In Re: Venugopal Nayudu - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- t.n. district police act, 1859 [act no. 24/1859]. section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explanation (1); [a.p. shah,c.j., f.m. ibrajhim kalifulla & v. ramasubramanian, jj] rule 14(b),ci.(iv) explanation (1) providing that a person acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt shall be treated as person involved in criminal case - validity being questioned - held, the impugned rule 14(b) ci.(iv) explanation (1) has been issued in exercise of the power conferred upon the government under the tamil nadu district police act, the criminal city police act and the proviso to article 309 of the constitution., the rule is not assailed on the ground of lack of competence. it is challenged only on the ground that it is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. but it is well settled that if a rule passes the twin tests of (i) being founded on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) such differentia having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, it cannot be said to be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. the impugned rule creates a classification of persons, who were not involved in criminal cases and persons, who were involved in criminal cases. the object of creating such a classification is to ensure that only those persons, whose character and antecedents were beyond and shadow of doubt alone, are permitted entry into the police service of the state. the rule is only a reflection of the intention of the government to maintain purity of administration. the rule merely provides a check post or a filter point, to ensure that only those, who had a clean record of personal life, are admitted into the system. that the existing system, has already come under heavy dose of criticism, cannot be swept under the carpet. therefore, as an employer, the government is entitled to prescribe, especially in a disciplined force like the police force, such a restriction at the entry level. there cannot be a dispute about the proposition that an employer has the right to prescribe any qualifications for appointment to a post. if that be so, an employer has a concomitant right even to prescribe disqualifications when it comes appointment to a post. persons who were never involved in criminal cases, need not be treated as equals to or on par with persons who were involved in criminal cases merely because they are acquitted later, especially in the matter of selection to the police service of the state. the classification made between them, is not only reason able but also has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. the employer does have the right to choose a person untainted with any allegations. the attempt made to assail the impugned rules on the ground of violation of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution is fragile. the impugned rules themselves appear to be a product of the application of the right to equality. a person, who was never involved in any criminal case, cannot be equated to a person, who was involved in a criminal case, merely because he is acquitted later, at least insofar as matters of public employment are concerned. therefore, the challenge to the impugned rule on the ground of infringement of articles. 14 and 16 of the constitution must fail. -- section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); appointment - state police service - disqualification of a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case - validity? held, by virtue of explanation 1 to clause (iv) of rule 14(b) of the t.n. special police subordinate service rules, a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case, can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified. the reason as to why cr.p.c. does not make a distinction between an acquittal on benefit of doubt and an honourable acquittal, is to ensure that no person shall be tried for a second time for the same offence for which he is tried and convicted or acquitted once. what is provided under section 300(1) of cr.p.c. is only a reassurance of the constitutional right guaranteed under article 20(2). the principle behind this prescription under section 300 of cr.p.c. is to avoid double jeopardy to a person. if the code recognizes such a distinction, it may make inroads into this concept of double jeopardy. but the concept of double jeopardy, to some extent, is allergic to service law. in many cases the supreme court has made it clear - (i) that the imposition of a punishment and the denial of promotion did not amount to double jeopardy, and (ii) that the conviction by a criminal court and the disciplinary proceedings initiated either on the basis of conduct which let to the conviction or on pure questions of misconduct, did not amount to double jeopardy. since the concept of acquittal is an acquittal, is an off shoot of the principle of double jeopardy underlying section 300(1) of the code, it cannot be imported into service law, where the principle of double jeopardy itself is looked down upon. therefore, the explanation 1 to rule 14(b) of the impugned rules, treating a person acquitted on benefit of doubt, as a person involved in a criminal case, is only in tune with well settled principles applicable to service jurisprudence. a person discharged does not even have protection under section 300 of cr.p.c. and hence such a person cannot assail the explanation 1 to the impugned rule 14(b). -- section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); - appointment to state police service - failure of a person to disclose in the application form, either his involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case against him - effect? - held, the failure of a person to disclose his involvement in a criminal case, at the earliest point of time, when the application form is filled up, is fatal. his subsequent disclosure, whether before acquittal or after acquittal, will not cure the defect. in any case, the subsequent disclosure may not have any effect upon his selection, since his case will then fall under any one of the two explanations under clause (iv) of rule 14(b) and make him ineligible for the current selection or for all future selection depending on whether the acquittal is honourable or otherwise. -- t.n. district police act, 1859. section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explanation (1); rule 14(b),ci.