Medai Delavoi Thirumalayappa Vs. Karuppayi Ammal and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- t.n. district police act, 1859 [act no. 24/1859]. section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explanation (1); [a.p. shah,c.j., f.m. ibrajhim kalifulla & v. ramasubramanian, jj] rule 14(b),ci.(iv) explanation (1) providing that a person acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt shall be treated as person involved in criminal case - validity being questioned - held, the impugned rule 14(b) ci.(iv) explanation (1) has been issued in exercise of the power conferred upon the government under the tamil nadu district police act, the criminal city police act and the proviso to article 309 of the constitution., the rule is not assailed on the ground of lack of competence. it is challenged only on the ground that it is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. but it is well settled that if a rule passes the twin tests of (i) being founded on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) such differentia having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, it cannot be said to be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. the impugned rule creates a classification of persons, who were not involved in criminal cases and persons, who were involved in criminal cases. the object of creating such a classification is to ensure that only those persons, whose character and antecedents were beyond and shadow of doubt alone, are permitted entry into the police service of the state. the rule is only a reflection of the intention of the government to maintain purity of administration. the rule merely provides a check post or a filter point, to ensure that only those, who had a clean record of personal life, are admitted into the system. that the existing system, has already come under heavy dose of criticism, cannot be swept under the carpet. therefore, as an employer, the government is entitled to prescribe, especially in a disciplined force like the police force, such a restriction at the entry level. there cannot be a dispute about the proposition that an employer has the right to prescribe any qualifications for appointment to a post. if that be so, an employer has a concomitant right even to prescribe disqualifications when it comes appointment to a post. persons who were never involved in criminal cases, need not be treated as equals to or on par with persons who were involved in criminal cases merely because they are acquitted later, especially in the matter of selection to the police service of the state. the classification made between them, is not only reason able but also has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. the employer does have the right to choose a person untainted with any allegations. the attempt made to assail the impugned rules on the ground of violation of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution is fragile. the impugned rules themselves appear to be a product of the application of the right to equality. a person, who was never involved in any criminal case, cannot be equated to a person, who was involved in a criminal case, merely because he is acquitted later, at least insofar as matters of public employment are concerned. therefore, the challenge to the impugned rule on the ground of infringement of articles. 14 and 16 of the constitution must fail. -- section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); appointment - state police service - disqualification of a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case - validity? held, by virtue of explanation 1 to clause (iv) of rule 14(b) of the t.n. special police subordinate service rules, a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case, can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified. the reason as to why cr.p.c. does not make a distinction between an acquittal on benefit of doubt and an honourable acquittal, is to ensure that no person shall be tried for a second time for the same offence for which he is tried and convicted or acquitted once. what is provided under section 300(1) of cr.p.c. is only a reassurance of the constitutional right guaranteed under article 20(2). the principle behind this prescription under section 300 of cr.p.c. is to avoid double jeopardy to a person. if the code recognizes such a distinction, it may make inroads into this concept of double jeopardy. but the concept of double jeopardy, to some extent, is allergic to service law. in many cases the supreme court has made it clear - (i) that the imposition of a punishment and the denial of promotion did not amount to double jeopardy, and (ii) that the conviction by a criminal court and the disciplinary proceedings initiated either on the basis of conduct which let to the conviction or on pure questions of misconduct, did not amount to double jeopardy. since the concept of acquittal is an acquittal, is an off shoot of the principle of double jeopardy underlying section 300(1) of the code, it cannot be imported into service law, where the principle of double jeopardy itself is looked down upon. therefore, the explanation 1 to rule 14(b) of the impugned rules, treating a person acquitted on benefit of doubt, as a person involved in a criminal case, is only in tune with well settled principles applicable to service jurisprudence. a person discharged does not even have protection under section 300 of cr.p.c. and hence such a person cannot assail the explanation 1 to the impugned rule 14(b). -- section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); - appointment to state police service - failure of a person to disclose in the application form, either his involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case against him - effect? - held, the failure of a person to disclose his involvement in a criminal case, at the earliest point of time, when the application form is filled up, is fatal. his subsequent disclosure, whether before acquittal or after acquittal, will not cure the defect. in any case, the subsequent disclosure may not have any effect upon his selection, since his case will then fall under any one of the two explanations under clause (iv) of rule 14(b) and make him ineligible for the current selection or for all future selection depending on whether the acquittal is honourable or otherwise. -- t.n. district police act, 1859. section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explanation (1); rule 14(b),ci.