R. Margabandhu Vs. Sundaravadhanam and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- orderrengasamy, j. 1. these revisions are filed against the order of the subordinate judge, vridhachalam, in i.a.no. 524 of 1996 in l.a.o.p.no. 160 of 1992 and other connected applications.2. the revision petitioner herein was an advocate for the respondents in all these revisions for filing the land acquisition original petitions claiming enhanced compensation and the respondents filed petitions seeking permission of the court to revoke the vakalat given to the revision petitioner in which the revision petitioner contended that unless he was paid rs. 5,000 in each petition towards his fees, the revocation could not be ordered. the learned subordinate judge fixed the fees of the revision petitioner at one-third of the fees which he might have got after the disposal of the petitions which ended in compromise. the revision petitioner, aggrieved of this order of the learned subordinate judge, vridhachalam, has come forward with these revisions under section 115, code of civil procedure claiming his fee at rs. 5,000 for each petition as agreed between them when he accepted the brief.3. before adverting to the points in controversy, it is proper to mention certain facts relating to these petitions. the respondents herein filed the petitions for enhanced compensation in the years 1985 to 1993 engaging the revision petitioner herein as their counsel, in the court of the subordinate judge, cuddalore. some time later, all these petitions were transferred to the file of the subordinate judge, vridhachalam, where one mr. sampath, an advocate and junior to the revision petitioner, entered appearance for these respondents, along with the revision petitioner mr. margabandhu. these petitions for enhanced compensation were pending in the courts for nearly a decade and the version of the respondents herein is that as another land in the same area, acquired for the neyveli lignite corporation, for whose benefit the lands covered in the revision petitions also were acquired, was valued ultimately at a certain price, all the respondents thought that as a reasonable price for their lands also and when they contacted neyveli lignite corporation, which also immediately agreed to pay the same price for their lands also, they agreed to compromise the matter fixing the same price for these lands. it is the representation made on behalf of the respondents, which is also made clear in their counter affidavit filed in the stay application that when they informed their advocate, the revision petitioner herein, that they had agreed to compromise the matter and wanted to file the compromise petition before the subordinate judge, vridhachalam, for fixing the value as said above, the revision petitioner was against such a compromise and ultimately though he agreed for signing the compromise petition, he insisted for 15% of claim as his fees, for which they were not agreeable. so, petitions were filed by these respondents before the subordinate judge seeking permission for revocation of the vakalats given to the petitioner. it was also mentioned by them in their petition that they arranged for the appearance of the revision petitioner herein only through one mr. sampath, an advocate practising in the vridhachalam court, who received rs. 3,000 as fees for each of these petitions and as the entire fees was already paid, they are not liable to pay anything more and as the compromise has to be effected, they wanted permission to revoke the vakalat given in favour of the revision petitioner.4. the learned subordinate judge after hearing the contention of both sides, namely the revision petitioner herein and the respondents, has found that there is no acceptable proof for the payment of rs. 3,000 by these respondents to mr. sampath, the advocate of vridhachalam, and therefore, the payment of the fees to the advocate is not proved. the learned subordinate judge has further held that as these respondents wanted to revoke the vakalat in favour of the revision petitioner herein, the parties are bound to pay the fees to the outgoing advocate according to the scale fixed under the legal practitioners fees rules. relying upon rule 3(2) and proviso to sub-rule (c) and also rule 12, the learned subordinate judge has held that the respondents are bound to pay one third of the amount of the award, as the petition were not disposed of on contest but only on compromise.5. the learned counsel for the respondents questioned the maintainability of these revisions under section 115 of the code of civil procedure and according to the learned counsel, as the proceedings was for compensation between the claimants, namely the respondents and the land acquisition officer, the revision petitioner who was only a counsel, cannot file revision in that proceedings seeking relief for himself and the appropriate forum will be to file a separate suit against the respondents herein for the claim of the revision petitioner and therefore, the revisions are not sustainable. the learned counsel, in support of his argument, relied upon a decision of this court in venkatasubramanian c.s. v. state bank of india, 1996 (2) l.w 156. no doubt, in that case also, a revision was filed under section 115 of the code of civil procedure for the revocation of the vakalat of the advocate. this court has dismissed the revision as not maintainable under section 115 of the code of civil procedure. but it is not clear from this judgment what is the nature of relief sought for in that revision. what we are able to understand from that decision is that a party filed a petition to revoke the vakalat of his advocate and the court, revoking the vakalat, permitted the party to engage any other counsel to conduct his case mentioning that the outgoing advocate could work out his remedy in appropriate proceedings. he has not given any finding as to what the advocate was entitled to by virtue of the revocation of the vakalat. in the revision also, we do not know whether the advocate challenged the validity of the revocation of the vakalat or he sought for any other relief. the single judge of this court has observed that when the trial court had in its discretion decided not to entertain the controversy but the rights of the outgoing advocate were kept intact, directing him to work out his remedy separately, there was no justification for the interference by way of revision under section 115, code of civil procedure. but the facts are different in this case though there is revocation of vakalat in both cases. in the case on hand, the learned