Mrs. Vimala Vs. R. Govindaswamy and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- orders. jagadeesan, j.1. the petitioner, who is the respondent in m.c.o.p. no. 1646 of 1989 on the file of the motor accident claims tribunal, cuddalore, has filed this revision against the order of compromise dated 20.8.1992 in the aforesaid original petition.2. the case of the petitioner is that as per the memorandum of compromise the tribunal has recorded compromise without any proof of the same, and that the parties could have been examined before ever the compromise is recorded and since the order being the mechanical one cannot be sustained.3. i find from the certified copies of the order that the tribunal has passed the compromise decree only after satisfying itself with regard to the compromise entered into between the parties. the court below has stated in the order as follows:3. today petition taken up for hearing. petitioners 1 to 5 and respondent present. joint compromise memo filed. both parties agree to pass an award in terms of the compromise and accordingly an award is passed for a sum of rs. 55,000 as full suit in terms of the joint compromise memo.' the wording of the tribunal in the order clearly establishes that the parties were present before the tribunal and also have agreed for the passing of the award in terms of compromise. if that be so, no further enquiry is necessary or contemplated under the act. when once, the order reveals the application of mind, the name can be acted upon.4. moreover, if the petitioner is aggrieved against the statement made in the order, the remedy is something also. it is not open to the petitioner to dispute the statement made in the order of the tribunal, before this court, especially when it is a statement of fact, as has been held in state of maharashtra v. ramdas shrinivas nayar a.i.r. 1982 s.c. 1949, which reads as follows.5. the same principle has been followed by this court in the judgment reported in joseph michamel v. ramachandran (1992) 1 l.w. 198 and observed as follows:in this context, i may observe that what has been stated in the judgment or order by the court is to be taken as conclusive, unless it has been proved contrary with reference to the actual proof of records as observed by lord atkinson in his decision in somasundaram v. subramanian a.i.r. 1926 p.c. 136, that the judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigations.6. in another judgment imported in m/s. s. muthuswamy v. chief engineer, construction works branch, southern railway : (1992)1mlj121 , it has been observed as follows:the supreme court had deprecated the practice of the parties contradicting the statements recorded in the judgments by affidavit for other evidence. the supreme court has observed as follows:statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. if a partly thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the judges, to call the attention of the very judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. that is the only way to have the record corrected. if no such steps is taken, the matter must necessarily and there. of course, a party may resile and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but he may not call in question there very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment.in perumal gounder v. easwara kandar 89 l. w. 198 is also on the same point. ismail, j. (as he then was) has observed as follows:a statement in a judgment or order as to what had taken place in court is conclusive and cannot be allowed to be controverted by an affidavit or otherwise, and a party, who is aggrieved by what he considers a wrong statement in the judgment should apply to the very same judge by way of review.another recent judgment of our high court can also be referred to in this connection. in a.m. shamsudeen and ors. v. the district judge, west thanjavur : (1990)2mlj461 , k.s. bakthavatsalam, j. has observed as under:it is well settled that what happened in the court is a matter to be found out only from the judgment and that judgment alone is final.7. on the basis of the above stated principles, i am of the opinion what it is not open to the petitioner at this stage to raise the objection that without the knowledge of the petitioner the compromise has been recorded and the petitioner has signed the compromise memo without knowing the contents of the same.8. hence the civil revision petition is absolutely devoid of merits and accordingly the same is dismissed. there will be no order as to costs.9. if any execution is pending for recovery of the award amount, the tribunal is directed to dispose of the same on priority basis, without making any further delay dispose of the same on priority basis, without making any further delay.

Judgment:
ORDER

S. Jagadeesan, J.

1. The petitioner, who is the respondent in M.C.O.P. No. 1646 of 1989 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Cuddalore, has filed this revision against the order of compromise dated 20.8.1992 in the aforesaid original petition.

2. The case of the petitioner is that as per the memorandum of compromise the tribunal has recorded compromise without any proof of the same, and that the parties could have been examined before ever the compromise is recorded and since the order being the mechanical one cannot be sustained.

3. I find from the certified copies of the order that the tribunal has passed the compromise decree only after satisfying itself with regard to the compromise entered into between the parties. The court below has stated in the order as follows:

3. Today petition taken up for hearing. Petitioners 1 to 5 and respondent present. Joint compromise memo filed. Both parties agree to pass an award in terms of the compromise and accordingly an award is passed for a sum of Rs. 55,000 as full suit in terms of the joint compromise memo.' The wording of the Tribunal in the order clearly establishes that the parties were present before the Tribunal and also have agreed for the passing of the award in terms of compromise. If that be so, no further enquiry is necessary or contemplated under the Act. When once, the order reveals the application of mind, the name can be acted upon.

4. Moreover, if the petitioner is aggrieved against the statement made in the order, the remedy is something also. It is not open to the petitioner to dispute the statement made in the order of the tribunal, before this Court, especially when it is a statement of fact, as has been held in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayar A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1949, which reads as follows.

5. The same principle has been followed by this Court in the judgment reported in Joseph Michamel v. Ramachandran (1992) 1 L.W. 198 and observed as follows:

In this context, I may observe that what has been stated in the judgment or order by the Court is to be taken as conclusive, unless it has been proved contrary with reference to the actual proof of records as observed by Lord Atkinson in his decision in Somasundaram v. Subramanian A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 136, that the judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigations.

6. In another judgment imported in M/s. S. Muthuswamy v. Chief Engineer, Construction Works Branch, Southern Railway : (1992)1MLJ121 , it has been observed as follows:

The Supreme Court had deprecated the practice of the parties contradicting the statements recorded in the judgments by affidavit for other evidence. The Supreme Court has observed as follows:

Statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a partly thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such steps is taken, the matter must necessarily and there. Of course, a party may resile and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but he may not call in question there very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment.

In Perumal Gounder v. Easwara Kandar 89 L. W. 198 is also on the same point. Ismail, J. (as he then was) has observed as follows:

A statement in a judgment or order as to what had taken place in court is conclusive and cannot be allowed to be controverted by an affidavit or otherwise, and a party, who is aggrieved by what he considers a wrong statement in the judgment should apply to the very same Judge by way of review.

Another recent Judgment of our High Court can also be referred to in this connection. In A.M. Shamsudeen and Ors. v. The District Judge, West Thanjavur : (1990)2MLJ461 , K.S. Bakthavatsalam, J. has observed as under:

It is well settled that what happened in the court is a matter to be found out only from the judgment and that judgment alone is final.

7. On the basis of the above stated principles, I am of the opinion what it is not open to the petitioner at this stage to raise the objection that without the knowledge of the petitioner the compromise has been recorded and the petitioner has signed the compromise memo without knowing the contents of the same.

8. Hence the civil revision petition is absolutely devoid of merits and accordingly the same is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

9. If any execution is pending for recovery of the award amount, the Tribunal is directed to dispose of the same on priority basis, without making any further delay dispose of the same on priority basis, without making any further delay.