Madura Coats Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- securitisation & reconstruction of financial assets & enforcement of security interest act, 2002 [c.a. no. 54/2002]section 17; power of tribunal to impose condition relating to deposit for grant of stay of auction held, there is no specific provision made under section 17 of securitisation act or under any other provisions of the said act empowering the tribunal to pass any interim order. but under sub-section (12) of section 19 of the recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions act, 1993, the tribunal has been empowered to pass various interim orders. if sub-section (7) of section 17 of securitisation act is read along with sub-section (12) of section 19 of recovery of debts due to bank is and financial institutions act, it would be clear that the tribunal also has jurisdiction to pass interim orders under section 17 of the securitisation act in appropriate cases. the tribunal is empowered to grant interim stay subject to such conditions as may be deemed proper including condition of deposit. even under section 69 of the transfer of property act, the only remedy of the borrower whose mortgage has invoked section 69 of the transfer of property act, is to file a civil suit and in such suit the court has power to grant injunction and to impose condition for the grant thereof--section 17; [a.p. shah c.j., f.m. ibrahim kalifulla & v. ramasubramanian, jj] proceedings under section 17 power of the tribunal to pass any interim order held, once the possession of the secured asset is taken, there would be no occasion for the tribunal to order redelivery of possession till final determination of the issue. in other words, it is only when the tribunal comes to the conclusion that any of the measures, referred to in section 13 (4) taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of the act and the rules made thereunder, then only the tribunal can restore possession of such secured assets to the borrower. by virtue of sub-section (7) of section 17 of the securitisation act read with section 19 (12) of the recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions act the tribunal undoubtedly possess ancillary power to pass interim orders subject to the conditions as it may deems fit and proper to impose, but it does not in any way override the special provisions contained in section 17(3) of the securitisation act. the statutory scheme of the securitisation act is such that the borrower could take recourse to application under section 17 only if one or other measure is taken by the secured creditor, and the tribunal can restore the status quo ante only if it comes to the conclusion that any of the measure taken by the secured creditor is not in accordance with the provisions of the act. the scheme cannot be bypassed by issuing a mandatory order for redelivery of the possession before conclusion of the proceedings under section 17--sections 17, 13 (4); [a.p.shah, c.j., f.m. ibrahim kalifulia &v. ramasubramanian, jj] scope of enquiry under section 17 held, the main purpose of the securitisation act, and in particular section 13 thereof, is to enable and empower the secured creditors to take possession of their securities and to deal with them without the intervention of the court. therefore, in an application under section 17, the tribunal is concerned only with the validity of the acts of the secured creditor in taking possession of the securities and dealing with the same under section 13. all such grounds, which would render the action of the bank/financial institution illegal, can be raised before the tribunal in the proceedings under section 17. it is for the tribunal to decide in each case whether the action of the bank was in accordance with the provisions of the act and legally sustainable. however, while considering the question of validity of the action of the bank, it is not necessary for the tribunal to adjudicate the exact amount due to the secured creditors. in other words, the purpose of an application under section 17 is not the determination of the quantum of claim per se as the tribunal is concerned with the issue of the validity of the measures taken by the banks/financial institutions under section 13(4)--sections 17(4), 13(4) ; [a.p. shan c.j.,f.m.ibrahim kalifulla & v. ramasubramanian, jj] appeal right of bank held, the right of the bank is not automatically suspended upon filing of an appeal by borrower under section 17 of the securitisation act and the bank as secured creditor can proceed to auction secured asset where no stay is granted by the tribunal. there is nothing in section 17 of the securitisation act which would indicate that the legislature intended that there would be automatic stay of recovery proceedings by bank under section 13(4) on filing an appeal by borrower under section 17. use of the expressions if and then under section 17 would not mean that the bank can take one or more measures laid down under section 13(4) only if the tribunal declares that the action taken already is in accordance with the provisions of the securitisation act and the rules made thereunder. use of the word if does not connote a condition precedent. it is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they harmonized with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. the provisions of section 17 must, therefore, receive such construction at the hands of the court as would advance the object and at any event not thwart it. in other words, the principle of purposive interpretation should be applied while construing the said provisions. the securitisation act is enacted to provide a speedy and summary remedy for recovery of thousands of crores which were due to the banks and financial institutions. r. jayasimha babu, j.1. a sum of rs. 25,000 paid by the assessee to a purchaser of a property, which it had sold eight years earlier, has been disallowed as not forming part of its allowable business expenditure. the assessee's contention was that the payment was necessary even though it was voluntary, as the assessee had to sell the property free of encumbrances.2. no material was placed before the assessing authority by the assessee in support of that contention that there was an undischarged encumbrancewhich required the assessee having to pay the amount eight years later. the assessee itself had purchased the property several decades earlier and enjoyed the same and had sold it in the year 1968. after that sale, the wakf board had filed a suit against the purchaser, claiming a right to possession and the assessee was not a party to that suit. the purchaser appears to have entered into a compromise with the wakf board agreeing to pay a sum of rs. 50,000. subsequently, the purchaser received rs. 25,000 from the assessee. there was clearly no encumbrance in favour of the wakf board, which came to be discharged by the payment made by the assessee.3. the assessee also did not place any material to show that its title to the property itself was defective in any way and that, therefore, there was a duty to reimburse the purchaser any part of the amount that the purchaser had paid to any person who had a right in the property which was enforceable.4. learned counsel for the assessee argued before us that the payment can be sustained on the ground that the assessee was required to make that payment to preserve the goodwill and reputation of the assessee. that was not the ground put forth before the authority below. moreover, a voluntary payment made to a purchaser eight years after the sale, especially when the purchaser has no dealings with the assessee, except the fact of having entered into the sale transaction years ago, cannot be regarded as a payment made for the purpose of preserving the goodwill and reputation of the assessee.5. the question referred to us, viz., question no. 21, regarding the correctness of the tribunal's holding that the amount paid by it to the purchaser, fenner india ltd., during the assessment year 1978-79 is not allowable as a deduction, is, therefore, answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.6. it is agreed by counsel that in the light of the decision in t. c. no. 391 of1992, dated april 26, 2000, to which the assessee is a party question no. 1, viz.,'whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the tribunalwas right in holding that the weighted deduction under section 35b is notallowable with regard to the commission paid to dealers in india ?'is required to be answered in favour of the revenue, and question no. 3, viz.,'whether the tribunal was right in holding that gratuity provision is not an allowable deduction ?'is also required to be answered in favour of the assessee. these questions are, therefore, answered accordingly.