In Re: K. Parameswara Nambudri - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
criminal procedure code (act v of 1898), section 195(1)(b) - false endorsement on promissory note with intent to use it as evidence--suit on promissory note--penal code (act xiv of 1860), section 193, complaint under--sanction for prosecution, if necessary. - t.n. district police act, 1859 [act no. 24/1859]. section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explanation (1); [a.p. shah,c.j., f.m. ibrajhim kalifulla & v. ramasubramanian, jj] rule 14(b),ci.(iv) explanation (1) providing that a person acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt shall be treated as person involved in criminal case - validity being questioned - held, the impugned rule 14(b) ci.(iv) explanation (1) has been issued in exercise of the power conferred upon the government under the tamil nadu district police act, the criminal city police act and the proviso to article 309 of the constitution., the rule is not assailed on the ground of lack of competence. it is challenged only on the ground that it is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. but it is well settled that if a rule passes the twin tests of (i) being founded on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) such differentia having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, it cannot be said to be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. the impugned rule creates a classification of persons, who were not involved in criminal cases and persons, who were involved in criminal cases. the object of creating such a classification is to ensure that only those persons, whose character and antecedents were beyond and shadow of doubt alone, are permitted entry into the police service of the state. the rule is only a reflection of the intention of the government to maintain purity of administration. the rule merely provides a check post or a filter point, to ensure that only those, who had a clean record of personal life, are admitted into the system. that the existing system, has already come under heavy dose of criticism, cannot be swept under the carpet. therefore, as an employer, the government is entitled to prescribe, especially in a disciplined force like the police force, such a restriction at the entry level. there cannot be a dispute about the proposition that an employer has the right to prescribe any qualifications for appointment to a post. if that be so, an employer has a concomitant right even to prescribe disqualifications when it comes appointment to a post. persons who were never involved in criminal cases, need not be treated as equals to or on par with persons who were involved in criminal cases merely because they are acquitted later, especially in the matter of selection to the police service of the state. the classification made between them, is not only reason able but also has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. the employer does have the right to choose a person untainted with any allegations. the attempt made to assail the impugned rules on the ground of violation of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution is fragile. the impugned rules themselves appear to be a product of the application of the right to equality. a person, who was never involved in any criminal case, cannot be equated to a person, who was involved in a criminal case, merely because he is acquitted later, at least insofar as matters of public employment are concerned. therefore, the challenge to the impugned rule on the ground of infringement of articles. 14 and 16 of the constitution must fail. -- section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); appointment - state police service - disqualification of a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case - validity? held, by virtue of explanation 1 to clause (iv) of rule 14(b) of the t.n. special police subordinate service rules, a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case, can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified. the reason as to why cr.p.c. does not make a distinction between an acquittal on benefit of doubt and an honourable acquittal, is to ensure that no person shall be tried for a second time for the same offence for which he is tried and convicted or acquitted once. what is provided under section 300(1) of cr.p.c. is only a reassurance of the constitutional right guaranteed under article 20(2). the principle behind this prescription under section 300 of cr.p.c. is to avoid double jeopardy to a person. if the code recognizes such a distinction, it may make inroads into this concept of double jeopardy. but the concept of double jeopardy, to some extent, is allergic to service law. in many cases the supreme court has made it clear - (i) that the imposition of a punishment and the denial of promotion did not amount to double jeopardy, and (ii) that the conviction by a criminal court and the disciplinary proceedings initiated either on the basis of conduct which let to the conviction or on pure questions of misconduct, did not amount to double jeopardy. since the concept of acquittal is an acquittal, is an off shoot of the principle of double jeopardy underlying section 300(1) of the code, it cannot be imported into service law, where the principle of double jeopardy itself is looked down upon. therefore, the explanation 1 to rule 14(b) of the impugned rules, treating a person acquitted on benefit of doubt, as a person involved in a criminal case, is only in tune with well settled principles applicable to service jurisprudence. a person discharged does not even have protection under section 300 of cr.p.c. and hence such a person cannot assail the explanation 1 to the impugned rule 14(b). -- section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); - appointment to state police service - failure of a person to disclose in the application form, either his involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case against him - effect? - held, the failure of a person to disclose his involvement in a criminal case, at the earliest point of time, when the application form is filled up, is fatal. his subsequent disclosure, whether before acquittal or after acquittal, will not cure the defect. in any case, the subsequent disclosure may not have any effect upon his selection, since his case will then fall under any one of the two explanations under clause (iv) of rule 14(b) and make him ineligible for the current selection or for all future selection depending on whether the acquittal is honourable or otherwise. -- t.n. district police act, 1859. section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explanation (1); rule 14(b),ci.