(iv) explanation (1) providing that a person acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt shall be treated as person involved in criminal case - validity being questioned - held, the impugned rule 14(b) ci.(iv) explanation (1) has been issued in exercise of the power conferred upon the government under the tamil nadu district police act, the criminal city police act and the proviso to article 309 of the constitution., the rule is not assailed on the ground of lack of competence. it is challenged only on the ground that it is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. but it is well settled that if a rule passes the twin tests of (i) being founded on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) such differentia having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, it cannot be said to be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. the impugned rule creates a classification of persons, who were not involved in criminal cases and persons, who were involved in criminal cases. the object of creating such a classification is to ensure that only those persons, whose character and antecedents were beyond and shadow of doubt alone, are permitted entry into the police service of the state. the rule is only a reflection of the intention of the government to maintain purity of administration. the rule merely provides a check post or a filter point, to ensure that only those, who had a clean record of personal life, are admitted into the system. that the existing system, has already come under heavy dose of criticism, cannot be swept under the carpet. therefore, as an employer, the government is entitled to prescribe, especially in a disciplined force like the police force, such a restriction at the entry level. there cannot be a dispute about the proposition that an employer has the right to prescribe any qualifications for appointment to a post. if that be so, an employer has a concomitant right even to prescribe disqualifications when it comes appointment to a post. persons who were never involved in criminal cases, need not be treated as equals to or on par with persons who were involved in criminal cases merely because they are acquitted later, especially in the matter of selection to the police service of the state. the classification made between them, is not only reason able but also has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. the employer does have the right to choose a person untainted with any allegations. the attempt made to assail the impugned rules on the ground of violation of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution is fragile. the impugned rules themselves appear to be a product of the application of the right to equality. a person, who was never involved in any criminal case, cannot be equated to a person, who was involved in a criminal case, merely because he is acquitted later, at least insofar as matters of public employment are concerned. therefore, the challenge to the impugned rule on the ground of infringement of articles. 14 and 16 of the constitution must fail - section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); appointment - state police service - disqualification of a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case - validity? held, by virtue of explanation 1 to clause (iv) of rule 14(b) of the t.n. special police subordinate service rules, a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case, can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified. the reason as to why cr.p.c. does not make a distinction between an acquittal on benefit of doubt and an honourable acquittal, is to ensure that no person shall be tried for a second time for the same offence for which he is tried and convicted or acquitted once. what is provided under section 300(1) of cr.p.c. is only a reassurance of the constitutional right guaranteed under article 20(2). the principle behind this prescription under section 300 of cr.p.c. is to avoid double jeopardy to a person. if the code recognizes such a distinction, it may make inroads into this concept of double jeopardy. but the concept of double jeopardy, to some extent, is allergic to service law. in many cases the supreme court has made it clear - (i) that the imposition of a punishment and the denial of promotion did not amount to double jeopardy, and (ii) that the conviction by a criminal court and the disciplinary proceedings initiated either on the basis of conduct which let to the conviction or on pure questions of misconduct, did not amount to double jeopardy. since the concept of acquittal is an acquittal, is an off shoot of the principle of double jeopardy underlying section 300(1) of the code, it cannot be imported into service law, where the principle of double jeopardy itself is looked down upon. therefore, the explanation 1 to rule 14(b) of the impugned rules, treating a person acquitted on benefit of doubt, as a person involved in a criminal case, is only in tune with well settled principles applicable to service jurisprudence. a person discharged does not even have protection under section 300 of cr.p.c. and hence such a person cannot assail the explanation 1 to the impugned rule 14(b). - section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); - appointment to state police service - failure of a person to disclose in the application form, either his involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case against him - effect? - held, the failure of a person to disclose his involvement in a criminal case, at the earliest point of time, when the application form is filled up, is fatal. his subsequent disclosure, whether before acquittal or after acquittal, will not cure the defect. in any case, the subsequent disclosure may not have any effect upon his selection, since his case will then fall