subordinate judge heard the parties and before permitting for the revocation of the vakalat, has passed the order fixing the fees payable by the party to their advocate. therefore, it is not as if the revision petitioner's right was kept intact for another proceedings as found in the other case. when a quantum of fee is fixed, naturally, the aggrieved party must have the right to challenge this order. under article 227(3) of the constitution of india, the high court has the powers to settle the table of fees to the sheriffs, clerks and officers of the courts and also to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising there. only by virtue of these powers, the high court has framed the legal practitioners fees rules. when a legal practitioner's fee is fixed and a party is aggrieved of that certificate, under this article, he is entitled to knock the doors of this court for the remedy. hence, the argument that the revision petitions are not maintainable is not a sound argument. accordingly, the same is rejected.6. the petitioner herein, contended throughout that these respondents/claimants had agreed to pay his fees at rs. 5,000 for each case and unless they were made to pay this amount, the revocation of the vakalat could not be permitted. such contention is found in the counter filed by the revision petitioner before the lower court. in this revision also, in the grounds of his revision, he has contended in paragraph 6 that he is entitled to legal fees at rs. 5,000 for each petition, as this was agreed to be paid by the respondents. therefore, the revisions also were filed claiming his legal fees at rs. 5,000 for each petition. however, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner herein would now concede that the revision petitioner is not entitled to claim the agreed fees but only the schedule fees as fixed under the legal practitioners fees rules. therefore, we need not go into the question whether the respondents/claimants had agreed to pay rs. 5,000 as fees to the revision petitioner.7. both the counsels have conceded that the percentage mentioned in rule 3(2) of the legal practitioners fees rules is with reference to the amount awarded as compensation by the court. in these claim petitions, the compensation amount agreed under the compromise between the parties varies from rs. 200 to rs. 1,44,400 and in each case, the schedule fees, as fixed by the legal practitioners fees rules, varies according to the award amount.8. the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would submit that the revision petitioner is entitled to the full schedule fees as mentioned in rule 3(2) of the legal practitioners fee rules but the learned subordinate judge, vridhachalam, has wrongly scaled down this fees at one-third of the full schedule fee, which is incorrect in view of the series of decisions and therefore, the learned counsel would contend that the error in the order of the lower court is only in reducing the schedule fees to one third which must be corrected to the full schedule fees as mentioned in rule 3(2) of the rules. on a perusal of the rules relating to the legal practitioner fees. rule 3(2) gives the percentage in the amount for value of the claim for fixation of the legal fees of the advocates and proviso to sub-rule (c) to rule 3(2) reads as under:'provided that in the case of suits of the kind mentioned in clause (2) above, when such suits are settled, withdrawn, compromised, decided on confession of judgment or dismissal for default (1) at or before the settlement of issue; or (2) after the settlement of issues but before the commencement of trial; or (3) after the commencement of trial but before judgment, the fee payable shall be one-third, or one-fourth or one-half respectively (as the case may be), of the fee calculated under that clause: '(12) land acquisition cases, as between the collector and the claimants-the fee shall be as under rule 3(2) of the amount claimed in excess of the award, subject to a minimum of rs. 250.00 and maximum of rs. 5,000.00. in cases between rival claimants, the fee shall be calculated as prescribed for suits under rule 3(2).' therefore, it is made clear that rule 3(2) which fixes the legal practitioner's fee is subject to rule 12 which relates to the land acquisition matters. the proviso to sub-rule (c) is very specific that one-third or one-fourth or one-half shall be the fees calculated when the claim was settled or withdrawn, or compromised or decided on confession, or dismissed for default, which rule is applicable in this case in view of the reason that there was a compromise in these petitions accepting the value of the lands at certain rate. in spite of this specific proviso to sub-rule (c), the contention taken by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that the vakalat of the revision petitioner was sought to be revoked even before recording the compromise, that the petitioner was not in the picture when the compromise was recorded between the claimants and the respondents, neyveli lignite corporation, and as no allegations were made against the revision petitioner for revoking the vakalat, proviso to sub-rule (c) cannot restrict his right to claim the full schedule fee and therefore, the restriction to one-third of the schedule fee is illegal. in this connection, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner has referred to three decisions, which are mentioned in the grounds of revision also. the first decision is sundaramurthy v. muthiah mudaliar, air 1945 mad. 190 in which the client proposed to abandon his advocate when the case was ready for hearing and he wanted to engage some other advocate. no allegation was made in the petition against the advocate for revocation of the vakalat and therefore, the bench of this court had observed that in the absence of misconduct on the part of the advocate engaged by the client, the client is not entitled to sanction of the court for a change of the advocate, who had the charge of the case till then, without making a satisfactory arrangement to pay the fees of the advocate. it is pertinent to mention that at that time, the legal practitioners fees rules was not enacted and originally, the legal practitioner's fees was allowed as agreed to between the parties. later a chapter was incorporated in the civil rules of practice and circular orders and it is not clear whether any schedule fee was fixed at that time though the legal practitioners had a lien for their fees. in the above decision, the right of the advocates for their fee incorporated in the civil rules of practice is not mentioned. the