(iv) explanation (1) providing that a person acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt shall be treated as person involved in criminal case - validity being questioned - held, the impugned rule 14(b) ci.(iv) explanation (1) has been issued in exercise of the power conferred upon the government under the tamil nadu district police act, the criminal city police act and the proviso to article 309 of the constitution., the rule is not assailed on the ground of lack of competence. it is challenged only on the ground that it is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. but it is well settled that if a rule passes the twin tests of (i) being founded on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) such differentia having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, it cannot be said to be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. the impugned rule creates a classification of persons, who were not involved in criminal cases and persons, who were involved in criminal cases. the object of creating such a classification is to ensure that only those persons, whose character and antecedents were beyond and shadow of doubt alone, are permitted entry into the police service of the state. the rule is only a reflection of the intention of the government to maintain purity of administration. the rule merely provides a check post or a filter point, to ensure that only those, who had a clean record of personal life, are admitted into the system. that the existing system, has already come under heavy dose of criticism, cannot be swept under the carpet. therefore, as an employer, the government is entitled to prescribe, especially in a disciplined force like the police force, such a restriction at the entry level. there cannot be a dispute about the proposition that an employer has the right to prescribe any qualifications for appointment to a post. if that be so, an employer has a concomitant right even to prescribe disqualifications when it comes appointment to a post. persons who were never involved in criminal cases, need not be treated as equals to or on par with persons who were involved in criminal cases merely because they are acquitted later, especially in the matter of selection to the police service of the state. the classification made between them, is not only reason able but also has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. the employer does have the right to choose a person untainted with any allegations. the attempt made to assail the impugned rules on the ground of violation of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution is fragile. the impugned rules themselves appear to be a product of the application of the right to equality. a person, who was never involved in any criminal case, cannot be equated to a person, who was involved in a criminal case, merely because he is acquitted later, at least insofar as matters of public employment are concerned. therefore, the challenge to the impugned rule on the ground of infringement of articles. 14 and 16 of the constitution must fail - section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); appointment - state police service - disqualification of a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case - validity? held, by virtue of explanation 1 to clause (iv) of rule 14(b) of the t.n. special police subordinate service rules, a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case, can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified. the reason as to why cr.p.c. does not make a distinction between an acquittal on benefit of doubt and an honourable acquittal, is to ensure that no person shall be tried for a second time for the same offence for which he is tried and convicted or acquitted once. what is provided under section 300(1) of cr.p.c. is only a reassurance of the constitutional right guaranteed under article 20(2). the principle behind this prescription under section 300 of cr.p.c. is to avoid double jeopardy to a person. if the code recognizes such a distinction, it may make inroads into this concept of double jeopardy. but the concept of double jeopardy, to some extent, is allergic to service law. in many cases the supreme court has made it clear - (i) that the imposition of a punishment and the denial of promotion did not amount to double jeopardy, and (ii) that the conviction by a criminal court and the disciplinary proceedings initiated either on the basis of conduct which let to the conviction or on pure questions of misconduct, did not amount to double jeopardy. since the concept of acquittal is an acquittal, is an off shoot of the principle of double jeopardy underlying section 300(1) of the code, it cannot be imported into service law, where the principle of double jeopardy itself is looked down upon. therefore, the explanation 1 to rule 14(b) of the impugned rules, treating a person acquitted on benefit of doubt, as a person involved in a criminal case, is only in tune with well settled principles applicable to service jurisprudence. a person discharged does not even have protection under section 300 of cr.p.c. and hence such a person cannot assail the explanation 1 to the impugned rule 14(b). - section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); - appointment to state police service - failure of a person to disclose in the application form, either his involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case against him - effect? - held, the failure of a person to disclose his involvement in a criminal case, at the earliest point of time, when the application form is filled up, is