under any one of the two explanations under clause (iv) of rule 14(b) and make him ineligible for the current selection or for all future selection depending on whether the acquittal is honourable or otherwise.wallace, j.1. the point for decision in these civil revision petitions is whether the village of yellainaikanpatti of' which the petitioner is an inamdar, has been shown to be an estate under the' madras estates land act. this is a mixed question of fact and law.2. the plaintiffs are tenants of the village and sued in the revenue court of the sub-collector of tuticorin for pattas on the footing that they possess occupancy rights. that court held that the village was. not an estate and dismissed the suit. the district judge on appeal held that 'the village is an estate, and remanded the suits for hearing on the other issues. the defendant comes up in revision. his main contention is that the district judge has not rightly understood the law on the matter, and has passed his judgment not on the evidence, but on unfounded surmises of his own.3. the onus of showing that they are entitled to bring suits in the special revenue court lies undoubtedly on the plaintiffs. both the lower courts have found that the oral evidence is of practically no use in deciding the present point; and the only documents that have been relied upon before me on the one side or the other are exs. uu, an olagu ayacut account of 1803, and ex. 49, an inam register of 1865. these are the only early documents which are available to show what was the nature of the inam. the original grant is not available. from 'ex. 49, col. 15 it appears that the inam was granted in 1775 for ' populating the village.' the natural inference from that entry is that the village was then direlict or waste, and that is the defendant's contention. plaintiffs contend that the fact that the olagu account, ex. uu, mentions tenants, is evidence that there probably were tenants also in 1775. i am clear that no such inference can be drawn. the more reasonable inference is that the populating of the village for which the inam was granted in 1775, had been in some measure successful by 1803. the entry in col. 8, ex. 49, ' description of inam,' is for subsistence as charity. this does not carry the case any further, converting waste land into arable land might without any stretch of language be termed charity. no other form of charity has been suggested by the plaintiffs.4. finally the plaintiffs rely on the description of the village in ex. 49 as a kattukuthagai village. the district judge concludes from that term that the inamdar in 1775 was a renter or farmer of the melwaram right from government, failing to see that such a conclusion puts the plaintiffs out of court, for if the inamdar was merely renting or farming the melwaram, then there was no grant of the melwaram at all, and therefore the inam is not an 'estate.' now wilson's glossary definition of kattukuthagai is ' land held on farm at a permanently fixed money rent which is usually light.' the tinnevelly gazetteer defines it as a form of lease in which a fixed rental is paid in money or in kind. the other authorities quoted in para. 42 of the district judge's judgment do not alter the essential nature of the term. but when the district judge concludes from them, that the kattukuthagai was a renter of the melwaram, i am quite unable to follow him. the kattukuthagai was in essence a lease or grant of land at a favourable rent.5. the use of this term in the inam register only makes the plaintiffs' case worse, since it implies that the village lands were handed over to the original inamdar at a favourable rent. there is nothing in the term itself from which one is entitled to infer, that what was handed over was only the melwaram, and if the village was, as i am inclined to hold, waste at the time of the grant, there would be no melwaram to hand over. i think, so far as one can infer anything from the very meagre records, the correct inference is that the village as a whole was handed over to the inamdar at a favourable rent in order that it might attract cultivators and tenants, and that there was no grant of the melwaram only. plaintiffs in any case have entirely failed to prove that the grant was of the melwaram only.6. the existence of tenants with occupancy rights much later on will not help them. it may be remarked incidentally that the olagu account of 1803 does not describe the tenants as occupancy tenants or use any word implying occupancy right. it is not till very much later that we meet any evidence from which it is possible to infer the existence of occupancy rights, and no document implying such and emanating from the inamdar, for example, patta or muchlika, has been so far filed.7. this appears to me to be a case in which the district judge has concluded in favour of the plaintiffs on no evidence whatever. the inam register and the olagu account afford no support to the plaintiff's version as to the terms of the original grant, nor will a finding that some of the tenants have for some years past exercised occupancy rights assist in proving that the village is - an estate, since it is not open to the court to infer retrospectively from recent documents, that the original grant in 1775 was of the melwaram only: see the privy council case naina pillai marakayar v. ramanathan chettiar a.i.r. 1924 p.c. 65.8. the discussion about swami bhogam also is of no assistance on this point, as has been candidly admitted before me.9. the district judge's decision is therefore passed on no evidence and cannot be supported. it is hereby set aside. the sub-collector's decrees dismissing the suit are restored, but without prejudice to plaintiffs' rights to agitate their rights in the civil court. the plaintiffs will pay the defendant's costs in all courts up to date. a consolidated fee of rs. 350, for the set, to be distributed among the suits is allowed. i regret the necessity for reversing the order of the district court since it is now nearly 10 years since the plaints were filed. a great deal of delay occurred before the district judge, and that will have to be explained in a separate reference.