we had examined both the orders dated 15.3.2001 and 9.4.1999 and we find that cogent reasons have been given for restoring the seniority of the appellants and the relevant paragraphs will be extracted hereinbelow.

16. The order passed by the Corporation reveals the following facts:

(a) The fact that the appellants who as Technical Assistants were terminated from the service of the Corporation on the ground of want of vacancy in the Quality Control Wing and that the termination would amount to retrenchment and one of the procedures to be followed in such cases of termination is the last-come-first-go rule.

(b) That there was a clear violation of the last-come-first-go rule and the appellants who were seniors had been terminated, while retaining other juniors in service.

(c) That one K. Shanmugam who was working as AQI in Thanjavur Region was terminated from service for want of vacancy and he was promoted as Assistant, computing his entire service from the date of first appointment in the Quality Control Wing.

(d) That there was no difference between the case of Thiru. Shanmugam and others and the appellants herein.

(e) That the appellants as Technical Assistants were in the scale of pay of Rs. 250-10-300-15-450, which is the same as the scale of pay of the Assistants and when their services were terminated for want of vacancy in the Quality Control Wing and they were re-appointed in the Administrative Wing, they should have been appointed only on the same scale of pay, and to demote them for no fault of theirs was not proper.

(f) In the Service Rules framed on 1.6.1973, the earlier service rules were in force during the time of their re-appointment in the Administrative Wing, there was neither separate classified categories nor prohibition of appointment from one wing to another wing. Such a right is implied and inherent in the Corporation.

(g) That it is only in the Service Rules which came into force subsequently that provided for separate avenues for promotion for persons working in the Administrative Wing and Quality Control Wing and it cannot in any way stand in the way of the Corporation to grant the benefit of service to those whose services were terminated for want of vacancy and re-appointed in the Administrative Wing.

So, for the aforesaid reasons, the decision was taken.

17. It is well settled that sitting in Article 226 of the Constitution, we have to examine whether the decision was taken correctly and not examine whether the right decision was taken. We are not sitting in appeal. Of course, we can test the correctness of the decision, if the decision is totally perverse or shocking or violative of the principles of natural justice. But, if that is one reasonable perspective of looking at things, then we cannot correct it merely because we hold a different view - vide Director of Education, Uttaranchal v. Ved Prakash Joshi : 2005CriLJ3731 . In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Johri Mal : AIR2004SC3800 , the Supreme Court held as follows:

28. The scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of the omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court. The limited scope of judicial review, succinctly put, is:

(i) Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies.

(ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds.

(iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal.

(iv) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a court is limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice.

(v) The courts cannot be called upon to undertake the government duties and functions. The court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. Social and economic belief of a judge should not be invoked as a substitute for the judgment of the legislative bodies. (See Ira Munn v. State of Illinois 94 US 113 : 24 L Ed 77 (1876)....

32. Prof. Bernard Schwartz in his celebrated book (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., Little Brown Company, 1991) dealing with the present status of judicial review in the American context, summarised as under:If the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into little more than media for the transmission of cases to the courts. That would destroy the values of agencies, created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in the complicated fields. At the same time, court should not rubber-stamp agencies; the scope of judicial enquiry must not be so restricted that it prevents full enquiry into the action of legality. If that question cannot be properly explored by the judge, the right to review becomes meaningless ... in the final analysis, the scope of review depends on the individual judge's estimate of the justice of the case.

18. The Corporation has been consistently holding the view that at the relevant point of time, the two services, viz., Technical Service and Administrative Service was not divided in water tight compartments. It has consistently held that it had done injustice to these three by sending them to a lower scale of pay. We have seen the 1976 Service Rules and it divides the employees only according to the pay scales. The learned single Judge, on a re-appreciation of evidence, had decided that the two services were divided into water tight compartments. If there had been such a division, the appellants cannot be fitted in the Administrative Wing even as Junior Assistants. The learned single Judge held that the original appointment of the appellants was temporary, so they had no vested right. But we find that even Pandiramaiah was appointed temporarily on a consolidated pay. But we find in the order of the Corporation that they were originally appointed on a basic pay of Rs. 250/- and were ousted to 'disbandment of ports' in Madurai Region. So, it is clear that the ports to which they had been appointed had been disbanded. The Corporation, therefore, was of the opinion that when the ports were abandoned, the appellants who were seniors in the same category ought to have been accommodated and the juniors should have 'gone out'. But this basic rule was violated. The Corporation was also of the opinion since at the time of their re-appointment in the Administrative Wing, 'neither there was any separate classified categories nor prohibition of such appointment from one wing to another wing', they were senior to the respondents. If so, giving them their seniority on the basis of the scale of pay that they were earning before the ouster cannot be said to be in any way injuring any legitimate right of the persons in the Administrative Wing.

19. For all the reasons stated above, the writ appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, W.A.M.P. No. 4388 of 2004 is closed.