Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Dulasi Ammal and 5 ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- orderp. sathasivam, j.1. since common questions involve in all the above appeals, the same may be disposed of by the following orders:2. all the above appeals have been filed by the insurance company questioning its liability in view of sections 95 and 96 of the motor vehicles act, 1939 as well as terms and conditions of the policy executed in the respective cases.3. in c.m.a.no.227 of 1987 the wife and children of the deceased varadarasu pillai have filed m.c.o.p.no.l30 of 1985 before the motor accidents claims tribunal, tindivanam, claiming a sum of rs. 75,000 as compensation. since the deceased died while he was travelling in a goods vehicle accompanying the goods, they have impleaded the owner of the lorry as well as his insurer as respondents. the tribunal after holding that the.....

Judgment:
ORDER

P. Sathasivam, J.

1. Since common questions involve in all the above appeals, the same may be disposed of by the following Orders:

2. All the above appeals have been filed by the Insurance Company questioning its liability in view of Sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as well as terms and conditions of the policy executed in the respective cases.

3. In C.M.A.No.227 of 1987 the wife and children of the deceased Varadarasu Pillai have filed M.C.O.P.No.l30 of 1985 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Tindivanam, claiming a sum of Rs. 75,000 as compensation. Since the deceased died while he was travelling in a goods vehicle accompanying the goods, they have impleaded the owner of the lorry as well as his insurer as respondents. The Tribunal after holding that the accident was caused due to the rashness and negligence of the driver of the lorry, passed an award for Rs. 55,250 in favour of the petitioner therein and directed both the respondents to pay the same jointly and severally. Aggrieved by the said award, the second respondent before the court below, Insurance Company has filed C.M.A.No.227 of 1987 before this Court questioning its liability.

4. In C.M.A.No.504 of 1987 for the death of one Gunasekaran, the parents have filed MC.O.P.No.1154 of 1985 on the file of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Cuddalore, claiming compensation of Rs. 1,50,000. The deceased travelled in the goods van T.N.F.8709 for transport of goods and while he was returning to Cuddalore in the same vehicle, the vehicle met with an accident thereby he died on the spot. The court below after holding that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the van driver and after holding that the claimants are entitled to claim compensation against the Insurance Company, passed an award for Rs. 38,000 against respondent 1 and 3 therein (owner and insurer). Aggrieved against the said award the third respondent namely United India Insurance Company has filed the present appeal before this Court challenging its liability.

5. In the very same appeal not satisfied with the quantum of compensation, the claimants have filed cross appeal for the disallowed portion of the claim on various grounds.

6. In C.M.A.No.580 of 1987 the claimant who sustained injuries in a motor accident that took place on 23.3.85 while travelling in a Matador van T.N.I.2786 met with an accident filed M.CO.P.No.655 of 1985 on the file of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madurai, claiming a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation. The Tribunal after holding that the accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of the goods vehicle passed an award for Rs. 51,000 in favour of the petitioner and directed the respondents 1 and 3 (owner of the van and insurer) to pay the said amount. Aggrieved against the award of the Tribunal the third respondent namely New India Assurance Company has filed the above appeal questioning their liability.

7. In C.M.A.No.1116 of 1990 one Muthammal has filed M.CO.P.No.73 of 1989 on the file of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil against the death of her husband Selvaraj in a motor accident that took place on 29.4.89 claiming a compensation of Rs. 3,00,000. The Tribunal after holding that the accident was caused due to the rashness and negligence of the driver of the goods vehicle and after holding that the Insurance Company has to indemnify the owner of the van passed an award for Rs. 1,41,000 and directed the third respondent Insurance Company to deposit the said amount. Aggrieved by the said award, the third respondent namely Oriental Insurance Company has filed the above appeal questioning its liability.

8. As already stated, the appellants in all the appeals namely Insurance Companies questioning only their liability as per the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as well as on the terms and conditions of the policy, there is no need to discuss or mention the facts leading to the accident, negligence and quantum aspects.

9. On behalf of the appellants, I have heard Mr.K.S. Narasimhan and Mr.R. Vedantham. On behalf of the claimants, I have heard the arguments of Mr.V. Prabakhar, Mr.K.V. Sridharan and Mr.K Srikumaran Nair. On behalf of the owner of the vehicle, Mr.R. Muthukumaraswami advanced his arguments.

10. Mr.K.S. Narasimhan and Mr.R. Vedantham raised the following contentions:-

(i) The Tribunal failed to note that the deceased was not required to be covered under Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, nor was covered under the terms and conditions of the policy.

(ii) The Tribunal failed to see that the deceased had travelled in the vehicle as owner of the goods and in the absence of any contract of employment between the owner of the vehicle and the deceased passenger, the Insurance Company cannot be held liable in law to compensate the loss sustained by the claimants.

(iii) The Tribunal failed to note that the Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify the owner or the insured under law as well as under the terms and conditions of the policy. Further, the deceased/injured was not travelling either in pursuance to the contract of employment or in the course of employment and as such he is a person not required to be covered under Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act or covered under the terms of the policy.

(iv) The award of the Tribunal making the insurance company also liable is contrary to the various decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court.

11. On the other hand, Mr.V. Prabhakar defended the award of the Tribunal and submitted that in the light of the factual position available in the respective cases coupled with Section 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act as well as terms and conditions of the policies the insurance company is liable to pay the amount in all the cases. According to him, the court below after correctly construing the above provision and on the basis of the factual position, passed the award directing the insurance company to pay the same. He also cited various decisions in support of the award of the Tribunal. Mr.R. Muthukumaraswami and others have also raised similar contentions supporting the award of the Tribunal.

