M. Vallavaraj, d Company C.i.S.F. Unit, Madras Port Trust Vs. the Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force Unit, - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - how best the reputation of a force must be preserved and protected is purely in the hands of the employer himself and it is not for the court to interfere and say that any such misconduct is not likely to affect the image of the force itself. we would like to mention here that it is not for us to step in and substitute our opinion as to whether the image of central industrial security force is tarnished or not.orderr. balasubramanian, j.1. the writ petitioner came to be dismissed from service by order dated 20.02.1993 passed by the second respondent which was affirmed by the appellate authority/first respondent by order dated 20.12.1993. this order of dismissal is in challenge in the writ petition. heard mr. a. thirumurthy, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner and mr. k. rajendran, learned senior central government standing counsel for the respondent. 2. the only charge against the petitioner is that he had taken medical leave (with effect from 21.7.1992) for two days on false grounds; left the headquarters without permission to kancheepuram and there he was arrested by a local police on an allegation of criminal offence on 22.07.1992 whereby he was remanded to judicial custody which tarnished the image of central industrial security force. there is no dispute that all the procedures established by law that follows issuance of the charge memo had been strictly complied with. number of witnesses have been examined and the enquiry officer's report finding that the charge stands proved was accepted by the employer who, again after complying with all the legal formalities, passed an order of dismissal. mr. a. thirumurthy learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner does not raise any dispute on the above aspects. therefore, the fact remains established that while on medical leave for two days with effect from 21.07.1992 the writ petitioner went out of the headquarters without prior permission from his employer and while he was so away he came to be arrested and sent for judicial remand. 3. it is argued by mr. a. thirumurthy, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner that there is no material on record to support the finding that on false grounds the writ petitioner had availed medical leave; going out of headquarters without prior permission cannot be of such a serious nature warranting punishment of dismissal and in any event the petitioner having been acquitted by a competent criminal court, his detention in judicial custody looses its importance. therefore, the submission is that, once the criminal court gives an acquittal to the writ petitioner, his detention in judicial custody for a period of two days is insignificant and it may not be the basis for the charge memo itself. then it is submitted that accepting the position that the petitioner, without informing his authorities in advance, left the headquarters while he was on medical leave, the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate to the gravity of the charge levelled against him. in support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on a judgment of the supreme court reported in (syed zaheer hussain v. union of india) where a punishment of dismissal imposed for unauthorised absence was held to be harsh. the learned counsel for the writ petitioner also relied upon the judgment of the hon'ble supreme court reported in (bahadur s. solanki v. l.i.c. of india and anr.) that once a delinquent employees comes out successfully in a criminal case, punishment imposed departmentally have to be necessarily set aside. we heard the learned senior central government standing counsel who would state that having regard to the task force namely central industrial security force in which the writ petitioner was employed during the relevant time, his detention in judicial custody for two days had definitely brought a disrespect to the force itself. how best the reputation of a force must be preserved and protected is purely in the hands of the employer himself and it is not for the court to interfere and say that any such misconduct is not likely to affect the image of the force itself. in other words, the learned central government standing counsel would submit that the court would not be in a position to substitute its own opinion to that of the employer that in a given circumstance, the image of the said employer is tarnished or not. 4. in the light of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel on either side, we went through the entire materials on record. in the first judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner the employee was a sorting assistant who had been dismissed from service on account of unauthorised absence. except the allegation of mere unauthorised absence there was nothing else against the employee in that case. the supreme court, on the facts and circumstances available in that case, was of the opinion that the punishment of dismissal was too harsh and thus substituted an appropriate lesser punishment. therefore, the question whether the punishment imposed by an employer calls for an interference or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances available in each case. there may be cases and cases where the facts would stare against the employee, the same being very serious and grievous in nature and there may not be scope at all for the court to interfere in the quantum of punishment imposed. in the case on hand, the writ petitioner was employed as a police constable in central industrial security force and according to the employer, it commands a high reputation and respect in this country and, therefore, according to it when a personnel of its force is arrested in a criminal case and sent for judicial remand, its image gets tarnished. we would like to mention here that it is not for us to step in and substitute our opinion as to whether the image of central industrial security force is tarnished or not. several circumstances, including the nature of duties to be discharged by the task force, might have entered the mind of the employer to come to the conclusion that such act of its personnel getting involved in a criminal case and being sent for judicial remand in concluding that it would be definitely diminishing its image and reputation. such punishment, in our opinion, would only act as deterrent in the mind of other personnel of that force to be careful and not to involve themselves in such occurrence in the future. if any leniency is shown in the order of punishment, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, then this court would be doing an act which would demoralise the strict discipline of the force itself. therefore, on facts, we find that the first judgment of the supreme court referred to above do not apply to the case on hand.5. as far as the second case is concerned, that was a case of dismissal from service based solely on the ground of conviction by a criminal court. on appeal, the conviction was reversed. on that judgment of acquittal, the dismissed employee moved the court and a learned single judge of the high court directed reinstatement with full backwages. that judgment was assailed before the division bench which maintained the order of reinstatement but denied backwages for the period ordered. that is how the employee went before the hon'ble supreme court. in that context, the supreme court thought it fit to give 50% of the backwages only. again on facts the second case cited by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner do not apply to the case on hand.6. from the materials available on record, there is no dispute that the finding of guilt rendered by the enquiry officer and accepted by the employer is supported by legal evidence. the learned counsel for the writ petitioner himself does not dispute that while on medical leave petitioner went out of headquarters and that while he was so away, he was arrested and sent for judicial remand during which he was detained in prison for two days. these facts, in the mind of the employer namely central industrial security force, had caused irreparable damage to the reputation of their establishment itself and therefore, when they choose to inflict a punishment of dismissal of such adverse impact on their force, it is not for this court to step in and alter the punishment. we find absolutely no merit to interfere with the finding from any angle. writ petition and the connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed. no costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

R. Balasubramanian, J.

1. The writ petitioner came to be dismissed from service by order dated 20.02.1993 passed by the second respondent which was affirmed by the appellate authority/first respondent by order dated 20.12.1993. This order of dismissal is in challenge in the writ petition. Heard Mr. A. Thirumurthy, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner and Mr. K. Rajendran, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondent.

