S. Venkiteswara Aiyer Vs. T.N. Ramasami Aiyar and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- t.n. district police act, 1859 [act no. 24/1859]. section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explanation (1); [a.p. shah,c.j., f.m. ibrajhim kalifulla & v. ramasubramanian, jj] rule 14(b),ci.(iv) explanation (1) providing that a person acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt shall be treated as person involved in criminal case - validity being questioned - held, the impugned rule 14(b) ci.(iv) explanation (1) has been issued in exercise of the power conferred upon the government under the tamil nadu district police act, the criminal city police act and the proviso to article 309 of the constitution., the rule is not assailed on the ground of lack of competence. it is challenged only on the ground that it is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. but it is well settled that if a rule passes the twin tests of (i) being founded on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) such differentia having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, it cannot be said to be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. the impugned rule creates a classification of persons, who were not involved in criminal cases and persons, who were involved in criminal cases. the object of creating such a classification is to ensure that only those persons, whose character and antecedents were beyond and shadow of doubt alone, are permitted entry into the police service of the state. the rule is only a reflection of the intention of the government to maintain purity of administration. the rule merely provides a check post or a filter point, to ensure that only those, who had a clean record of personal life, are admitted into the system. that the existing system, has already come under heavy dose of criticism, cannot be swept under the carpet. therefore, as an employer, the government is entitled to prescribe, especially in a disciplined force like the police force, such a restriction at the entry level. there cannot be a dispute about the proposition that an employer has the right to prescribe any qualifications for appointment to a post. if that be so, an employer has a concomitant right even to prescribe disqualifications when it comes appointment to a post. persons who were never involved in criminal cases, need not be treated as equals to or on par with persons who were involved in criminal cases merely because they are acquitted later, especially in the matter of selection to the police service of the state. the classification made between them, is not only reason able but also has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. the employer does have the right to choose a person untainted with any allegations. the attempt made to assail the impugned rules on the ground of violation of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution is fragile. the impugned rules themselves appear to be a product of the application of the right to equality. a person, who was never involved in any criminal case, cannot be equated to a person, who was involved in a criminal case, merely because he is acquitted later, at least insofar as matters of public employment are concerned. therefore, the challenge to the impugned rule on the ground of infringement of articles. 14 and 16 of the constitution must fail. -- section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); appointment - state police service - disqualification of a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case - validity? held, by virtue of explanation 1 to clause (iv) of rule 14(b) of the t.n. special police subordinate service rules, a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case, can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified. the reason as to why cr.p.c. does not make a distinction between an acquittal on benefit of doubt and an honourable acquittal, is to ensure that no person shall be tried for a second time for the same offence for which he is tried and convicted or acquitted once. what is provided under section 300(1) of cr.p.c. is only a reassurance of the constitutional right guaranteed under article 20(2). the principle behind this prescription under section 300 of cr.p.c. is to avoid double jeopardy to a person. if the code recognizes such a distinction, it may make inroads into this concept of double jeopardy. but the concept of double jeopardy, to some extent, is allergic to service law. in many cases the supreme court has made it clear - (i) that the imposition of a punishment and the denial of promotion did not amount to double jeopardy, and (ii) that the conviction by a criminal court and the disciplinary proceedings initiated either on the basis of conduct which let to the conviction or on pure questions of misconduct, did not amount to double jeopardy. since the concept of acquittal is an acquittal, is an off shoot of the principle of double jeopardy underlying section 300(1) of the code, it cannot be imported into service law, where the principle of double jeopardy itself is looked down upon. therefore, the explanation 1 to rule 14(b) of the impugned rules, treating a person acquitted on benefit of doubt, as a person involved in a criminal case, is only in tune with well settled principles applicable to service jurisprudence. a person discharged does not even have protection under section 300 of cr.p.c. and hence such a person cannot assail the explanation 1 to the impugned rule 14(b). -- section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); - appointment to state police service - failure of a person to disclose in the application form, either his involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case against him - effect? - held, the failure of a person to disclose his involvement in a criminal case, at the earliest point of time, when the application form is filled up, is fatal. his subsequent disclosure, whether before acquittal or after acquittal, will not cure the defect. in any case, the subsequent disclosure may not have any effect upon his selection, since his case will then fall under any one of the two explanations under clause (iv) of rule 14(b) and make him ineligible for the current selection or for all future selection depending on whether the acquittal is honourable or otherwise. -- t.n. district police act, 1859. section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explanation (1); rule 14(b),ci.