12. I have carefully considered the rival submissions.

13. In order to appreciate the arguments of both sides and for the disposal of the above appeals, I have to consider the relevant Section namely Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which reads as follows:-

'95. Requirements of policies and limits of liability - (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which -

(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer or by a co-operative society allowed under Section 108 to transact the business of an insurer, and

(b) Insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy tot he extent specified in Sub-section (2) -

(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or 'arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;

(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; Provided that a policy shall not be required -

(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workman's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death or, or bodily injury to, any such employee -

(a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or

(b) if it is a public service vehicle, engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or

(c) if it is a goods vehicle, being carried in the vehicle, or

(ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises, or

(iii) to cover any contractual liability.

Explanation - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place.

(2) x x x

(a) x x x

(b) xxx

(c) x x x

(d) x x x

(3) x x x

(4) x x x

(4-A) xxx

(5) x x x x'.

14. In order to understand the above appeal cases fully, I hereby re-capitulate the following factual position as seen from the pleadings of both parties. In C.M.A.No.227 of 1987 the deceased was travelling in a goods vehicle accompanying his goods and while doing so, he met with a fatal accident. In C.M.A.No.504 of 1987 the deceased viz, K. Gunasekar while travelling in a goods van for transport of goods as agent of the owner of the goods met with an accident and died. In C.M.A.No.580 of 1987 the claimant in pursuance of the contract of employment, was deputed to take the waste paper load to a mill on that date. In that way he engaged that said van and then he travelled in the vehicle in order to safeguard the load and deliver the goods to the mill safely. While he was travelling in the goods vehicle, he met with an accident and sustained injuries. In C.M.A.No.1116 of 1990 the deceased Selvaraj hired tempo van T.C.K.5270 on 29.4.1989 and loaded grinding stones and ammi and kulavi etc., for transporting the same to Kulasekaram. The deceased was also travelling in the tempo van and he was sitting in the front seat. (i.e., near driver's seat). While travelling in the said vehicle, due to negligence of the driver, the van fell into a tank to a distance of about 30 feet down from the road level due to which, the deceased sustained fatal injuries. The claimants have projected their case that the deceased/injured were accompanying the goods in order to safe-guard the same and with specific terms of agreement agreed by all the parties concerned. In those circumstances, as per Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act as well as terms and conditions of the insurance policies, the insurer has to indemnify the owner and according to the claimants, the court below has rightly directed the insurance company to satisfy the awards passed in all the four cases.

15. In view of the above factual position, let us consider the various decisions cited by the learned counsel for the insurance company. In The Commonwealth Assurance Co. Ltd., Bombay v. V.P. Rahim Khan Sahib 1971 A.CJ.295 a single Judge of this Court with reference to Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act has observed that in case of passengers carried in a goods vehicle an insurance company is liable to pay compensation only in respect of death or injury to such passengers who are carried in the vehicle by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment and that an owner of goods accompanying the goods in a truck cannot be said to be travelling in the truck by virtue of any such contract.

16. In C. Narayanan v. Madras State Palm Gur Sammelan 1974 A.C.J. 479 a Division Bench of this Court while construing Section 95 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 has held that a passenger carried by a lorry will not be covered by the insurance policy, unless he is proved to be a passenger travelling by reason of or in pursuance of contract of employment. The Bench has also concluded thus:-

'...The proviso to Section 95(1) also makes it clear that a policy is not required to cover liability in respect of the death arising out of and in the course of his employment of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, other than liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the death or bodily injury to any such employee. Therefore the only liability for death or injury to the person in the course of his employment is under Workmen's Compensation Act. If the person was not in employment and if he was travelling without authorisation, there is no provision in the Act to protect such a person. The rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act prohibit travel by any person as a passenger in a goods vehicle. Under the circumstances, we see no ground for fastening any liability on the insurer or on the owner of the vehicle for the injuries sustained by the person who was travelling without authority in the lorry and sustained injuries due to the negligence of the driver. The question has been elaborately considered by Ganesan J. In Common Wealth Assurance Co. Ltd., v. Rahim Khan Sahib 1971 A.C.J. 295. We agree with the view of the learned Judge and hold that a passenger carried by a lorry will not be covered by the insurance policy, unless he is proved to be a passenger travelling by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment.'

17. In Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. 1977 A.C.J. 343 S.C. it was held thus:-

'Therefore it is not required that a policy of insurance should cover risk to the passengers who are not carried for hire or reward. As under Section 95 the risk to a passenger in a vehicle who is not carried for hire or reward is not required to be insured the plea of the counsel for the insurance company will have to be accepted and the insurance company held not liable under the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Act.'

18. In G. Dhyanand v. Zaamni Bi 1982 A.C.J. 399 a Division Bench of this Court has held thus:-

'But as far as the insurance company is concerned, the terms of the policy will have to prevail. The policy is marked as Ex.Bl. On a perusal of the policy it is seen that it is nothing but a reproduction of the terms set out in Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Following the view expressed in the decisions referred to above interpreting similar clauses in the policy of insurance, we have no hesitation in holding that the second appellant, insurance company is not liable since the liability in respect of the passenger in the lorry has been specifically excluded by the terms of the policy.'

The very same view has been reiterated in C.M.A.No.398 of 1979 dated 24.7.1981.