(iv) explanation (1) providing that a person acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt shall be treated as person involved in criminal case - validity being questioned - held, the impugned rule 14(b) ci.(iv) explanation (1) has been issued in exercise of the power conferred upon the government under the tamil nadu district police act, the criminal city police act and the proviso to article 309 of the constitution., the rule is not assailed on the ground of lack of competence. it is challenged only on the ground that it is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. but it is well settled that if a rule passes the twin tests of (i) being founded on an intelligible differentia, and (ii) such differentia having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, it cannot be said to be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. the impugned rule creates a classification of persons, who were not involved in criminal cases and persons, who were involved in criminal cases. the object of creating such a classification is to ensure that only those persons, whose character and antecedents were beyond and shadow of doubt alone, are permitted entry into the police service of the state. the rule is only a reflection of the intention of the government to maintain purity of administration. the rule merely provides a check post or a filter point, to ensure that only those, who had a clean record of personal life, are admitted into the system. that the existing system, has already come under heavy dose of criticism, cannot be swept under the carpet. therefore, as an employer, the government is entitled to prescribe, especially in a disciplined force like the police force, such a restriction at the entry level. there cannot be a dispute about the proposition that an employer has the right to prescribe any qualifications for appointment to a post. if that be so, an employer has a concomitant right even to prescribe disqualifications when it comes appointment to a post. persons who were never involved in criminal cases, need not be treated as equals to or on par with persons who were involved in criminal cases merely because they are acquitted later, especially in the matter of selection to the police service of the state. the classification made between them, is not only reason able but also has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. the employer does have the right to choose a person untainted with any allegations. the attempt made to assail the impugned rules on the ground of violation of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution is fragile. the impugned rules themselves appear to be a product of the application of the right to equality. a person, who was never involved in any criminal case, cannot be equated to a person, who was involved in a criminal case, merely because he is acquitted later, at least insofar as matters of public employment are concerned. therefore, the challenge to the impugned rule on the ground of infringement of articles. 14 and 16 of the constitution must fail - section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); appointment - state police service - disqualification of a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case - validity? held, by virtue of explanation 1 to clause (iv) of rule 14(b) of the t.n. special police subordinate service rules, a person acquitted on benefit of doubt or discharged in a criminal case, can still be considered as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as disqualified for selection to the police service of the state and that the same cannot be termed as illegal or unjustified. the reason as to why cr.p.c. does not make a distinction between an acquittal on benefit of doubt and an honourable acquittal, is to ensure that no person shall be tried for a second time for the same offence for which he is tried and convicted or acquitted once. what is provided under section 300(1) of cr.p.c. is only a reassurance of the constitutional right guaranteed under article 20(2). the principle behind this prescription under section 300 of cr.p.c. is to avoid double jeopardy to a person. if the code recognizes such a distinction, it may make inroads into this concept of double jeopardy. but the concept of double jeopardy, to some extent, is allergic to service law. in many cases the supreme court has made it clear - (i) that the imposition of a punishment and the denial of promotion did not amount to double jeopardy, and (ii) that the conviction by a criminal court and the disciplinary proceedings initiated either on the basis of conduct which let to the conviction or on pure questions of misconduct, did not amount to double jeopardy. since the concept of acquittal is an acquittal, is an off shoot of the principle of double jeopardy underlying section 300(1) of the code, it cannot be imported into service law, where the principle of double jeopardy itself is looked down upon. therefore, the explanation 1 to rule 14(b) of the impugned rules, treating a person acquitted on benefit of doubt, as a person involved in a criminal case, is only in tune with well settled principles applicable to service jurisprudence. a person discharged does not even have protection under section 300 of cr.p.c. and hence such a person cannot assail the explanation 1 to the impugned rule 14(b). - section 10 & tamil nadu special police subordinate service rules, rule 14(b), clause (iv) explantion (1); - appointment to state police service - failure of a person to disclose in the application form, either his involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case against him - effect? - held, the failure of a person to disclose his involvement in a criminal case, at the earliest point of time, when the application form is filled up, is fatal. his subsequent disclosure, whether before acquittal or after acquittal, will not cure the defect. in any case, the subsequent disclosure may not have any effect upon his selection, since his case will then fall under any one of the two explanations under clause (iv) of rule 14(b) and make him ineligible for the current selection or for all future selection depending on whether the acquittal is honourable or otherwise.orderwilliam ayling, j.1. the complaint in this case sets out that sometime in the month of chingom 1087 (malabar) corresponding to august 1912, the accused persons, the present petitioners, wrote an endorsement on a promissory note, which had been executed in favour of the complainant (present counter-petitioner), purporting to record a payment of rs. 1,500 towards that promissory note. no such payment, according to complainant, was ever made; and his case is that the endorsement was written with the intention that it might appear in evidence in case he (complainant) brought a civil suit to recover the amount due on the promissory note.2. now assuming that complainant is in a position to make out (1) that accused wrote the endorsement, (2) that the payment which it purports to record was never made, (3) that the intention of accused was that the endorsement should appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, then the offence of fabricating false evidence defined in section 192, indian penal code, and made punishable by section 193, indian penal code, would seem to be established. the intention above referred to, must almost necessarily be a matter of inference, but if it were shown that the accused could have had no other object than the appearance of the endorsement in evidence, in case a suit should be brought on the promissory note, then i do not think the uncertainty, at the time of writing the endorsement as to whether any suit would ever actually be brought, affects the completeness of the offence.3. the question is whether in this case the joint magistrate before whom the complaint was presented on 20th february 1914 was precluded from taking cognizance of the offence by reason of section 195(1)(6), code of criminal procedure. i agree with my learned brother that the earlier presentation of the complaint before a magistrate who had no jurisdiction to entertain it, may be disregarded.4. it is admitted that before 20th february 1914, complainant had actually filed a suit on the promissory note (original suit no. 275 of 1912 on the file of the court of the district munsif of walawanad) and got a decree which was at that time under appeal. the question is whether this circumstance renders the sanction of the civil court necessary under section 195(1)(b), code of criminal procedure.5. it has been argued before us that it does not inasmuch as the suit had not admittedly been instituted at the time when the endorsement was written and the offence committed, i cannot accept this view. the object of this clause of the section seems to be to save the time of criminal courts being wasted, and accused persons being needlessly harassed, by erecting a safeguard against rash, baseless, or vexatious prosecutions for the offences specified. it aims at doing so by providing that where, prior to the institution of the criminal prosecution, a properly constituted judicial tribunal has placed itself in a position to determine whether the facts constituting the offence really exist, the criminal court should decline cognisance unless that tribunal has, in effect, certified that, in its opinion, the complaint is one worthy of investigation. i see no reason why this safeguard should be limited to cases where the offence is committed pendente lite and should not extend to cases of fabrication of false evidence in advance. its desirability is just as great in the one case as in the other.6. it is, of course, necessary that the proceeding in any court referred to in the clause should be actually instituted before the criminal court is asked to take cognisance of the offence. if it is not, there is nothing in section 195 to prevent the court from taking cognisance of the case. and once the court has lawfully taken cognisance of the case, its jurisdiction is not affected by the subsequent coming into existence of a circumstance which would have barred its jurisdiction, if it had existed at the time of institution.7. in my opinion this was a case in which the sanction of the civil court was necessary, and the complaint should have been dismissed by the joint magistrate.tyabji, j.8. in this case we are asked to revise an order of the sub-divisional magistrate of malapuram, dated 23rd april 1915, in which he held that he could take cognizance of the complaint before him notwithstanding that no sanction had been obtained under section 195 of the criminal procedure code.9. the facts alleged in the complaint are that an endorsement had been falsely, made in the handwriting and signature of the 2nd accused to the effect that its. 1,500 had been paid in respect of a certain promissory note; and it is admitted before us that if the complainant's story is true, then false evidence was fabricated on or about the 30th of august 1912. the complainant's case is that it was fabricated for the purpose of being used in some stage of a judicial proceeding and that, therefore, an offence under section 193, indian penal code, was committed.10. the complaint was filed in the first instance before a 2nd class magistrate on 19th november 1912, but as he had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of it, it was transferred on the 20th february 1914 to a magistrate of the 1st class.11. between the date of the complaint before the 2nd class magistrate and the transfer to the 1st class magistrate's court, civil proceedings were instituted (viz., original suit no. 275 of 1912 in the court of the district munsif of malawanad, resulting in appeal no. 40 of 1913 which was disposed of on 13th october 1913). the promissory note is alleged to have been filed as an exhibit in these civil proceedings.12. it seems to me to be clear that the complaint before the 2nd class magistrate cannot be considered for fixing the date of the criminal proceedings, as that magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the offence.13. if this is correct, then the offence is alleged to have been committed on or about 30th august 1912, civil proceedings were commenced some time after, and then on 20th february 1914 the complaint was filed before the first class magistrate.14. it is admitted that the sanction of the civil court has not been obtained and the question arises whether the omission to do so, is