| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/822568 |
| Court | Chennai |
| Decided On | Oct-14-1925 |
| Judge | Phillips, J. |
| Reported in | 92Ind.Cas.251 |
| Appellant | Srinivasa Chetti |
| Respondent | Chenna Chetti (Dead) and ors. |
| Cases Referred | Bai Somi v. Chokshi Ishvardas Mangaldas Ind. Dec.
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Excerpt:
surety, release of - misconduct of party. - securitisation & reconstruction of financial assets & enforcement of security interest act, 2002 [c.a. no. 54/2002]section 17; power of tribunal to impose condition relating to deposit for grant of stay of auction held, there is no specific provision made under section 17 of securitisation act or under any other provisions of the said act empowering the tribunal to pass any interim order. but under sub-section (12) of section 19 of the recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions act, 1993, the tribunal has been empowered to pass various interim orders. if sub-section (7) of section 17 of securitisation act is read along with sub-section (12) of section 19 of recovery of debts due to bank is and financial institutions act, it would be clear that the tribunal also has jurisdiction to pass interim orders under section 17 of the securitisation act in appropriate cases. the tribunal is empowered to grant interim stay subject to such conditions as may be deemed proper including condition of deposit. even under section 69 of the transfer of property act, the only remedy of the borrower whose mortgage has invoked section 69 of the transfer of property act, is to file a civil suit and in such suit the court has power to grant injunction and to impose condition for the grant thereof--section 17; [a.p. shah c.j., f.m. ibrahim kalifulla & v. ramasubramanian, jj] proceedings under section 17 power of the tribunal to pass any interim order held, once the possession of the secured asset is taken, there would be no occasion for the tribunal to order redelivery of possession till final determination of the issue. in other words, it is only when the tribunal comes to the conclusion that any of the measures, referred to in section 13 (4) taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of the act and the rules made thereunder, then only the tribunal can restore possession of such secured assets to the borrower. by virtue of sub-section (7) of section 17 of the securitisation act read with section 19 (12) of the recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions act the tribunal undoubtedly possess ancillary power to pass interim orders subject to the conditions as it may deems fit and proper to impose, but it does not in any way override the special provisions contained in section 17(3) of the securitisation act. the statutory scheme of the securitisation act is such that the borrower could take recourse to application under section 17 only if one or other measure is taken by the secured creditor, and the tribunal can restore the status quo ante only if it comes to the conclusion that any of the measure taken by the secured creditor is not in accordance with the provisions of the act. the scheme cannot be bypassed by issuing a mandatory order for redelivery of the possession before conclusion of the proceedings under section 17--sections 17, 13 (4); [a.p.shah, c.j., f.m. ibrahim kalifulia &v. ramasubramanian, jj] scope of enquiry under section 17 held, the main purpose of the securitisation act, and in particular section 13 thereof, is to enable and empower the secured creditors to take possession of their securities and to deal with them without the intervention of the court. therefore, in an application under section 17, the tribunal is concerned only with the validity of the acts of the secured creditor in taking possession of the securities and dealing with the same under section 13. all such grounds, which would render the action of the bank/financial institution illegal, can be raised before the tribunal in the proceedings under section 17. it is for the tribunal to decide in each case whether the action of the bank was in accordance with the provisions of the act and legally sustainable. however, while considering the question of validity of the action of the bank, it is not necessary for the tribunal to adjudicate the exact amount due to the secured creditors. in other words, the purpose of an application under section 17 is not the determination of the quantum of claim per se as the tribunal is concerned with the issue of the validity of the measures taken by the banks/financial institutions under section 13(4)--sections 17(4), 13(4) ; [a.p. shan c.j.,f.m.ibrahim kalifulla & v. ramasubramanian, jj] appeal right of bank held, the right of the bank is not automatically suspended upon filing of an appeal by borrower under section 17 of the securitisation act and the bank as secured creditor can proceed to auction secured asset where no stay is granted by the tribunal. there is nothing in section 17 of the securitisation act which would indicate that the legislature intended that there would be automatic stay of recovery proceedings by bank under section 13(4) on filing an appeal by borrower under section 17. use of the expressions if and then under section 17 would not mean that the bank can take one or more measures laid down under section 13(4) only if the tribunal declares that the action taken already is in accordance with the provisions of the securitisation act and the rules made thereunder. use of the word if does not connote a condition precedent. it is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they harmonized with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. the provisions of section 17 must, therefore, receive such construction at the hands of the court as would advance the object and at any event not thwart it. in other words, the principle of purposive interpretation should be applied while construing the said provisions. the securitisation act is enacted to provide a speedy and summary remedy for recovery of thousands of crores which were due to the banks and financial institutions. phillips, j.1. the petitioner stood surety in a sum of rs. 4,000 for the respondent who undertook to re-pay to a minor his share of an estate in case the court declared that the minor had been validly adopted. the petitioner subsequently applied to be released from his obligation under the bonds and that the bonds should be cancelled. the district judge has held that he cannot be released from his obligations unless and until he finds some one else willing to offer security.2. it is now contended that it is not the petitioner's duty to find another security but it is the respondent's duty either to pay up the whole amount for, which the security is given or to produce some other security. this ignores the contract entered into by the petitioner that he would be responsible until a certain specified time for any loss that might be incurred by the minor during that period and that contract cannot be set aside at the mere wish of the petitioner. it is possible that he may have some remedy against the respondent if he can prove the misconduct alleged, but he has contracted both with the respondent, and with the court that he will carry out a certain promise, namely, to pay rs. 4,000 if default is committed by the respondent. it is not for him to say that he will or will not discharge this obligation and, therefore, i think that the district judge was right in dismissing his application. i may refer in ibis connection to a case, reported in bai somi v. chokshi ishvardas mangaldas ind. dec. 166 which supports my view.
Judgment:Phillips, J.
1. The petitioner stood surety in a sum of Rs. 4,000 for the respondent who undertook to re-pay to a minor his share of an estate in case the Court declared that the minor had been validly adopted. The petitioner subsequently applied to be released from his obligation under the bonds and that the bonds should be cancelled. The District Judge has held that he cannot be released from his obligations unless and until he finds some one else willing to offer security.
2. It is now contended that it is not the petitioner's duty to find another security but it is the respondent's duty either to pay up the whole amount for, which the security is given or to produce some other security. This ignores the contract entered into by the petitioner that he would be responsible until a certain specified time for any loss that might be incurred by the minor during that period and that contract cannot be set aside at the mere wish of the petitioner. It is possible that he may have some remedy against the respondent if he can prove the misconduct alleged, but he has contracted both with the respondent, and with the Court that he will carry out a certain promise, namely, to pay Rs. 4,000 if default is committed by the respondent. It is not for him to say that he will or will not discharge this obligation and, therefore, I think that the District Judge was right in dismissing his application. I may refer in Ibis connection to a case, reported in Bai Somi v. Chokshi Ishvardas Mangaldas Ind. Dec. 166 which supports my view.