19. In M. Kandaswamy Pillai v. Chinnaswamy 1985 A.C.J. 232 the Division Bench of this Court after construing Section 95 in the light of the insurance policy have held thus:

'Quite rightly therefore the Tribunal held both in law and under the policy of insurance that the insurance company is not liable to the claims made in these proceedings.'

20. In Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Limited v. Hirabai Vithal Nikam 1988 A.C.J. 494 the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that whether a passenger is carried in a goods vehicle for hire or reward and the terms of the contract of insurance do not cover such carriage, the insurer is not liable for the death or bodily injury to such a passenger.

21. In New India Assurance Co., Ltd., v. Santha, 1988 A.C.J. 689 the Division Bench of this Court has held that in the case of death of a owner accompanying the goods who has not been specifically covered by the policy together with the provisions of Section 95(2)(b), the insurance company cannot be mulcted with liability.

22. In Indrani v. S. Ramalingam 1989 A.C.J. 1007 a passenger was allowed by a driver to travel in a goods vehicle and ultimately he was killed when the vehicle dashed against a tree. In those circumstance, the Division Bench of this Court in the said decision has held that the deceased was not carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, hence the insurance company is not liable to pay any amount. The very same view has been expressed by another Division Bench decision of this Court reported in New India Assurance Co., Ltd., v. B. Saraswathi Animal 1991 A.C.J. 327

23. In National Insurance Co., Ltd., v. Dundamma 1992 A.C.J. 1 the Full Bench of Karnataka High Court while interpreting Section 95(l)(b) of the Act coupled with the policy therein has held that persons travelling in a goods vehicle other than employees of the owner of the vehicle are not required to be covered by a policy issued in terms of Section 95 by force of clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95(l)(b).

24. In Bakthavatsalam v. S. Rajalakshmi a Division Bench of this Court has held that since the deceased was an unauthorised passenger, insurance company cannot be held liable. However, the Bench has directed the owner to pay the compensation.

25. The very same view has been taken by another Division Bench in Ramadoss Motor Transport v. New India Assurance Co., Ltd. .

26. The Full Bench of Orissa High Court in New India Assurance Co., Ltd., v. Kanchan Bewa : AIR1994Ori65 while interpreting Section 95(l)(b) of the Act has concluded that insurance company is not liable for death or injuries suffered by persons carried for hire or reward in a goods vehicle.

27. In New India Assurance Co., Ltd., v. Mohanbhai Ravjibhai : (1993)2GLR639 the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court has held that if a claimant was not found to be an employee or a passenger for hire or reward but was found to be a gratuitous passenger, insurance company cannot be held liable for compensation.

28. Finally after taking through the latest Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Kanniappa Nadar v. Jayapandi and 10 others : AIR1997Mad236 the learned counsel for the insurance company submitted that in view of the law laid down by various earlier decisions of this Court, and other High Courts as well as Apex Court they insisted that instead of following the above said ruling Kanniappa Nadar v. Jayapandi and 10 others : AIR1997Mad236 DB requested to apply the principles enunciated in the decisions cited earlier and prayed for interference in these appeals.

29. Mr.R. Muthukumaraswami, learned counsel appearing for the owner of the vehicle in C.M.A.No.504 of 1987 heavily relied on the recent Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in Kanniappa Nadar v. Jayapandi and 10 others : AIR1997Mad236 . After taking me through the said judgment, he submitted that since the Bench has considered all the earlier case laws of this Court as well as the Apex Court and rejected the claim of the insurance company, contended that the said decision is binding on me and prayed for dismissal of the appeals.

30. Mr.V. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing for the claimants in C.M.A.no.504 of 1987 before citing various decisions in support of his contention brought to my notice that the insurance company has not let in any evidence to controvert the evidence adduced by the claimants with regard to the nature of employment and the purpose and reason for travelling in a goods vehicle along with the goods. It is true that except marking the insurance policy in 3 cases they have not taken any care to examine any one to rebut the evidence let in on the side of the claimants. In all the cases evidence was let in on the side of the claimants in order to prove that the deceased/injured was travelling in a goods vehicle accompanying the goods. In those circumstances, it is contended that so long as owner has not committed any breach, the insurer is undoubtedly liable to satisfy the award.

31. Now I shall consider the decisions referred to by Mr.V. Prabhakar in support of his contentions. In Skandia Insurance Co, Ltd., v. Kokilaben Chandravadan : [1987]2SCR752 there was a breach of condition of excluding driving of vehicle of the insured owner by a person not duly licensed. After considering Section 96(2)(b)(ii) and 84 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Apex Court in the said decision has held that the owner of the vehicle is not liable where accident caused by an unlicensed person when licensed driver employed by the owner left the vehicle unattended contrary to express or implied orders of the owner. They further held that exclusion clause in the contract of insurance making the owner absolutely irrespective of circumstances leading to driving by unlicensed driver must be read down being in conflict with the main statutory provision. After considering the said provisions and in the light of the policy of the insurance Their Lordships have held that 'the exclusion clause does not exonerate the insured.'

