Union of India Owning Southern Railway Rep. by Its General Manager, Chennai-3 Vs. Krishnammal and 3 Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - 4. having heard learned counsel for the appellant/railways and learned counsel appearing for the respondents/claimants, we are of the opinion that in view of the exceptional facts and circumstances of this particular case where injury is a result of negligence on the part of the railway administration in maintaining the coaches and the consequent death of the deceased as a result of such negligence being not disputed and where the accident in question took place in the year 1990 and the claim petition itself was preferred in the year 1995 and since we are in the year 2001, it would be unjust and inequitable to direct the respondents to intiate proceedings afresh in a civil court by way of a suit. this court, strongly committed to the principles of justice, is not only concerned.....orderk. narayana kurup, j.1. one samishankar along with his wife krishammal, their son saravanan and his brother in law panchavarnam was traveling from dadar to madras on 22.9.1990 in dadar express. after the train left renigunta railway station, samishankar went to the toilet, where a sharp rusted iron plate protruding from the toilet wall struck him, as a result of which, he sustained bleeding injury on the neck and later succumbed to the same, giving rise to claim petition as o.a.no.93 of 1995 before the railway claims tribunal, chennai.2. before the tribunal, the railways contended inter alia that the claim petition is barred by limitation; that the incident in question is neither an 'accident' nor an 'untoward incident', as defined under sections 123 and 124a of the railways act,.....

Judgment:
ORDER

K. Narayana Kurup, J.

1. One Samishankar along with his wife Krishammal, their son Saravanan and his brother in law Panchavarnam was traveling from Dadar to Madras on 22.9.1990 in Dadar Express. After the train left Renigunta Railway Station, Samishankar went to the toilet, where a sharp rusted iron plate protruding from the toilet wall struck him, as a result of which, he sustained bleeding injury on the neck and later succumbed to the same, giving rise to claim petition as O.A.No.93 of 1995 before the Railway Claims Tribunal, Chennai.

2. Before the Tribunal, the Railways contended inter alia that the claim petition is barred by limitation; that the incident in question is neither an 'accident' nor an 'untoward incident', as defined under Sections 123 and 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 and in that view, the claim petition is liable to be dismissed. The Tribunal, while condoning the delay in preferring the claim petition, after rendering a finding that there is sufficient cause for belated filing of claim petition, however, dismissed the petition holding that the incident is neither an accident nor an untoward incident as defined under the Act and being a tortuous liability incurred by the Railways, relegated the parties to the Civil Court for redressal of their grievances.

3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the claims Tribunal, the claimants/respondents herein preferred C.M.A.No.911/1999 before this court, which came to be allowed, as per the judgment impugned in this L.P.A. The learned single Judge, while allowing the C.M.A. and setting aside the orders passed by the claims Tribunal, directed the appellant/Railways to pay a sum of Rs.2.00 lakhs as compensation to the respondents as per the rules framed under the Railways Act with interest thereon at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date of petition till realisation. Hence, this L.P.A by the Railways.

4. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant/Railways and learned counsel appearing for the respondents/claimants, we are of the opinion that in view of the exceptional facts and circumstances of this particular case where injury is a result of negligence on the part of the Railway administration in maintaining the coaches and the consequent death of the deceased as a result of such negligence being not disputed and where the accident in question took place in the year 1990 and the claim petition itself was preferred in the year 1995 and since we are in the year 2001, it would be unjust and inequitable to direct the respondents to intiate proceedings afresh in a civil court by way of a suit. In our considered opinion, to ask the parties to vindicate the admitted claim before the Civil Court, at this distance of time, will certainly result in miscarriage of justice. Had it been the case that disputed questions of fact arise for adjudication and there is clear denial of tortious liability, which is not the case here, the position would have been different. In this connection, we have to remind ourselves that this court is not only a Court of law but also a court of equitable jurisdiction, which has to be exercised in such a way as to mete out to justice the aggrieved party viz., the respondent/legal heirs of the deceased. While interpreting laws and administering justice, the Courts have to discharge their function humanely and with an element of mercy. No law, whether it be judge made or legislatively enacted, can be perfectly drafted as to leave no room for dispute. The law with which we are concerned, namely, The Railways Act, if literally interpreted, will certainly result in elbowing out the legal representatives of the decreased, causing untold misery, hardship and miscarriage of justice. Most of the world's injustices are inflicted not with the fists, but with the elbows. When we use our fists, we use them for a definite purpose, and we are answerable to others and to ourselves for that purpose. Our elbows, we may comfortably suppose, trace random pattern for which we are not responsible, even though our neighbour may be painfully aware that he is being systematically pushed from his seat. In the aforesaid metaphor, the neighbour is none other than the respondents herein whose interests are sacrified at the altar of justice by the internal immorality of the law with which we are concerned viz., the Railways Act, which denies them access to a speedier forum to settle their claim. This Court, strongly committed to the principles of justice, is not only concerned with the legislative fists, but with their elbows as well, (see in this connection 'The Morality of Law' by Lon L. Fuller, Second Indian Reprint 2000, at page 159).

5. Accordingly, we treat the claim petition preferred by the respondents before the Claims Tribunal as a writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to mete out justice, reminding ourselves that there is no proposition of law that in every, case of tortious liability, recourse must perforce be had to a suit only. When there is admittedly negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21, namely, Right to Life, it cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution, since right to life is one of the basic human rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution (See in this connection, U.P. State Co-operative Land Developments Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey, ; Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Sumathi and others, and P. A. Naryanan v. Union of India and others, .

6. But, this does not mean that the learned Single Judge was right in hold in that the incident in question is an 'untoward incident' as defined under Section 123(c)(2) of the Railways Act, 1989. The Phraseology of Section 123(c)(2) is clear and plain and admits of no ambiguity, namely, an untoward incident means 'accident falling of any passenger from a train carrying passengers'. Evidently, the deceased did not fall from a train carrying passengers. On the other hand, he suffered a fall inside the toilet, which, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be fall from a train. Accordingly, we vacate the finding of the learned single Judge holding that the incident which gave rise to the claim petition is an untoward incident as defined under Section 123(c(2) of the Act. As a sequel, we also hold that Section 124A of the Act is not attracted to the facts of the present case, considering the fact that the incident in question took place on 22.9.1990 whereas the said amended section came into force only with effect from 1.8.1994.

7. The result, therefore, is that though the appellant may be on a strong wicket from the legal point of view in the sense the incident in question is neither an 'accident' nor an 'untoward incident' attracting the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal, having regard to the long lapse of time, namely, 11 years from the date of incident and the admitted negligent conduct off the administration in maintaining the coaches resulting in the death of the deceased. We uphold the claim for compensation (which in fairness was agreed to by the learned counsel for the appellant), namely, the sum of Rs.2.00 lakhs already deposited by the appellant before this court with interest at 12% p.a from the date of petition till the date of deposit. Since the amount is already in deposit, the respondents/Claimants will be at liberty to withdraw the same forthwith.

8. L.P.A is ordered accordingly. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P. is closed.