fatal to the proceedings in the 1st class magistrate's court.15. section 195(1)(6) of the criminal procedure code, as it has to be read in the present connection, provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 193 of the indian penal code, of fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being' used in any stage of a judicial proceeding when such offence is committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any court, except with the previous sanction of the court. the real point arising in this case is, whether it can be predicated of the offence in question, that it is committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any court, notwithstanding that the offence was complete before any proceeding had been taken in the civil courts.16. in noor mahomed v. kaikhosru 4 bom. l.r. 268, the acting chief presidency magistrate, in his reference to the high court, pointed out that if the clause in question is interpreted very widely, it may retrospectively render nugatory many complaints which are valid when filed; and the court accepting the magistrate's view, was of opinion that when the offence in question is one under section 471 of the indian penal code (use of a forged document) and the document is alleged to have been used outside the court, no sanction is necessary. according to this case, if the document has already bean used outside the court and the charge refers to that offence, no sanction is necessary, though subsequently to such use legal proceedings are instituted and the document is produced or given in evidence in court, and apparently though such production in court may have been prior to the complaint. a similar view is expressed by knox, j., in lalta prosod v. emperor 17 ind. cas. 799 : 13 cri.l.j. 863.17. no authority has been cited to us having reference to section 195(1)(6). the cases brought to our notice were all under section 195(1)(c).18. clauses (6) and (c) agree in some respects, but differ in this that the offence is identified in clause (b) by reference to the fact that it has a direct connection with some proceeding in court, viz., having been (i) committed in, or (ii) in relation to the proceeding; whereas in clause (c) the offence has to be connected not with the proceeding, but (i) with a document produced or given in evidence in the proceeding and (ii) by the fact that the document has been produced or given in evidence by a party to the proceeding.19. in the one case, it suffices if the offence has reference to the proceeding, in the other, it must have reference to a party to the proceeding, and to a document produced or given in evidence by the party. the corresponding portions of the particular expression on which the present decision turns are also not the same; clause (6) runs when the offence is committed,' clause (c) 'when the offence has been committed.'20. in giridhari marwari v. emperor 12 c.w.n. 822, the counsel for the prosecution conceded that subsequent legal proceedings altered the circumstances in regard to a charge for forgery (section 463) so that the prosecution could not proceed, though the offence was complete and the complaint had been made before any legal proceedings had been instituted. but the concession was opposed to the decision in noor mahomed v. kaihhosru 4 bom. l.r. 268, to which i have just referred and the court did not in giridhari marwari v. emperor 12 c.w.n. 822: 8 cri. l.j. 51 itself express any opinion on the question.21. in teni shah v. bolahi shah 5 ind. cas. 879 : 11 cri. l.j. 280, it is merely stated at page 480: 'this forgery is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced at a proceeding in this court; it comes, therefore, within the express words of section 195 and before the petitioner could be prosecuted for forgery sanctioti is required.' the case does not take us any further.22. these decisions, as i have already said, are on clause (c). the offences referred to in clause (b) fall under two classes:i. some of them (e.g., those under the indian penal code sections 205 et seq.) are such as can be committed only in or io relation to legal proceedings.ii. there are others (including the offence under section 193, indian penal code) which may be committed irrespective of legal proceedings.23. it is only in regard to an offence falling under the latter head that the qualification 'when such offence is committed in or in relation to any proceeding' can have any force.24. again, some of the offences falling under the second head are such that the accused must have legal proceedings in contemplation; and the offence now in question (fabrication of evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding) is obviously one of this nature.25. in regard to offences of the last mentioned kind, it seems to me that the operation of the clause must be attracted to cases where, before any charge is brought against the accused, such legal proceedings have already commenced as the prosecution alleges to have been in the contemplation of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence, i can quite see that by interpreting the section in a very strict way when the offence is complete prior to there being any legal proceedings, there may appear no necessity for sanction. for it may be said that no act can be done, and no offence committed, in or in relation to any non-existent proceeding. but as my learned brother points out, the object of the section is to prevent rash, baseless or vexatious prosecutions in regard to offences for which a safeguard is available. hence when the offence is of such a nature that at the time of committing it, the accused must have legal proceedings in mind, and prior to his being charged with the commission of the offence legal proceedings of the same nature have already commenced in any court, it seems to me that it is most in consonance with the intention of the legislature to require that the sanction of the court should be obtained.26. this decision is not opposed to that given in noor mahomed v. kaikhosru 4 bom. l.r. 268. for there the offence was under section 471-the use of a forged document--not an offence in which the accused has necessarily any legal proceedings in mind at the time of committing the offence, and the actual offence charged had no reference to any legal proceedings.27. in my opinion, therefore, the court cannot in this case take cognizance of the offence.