32. In B.V. Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co., Ltd. : AIR1996SC2054 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that breach of carrying humans in a goods vehicle more than the number permitted in terms of the insurance policy cannot be said to be such fundamental breach so as to afford ground to the insurer to deny indemnification unless there were some factors which contributed to the causing of the accident. They further held that the exclusion terms of the insurance policy must be read down to serve the main purpose of the policy. Further Their Lordships observed thus:-

'The National Commission went for the strict construction of the exclusion clause. The reasoning that the extra passengers being carried in the goods vehicle could not have contributed, in any manner, to the occurring of the accident, was barely noticed and rejected sans any plausible account; even when the claim confining the damage to the vehicle only was limited in nature. We, thus, are of the view that in accord with the Skandia case : [1987]2SCR752 the aforesaid exclusion terms of the insurance policy must be read down so as to serve the main purpose of the policy that is to indemnify the damage caused to the vehicle, which we hereby do.'

33. In Abdul Razak v. Sharifunnisan AIR 1983 All. 400 it is held that whenever a person hires a goods vehicle for transporting his goods from one place to the other, he himself or his employee is entitled to be carried in the vehicle under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The risk of persons who are carried in a transport vehicle is compulsorily covered by an insurance policy. Proviso (ii) to Section 9(l)(b) of the Act also lays down that a policy shall be necessary where passengers are carried in a vehicle for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment.

34. As already stated, strong reliance was placed in support of a recent Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Kanniappa Nadar v. Jayapandi and 10 others : AIR1997Mad236 . Since both sides referred the above judgment and being the latest Division Bench judgment, now I shall consider whether the decision rendered in that case is applicable to the present case. In the said case on 27.3.1985 when some of the claimants and others were travelling in the lorry with paddy bags between Tirunelveli and Kariyapatti, near the garden of one Thanga Pandian on the Virudhunagar Kallakurichi Road, an accident took place in which some persons lost their lives and others sustained injuries. The legal representatives of the deceased passengers who travelled in the lorry claimed various amount as compensation stating that the lorry involved in the accident was driven rashly and negligently by its driver and that has caused the accident and therefore, compensation should be awarded to them. The owner of the lorry has pleaded that he was not liable for payment of compensation. The insurance company filed a counter therein and contended that the owner of the lorry had permitted 50 passengers to be carried in the goods vehicle. The same was opposed to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as well as the provisions of the policy. The persons accompanying the goods were not covered under the terms of the policy issued by the insurance company, therefore no liability for payment of compensation could be fastened on it. Dealing with the liability of the insurance company, the Tribunal took the view that the persons who travelled in the lorry and had sustained injuries or lost their lives had not been established to have travelled on payment of hire charges and that they were in the lorry only for the purpose of safeguarding their paddy bags and for loading and unloading purpose. In the view so taken the Tribunal fastened liability on the insurance company for payment of compensation to the claimants. Against the said award appeals have been filed by the insurance company and contended that the permit in respect of the lorry did not permit carrying of passengers in the goods vehicle and there is a gross violation of the permit conditions and therefore, the insurance company was not liable as per the Act and the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. The learned single Judge in that case accepting the argument of the learned counsel for the insurance company allowed the appeal and directed the owner of the lorry to pay the amount and modified the award of the Tribunal as mentioned above. In other words, the liability of the appellant insurance company will stand deleted. Aggrieved by the common judgment of the learned single Judge, the owner of the vehicle has preferred Letters Patent Appeals before the Bench of this court. Before the bench in the above referred case it is contended that the learned Judge has failed to see that mere breach of the exclusion clause in the policy does not absolve of his liability and the onus is on the insurer to establish that the insured himself is guilty of committing the breach of contract of insurance and the learned Judge ought to have held that the immunity sought under Section 96(2)(B)(ii) of the Act was not available to the insurance company in respect of the issue governing the claim in question. It is also contended that there can be no breach or violation of the promise on the part of the insured so as to enable the insurer to take shelter under the umbrella of the exclusion clause. It is further contended that the learned judge should have held that when the insured had not committed any wilful infringement or violation of the terms and conditions of the policy, and unless it is established that the insured was at fault and was guilty of a breach, the insurer cannot escape from its obligation to indemnify the insured. The other contention is that the learned judge has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the injured and the deceased passengers were travelling in the lorry along with their merchandise and as such, they were not covered under the terms and conditions of the policy covering the risk in question. Like the owner/appellant, the insurance company has also raised various objections. Both the sides have placed several decisions in support of their contentions. The Division Bench considered almost all the cases on this aspect and most of the cases were cited before me as mentioned above.

35. While examining the liability to pay the compensation by the insurance company, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:-

'Some of the aforesaid significant amendments introduced in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 have been referred to above only to indicate that even Parliament is conscious that right to claim compensation by the claimants in connection with the motor vehicles accidents should not be defeated on technical grounds.'

36. The following observation of the latest Division Bench Kanniappa Nadar v. Jayapandi and 10 others : AIR1997Mad236 referred above is extracted hereunder:-

'In our opinion, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Sohan Lal Passi's case would squarely apply to the case on hand. In the instant case, the owner of the vehicle had appointed the licensed driver to the vehicle and the accident in question has taken place when the vehicle was transporting goods. There is no evidence adduced by the insurer that the owner of the vehicle authorised or permitted the owners of the goods which was being transported in the vehicle at the time of the accident, to travel in the transport vehicle-in-question, nor is there any evidence to show that the driver was authorised to carry the owners of the goods along with the goods in the transport vehicle in question. There is no evidence to infer that there was even an implied consent for doing it by the owner of the vehicle. There is also no evidence to show that with the knowledge of the owner of the vehicle the owners of the goods were taken along with the goods in the vehicle. Further, it is also not proved that they are the gratuitous passengers. Thus, it is a case in which the driver on his own accord appears to have allowed the owners of the goods to travel in the transport vehicle along with their goods. There is no evidence to show that the owner of the vehicle wilfully allowed the transport vehicle in question to be used for the purpose which was not allowed by the permit.' ...