2. The only charge against the petitioner is that he had taken medical leave (with effect from 21.7.1992) for two days on false grounds; left the headquarters without permission to Kancheepuram and there he was arrested by a local police on an allegation of criminal offence on 22.07.1992 whereby he was remanded to judicial custody which tarnished the image of Central Industrial Security Force. There is no dispute that all the procedures established by law that follows issuance of the charge memo had been strictly complied with. Number of witnesses have been examined and the enquiry officer's report finding that the charge stands proved was accepted by the employer who, again after complying with all the legal formalities, passed an order of dismissal. Mr. A. Thirumurthy learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner does not raise any dispute on the above aspects. Therefore, the fact remains established that while on medical leave for two days with effect from 21.07.1992 the writ petitioner went out of the headquarters without prior permission from his employer and while he was so away he came to be arrested and sent for judicial remand.

3. It is argued by Mr. A. Thirumurthy, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner that there is no material on record to support the finding that on false grounds the writ petitioner had availed medical leave; going out of headquarters without prior permission cannot be of such a serious nature warranting punishment of dismissal and in any event the petitioner having been acquitted by a competent criminal Court, his detention in judicial custody looses its importance. Therefore, the submission is that, once the criminal Court gives an acquittal to the writ petitioner, his detention in judicial custody for a period of two days is insignificant and it may not be the basis for the charge memo itself. Then it is submitted that accepting the position that the petitioner, without informing his authorities in advance, left the headquarters while he was on medical leave, the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate to the gravity of the charge levelled against him. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (Syed Zaheer Hussain v. Union of India) where a punishment of dismissal imposed for unauthorised absence was held to be harsh. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (Bahadur S. Solanki v. L.I.C. Of India and Anr.) that once a delinquent employees comes out successfully in a criminal case, punishment imposed departmentally have to be necessarily set aside. We heard the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel who would state that having regard to the task force namely Central Industrial Security Force in which the writ petitioner was employed during the relevant time, his detention in judicial custody for two days had definitely brought a disrespect to the force itself. How best the reputation of a force must be preserved and protected is purely in the hands of the employer himself and it is not for the Court to interfere and say that any such misconduct is not likely to affect the image of the force itself. In other words, the learned Central Government Standing Counsel would submit that the Court would not be in a position to substitute its own opinion to that of the employer that in a given circumstance, the image of the said employer is tarnished or not.

4. In the light of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel on either side, we went through the entire materials on record. In the first judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner the employee was a sorting assistant who had been dismissed from service on account of unauthorised absence. Except the allegation of mere unauthorised absence there was nothing else against the employee in that case. The Supreme Court, on the facts and circumstances available in that case, was of the opinion that the punishment of dismissal was too harsh and thus substituted an appropriate lesser punishment. Therefore, the question whether the punishment imposed by an employer calls for an interference or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances available in each case. There may be cases and cases where the facts would stare against the employee, the same being very serious and grievous in nature and there may not be scope at all for the Court to interfere in the quantum of punishment imposed. In the case on hand, the writ petitioner was employed as a police constable in Central Industrial Security Force and according to the employer, it commands a high reputation and respect in this country and, therefore, according to it when a personnel of its force is arrested in a criminal case and sent for judicial remand, its image gets tarnished. We would like to mention here that it is not for us to step in and substitute our opinion as to whether the image of Central Industrial Security Force is tarnished or not. Several circumstances, including the nature of duties to be discharged by the task force, might have entered the mind of the employer to come to the conclusion that such act of its personnel getting involved in a criminal case and being sent for judicial remand in concluding that it would be definitely diminishing its image and reputation. Such punishment, in our opinion, would only act as deterrent in the mind of other personnel of that force to be careful and not to involve themselves in such occurrence in the future. If any leniency is shown in the order of punishment, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, then this Court would be doing an act which would demoralise the strict discipline of the force itself. Therefore, on facts, we find that the first judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above do not apply to the case on hand.

5. As far as the second case is concerned, that was a case of dismissal from service based solely on the ground of conviction by a criminal Court. On appeal, the conviction was reversed. On that judgment of acquittal, the dismissed employee moved the Court and a learned single Judge of the High Court directed reinstatement with full backwages. That judgment was assailed before the Division Bench which maintained the order of reinstatement but denied backwages for the period ordered. That is how the employee went before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In that context, the Supreme Court thought it fit to give 50% of the backwages only. Again on facts the second case cited by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner do not apply to the case on hand.

6. From the materials available on record, there is no dispute that the finding of guilt rendered by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the employer is supported by legal evidence. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner himself does not dispute that while on medical leave petitioner went out of headquarters and that while he was so away, he was arrested and sent for judicial remand during which he was detained in prison for two days. These facts, in the mind of the employer namely Central Industrial Security Force, had caused irreparable damage to the reputation of their establishment itself and therefore, when they choose to inflict a punishment of dismissal of such adverse impact on their force, it is not for this Court to step in and alter the punishment. We find absolutely no merit to interfere with the finding from any angle. Writ petition and the connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed. No costs.