decision simply says that when there was no allegation against the advocate, the party was bound to pay the legal fees as agreed by him. in the absence of the statutory rules, this court at that time, had directed the party to pay the agreed fees.9. in the next case in c.i.t. board, mysore v. m.p. ramanna, air 1974 kar. 88 also, the above view of the madras high court was followed and the karnataka high court also would observe that when no proof for the misconduct or want of capacity on the part of the counsel is established, leave can be granted for revocation of the vakalat subject to the condition that the client pays the full fee agreed upon for the entire case. in this decision also the karnataka high court has not referred to any standing rules under which the legal practitioners were governed for payment of their fees.10. in the third case, union of india v. radhey shyam, , the rajasthan high court has referred to clause 3 (a) of the terms of engagement of advocates for district courts and under that clause, an advocate was entitled to half of the total fee soon after the written statement was filed and the remaining half was payable at the conclusion of the suit after judgment was pronounced. therefore, what appears from this judgment is that the party was bound to pay the agreed fees on two instalments, the first instalment soon after the filing of the written statement and the second instalment after the conclusion of the trial and pronouncement of the judgment. from the judgment, i am unable to say that any schedule fee was fixed under the terms of engagement of advocates for district courts, which was in force in rajasthan state. therefore, in that case when the client wanted to engage another lawyer and sought permission to revoke the vakalat of the outgoing lawyer, the court insisted for payment of the agreed fees when especially no proof of misconduct on the part of the advocate was placed before the court.11. in this revision, it is not as if nothing has been alleged against the revision petitioner advocate, it was represented for the respondents that though all these respondents were agreeable for a particular price towards the land value and they also compromised with the neyveli lignite corporation to receive that value, the revision petitioner herein refused to draft the compromise petition and much against his wish, ultimately though he agreed to draft the compromise petition, he wanted fees at 15% of the claim much against the schedule fees and therefore, it will amount to misconduct on his part. one important circumstance is worth to be mentioned at this stage. it is conceded by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner also that after the revocation of the vakalat of the revision petitioner, the respondents did not engage any other counsel and both parties themselves appeared before the court for compromise and the compromise also was recorded. it is not as if that the respondents wanted to revoke the vakalat of the revision petitioner for the purpose of engaging some other advocate. by revoking the vakalat of the revision petitioner, they did not gain anything. on the other hand, they themselves had to prepare the compromise memo and represent before the court reporting compromise. therefore, what is represented on behalf of the respondents appears to be true, namely the revision petitioner, who was the advocate for the respondents, was reluctant to the request of the respondents to compromise the matter probably for the reason that if the matter was put to trial, he would be eligible to claim more fees. it is also the allegation of the respondents in their counter filed in this court in the stay application that the revision petitioner claimed 15% of the claim towards his fees for signing the compromise memo and as they expressed their inability, he declined to process the matter. only thereafter, they were forced to file the petitions for the revocation of the vakalats. after revocation of the vakalats by the order of the learned subordinate judge as mentioned above, without the aid of any advocate, the parties themselves compromised the matter before the court. therefore, it cannot be said that nothing is alleged by the respondents against the revision petitioner for the revocation of the vakalats. apart from this aspect, the above decisions cannot be relevant to this case when compared to the present situation in tamil nadu after the commencement of the legal practitioners fee rules, which restricts and prescribes the advocate's fees and an advocate cannot claim the fees anything more than what is fixed under this rules. it is for this reason, though it is the consistent contention of the revision petitioner till this day that he was entitled to the agreed fees of rs. 5,000 in each claim petition, today he conceded that he cannot claim more than the schedule fees. therefore, the fees can be claimed only according to the schedule fixed under rule 3(2).12. even though the proviso to sub-rule (c) to rule 3(2) reads that in the course of suits when settled or withdrawn or compromised or decided on confession of judgment or dismissed for default, the fee shall be one-third or one-fourth or one-half respectively as the case may be, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner would contend that this proviso to sub-rule (c) is not applicable for the petitioner for the reason that he did not continue on record on the date of the compromise because the compromise was recorded only after revocation of the vakalat. this contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is devoid of any merit because had he been allowed to continue on record as the advocate of the respondents, his fees could have been only one-third of the schedule fee, as the matter was compromised between the parties. therefore, when he was entitled to claim only one-third of the schedule fee, even if he had continued on record on the date of the disposal, by compromise, he cannot claim better right than what he would have been entitled to after the revocation of his vakalat also. therefore, certainly, the revision petitioner cannot claim full schedule fee though the rules restrict to one third alone in the cases when the matter was compromised between the parties. therefore, the learned subordinate judge is perfectly correct in fixing the fees of the revision petitioner at one-third of the schedule fees mentioned in rule 3(2). the revision petitioner, therefore, cannot claim anything in excess of that and all the revisions have no merit even for admission. therefore, the revisions are dismissed in the admission stage.