'Sohan Lal Passi's case was referred to a three judge Bench, in the light of the stand taken by the insurance company that when Section 96(2)(b)(ii) has provided that the insurer shall be entitled to defend the action on the ground that there has been breach of a specified condition to the policy i.e., the vehicle should not be driven by a person who is not duly licensed, the insurance company cannot be held to be liable to indemnify the owner of the vehicle. On this point the view taken in Skandia Insurance Co., Ltd. : [1987]2SCR752 was against the insurer. The relevant portion of the judgment in Skandia Insurance Co., Ltd.,'s case : [1987]2SCR752 is as follows:-

'The defence built on the exclusion clause cannot succeed for three reasons, viz.,

1. On a true interpretation of the relevant clause which interpretation is at peace with the conscience of Section 96, the condition excluding driving by a person not duly licensed is not absolute and the promisor is absolved once it is shown that he has done everything in his power to keep, honour and fulfil the promise and he himself is not guilty of a deliberate breach.

2. Even if it is treated as an absolute promise, there is substantial compliance therewith upon an express or implied mandate being given to the licensed driver not to allow the vehicle to be left unattended so that it happens to be driven by an unlicensed driver.

3. The exclusion clause has to be 'read down' in order that it is not at war with the 'main purpose' of the provisions enacted for the protection of victims of accidents so that the promisor is exculpated when he does everything in his power to keep the promise.'

It was to examine the correctness of the aforesaid view as pointed out above, the Shohan Lal Passi's case was referred to a larger Bench of three Judges, in which it was held thus:-

'According to us, Section 96(2)(b)(ii) should not be interpreted in a technical manner, Sub-section (2) of Section 96 only enables the insurance company to defend itself in respect of the liability to pay compensation on any of the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (2) including that there has been a contravention of the condition excluding the vehicle being driven by any person who is not duly licensed. This bar on the fact of it operates on the person insured. If the person who has got the vehicle insured has allowed the vehicle to be driven by a person who is not duly licensed then only that clause shall be attracted. In a case where the person who has got insured the vehicle with the insurance company has appointed a duly licensed driver and if the accident takes place when the vehicle is being driven by a person not duly licensed on the basis of the authority of the driver duly authorised to drive the vehicle whether the insurance company in that event shall be absolved from its liability. The expression 'breach' occurring in Section 96(2)(b) means infringement or violation of a promise or obligation. As such the insurance company will have to establish that the insured was guilty of an infringement or violation of a promise. The insurer has also to satisfy the Tribunal or the Court that such violation or infringement on the part of the insured was wilful. If the insured has taken all precautions by appointing a duly licensed to drive the vehicle in question and it has not been established that it was the insured who allowed the vehicle to be driven by a person not duly licensed, then the insurance company cannot repudiate its statutory liability under Sub-section (1) of Section 96.'

Therefore, it is clear from the rule laid down in Sohan Lal Passi's case, that the burden of proving the breach of condition of permit or the contract of insurance by the insured is on the insurer, viz., the insurance company. In the instant case, that burden has not been discharged. Therefore, the Insurance Company cannot absolve from its liability to pay the compensation to the claimants. In the view we take the contention of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company based on the exclusion clause contained in the contract of insurance has to fail.'

37. After the decision of Kanniappa Nadar v. Jayapandi and 10 others : AIR1997Mad236 , Raju, J. had an occasion to consider similar issue in CM.A.s.Nos.852 to 854 of 1987. The learned Judge has also considered various decisions of this court as well as the Apex Court including the decision of the Division Bench reported in Kanniappa Nadar v. Jayapandi and 10 others : AIR1997Mad236 . The conclusion of the learned Judge which is very relevant for the disposal of the present case is extracted hereunder:-_

'....I am of the view that differences in nature of claims depending upon the facts of each case, apart, the elucidation of the issue and clarification and emphasis of the principles laid down in the earlier decision of the Supreme Court by their Lordships of the Apex Court who decided the case reported in : AIR1996SC2054 leads to the inevitable conclusion that in dealing with the assertion of an Insurance Company for being absolved of its liability, the provisions contained in Section 96 as also the clauses in any of the Insurance Policy must be so read down to perpetuate the main purpose of the policy to indemnify the damage caused and to reimburse the injured particularly when the claims of third parties are involved. The application of the principle of purposive construction and interpretation as ordained in the latest pronouncement in the Supreme Court would overcome the difference in the nature of the claims being one relating to compensation payable on account of the death or merely injuries sustained in an accident or the damage caused to the vehicle or property. In view of the latest unreported decision of the First Bench of this Court since reported in Kanniappa Nadar v. Jayapandi and 10 others : AIR1997Mad236 and the decisions of the Supreme Court noticed therein, it has to be taken that the other line of decisions taking a contra view can no longer be a good or binding authority for the propositions proclaimed therein. The latest pronouncement of the Division Bench it also very much binding on me, sitting as a single Judge.'

38. As already stated, the Division Bench in Kanniappa Nadar v. Jayapandi and 10 others : AIR1997Mad236 and the learned single judge in the above referred case namely C.M.As.Nos.852 to 854 of 1987 dated 24.12.1996 have considered almost all the decisions applicable to the facts of the present case, there is no need to discuss once again in the present cases. Further, the Division Bench considered those cases and laid down a law which has also been explained and followed by Raju, J. in the above referred unreported decision. Those two decisions referred above are very much binding on me. In those circumstances, as already stated, except referring the latest Division Bench judgment and the unreported judgment of the learned judge, I am not discussing each one of the decisions referred to by both sides.