fatal. his subsequent disclosure, whether before acquittal or after acquittal, will not cure the defect. in any case, the subsequent disclosure may not have any effect upon his selection, since his case will then fall under any one of the two explanations under clause (iv) of rule 14(b) and make him ineligible for the current selection or for all future selection depending on whether the acquittal is honourable or otherwise.order1. petitioner who is a first grade pleader has been charged under section 14 of the legal practitioners act by the sub-divisional magistrate, pattukottah. he was engaged to represent the accused in a security case and all the charges against him, except one, alleged various acts of misconduct in relation to that case. these charges were made to the district magistrate, tanjore, by the deputy superintendent of police, who suggested that proceedings should be taken against petitioner under the legal practioners act. in the result the additional district magistrate forwarded the police report to the sub-divisional magistrate: pattukottah for enquiry and the latter issued notice to petitioner under section 14 of the act. it is not quite clear what was in the mind of the additional district magistrate whether he intended that the sub-divisional magistrate should himself dispose of the charges or whether his idea was that a sort of preliminary enquiry should be held and a report should be submitted with a view to possible future action by himself. from either point of view, he acted without jurisdiction. the legal practitioners act makes no provision either for the transfer of proceedings or for the holding of a preliminary enquiry of such a nature. mr. jayarama aiyar contends that in any event most of the charges against his client cannot be enquired into as they relate to alleged acts of misconduct not committed in or in relation to the court which proposes to enquire into them. that, we consider, is an objection that should more properly be taken before the district magistrate, who will now proceed to deal with the matter himself. as, however, it has been taken here, we may as well dispose of it at once. the view relied on by mr. jayarama iyer finds support in several decisions of the patna high court of which we may quota that reported in emperor v. satyendra nath ray [1920] 1 p.l.t. 379 as an example. the same view has been expressed by the calcutta high court in in re radha nath charan chukerbutty [1905] 4 c.l.j. 229. with great respect, we prefer to follow the ruling of the calcutta high court reported as in re rabindra nath chatterjee a.i.r. 1922 cal. 484. as pointed out by woodroffe, j., and mookerjee, j., section 14 of the legal practitioners act does not limit the consideration of a charge to the court in which the misconduct is alleged to have been committed. to say that it does, is, we think, to read into section 14 something that is not there.2. the district magistrate will now dispose of the report made to him in accordance with law, but we think it undesirable that proceedings for misconduct against the defence vakil should be taken before the security case against his client has been disposed of.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. Petitioner who is a First Grade Pleader has been charged under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Pattukottah. He was engaged to represent the accused in a security case and all the charges against him, except one, alleged various acts of misconduct in relation to that case. These charges were made to the District Magistrate, Tanjore, by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who suggested that proceedings should be taken against petitioner under the Legal Practioners Act. In the result the Additional District Magistrate forwarded the police report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate: Pattukottah for enquiry and the latter issued notice to petitioner under Section 14 of the Act. It is not quite clear what was in the mind of the Additional District Magistrate whether he intended that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate should himself dispose of the charges or whether his idea was that a sort of preliminary enquiry should be held and a report should be submitted with a view to possible future action by himself. From either point of view, he acted without jurisdiction. The Legal Practitioners Act makes no provision either for the transfer of proceedings or for the holding of a preliminary enquiry of such a nature. Mr. Jayarama Aiyar contends that in any event most of the charges against his client cannot be enquired into as they relate to alleged acts of misconduct not committed in or in relation to the Court which proposes to enquire into them. That, we consider, is an objection that should more properly be taken before the District Magistrate, who will now proceed to deal with the matter himself. As, however, it has been taken here, we may as well dispose of it at once. The view relied on by Mr. Jayarama Iyer finds support in several decisions of the Patna High Court of which we may quota that reported in Emperor v. Satyendra Nath Ray [1920] 1 P.L.T. 379 as an example. The same view has been expressed by the Calcutta High Court in In re Radha Nath Charan Chukerbutty [1905] 4 C.L.J. 229. With great respect, we prefer to follow the ruling of the Calcutta High Court reported as In re Rabindra Nath Chatterjee A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 484. As pointed out by Woodroffe, J., and Mookerjee, J., Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act does not limit the consideration of a charge to the Court in which the misconduct is alleged to have been committed. To say that it does, is, we think, to read into Section 14 something that is not there.

2. The District Magistrate will now dispose of the report made to him in accordance with law, but we think it undesirable that proceedings for misconduct against the defence vakil should be taken before the security case against his client has been disposed of.