Tvl. Cholan Roadways Corporation Ltd., Kumbakonam Vs. Pl-A. Annamalai Chettiar, Prop Pla Savings Corporation Ltd. and Others - Court Judgment

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motor vehicles - permit - motor vehicles act, 1988 and constitution of india - appellant applied for route permit - respondent refused to grant route permit to appellant - decision of respondent challenged in writ appeal - respondent contended that appellant had no locus standi to oppose refusal as it was not party in writ petition - appellant was aggrieved party as permit not granted to it - mere fact that appellant was not party in writ petition does not affect position - appellant had locus standi to oppose refusal. - - 4.1. aggrieved by the aforesaid grant, three unsuccessful applicants, viz. but when the tribunal acted contrary to what was stated earlier and applied the provisions of the new motor vehicles act of 1988, accepting the joint memo of compromise filed by the parties and also taking a wrong view of the ruling in bappan's case [1987]2scr391 ,the first respondents is undoubtely entitled to challenge the order of the tribunal inasmuch as the grant of permit in favour of the applicant herein offends the provisions of the act as well as the approved schemes. he may not operate on any part or portion of the notified route or area on the mere ground that the permit as originally granted to him covered the notified route or area .it is also well known that often times permits for plying stage carriages from a point a short distance beyond another terminus of a notified route have been applied for and granted subject to the so called 'corridor restrictions' which are but mere ruses or traps to obtain permits and to frustrate the scheme. it was observed in adarsh travels case air1986sc319 :it is quite well known that under the guise of the so-called 'corridor restrictions' permits over longer routes which cover shorter notified routes or 'overlapping' parts of notified routes are more often than not mis-utilsed since it is well impossible to keep a proper check at every point of the route. the section clearly refers to any route covered by an approved scheme.orderk. a. swami, cj.1. the first three writ appeals are preferred against the common order dated 19-7-1991 passed by the learned single judge in writ petitions 9909 to 9911/91, whereas writ appeal 1111 of 1993 is preferred against the order dated 21-9-1993 rejecting w.m.p. 16050 of 1993 filed in writ petition 10498 of 1993. when writ appeal 1111 of 1993 came up for consideration, it was brought to our notice that writ appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991 also involve the same point and are concerned with the validity of the permits granted in favour of the 1st respondent in each one of the appeals. it was also submitted that the arguments in writ appeal 1111 of 1993 and writ petition 10498 of 1993 will be the same. therefore, we directed the writ appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991 and writ petition 10498 of 1993 be posted with writ appeal 1111 of 1993.2. all these matters had come up on anearlier occasion for hearing, but at the requestof the learned counsel appearing for thegrantees of the permits, they were adjourned.accordingly, these matters have come uptoday for final disposal. 3. the facts necessary for the purpose ofdeciding the contentions urged, which are common to all these matters are as follows: the regional transport authority, trichy, invited applications for grant of stage carriage permit on the route tiruvanaikoil to regional engineering college, trichy, in the year 1982. there were about 14 applications filed by various operators. the appellants in writ appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991 and the 1st respondent in each one of them were also the applicants. the petitioner in w.p. no. 10498 of 1993 was not an applicant. it may be pointed out that the petitioner in writ petition 10498 of 1993 and the appellant in writ appeal 1111 of 1993 are the same, viz., dheeran chinnamalai transport corporation.4. the regional transport authority by its resolution dated 13-3-1986 rejected all the applications except that of annamalai transports, applicant no. 11 in the proceedings of the regional transport authority. the application of cholan roadways transport corporation was rejected on the ground that there was a bifurcation of the cholan roadways transport corporation into two corporations, viz., cholan roadways corporation and deeran chinnamalai transport corporation limited, that deeran chinnamalai transport corporation limited was not an applicant and the request of cholan' roadways transport corporation for granting the permit in favour of deeran chinnamalai transport corporation could not be granted. as far as annamalai transport is concerned, the regional transport authority taking into consideration the experience both in town and mofussil bus services, sector qualification in between gandhi market and r.e.c. and also the fact that after 1975, it has not been granted any permit, preferred annamalai transport, trichy and granted the permit on the route t. v. koil to regional engineering college, via k..g. gate, butter-worth road, e.b. road, market, ariyamangaiam, tiruverumbur and b.h.e.l. training centre.4.1. aggrieved by the aforesaid grant, three unsuccessful applicants, viz., thiru asa johan divianathan, tvl. pl.a. service andthiru s. chandrasekharan, preferred