(iv) explanation (1) providing that a person acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt shall be treated as person involved in criminal case - validity being questioned - held, the impugned rule 14(b) ci.(iv) explanation (1) has been issued in exercise of the power conferred upon the government under the tamil nadu district police act, the criminal city police act and the proviso to article 309 of the constitution., the rule is not assailed on the ground of lack of competence. it is challenged only on the ground that it is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. but it is well settled that if a rule passes the twin tests of (i) being founded on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) such differentia having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, it cannot be said to be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. the impugned rule creates a classification of persons, who were not involved in criminal cases and persons, who were involved in criminal cases. the object of creating such a classification is to ensure that only those persons, whose character and antecedents were beyond and shadow of doubt alone, are permitted entry into the police service of the state. the rule is only a reflection of the intention of the government to maintain purity of administration. the rule merely provides a check post or a filter point, to ensure that only those, who had a clean record of personal life, are admitted into the system. that the existing system, has already come under heavy dose of criticism, cannot be swept under the carpet. therefore, as an employer, the government is entitled to prescribe, especially in a disciplined force like the police force, such a restriction at the entry level. there cannot be a dispute about the proposition that an employer has the right to prescribe any qualifications for appointment to a post. if that be so, an employer has a concomitant right even to prescribe disqualifications when it comes appointment to a post. persons who were never involved in criminal cases, need not be treated as equals to or on par with persons who were involved in criminal cases merely because they are acquitted later, especially in the matter of selection to the police service of the state. the classification made between them, is not only reason able but also has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. the employer does have the right to choose a person untainted with any allegations. the attempt made to assail the impugned rules on the ground of violation of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution is fragile. the impugned rules themselves appear to be a product of the application of the right to equality. a person, who was never involved in any criminal case, cannot be equated to a person, who was involved in a criminal case, merely because he is acquitted later, at least insofar as matters of public employment are concerned. therefore, the challenge to the impugned rule on the ground of infringement of articles. 14 and 16 of the constitution must fail - section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); appointment - state police service - disqualification of a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case - validity? held, by virtue of explanation 1 to clause (iv) of rule 14(b) of the t.n. special police subordinate service rules, a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case, can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified. the reason as to why cr.p.c. does not make a distinction between an acquittal on benefit of doubt and an honourable acquittal, is to ensure that no person shall be tried for a second time for the same offence for which he is tried and convicted or acquitted once. what is provided under section 300(1) of cr.p.c. is only a reassurance of the constitutional right guaranteed under article 20(2). the principle behind this prescription under section 300 of cr.p.c. is to avoid double jeopardy to a person. if the code recognizes such a distinction, it may make inroads into this concept of double jeopardy. but the concept of double jeopardy, to some extent, is allergic to service law. in many cases the supreme court has made it clear - (i) that the imposition of a punishment and the denial of promotion did not amount to double jeopardy, and (ii) that the conviction by a criminal court and the disciplinary proceedings initiated either on the basis of conduct which let to the conviction or on pure questions of misconduct, did not amount to double jeopardy. since the concept of acquittal is an acquittal, is an off shoot of the principle of double jeopardy underlying section 300(1) of the code, it cannot be imported into service law, where the principle of double jeopardy itself is looked down upon. therefore, the explanation 1 to rule 14(b) of the impugned rules, treating a person acquitted on benefit of doubt, as a person involved in a criminal case, is only in tune with well settled principles applicable to service jurisprudence. a person discharged does not even have protection under section 300 of cr.p.c. and hence such a person cannot assail the explanation 1 to the impugned rule 14(b). - section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); - appointment to state police service - failure of a person to disclose in the application form, either his involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case against him - effect? - held, the failure of a person to disclose his involvement in a criminal case, at the earliest point of time, when the application form is filled up, is fatal. his subsequent disclosure, whether before acquittal or after acquittal, will not