39. Coming to the facts of the case in the earlier part of my order itself I have already narrated how the incident had taken place in all the four cases. The claimants have also examined witnesses to speak about the occurrence as well as how the deceased/injured travelled in a goods vehicle or which necessitated them to travel along with the goods in a goods vehicle. Apart from the specific pleadings, the claimants have established their case by let in oral evidence which, according to me, after perusal is meritable. In the absence of any contra evidence from the side of the insurance companies, the case pleaded by the claimants have to be accepted. In those circumstances, on the line of the conclusion reached by Raju, J., in the above referred cases, I am of the view that the insurance companies cannot wriggle out of their liability. Hence in the light of legal position referred above and uncontroverted facts available in all these cases, I am in entire agreement with the conclusion reached by the Tribunal.

40. For all the reasons stated above, I hereby confirm the conclusion arrived by the Tribunal with regard to liability of the insurance company.

41. Now I shall consider cross-objections filed in C.M.A.No.504 of 1987 with regard to the disallowed claim. Even at the outset, Mr.R. Vedantham, learned counsel for the appellant in C.M.A.No.504 of 1987 raised an objection regarding maintainability of the present cross appeal by the claimants. The said cross appeal has been filed under Order 41, Rule 22 of Code of Civil Procedure. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, inasmuch as the appellant insurance company has filed the present appeal only with regard to its liability, the present cross objection claiming higher compensation against the owner of the vehicle who is one of the respondents in the appeal is not maintainable. According to him, the appellant has nothing to do with the relief claimed in the cross objection and the cross objection is for claiming relief only against one of the co-respondents. In those circumstance, according to him, the cross objection is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. In support of the above contention, Mr. Vedantham relied the following decisions:-

(1) Panna Lal v. State of Bombay : [1964]1SCR980 ; (2) Nirmala Bala Chose v. Balai Chand Ghose : [1965]3SCR550 ; (3) Choudhary Sahu v. State of Bihar : [1982]2SCR178 ; (4) National Insurance Co., Ltd., v. H.N. Rama Prasad 1985 ACJ 864; (5) Dyer Meakin Brewaries Ltd., v. Bimia Gupta 1986 A.C.J. 334; (6) Nation Insurance Co., ltd., v. V. Vasanatha : (1987)2MLJ204 , (7) Hindustan General Insurance Society Ltd., now National Insurance Co., Ltd., v. Nilima Mahanta ; (8) United India Insurance Co., Ltd., Gobi v. Rqjammal, 1992 (2) L.W. 147; (9) United India Insurance Co., Ltd., v. M.R.Subramanian 1995 (2) L.W. 360

42. A leading judgment of the Apex Court in this regard is Panna Lal v. State of Bombay : [1964]1SCR980 popularly known as Pannalal's case. The following conclusion of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above said case is useful for the disposal of the present question and the same is extracted hereunder:-

'In our opinion, the view that has now been accepted by all the High Courts that Order 4, Rule 22 permits as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being reopened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under Order 41, Rule 22 can be directed against the other respondents, is correct. Whatever may have been the position under the old Section 561, the use of the word 'cross-objection' in Order 41, Rule 22 expresses unmistakably the intention of the legislature that the objection of the legislature that the objection has to be directed against the appellant. As Rajamannar, C.J. said in : AIR1950Mad379 'The legislature by describing the objection which could be taken by the respondent as a 'cross-objection' must have deliberately adopted the view of the other High Courts. One cannot treat an objection by a respondent in which the appellant has no interest as a cross-objection. The appeal is by the appellant against a respondent. The cross-objection must be an objection by a respondent against the appellant.'

We think, with respect, that these observations put the matter clearly and correctly. That the legislature also wanted to give effect to the views held by the different High courts that in exceptional case as mentioned above an objection can be preferred by a respondent against a co-respondent is indicated by the substitution of the word 'appellant' in the third paragraph by the words 'the party who may be affected by such objection.'

43. In Nirmala Bala v. Balai Chand : [1965]3SCR550 the Supreme Court after referring Order 41, Rule 22 as well as Rule 33 has observed thus:-

'The rule is undoubtedly expressed in terms which are wide, but it has to be applied with discretion, and to cases where interference in favour of the appellant necessitates interference also with a decree which has by acceptance or acquiescence become final so as to enable the court to adjust the rights of the parties. Where in an appeal the court reaches a conclusion which is inconsistent with the opinion of the court appealed from and in adjusting the right claimed by the appellant it is necessary to grant relief to a person who has not appeal, the power conferred by Order 41, Rule 33 may properly be invoked. The rule however does not confer an unrestricted right to reopen decrees which have become final merely because the appellate court does not agree with the opinion of the court appealed from.'

44. In Choudhary Sahu v. State of Bihar : [1982]2SCR178 the Apex Court has held that on the strength of the first part of sub clause (i).of Rule 22 of Order 41 the State of Bihar could only support the decree not only on the grounds decided in its favour but also on the grounds decided against it. The Commissioner however, could not set aside the findings in favour of the appellant on the strength of Order 41, Rule 22(1). Nor was the Commissioner empowered to do it by invoking Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C., as the rule did not confer, an unrestricted right to reopen decrees which had become final merely because the appellate court did not agree with the opinion of the Court appellated from.