appeals 710, 729 and 743 of 1981 respectively. an-namalai transport was the respondent. the state transport appellate tribunal by the order dated 24-4-1991 allowed all the appeals on the basis of the joint memo filed by the appellants and the respondent therein and granted permits to all the three appellants and confirmed the one granted in favour of annamalai transport.4.2. aggrieved by the order of the tribunal, the cholan roadways corporation preferred writ petitions 9909, 9910, 9911 of 1991. learned single judge by the order dated 19-7-1991 rejected the writ petitions on the ground that there was a bifurcation of the corporation into two, viz., cholan roadways, corporation and deeran chinnamalai transport corporation, that it did not challenge the resolution of the regional transport authority rejecting its application and granting the permit in favour of annamalai transport corporation.5. aggrieved by the order dated 19-7-1991, passed by the learned single judge in the aforesaid three petitions. writ appeals 1011, 3012 and 1013 of 1991 are preferred.6. it may be relevant to notice that even though the grant was made as long back as 24-4-91 in favour of 1st respondent in all the three appeals, w.a. nos. 1011 to 1013 of 1991, the permits have not yet been issued, as the timings conference, had not taken place till 9-6-1993.7. writ petition 10498 of 1993 is filed by deeran chinnamalai transport corporation seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the 1st respondent dated 11-5-1993 made in r. no. 71571 / a2/85. as the interim prayer made in w.m.p. 16050 of 1993 has been refused, writ appeal 1111 of 1993 is filed.8. one more circumstance which requires to be noticed at this stage is that on 10-11-82 the cholan roadways transport corporation published two draft schemes relating to two routes woraiyur to b.h.e.l. (via) puthur, court. junction, karai. ghandhi market and thiruverumhur for 20.6 kms. and k. k. nagar to srirangam (via) simca motorjunction, central bus stand, palakkarai, marakkadai gate, chinthamani bus stand and tiruvanaikoil for 15.6 kms. both the schemes were approved unde,r g.o. ms. 1341, home (transport-d) dated 23rd june, 1990 and g.o. ms. 1439, home (transport-d) dated 25th june, 1990 respectively and were published in the government gazette extraordinary on 27-6-1990. the validity of the approved schemes was challenged in w.ps. 7201 of 1990 etc., the writ petition were allowed on 31-10-1990 by a division bench of this court and the schemes were declared invalid. however, the cholan roadways transport corporation approached the supreme court and the supreme court allowed the appeal on 16-4-1993, set aside the order of the high court dated 31-10-1990 and declared the approved schemes as valid. the result is that from 10-11-1982 the draft scheme is operating, covering the two routes mentioned above and both the schemes have been approved on 27-6-1990. therefore, on the date the state transport appellate tribunal allowed the appeals 710, 729 and 743 of 1987 and granted the permits to respondents 2 to 4 in writ petition 10948 of 1993 and the 1st respondent in each of the writ appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991, the approved schemes must be held to have been in operation.9. it is not disputed before us that the route thiruvanakoil to regional engineering college, trichy overlaps the two routes, viz., woraiyur to bhel and k. k. nagar to srirangam covered by the approved schemes.10. in the background of these undisputed facts and in the light of the contentions urged on both sides, the following points arise for consideration.(i) whether the cholan roadways transport corporation can be considered to be an aggrieved party?(ii) whether the permits granted in favour of respondents 2 to 4 in writ petition 10498 of 1993, who are also 1st respondent in each of the writ appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991 respectively are liable to be quashed, as the same overlap the routes covered by the two approved schemes, viz., woraiyur to bheland k.k. nagar to srirangam.(iii) what is the effect of act 41 of 1992 on the proceedings in question?(iv) whether the petitioner in writ petition 10498 of 1993 is entitled to the relief sought for?point (i):11. the contention of dr. v. subramaniam, learned counsel appearing for the grantees is that as the permits granted in favour of them were not challenged by the cholan roadways transport corporation by preferring an appeal and as it is not operating any service on the routes of the approved scheme in question, it cannot be considered to be an aggrieved person. it is not possible to accept this argument. it is the cholan roadways transport corporation which has prepared and published the approved scheme. therefore, it is entitled to ensure that the scheme is not violated. in addition to this, section 103 of the motor vehicles act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the act) specifically provides that where in pursuance of an approved scheme, any state transport undertaking applies in such manner as may be prescribed by the state government in this behalf for a stage carriage permit or a goods carriage permit or a contract carriage permit in respect of a notified area or notified route, the state transport authority in any case where the said area or route lies in more than one region and the regional transport authority in any other case shall issue such permits to the state transport