The Special Tahsildar, L.A., Neighbourhood Scheme and ors. Vs. Lakshmi and ors. - Court Judgment

K.A. Swami, C.J.

1. These writ appeals are preferred against the common order dated 23rd December, 1993 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. Nos. 8217 of 1984 and 9199 of 1984.

2. Learned single Judge has allowed the writ petitions on the ground that the acquisition was for the purpose of the Housing Board and that Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act ought to have been followed.

3. It may be pointed out here that Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act provides a procedure to be followed for acquisition of land for companies. It may also be pointed out here that the Housing Board is a local authority. It was been specifically pointed out in Section 158 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act that the Tamil Nadu Housing Board shall be deemed to be a local authority for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Local Authorities Loans Act, 1914. When the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act specifically provides that the Tamil Nadu Housing Board shall be deemed to be local authority for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Act, we fail to appreciate how the learned single Judge could come to the conclusion that the acquisition should have been under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act. In addition to that, the expression 'public purpose' includes acquisition of land 'for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government or any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme.' [Italics supplied]. Therefore, the acquisition of land for the purpose of Housing Board is an acquisition for 'Public purpose.' That being so, there is no question of following the procedure prescribed under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, as the acquisition for the purpose of Housing Board is not an acquisition for a company.

4. In addition to that, a learned-single Judge of this Court in N. Chenniappan and Ors. v. Government of Tamil Nadu : (1980)2MLJ224 , has held thus:

One common question of law which is raised in all these writ petitions is that the acquisition should have been as for a company under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and since, in these cases, the procedure prescribed under Part VII has not been followed, the whole acquisition proceedings are invalid. Mr. Parasaran, learned Counsel leading the arguments in this batch of cases contended that under Sec.3 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961, the Board should be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and as such, the provisions of Part IV of the Land Acquisition Act alone should have been followed. He referred to Section 158 of the Housing Board Act, which provides that the Board shall be deemed to be a local authority for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Local Authorities Loans Act, 1914 but contended that the fiction created under this provision of deeming the Board as a local authority shall be restricted in its application to the extent that the acquisition without a contribution from the public fund could be valid, but the acquisition itself has to be under Part VII. In other words, the fiction enables the Government to acquire the land for purposes of the Housing Board without public contribution as required by law, but it does not enable the corporate character itself to be lost in the matter of acquisition of land for the Housing Board. I am unable to agree with this contention of the learned Counsel. The very purpose of deeming the Board to be a local authority for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Act will be defeated if this limit of construction of the deeming provision is to be made. It is true, it is not possible to extend a fiction beyond the purpose for which it was created. But I am sure, the purpose for which the fiction was created, was in order to enable the acquisition of lands for the purpose of the Housing Board under the normal provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, because if it were otherwise there was no need for deeming the Board as a local authority for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Act. There is no possibility also to apply the deeming provision only to a limited purpose of applicability of the Land Acquisition Act and not for the entire provisions of the Act. I may also add that the Act has received the assent of the President and therefore the deeming provision shall prevail over the definition of local authority in Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as held in the decision of the Supreme Court in Valjikhai v. State of Bombay : [1964]3SCR686 . The acquisition under Part II of the Land Acquisition Act, is, therefore, valid.

We agree with the aforesaid view expressed by the learned single Judge. Therefore, the ground stated by the learned single Judge for allowing the writ petitions does not survive.

5. It is also contended by learned Counsel appearing for the respondent in W.A. No. 1266 of 1995 that the name of the village where the land in question is situate, has been wrongly mentioned in the opening portion of the Notification.

6. On perusing the Notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, we find that in the Schedule to the Notification, the description of the land and the village wherein the land is situate and the extent, are correctly mentioned and that it is so, is not disputed. Therefore, we are of the view that simply because in the opening portion of the Notification, the name of village is wrongly mentioned, it cannot be held that it has affected the validity of the Notification, as long as in the Schedule to the Notification, it is correctly mentioned. It is the land mentioned in the Schedule to the Notification that is proposed to be acquired. Hence, the contention is rejected.

7. For the reasons stated above, the appeals are allowed. The order dated 23rd December, 1993 passed in the Writ Petition Nos. 8217 and 9199 of 1984 is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.