Judgment:
ORDER

Rengasamy, J.

1. These revisions are filed against the order of the Subordinate Judge, Vridhachalam, in I.A.No. 524 of 1996 in L.A.O.P.No. 160 of 1992 and other connected applications.

2. The revision petitioner herein was an advocate for the respondents in all these revisions for filing the Land Acquisition Original Petitions claiming enhanced compensation and the respondents filed petitions seeking permission of the Court to revoke the vakalat given to the revision petitioner in which the revision petitioner contended that unless he was paid Rs. 5,000 in each petition towards his fees, the revocation could not be ordered. The learned Subordinate Judge fixed the fees of the revision petitioner at one-third of the fees which he might have got after the disposal of the petitions which ended in compromise. The revision petitioner, aggrieved of this order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Vridhachalam, has come forward with these revisions under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure claiming his fee at Rs. 5,000 for each petition as agreed between them when he accepted the brief.

3. Before adverting to the points in controversy, it is proper to mention certain facts relating to these petitions. The respondents herein filed the petitions for enhanced compensation in the years 1985 to 1993 engaging the revision petitioner herein as their counsel, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. Some time later, all these petitions were transferred to the file of the Subordinate Judge, Vridhachalam, where one Mr. Sampath, an advocate and junior to the revision petitioner, entered appearance for these respondents, along with the revision petitioner Mr. Margabandhu. These petitions for enhanced compensation were pending in the Courts for nearly a decade and the version of the respondents herein is that as another land in the same area, acquired for the Neyveli Lignite Corporation, for whose benefit the lands covered in the revision petitions also were acquired, was valued ultimately at a certain price, all the respondents thought that as a reasonable price for their lands also and when they contacted Neyveli Lignite Corporation, which also immediately agreed to pay the same price for their lands also, they agreed to compromise the matter fixing the same price for these lands. It is the representation made on behalf of the respondents, which is also made clear in their counter affidavit filed in the stay application that when they informed their advocate, the revision petitioner herein, that they had agreed to compromise the matter and wanted to file the compromise petition before the Subordinate Judge, Vridhachalam, for fixing the value as said above, the revision petitioner was against such a compromise and ultimately though he agreed for signing the compromise petition, he insisted for 15% of claim as his fees, for which they were not agreeable. So, petitions were filed by these respondents before the Subordinate Judge seeking permission for revocation of the Vakalats given to the petitioner. It was also mentioned by them in their petition that they arranged for the appearance of the revision petitioner herein only through one Mr. Sampath, an advocate practising in the Vridhachalam Court, who received Rs. 3,000 as fees for each of these petitions and as the entire fees was already paid, they are not liable to pay anything more and as the compromise has to be effected, they wanted permission to revoke the vakalat given in favour of the revision petitioner.