undertaking, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in chapter v. therefore, apart from the fact that it has prepared and published the schemes, even if there is a bifurcation in the corporation and accordingly,' deeran chinnamalai transport corporation is to operate on the routes covered by the schemes, it does not in any way affect the right of the cholan roadways transport corporation to challenge the permits granted contrary to the approved schemes in question. a division bench of this court has also considered the question of locus standi more or less under the similar circumstances in review application 8 of 1993 and writpetition 10091 of 1993 decided on 28-7-1993 (sri ardhanari transports pvt. ltd. v. cheran transport corporation ltd. in paragraph no. 19 of the judgment, it has been held as follows:--'taking the question of locus standi in the first instance, we find that there is no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the applicant. we have already referred to the fact that the tribunal dismissed the application of first respondent to implead itself as a party to the appeal on the ground that the matter would be considered under the old motor vehicles act of 1939 and any order in the appeal would only result in only one person being entitled to the permit on the route in question. the said reasoning of the tribunal was expressly approved by this court in its order in the writ petition and only because of that, the writ petition was dismissed. but when the tribunal acted contrary to what was stated earlier and applied the provisions of the new motor vehicles act of 1988, accepting the joint memo of compromise filed by the parties and also taking a wrong view of the ruling in bappan's case : [1987]2scr391 , the first respondents is undoubtely entitled to challenge the order of the tribunal inasmuch as the grant of permit in favour of the applicant herein offends the provisions of the act as well as the approved schemes. as stated already, the schemes were prepared and published by the first respondent and approved by the government under the relevant provisions of the motor vehicles act. there is no dispute at any stage that the route in question viz., srurnugai to coimbatore overlaps the two approved scheme routes. even the order of the tribunal says so. hence, there can be no doubt whatever that the first respondent has locus standi to maintain the writ petition.'therefore, we are of the view that a mere fact that cholan roadways transport corporation did not challenge the permits granted in favour of respondents 2 to 4 in writ petition no. 10498 of 1993 before the state transport appellate tribunal did not in any way affect its right to challenge the permits on the ground that those permits were violativeof the schemes, accordingly, the first point is answered in the affirmative and it is held that the cholan roadways transport corporation is an aggrieved person and has locus standi to challenge the same......point (ii) --12. the contention of learned counsel appearing for the grantees is that the approved schemes in question cannot at all be considered as schemes of total exclusion, therefore the permits that have been granted covering a portion of the route of the approved schemes cannot be held to have contravened the schemes and as such, the tribunal cannot be held to have exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the permits. on the contrary, it is the contention of the appellant that both the approved schemes are the schemes of total exclusion and that there is no scope whatsoever to contend that the schemes are not of total exclusion, but are of only partial exclusion. in order to determine the validity of the rival contentions, it is relevant to refer to the relevant portion of both the approved schemes:--approval of scheme of state transport undertaking(g. o. ms. no. 1341, home (transport-d), 23rd june. 1990.no.ii(1)/iio/100(33-4)/90whereas the cholan transport corporation limited prepared and published the scheme relating to the route woraiyur to b.h.e.l. under section 68-c of the motor vehicles act, 1939 (central act iv of 1939) in part vi -- section of the tamil nadu government gazette extraordinary, dated 10th november, 1982. the scheme is now held by the deeran chinnamalai transport corporation limited.and whereas no objection with reference to sub-section (1) of section 68-d of the said act (section 100 of the motor vehicles act, 1988. central act 59 of 1988 to the said scheme has been received by the secretary to government of tamil nadu in the home department, who is empowered to exercise the powers of the state government under section 100 of the motor vehicles act, 1988 (central act 59 of 1988) in pursuance of rule 24 of the tamil nadu government business rules, 1978 (sic).now, therefore, i, r. nagarajan, secretary to government of tamil nadu, in the home department hereby approve as modified the said scheme under sub-section (2) of section 100 of the motor vehicles act, 1983 (central act 59 of 1988).approval of scheme of state transportundertakings(g. o. ms. no. 1438, home (transport-d),25th june, 1990whereas the cholan roadways corporation limited prepared and published the-scheme relating to the route k. k. nagar to srirangam under section 68-c of the motor vehicles act, 1939 (central act iv of 1939) at page of part vi -- section 3(b) of the tamil nadu government gazette extraordinary, dated 9th november, 1983. the scheme is now held