45. In Sumanbai v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1982 A.C.J. 513 the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court after following Pannalal's case : [1964]1SCR980 had held that in the instant case the appeal by the insured is limited to its liability. As stated above, the insurance company cannot question the quantum of compensation awarded. That being so, the question of quantum of compensation would not arise in an appeal instituted by an insurer. Therefore, the cross objections in the above appeals are not tenable.

46. The very same view has been reiterated by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Dyer Meakin Breweries Ltd., v. Bimla Cupla 1986 A.C.J. 334.

47. In National Insurance Company Ltd., v. Vasantha : (1987)2MLJ204 the Division Bench of this Court had held as follows:-

'This is an appeal preferred by third respondent. The claimants have not preferred any appeal, against the dismissal of the claim, as against respondents 1 and 2. In an appeal preferred by third respondent, on claimants being impleaded as respondents they cannot now ask for relief as against respondents 1 and 2 who are impleaded as corespondents 4 and 5 herein by invoking Order 41, Rule 33 of Civil Procedure Code. In Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. v. Karanreddi Subha Reddi and Ors. : AIR1974AP310 , relying upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Rajagopala Chetti v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board : AIR1934Mad103 it was held as under:-'It cannot therefore be contended that once the appeal reached the High Court all the provisions in C.P.C. applicable to appeals to the High Court are automatically attached.'

When an appeal was preferred under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the above observation was made. Therefore, this Court would not in this appeal, deal with a finding which has been arrived at as against respondents 1 and 2 before the Tribunal merely because they are impleaded herein as respondents 4 and 5.

48. In Hindustan General Insurance Society Ltd., v. Nilima Mahanta a single Judge of Gauhati High Court has held that the cross objection by the owner challenging the finding of negligence and compensation in an appeal by the insurance company is not maintainable.

49. In United India Insurance Company Ltd., v. Rajammal and 8 others 1992 (2) L.W. 147 the Division Bench of this Court has held that cross-objections by the claimants seeking enhancement of award, in an appeal filed by Insurance Company pleading for restricting its liability to Rs. 50,000 are not maintainable.

50. In United India Insurance Co., Ltd., etc., v. M.R. Subramanian and Anr. 1995 (2) L.W. 360 another Division Bench of this Court has also taken the same view holding that in such situation cross objection is not maintainable.

51. Mr.V. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the cross- objectors relying on Pannalal's case : [1964]1SCR980 vehemently contended that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the said decision it is open to one of the respondents to file cross appeal even though the appellant has nothing to do with the cross appeal. In order to substantiate his contention, he has very much relied on the following passage of the Apex Court:-

'In our opinion, the view that has now been accepted by all the High Courts that Order 41 Rule 22 permits as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being reopened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under Order 41, Rule 22 can be directed against the other respondents, is correct. Whatever may have been the position under the old Section 561, the use of the word 'cross-objection- on Order 41. Rule 22 expresses unmistakably the intention of the legislature that the objection has to be directed against the appellant.'

According to him, the relief sought for in the cross objection is intermixed with the other respondents and the appellant, hence it is an exceptional case as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the said Pannalal's case : [1964]1SCR980 in those circumstance, it is open to the cross-objector to seek relief even in this appeal. He also submitted that the above passage of the Supreme Court giving relief in a cross appeal filed under Order 41, Rule 22, more particularly in view of Rule 33 the Division Benches of this Court holding cross appeal in an appeal filed by the insurance company questioning merely its liability is not maintainable has not correctly decided. In other words, according to him, the earlier Division Benches have lost sight the observation of the Apex Court in para 18 in Pannalal's case : [1964]1SCR980 . In the light of the objection raised by Mr.V. Prabhakar, I have carefully considered the relevant provision namely Order 41, Rule 22 as well as Rule 33, C.P.C. I have also carefully studied the entire judgment of the Apex Court in the Pannalal's case : [1964]1SCR980 as well as the later Division Bench decisions of this Court. After analysing the same, I am unable to share the view expressed by Mr.Prabhakar. In this regard the following conclusion of the Division Bench decision reported in National Insurance Company Ltd., v. V. Vasanatha : AIR1988Mad146 is relevant and the same is hereby extracted:_

'Mr. Santhanagopalan referred to the last sentence in para 12 of the award which reads -'This claim against respondents 1 and 2 is dismissed without costs.'

This is an appeal preferred by third respondent. The claimants have not preferred any appeal against the dismissal of the claim, as against respondents 1 and 2. In an appeal preferred by third respondent, on claimants being impleaded as respondents they cannot now ask for relief as against respondents 1 and 2 who are impleaded as co-respondents 4 and 5 herein by invoking Order 41, Rule 33 of C.P.C. In Madras Motor and General Insurance Co., v. Katanreddi Subba Reddi : AIR1974AP310 , relying upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board : AIR1934Mad103 it was held as under -

'It cannot therefore be contended that once the appeal reached the High Court all the provisions in C.P.C. applicable to appeals to the High Court are automatically attracted.'

When an appeal was preferred under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the above observation was made. Therefore, this Court would not, in this appeal, deal with a finding which has been arrived at as against respondents 1 and 2 before the Tribunal, merely because they are impleaded herein as respondents 4 and 5.'