4. The Learned Subordinate Judge after hearing the contention of both sides, namely the revision petitioner herein and the respondents, has found that there is no acceptable proof for the payment of Rs. 3,000 by these respondents to Mr. Sampath, the advocate of Vridhachalam, and therefore, the payment of the fees to the advocate is not proved. The learned Subordinate Judge has further held that as these respondents wanted to revoke the vakalat in favour of the revision petitioner herein, the parties are bound to pay the fees to the outgoing advocate according to the scale fixed under the Legal Practitioners Fees Rules. Relying upon Rule 3(2) and proviso to Sub-rule (C) and also Rule 12, the learned Subordinate Judge has held that the respondents are bound to pay one third of the amount of the Award, as the petition were not disposed of on contest but only on compromise.

5. The learned counsel for the respondents questioned the maintainability of these revisions under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and according to the learned counsel, as the proceedings was for compensation between the claimants, namely the respondents and the Land Acquisition Officer, the revision petitioner who was only a counsel, cannot file revision in that proceedings seeking relief for himself and the appropriate forum will be to file a separate suit against the respondents herein for the claim of the revision petitioner and therefore, the revisions are not sustainable. The learned counsel, in support of his argument, relied upon a decision of this Court in Venkatasubramanian C.S. v. State Bank of India, 1996 (2) L.W 156. No doubt, in that case also, a revision was filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the revocation of the vakalat of the advocate. This Court has dismissed the revision as not maintainable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it is not clear from this Judgment what is the nature of relief sought for in that revision. What we are able to understand from that decision is that a party filed a petition to revoke the vakalat of his advocate and the Court, revoking the vakalat, permitted the party to engage any other counsel to conduct his case mentioning that the outgoing advocate could work out his remedy in appropriate proceedings. He has not given any finding as to what the advocate was entitled to by virtue of the revocation of the vakalat. In the revision also, we do not know whether the advocate challenged the validity of the revocation of the vakalat or he sought for any other relief. The single Judge of this Court has observed that when the trial Court had in its discretion decided not to entertain the controversy but the rights of the outgoing advocate were kept intact, directing him to work out his remedy separately, there was no justification for the interference by way of revision under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. But the facts are different in this case though there is revocation of vakalat in both cases. In the case on hand, the learned Subordinate Judge heard the parties and before permitting for the revocation of the vakalat, has passed the order fixing the fees payable by the party to their advocate. Therefore, it is not as if the revision petitioner's right was kept intact for another proceedings as found in the other case. When a quantum of fee is fixed, naturally, the aggrieved party must have the right to challenge this order. Under Article 227(3) of the Constitution of India, the High Court has the powers to settle the table of fees to the Sheriffs, Clerks and Officers of the Courts and also to Attorneys, Advocates and Pleaders practising there. Only by virtue of these powers, the High Court has framed the Legal Practitioners Fees Rules. When a legal practitioner's fee is fixed and a party is aggrieved of that certificate, under this Article, he is entitled to knock the doors of this Court for the remedy. Hence, the argument that the revision petitions are not maintainable is not a sound argument. Accordingly, the same is rejected.

6. The petitioner herein, contended throughout that these respondents/claimants had agreed to pay his fees at Rs. 5,000 for each case and unless they were made to pay this amount, the revocation of the vakalat could not be permitted. Such contention is found in the counter filed by the revision petitioner before the Lower Court. In this revision also, in the grounds of his revision, he has contended in paragraph 6 that he is entitled to legal fees at Rs. 5,000 for each petition, as this was agreed to be paid by the respondents. Therefore, the revisions also were filed claiming his legal fees at Rs. 5,000 for each petition. However, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner herein would now concede that the revision petitioner is not entitled to claim the agreed fees but only the Schedule fees as fixed under the Legal Practitioners Fees Rules. Therefore, we need not go into the question whether the respondents/claimants had agreed to pay Rs. 5,000 as fees to the revision petitioner.