by the peeran chinnamalai transport corporation limited.whereas no objection with reference to sub-section (1) of section 68-d of the said act (section 100 of the motor vehicles act, 1988 central act 59 of 1988) to the said scheme has been received by the secretary to government of tamil nadu in the home department, whois empowered to exercise the powers of the state government under section 100 of the motor vehicles act, 1988 (central act 59 of 1988) in pursuance of rule 24 of the tamil nadu government business rules, 1978 :now, therefore, i, r. nagarajan, secretary to government of tamil nadu in the home department hereby approve the said sub section (2) of section 100 of the motor vehicles act, 1988 (central act 59 of 1988).it is clear that both the schemes are the schemes of complete exclusion of the persons operating on the route except the state transport undertakings of the state. the schemes give the length and the other details of the route, in other words, the stages of the route from the starting point to terminal. when the scheme says that it is to the total exclusion of other persons operating on theroute except two state transport undertakings of the state, it means that private operators are not allowed to operate on any portion of the route. the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the grantees is that normally, the schemes will contain the other details such as to the complete exclusion ofother persons operating on the entire route except the state transport undertakings of the state and other persons of the other statesoperating under any permit or the entire route, etc. and the scheme will also state whether it covers the sector also. as, in the instant case, only the route is mentioned fromthe mere fact that in columns no. 4 and 5, it is stated that it is to the complete exclusion of other persons operating on the route, it cannot be held that the scheme is one of total exclusion. in our view, there is no ambiguity in the scheme, in-as-much-as it specifically states that it is to the complete exclusion of other persons operating on the route except the state transport undertakings of the state, learned counsel for the grantees, however, tried to contend that the scheme is not formulated as per the provisions contained in section 99 of the act, therefore, it cannot be held to be a valid scheme. this argument can only be stated to be rejected, in as much as the validity of the scheme is not challenged before us. in the absence of any challenge to the scheme, if the scheme has to be interpreted and enforced, as the scheme is the law, it is the duty of the court to enforce the law. the scheme does not leave any scope for contending that it is not a scheme of total exclusion. in such a situation, no private operator is allowed to operate his stage carriage on any portion of the route. this legal position as stated in section 104 of the act is also no more res integra, in the light of the decision of the constitution bench of the supreme court in m/s. adarsh travels bus service v. state of u. p. : air1986sc319 . the relevant portions of the decision as found in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are as follows :--paragraph 5:'it is thus seen that while the provisions of chapter iv-a are devised to override the provisions of chapter iv and is expressly so enacted, the provisions of chapter-iv-a are clear and complete regarding 'the manner and effect of' the 'take over' of the operation of a road transport undertaking in relation to any area or route or portion thereof. while on the one hand, the paramount consideration is the public interests, the interest of the existing operators are sufficiently taken care of and such slight inconvenience to the travelling public as may be inevitable are sought to be reduced to a minimum......'paragraph 6 :'a careful and diligent perusal of s. 68 c,s. 68 d (3) and s. 68ff in the light of the definition of the expression 'route' in s. 2 (28 a) appears to make it manifestly clear that once a scheme is published under s. 68-d in relation to any area or route or portion thereof, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of other persons or otherwise, no person other than the state transport undertaking may operate on the notified area or notified route except as provided in the scheme itself. a necessary consequence of these provisions is that no private operator can operate his vehicle on any part or portion of a notified area or notified route unless authorised so to do by the terms of the scheme itself. he may not operate on any part or portion of the notified route or area on the mere ground that the permit as originally granted to him covered the notified route or area ......' ..... 