Judgment:
ORDER

William Ayling, J.

1. The complaint in this case sets out that sometime in the month of Chingom 1087 (Malabar) corresponding to August 1912, the accused persons, the present petitioners, wrote an endorsement on a promissory note, which had been executed in favour of the complainant (present counter-petitioner), purporting to record a payment of Rs. 1,500 towards that promissory note. No such payment, according to complainant, was ever made; and his case is that the endorsement was written with the intention that it might appear in evidence in case he (complainant) brought a civil suit to recover the amount due on the promissory note.

2. Now assuming that complainant is in a position to make out (1) that accused wrote the endorsement, (2) that the payment which it purports to record was never made, (3) that the intention of accused was that the endorsement should appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, then the offence of fabricating false evidence defined in Section 192, Indian Penal Code, and made punishable by Section 193, Indian Penal Code, would seem to be established. The intention above referred to, must almost necessarily be a matter of inference, but if it were shown that the accused could have had no other object than the appearance of the endorsement in evidence, in case a suit should be brought on the promissory note, then I do not think the uncertainty, at the time of writing the endorsement as to whether any suit would ever actually be brought, affects the completeness of the offence.

3. The question is whether in this case the Joint Magistrate before whom the complaint was presented on 20th February 1914 was precluded from taking cognizance of the offence by reason of Section 195(1)(6), Code of Criminal Procedure. I agree with my learned brother that the earlier presentation of the complaint before a Magistrate who had no jurisdiction to entertain it, may be disregarded.

4. It is admitted that before 20th February 1914, complainant had actually filed a suit on the promissory note (Original Suit No. 275 of 1912 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif of Walawanad) and got a decree which was at that time under appeal. The question is whether this circumstance renders the sanction of the Civil Court necessary under Section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure.