7. Both the counsels have conceded that the percentage mentioned in Rule 3(2) of the Legal Practitioners Fees Rules is with reference to the amount awarded as compensation by the Court. In these claim petitions, the compensation amount agreed under the compromise between the parties varies from Rs. 200 to Rs. 1,44,400 and in each case, the Schedule fees, as fixed by the Legal Practitioners Fees Rules, varies according to the award amount.

8. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would submit that the revision petitioner is entitled to the full Schedule fees as mentioned in Rule 3(2) of the Legal Practitioners Fee Rules but the learned Subordinate Judge, Vridhachalam, has wrongly scaled down this fees at one-third of the full Schedule fee, which is incorrect in view of the series of decisions and therefore, the learned counsel would contend that the error in the order of the Lower Court is only in reducing the Schedule Fees to one third which must be corrected to the Full Schedule Fees as mentioned in Rule 3(2) of the Rules. On a perusal of the rules relating to the Legal Practitioner Fees. Rule 3(2) gives the percentage in the amount for value of the claim for fixation of the Legal Fees of the advocates and proviso to Sub-rule (c) to Rule 3(2) reads as under:

'Provided that in the case of suits of the kind mentioned in Clause (2) above, when such suits are settled, withdrawn, compromised, decided on confession of Judgment or dismissal for default (1) at or before the settlement of issue; or (2) after the settlement of issues but before the commencement of trial; or (3) after the commencement of trial but before Judgment, the fee payable shall be one-third, or one-fourth or one-half respectively (as the case may be), of the fee calculated under that clause: '(12) Land Acquisition cases, as between the Collector and the claimants-the fee shall be as under Rule 3(2) of the amount claimed in excess of the award, subject to a minimum of Rs. 250.00 and maximum of Rs. 5,000.00. In cases between rival claimants, the fee shall be calculated as prescribed for suits under Rule 3(2).'

Therefore, it is made clear that Rule 3(2) which fixes the legal practitioner's fee is subject to Rule 12 which relates to the land acquisition matters. The proviso to Sub-rule (c) is very specific that one-third or one-fourth or one-half shall be the fees calculated when the claim was settled or withdrawn, or compromised or decided on confession, or dismissed for default, which Rule is applicable in this case in view of the reason that there was a compromise in these petitions accepting the value of the lands at certain rate. In spite of this specific proviso to Sub-rule (c), the contention taken by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that the vakalat of the revision petitioner was sought to be revoked even before recording the compromise, that the petitioner was not in the picture when the compromise was recorded between the claimants and the respondents, Neyveli Lignite Corporation, and as no allegations were made against the revision petitioner for revoking the vakalat, proviso to Sub-rule (c) cannot restrict his right to claim the Full Schedule Fee and therefore, the restriction to one-third of the Schedule Fee is illegal. In this connection, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner has referred to three decisions, which are mentioned in the grounds of revision also. The first decision is Sundaramurthy v. Muthiah Mudaliar, AIR 1945 Mad. 190 in which the client proposed to abandon his advocate when the case was ready for hearing and he wanted to engage some other advocate. No allegation was made in the petition against the advocate for revocation of the vakalat and therefore, the Bench of this Court had observed that in the absence of misconduct on the part of the advocate engaged by the client, the client is not entitled to sanction of the Court for a change of the advocate, who had the charge of the case till then, without making a satisfactory arrangement to pay the fees of the advocate. It is pertinent to mention that at that time, the Legal Practitioners Fees Rules was not enacted and originally, the legal practitioner's fees was allowed as agreed to between the parties. Later a chapter was incorporated in the Civil Rules of Practice and Circular orders and it is not clear whether any Schedule fee was fixed at that time though the legal practitioners had a lien for their fees. In the above decision, the right of the advocates for their fee incorporated in the Civil Rules of Practice is not mentioned. The decision simply says that when there was no allegation against the advocate, the party was bound to pay the legal fees as agreed by him. In the absence of the statutory rules, this Court at that time, had directed the party to pay the agreed fees.

9. In the next case in C.I.T. Board, Mysore v. M.P. Ramanna, AIR 1974 Kar. 88 also, the above view of the Madras High Court was followed and the Karnataka High Court also would observe that when no proof for the misconduct or want of capacity on the part of the counsel is established, leave can be granted for revocation of the vakalat subject to the condition that the client pays the full fee agreed upon for the entire case. In this decision also the Karnataka High Court has not referred to any Standing Rules under which the legal practitioners were governed for payment of their fees.