'it is also well known that often times permits for plying stage carriages from a point a short distance beyond another terminus of a notified route have been applied for and granted subject to the so called 'corridor restrictions' which are but mere ruses or traps to obtain permits and to frustrate the scheme. if indeed there is any need for protecting the travelling public from inconvenience as suggested by the learned counsel we have no doubt that the state transport undertaking and the government will make a sufficient provision in the scheme itself to avoid inconvenience being caused to the travelling public.'paragraph 7 :'one of the submissions urged was that a route, according to definition, meant a line drawn between two terminal and, therefore, route ab cannot be the same route as cd even if c & d happened to be two points on the highway from a to b. it was argued that if route ab was different from route cd, the nationalisation of route cd had no effect whatsoever on the permits to ply stage carriages on the route ab, this argument is specious and is only to be stated to be rejected. in fact, whatever argument was open to the learned counsel on the basis of the decision of the privy council in kelani valley motor transit co. ltd. v. colombo ratnapuraomnibus co. ltd., air 1946 pc 137(supra) is no longer open to them in view ofthe definition of route inserted in s. 2(28-a)of the motor vehicles act by the amendingact of 1969). we do not have the slightestdoubt that route ab covers and includesevery part of the particular highway from a tob traversed by the motor vehicle along thatroute. it is impossible to accept the argumentthat only the termini have to be looked at andthe rest of the highway ignored in order todiscover a route for the purposes of the motorvehicles act. equally without substance is theplea that if an operator does not pick up or setdown any passenger between the two pointsof the common sector he cannot be said to beplying a stage carriage between those twopoints. the argument is entirely devoid ofsubstance for the simple reason that theoperator does charge the passenger for thedistance travelled along the highway between these two points also. another argument which was advanced and which is also lackingin substance is that a complete exclusion ofprivate operators from the common sectorwould be violative of article 14 and that itwould be ultra vires s. 68-d. we are unable tosee how either article 14 or s. 68-d of themotor vehicles act hit a scheme whichprovides for complete exclusion of privateoperators from the whole or any part of thenotified area. almost all these submissionshave been considered and met by the majorityjudgment in mysore state road transportcorpn. v. mysore revenue appellate tribunal, : [1975]1scr493 towhich we shall presently refer.'12.1. subsequent to this case, ah effort appears to have been made before the supreme court to dilute the legal position stated herein in bihar state road transport corporation v. state transport appellate tribunal, : [1991]1scr667 , but the said effort has not received the approval of the supreme court. on the contrary, adarsh travels case, : air1986sc319 has been approved. the relevant portions of that decision are as follows (at pp.702, 703 of air scw) :--'5. we have had the advantage of hearingmr. ranjit kumar, learned counsel for the appellant only since no one appeared either on behalf of the state of bihar nor for the permit holders respondents 3 and 4. the sole point for consideration is whether the view taken by the patna high court in marwari motor service case air 1973 patna 273 is any more relevant in view of the decision of the constitution bench of this court in adarsh travels bus service v. state of u. p. : air1986sc319 .6. in adarsh travels case : air1986sc319 , this court ruled that if the route has been nationalised under chapter iv-a of the motor vehicles act, a private operator with a permit to ply stage carriage for another route, which has a common overlapping sector with the nationalised route can ply his vehicle over that part of the overlapping common sector if he does not pick up or drop passengers on the overlapping part of the route, and the question would really get the right answer on the terms of the scheme rather than on the provision of the statute. the word 'route' was introduced to be defined in section 2(29-a) of the act by amendment from march 2, 1970 to mean the line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another. spelling out the necessity for its so defining it was recorded (scc p. 562, para 4) : (at pp. 32], 322 of air 1986) :'the introduction of section 2(28-a) defining the expression 'route' appears to have been necessitated to dispel the seeming acceptance by this court in nilkanth prasad v. state of bihar : air1962sc1135 of the suggested difference between 'route' and 'highway' by the privy council in kelani valley motor transit co. ltd. v. colombo- ratnapura omnibus co. ltd., 1946 ac 338 : air 1946 pc 137 where it was said,'a 'highway' the physical track along which an omnibus runs, whilst a 'route' appears to their lordships to be an abstract conception of line of travel between one terminus and another and to be something distinct from the highway traversed.... theremay be alternative roads leading from one terminous to another but that does not make the route and highway the same.'the present definition of route makes it a physical reality instead of an abstract conception and no- longer makes it something distinct from the highway traversed.'7. in the light of the above observations ranchi-chaibasa route is identified as the line of travel on which state transport undertaking on nationalisation is allowed to run its vehicles. the bracketed words 'direct service' occurring in serial no. 7 when contrasted with entries in serial nos. 1 to 6 reveal that the total route of ranchi-chaibasa, without leaving any portion, stood nationalised signifying by its name that ranchi-chaibasa route is a straight and direct line of travel which would be traversed by a vehicle by the state transport undertaking between two termini rendering all kinds of services. any further interpretation would frustrate the