5. It has been argued before us that it does not inasmuch as the suit had not admittedly been instituted at the time when the endorsement was written and the offence committed, I cannot accept this view. The object of this clause of the section seems to be to save the time of Criminal Courts being wasted, and accused persons being needlessly harassed, by erecting a safeguard against rash, baseless, or vexatious prosecutions for the offences specified. It aims at doing so by providing that where, prior to the institution of the criminal prosecution, a properly constituted judicial Tribunal has placed itself in a position to determine whether the facts constituting the offence really exist, the Criminal Court should decline cognisance unless that Tribunal has, in effect, certified that, in its opinion, the complaint is one worthy of investigation. I see no reason why this safeguard should be limited to cases where the offence is committed pendente lite and should not extend to cases of fabrication of false evidence in advance. Its desirability is just as great in the one case as in the other.

6. It is, of course, necessary that the proceeding in any Court referred to in the clause should be actually instituted before the Criminal Court is asked to take cognisance of the offence. If it is not, there is nothing in Section 195 to prevent the Court from taking cognisance of the case. And once the Court has lawfully taken cognisance of the case, its jurisdiction is not affected by the subsequent coming into existence of a circumstance which would have barred its jurisdiction, if it had existed at the time of institution.

7. In my opinion this was a case in which the sanction of the Civil Court was necessary, and the complaint should have been dismissed by the Joint Magistrate.

Tyabji, J.

8. In this case we are asked to revise an order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Malapuram, dated 23rd April 1915, in which he held that he could take cognizance of the complaint before him notwithstanding that no sanction had been obtained under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

9. The facts alleged in the complaint are that an endorsement had been falsely, made in the handwriting and signature of the 2nd accused to the effect that Its. 1,500 had been paid in respect of a certain promissory note; and it is admitted before us that if the Complainant's story is true, then false evidence was fabricated on or about the 30th of August 1912. The complainant's case is that it was fabricated for the purpose of being used in some stage of a judicial proceeding and that, therefore, an offence under Section 193, Indian Penal Code, was committed.

10. The complaint was filed in the first instance before a 2nd Class Magistrate on 19th November 1912, but as he had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of it, it was transferred on the 20th February 1914 to a Magistrate of the 1st Class.

11. Between the date of the complaint before the 2nd Class Magistrate and the transfer to the 1st Class Magistrate's Court, civil proceedings were instituted (viz., Original Suit No. 275 of 1912 in the Court of the District Munsif of Malawanad, resulting in Appeal No. 40 of 1913 which was disposed of on 13th October 1913). The promissory note is alleged to have been filed as an Exhibit in these civil proceedings.

12. It seems to me to be clear that the complaint before the 2nd Class Magistrate cannot be considered for fixing the date of the criminal proceedings, as that Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the offence.

13. If this is correct, then the offence is alleged to have been committed on or about 30th August 1912, civil proceedings were commenced some time after, and then on 20th February 1914 the complaint was filed before the first Class Magistrate.

14. It is admitted that the sanction of the Civil Court has not been obtained and the question arises whether the omission to do so, is fatal to the proceedings in the 1st Class Magistrate's Court.

15. Section 195(1)(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, as it has to be read in the present connection, provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, of fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being' used in any stage of a judicial proceeding when such offence is committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court, except with the previous sanction of the Court. The real point arising in this case is, whether it can be predicated of the offence in question, that it is committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court, notwithstanding that the offence was complete before any proceeding had been taken in the Civil Courts.

16. In Noor Mahomed v. Kaikhosru 4 Bom. L.R. 268, the acting Chief Presidency Magistrate, in his reference to the High Court, pointed out that if the clause in question is interpreted very widely, it may retrospectively render nugatory many complaints which are valid when filed; and the Court accepting the Magistrate's view, was of opinion that when the offence in question is one under Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code (use of a forged document) and the document is alleged to have been used outside the Court, no sanction is necessary. According to this case, if the document has already bean used outside the Court and the charge refers to that offence, no sanction is necessary, though subsequently to such use legal proceedings are instituted and the document is produced or given in evidence in Court, and apparently though such production in Court may have been prior to the complaint. A similar view is expressed by Knox, J., in Lalta Prosod v. Emperor 17 Ind. Cas. 799 : 13 Cri.L.J. 863.