10. In the third case, Union of India v. Radhey Shyam, , the Rajasthan High Court has referred to Clause 3 (a) of the Terms of Engagement of Advocates for District Courts and under that clause, an advocate was entitled to half of the total fee soon after the written statement was filed and the remaining half was payable at the conclusion of the suit after Judgment was pronounced. Therefore, what appears from this Judgment is that the party was bound to pay the agreed fees on two instalments, the first instalment soon after the filing of the written statement and the second instalment after the conclusion of the trial and pronouncement of the Judgment. From the Judgment, I am unable to say that any Schedule fee was fixed under the Terms of Engagement of Advocates for District Courts, which was in force in Rajasthan State. Therefore, in that case when the client wanted to engage another lawyer and sought permission to revoke the vakalat of the outgoing lawyer, the Court insisted for payment of the agreed fees when especially no proof of misconduct on the part of the advocate was placed before the Court.

11. In this revision, it is not as if nothing has been alleged against the revision petitioner advocate, it was represented for the respondents that though all these respondents were agreeable for a particular price towards the land value and they also compromised with the Neyveli Lignite Corporation to receive that value, the revision petitioner herein refused to draft the compromise petition and much against his wish, ultimately though he agreed to draft the compromise petition, he wanted fees at 15% of the claim much against the schedule fees and therefore, it will amount to misconduct on his part. One important circumstance is worth to be mentioned at this stage. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner also that after the revocation of the vakalat of the revision petitioner, the respondents did not engage any other counsel and both parties themselves appeared before the Court for compromise and the compromise also was recorded. It is not as if that the respondents wanted to revoke the vakalat of the revision petitioner for the purpose of engaging some other advocate. By revoking the vakalat of the revision petitioner, they did not gain anything. On the other hand, they themselves had to prepare the compromise memo and represent before the Court reporting compromise. Therefore, what is represented on behalf of the respondents appears to be true, namely the revision petitioner, who was the advocate for the respondents, was reluctant to the request of the respondents to compromise the matter probably for the reason that if the matter was put to trial, he would be eligible to claim more fees. It is also the allegation of the respondents in their counter filed in this Court in the stay application that the revision petitioner claimed 15% of the claim towards his fees for signing the compromise memo and as they expressed their inability, he declined to process the matter. Only thereafter, they were forced to file the petitions for the revocation of the vakalats. After revocation of the vakalats by the order of the learned Subordinate Judge as mentioned above, without the aid of any advocate, the parties themselves compromised the matter before the Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that nothing is alleged by the respondents against the revision petitioner for the revocation of the vakalats. Apart from this aspect, the above decisions cannot be relevant to this case when compared to the present situation in Tamil Nadu after the commencement of the Legal Practitioners Fee Rules, which restricts and prescribes the advocate's fees and an advocate cannot claim the fees anything more than what is fixed under this Rules. It is for this reason, though it is the consistent contention of the revision petitioner till this day that he was entitled to the agreed fees of Rs. 5,000 in each claim petition, today he conceded that he cannot claim more than the Schedule fees. Therefore, the fees can be claimed only according to the Schedule fixed under Rule 3(2).

12. Even though the proviso to Sub-rule (c) to Rule 3(2) reads that in the course of suits when settled or withdrawn or compromised or decided on confession of Judgment or dismissed for default, the fee shall be one-third or one-fourth or one-half respectively as the case may be, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner would contend that this proviso to Sub-rule (c) is not applicable for the petitioner for the reason that he did not continue on record on the date of the compromise because the compromise was recorded only after revocation of the vakalat. This contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is devoid of any merit because had he been allowed to continue on record as the advocate of the respondents, his fees could have been only one-third of the Schedule fee, as the matter was compromised between the parties. Therefore, when he was entitled to claim only one-third of the Schedule fee, even if he had continued on record on the date of the disposal, by compromise, he cannot claim better right than what he would have been entitled to after the revocation of his Vakalat also. Therefore, certainly, the revision petitioner cannot claim full Schedule Fee though the Rules restrict to one third alone in the cases when the matter was compromised between the parties. Therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge is perfectly correct in fixing the fees of the revision petitioner at one-third of the Schedule Fees mentioned in Rule 3(2). The revision petitioner, therefore, cannot claim anything in excess of that and all the revisions have no merit even for admission. Therefore, the revisions are dismissed in the admission stage.