cure the defect. in any case, the subsequent disclosure may not have any effect upon his selection, since his case will then fall under any one of the two explanations under clause (iv) of rule 14(b) and make him ineligible for the current selection or for all future selection depending on whether the acquittal is honourable or otherwise.wadsworth, j.1. this appeal raises a question of appropriation with reference to an application under section 19, madras act, 4 of 1938. the appellant, who is the applicant in the court below, was defendant 1 in this suit. the debt, so far as we need trace it back, starts with a principal of rs. 7250 as on 27th april 1925 when a security bond was executed. before the suit there were certain payments, the exact figure of which seems to be doubtful. the suit was filed in 1.928 for a sum of rs. 11,500. it ended in a decree which, so far as defendants 3 to 5 were concerned was based on a compromise and the same decree was made applicable to defendants 1 and 2 who allowed the suit to proceed ex parte. the decree provided for a payment of rs. 12,116 within four months or in default for payment of rs. 14,116, with interest at six per cent. no payment was made. the hypotheca mortgaged under the security bond was sold and realized rs. 5420 which was credited to the decree and part satisfaction was recorded. an application was preferred for a personal decree for the balance. we have not got this actual application before us, but the personal decree indicates that rs. 5420 realized by the sale was credited and presumably it must have been credited first towards interest due on the decree amount and then towards the principal sum decreed. for the balance, a personal decree was passed. thereafter, there were two payments aggregating to rs. 2476 made in 1932 and 1933. in 1937 the decree was assigned to the present respondent who took out execution for a sum of rs. 11,156-5-5 on 23rd september 1937. while this execution was pending, madras act, 4 of 1938 came into force and defendant 1 applied for a stay of sale and filed the present application under section 19 on 20fch september 1938. it is not disputed that the way in which the lower court has treated this application is incorrect. the learned judge has treated the decree as a compromise decree (which, so far as defendant 1 is concerned, it was not) and has taken the principal of the decree as the principal of the debt, a procedure which, even on the footing of its being a compromise decree, could hardly be supported on the facts of this case.2. it is contended for the appellant that both the payments made before the suit and the amount of rs. 5420 realized by the sale in 1930 must be regarded as open payments and that the interest outstanding on 1st october 1937 must be wiped off without regard to these payments. the contention with reference to the payments before suit is that these were payments credited to a debt which carried compound interest, that there was no benefit to be derived by the creditor in adjusting these payments to interest rather than to principal and that on the basis of the decision in parr's banking co. v. yates (1898) 2 q.b. 460 there is no presumption in such a case that the payments were first appropriated to interest. with reference to the sale amount credited to the decree at the time of the application for a personal decree, the contention is that though there may have been an appropriation towards the interest which had then accrued due on the amount decreed, there was no appropriation towards interest except to this extent and that at least the balance after deducting the accrued interest on the decree must be treated as an open payment.3. we find ourselves unable to accept either of these contentions. the question is not whether the creditor can prove positively an appropriation of these amounts towards interest, but whether the debtor is in a position to show that on 1st october 1937 these amounts had not been adjusted in reduction of interest and consequently that interest was outstanding unrealised. in the case of the payments before the suit, they were certainly adjusted to the debt and a balance was struck and the suit claim proceeded on the footing of this balance with interest thereon. they cannot therefore be regarded as unadjusted payments. when once it is conceded that these payments have been adjusted towards the debt, they must have been adjusted in reduction of either interest or principal and the debtor not being in a position to show that they have been adjusted in reduction of the principal, it follows that to the extent of these payments he cannot show that there was on 1st october 1937 interest outstanding.4. similarly, with reference to the payments made as a result of the sale after the decree, there is a demonstrable appropriation towards interest due under the decree. the balance of the payments has certainly been adjusted towards the decree debt which itself is made up of principal and interest. thus, with reference to this balance though the creditor is not able to prove that the money was appropriated towards the interest, the debtor is unable to prove that the payment was appropriated towards principal. he is therefore not in a position to show to the extent of this payment that interest was outstanding on 1st october 1937. the two later payments made in 1932 and 1933 have not been shown to have been adjusted to the debt before the act came into force. they cannot therefore be regarded as having reduced the amount of interest outstanding on 1st october 1937. the position therefore is that on 1st october 1937 there was a sum of rs. 7250, the principal of the debt and two payments aggregating rs. 2476 which had not been appropriated and were available to go in reduction of the principal as on that date. the balance, rs. 4774, will carry interest at the decree rate of six per cent, from 1st october 1937. the decree will be amended accordingly. as each party has succeeded to some extent, each party will bear his own costs in this court. no separate orders necessary on the memorandum of cross-objections.