52. In United India Insurance Co., Ltd., v. Rajammal and 8 others 1992 (2) L.W. 147 another Division Bench of this Court while considering the maintainability of cross objection in such situation has concluded thus:-

'We may also particularly point out that the abovesaid decision reported in 1983 A.CJ. 707 relies on a decision of a Full Bench of five Judges of this Court in Venkateswaralu v. Ramma : AIR1950Mad379 . The relevant passage in the above said Venkateswaralu v. Ramma : AIR1950Mad379 is as follows:'One cannot treat an objection by a respondent in which the appellant has no interest as a cross-objection. The appeal is by the appellant against a respondent. The cross-objection must be an objection by a respondent against the appellant.'

Further, we find that the above said passage of the Full Bench has also been approved by the supreme Court in Pannalal v. State of Bombay. After quoting the above said passage, the Supreme Court, in the said decision observed as follows:

'As early as in 1960 a Division Bench of this Court in Abubacker v. Abdulrahiman, 1960 K.L.T. 348 had taken the view that memorandum of cross-objections which is directed solely against co-respondents, not the appellants, is not maintainable under Order 41, Rule 22. The law is well-settled that as a general rule a respondent can file a cross-objection only against an appellant; and it is only in exceptional cases where the decree proceeds on a common ground or the interest of the appellant is intermixed with that of the respondent that respondent could be allowed to urge a cross-objection against a co-respondents

The learned counsel for the cross-objectors no doubt relied on the above said Pannalal's case : [1964]1SCR980 and also National Insurance Company v. Diwaliben. But the above said : [1964]1SCR980 deals with a different case and, therefore, the said decision cannot apply to the present facts, on the other hand, as we have already pointed out, the above referred to observation in Pannalal's case : [1964]1SCR980 approving the above referred to passage of the Full Bench of this court would squarely apply to the present case. The above referred to 1983 TAC 60 is distinguishable. The subject matter of the appeal therein by the Insurance Company was on the quantum of compensation itself since the Insurance Company thereof in its appeal sought to fully exonerate it from its liability. The other decision cited by the learned counsel, viz., Union Co-operative Insurance Society v. Lazarammal : AIR1974Mad379 only says generally that cross objection can be filed in Accident Claims Cases also. Then (1992) (I) TAC 117 dealing with the scope of Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C., has no application to the present case where the cross objection filed itself is not maintainable as stated above. Further the Supreme Court has clearly explained the restrictive scope of Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C. in Nirmala Bala Chose v. Balai Chand Ghose : [1965]3SCR550 and Choudhary Sahu v. State of Bihar : [1982]2SCR178 . '

53. The other Division Bench judgment which is against the cross-objector is reported in United India Insurance Co., Ltd., etc., v. M.R. Subramanian and Anr. 1995 (2) L.W. 360. In the said decision, the learned judges of the Division Bench have considered the earlier Division Bench decision of this court United India Insurance Co., Ltd., v. Rajammal and 8 others 1992 (2) L.W. 147 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Pannalal's case : [1964]1SCR980 and observed thus:

'A preliminary objection is taken by the appellant as against the maintainability of the memorandum of cross-objections. He points out that the appeal is confined to the liability of the Insurance Company and in that appeal the claimant cannot make a claim for enhancement, which is really directed against the owner of the vehicle who is a co-respondent in the appeal. Such a question has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in United India Insurance Co., Ltd., Gobi v. Rajammal and 6 others 1992 (2) L.W. 147 and it was held that such a Memorandum of cross-objection is not maintainable and dismissed the same on the ground. We have gone through the judgment of Division Bench and we are entirely in agreement with the reasoning contained in the judgment. The same is the view taken in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay : [1964]1SCR980 . Following the said judgment of the Division Bench we hold that the memorandum of cross-objection is not maintainable. Hence the memorandum of cross-objection is dismissed.'

54. The above referred 3 earlier Division Bench decisions of this Court clearly show that in an appeal filed by the Insurance company questioning only its liability it is not open to one of the respondents to claim any other relief more particularly higher compensation which has nothing to do with the relief claimed by the appellant. The three Division Bench namely United India Insurance Co., Ltd., etc., v. M.R. Subramanian and Anr. 1995 (2) L.W. 360 they have considered the decision of the Apex Court in Pannalal's case : [1964]1SCR980 and ultimately rejected the cross objection as not maintainable. In those circumstance, it is not possible for me to accept the argument of Mr.Prabhakar that the observation of the Supreme Court in Pannalal's case : [1964]1SCR980 has not been considered by any of the Division Bench on this aspect. I have already said the very same decision has been considered by the Division Bench and rejected the cross-appeal as not maintainable. I am also satisfied that the present claim in the cross appeal is not an exceptional case to take the aid of Rule 33 apart from Order 41, Rule 22, C.P.C. Looking at any angle, I am not inclined to take a different view in the light of the binding decisions of this court referred above. Since the point in issue directly covered by three Division Bench decisions of this Court, I am not referring the other decisions of various High Courts referred by the learned counsel for the cross objectors. I am satisfied that in the present appeal namely C.M.A.No..504 of 1987 the appellant/Insurance Company has confined its liability only hence in the appeal the claimant cannot make a claim for enhancement which is really directed against the owner of the vehicle who is co-respondent in the appeal. I am also of the same view expressed by the three Division Benches of this Court referred above, and more over those decisions are binding on me. Under these circumstances, I hold that the cross objection in C.M.A.No.504 of 87 is not maintainable.

55. Net result, I do not find any merit in all the appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Cross-objection in C.M.A.No.504 of 1987 is also dismissed as not maintainable. No costs.