17. No authority has been cited to us having reference to Section 195(1)(6). The cases brought to our notice were all under Section 195(1)(c).

18. Clauses (6) and (c) agree in some respects, but differ in this that the offence is identified in Clause (b) by reference to the fact that it has a direct connection with some proceeding in Court, viz., having been (i) committed in, or (ii) in relation to the proceeding; whereas in Clause (c) the offence has to be connected not with the proceeding, but (i) with a document produced or given in evidence in the proceeding and (ii) by the fact that the document has been produced or given in evidence by a party to the proceeding.

19. In the one case, it suffices if the offence has reference to the proceeding, in the other, it must have reference to a party to the proceeding, and to a document produced or given in evidence by the party. The corresponding portions of the particular expression on which the present decision turns are also not the same; Clause (6) runs when the offence is committed,' Clause (c) 'when the offence has been committed.'

20. In Giridhari Marwari v. Emperor 12 C.W.N. 822, the Counsel for the prosecution conceded that subsequent legal proceedings altered the circumstances in regard to a charge for forgery (Section 463) so that the prosecution could not proceed, though the offence was complete and the complaint had been made before any legal proceedings had been instituted. But the concession was opposed to the decision in Noor Mahomed v. Kaihhosru 4 Bom. L.R. 268, to which I have just referred and the Court did not in Giridhari Marwari v. Emperor 12 C.W.N. 822: 8 CrI. L.J. 51 itself express any opinion on the question.

21. In Teni Shah v. Bolahi Shah 5 Ind. Cas. 879 : 11 Cri. L.J. 280, it is merely stated at page 480: 'this forgery is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced at a proceeding in this Court; it comes, therefore, within the express words of Section 195 and before the petitioner could be prosecuted for forgery sanctioti is required.' The case does not take us any further.

22. These decisions, as I have already said, are on Clause (c). The offences referred to in Clause (b) fall under two classes:

I. Some of them (e.g., those under the Indian Penal Code Sections 205 et seq.) are such as can be committed only in or io relation to legal proceedings.

II. There are others (including the offence under Section 193, Indian Penal Code) which may be committed irrespective of legal proceedings.

23. It is only in regard to an offence falling under the latter head that the qualification 'when such offence is committed in or in relation to any proceeding' can have any force.

24. Again, some of the offences falling under the second head are such that the accused must have legal proceedings in contemplation; and the offence now In question (fabrication of evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding) is obviously one of this nature.

25. In regard to offences of the last mentioned kind, it seems to me that the operation of the clause must be attracted to cases where, before any charge is brought against the accused, such legal proceedings have already commenced as the prosecution alleges to have been in the contemplation of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence, I can quite see that by interpreting the section in a very strict way when the offence is complete prior to there being any legal proceedings, there may appear no necessity for sanction. For it may be said that no act can be done, and no offence committed, in or in relation to any non-existent proceeding. But as my learned brother points out, the object of the section is to prevent rash, baseless or vexatious prosecutions in regard to offences for which a safeguard is available. Hence when the offence is of such a nature that at the time of committing it, the accused must have legal proceedings in mind, and prior to his being charged with the commission of the offence legal proceedings of the same nature have already commenced in any Court, it seems to me that it is most in consonance with the intention of the Legislature to require that the sanction of the Court should be obtained.

26. This decision is not opposed to that given in Noor Mahomed v. Kaikhosru 4 Bom. L.R. 268. For there the offence was under Section 471-the use of a forged document--not an offence in which the accused has necessarily any legal proceedings in mind at the time of committing the offence, and the actual offence charged had no reference to any legal proceedings.

27. In my opinion, therefore, the Court cannot in this case take cognizance of the offence.