object of chapter iv-a whereunder the scheme is prepared. it was observed in adarsh travels case : air1986sc319 :--'it is quite well known that under the guise of the so-called 'corridor restrictions' permits over longer routes which cover shorter notified routes or 'overlapping' parts of notified routes are more often than not mis-utilsed since it is well impossible to keep a proper check at every point of the route. often times permits for plying stage carriages from a point a short distance beyond one terminus to a point at a short distance beyond another terminus of a notified route have been applied for and granted subject to the so-called 'corridor restrictions' which are but mere ruses or traps to obtain permits and to frustrate the scheme. if indeed there is any need for protecting the travelling public from inconvenience, the state transport undertaking and the government will have to make sufficient provision in the scheme itself to avoid inconvenience being caused to the travelling public.'8. if the interpretation put by the patna high court in marwari motor service case : air1973pat273 to the bracketed words 'direct service' is to be kept valid it would frustrate the very purpose of nationalisation, for any person in that event could operate on a nationalised route by adding thereto, or subtracting therefrom, some kileanmetre-roge and keep one terminus as a point of start, or a point of ending, on an unnotified route and put forward his willingness to submit himself to the discipline called 'corridor restrictions' which practice has been deprecated by this court.'12.2. therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the grantees that the permits granted to respondents 2 to 4 in writ petition 10498 of 1992 are not violative of the two approved schemes referred to above.13. learned counsel for the grantees also placed reliance on a decision of a learned single judge of this court in erode service, coimbatore v. the state transport appellate tribunal, madras-5 (w.p. nos. 973, 979, 1447, 1499 etc. of 1964 and 1965) dated 23rd august 1965. on the basis of this decision, it is contended that the operation on a portion of the route covered by the approved scheme is permissible in the light .of the wordings contained in the ..... scheme.we have gone through the decision carefully. we are of the view that the decision takes a view totally contrary to the decision of the supreme court in adarsh travels case (air 1986 sc 319). therefore, we overrule the said decision. point (ii) is, accordingly, answered in the affirmative.point (iii) :14. this point need not detain us any longer, because a division bench of this court has also considered the validity and effect of s. 10 of act 41 of 1992. learned counsel for the grantees relying on s. 10 of act 41 of 1992, contended, that the permits granted in favour of respondents 2 to 4 on 24-4-1991 by the state transport appellate tribunal in appeals 710, 729 and 743 are validated. a division bench of this court in a batch of writ petitions 1221 to 1223 of 1991 /1992 etc. (m/s. jeeva transport corpn.ltd. v. the state transport appellate tribunal, madras-104) decided on 30th april, 1993 has held that act 41 of 1991 is valid and it has also been further held as to the scope of s. 10 of act 41 of 1991 as follows :--'in w.p. nos. 2200 and 2418 of 1993, the petitioners are intra-state operators. an alternative contention is raised by the petitioners in these petitions. they have also challenged the validity of the provisions of ss. 1(3), 6(4) and 7 of the impugned act. in both the cases, permits have been granted to them by the state transport appellate tribunal on 28-2-1992. it is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that both the cases are governed by sec. 10 of the impugned act and that the permits have been validated by the provisions of the said section. it is contended that the section is operative from 4-6-1976 to the date of publication of the act viz., 31-7-1992. there is no merit in this contention. section 1(3) of the impugned act provides that all the provisions of the act except ss. 6 and 7 shall be deemed to have come into force on 4th june, 1976 and remained in force up to and inclusive of 30th june, 1990. hence, s. 19 of the impugned act also ceased to be in force after 30th june 1990. on the date of publication of the act, viz., 30-7-1992 the section was not in existence. section 6(4) of the impugned act expressly prohibits grant of new permit to any person on any route covered by a draft scheme. admittedly, the route for which the petitioners in both these writ petitions have obtained permits is covered by an approved scheme. no new permit could have been granted to the petitioners in these petitions on and after 1-7-1990. it is submitted that s. 10 of the impugned act expressly refers to the date of the publication of the act and all proceedings taken for grant of permits during the period 4-6-1976 to 31-7-1992 be deemed to be and to have always been taken in accordance with the provisions of the impugned act, as if the act had been in force at all material times. unless the grant or variation of a permit could have been made between 1-7-1990 and 31-7-1992, there is no question of validation of each permit. obviously the section being applicable to grant, variation,modification, extension or curtailment of the route has to be read in two parts. if it is a question of grant of permit, it can validate only any grant made on and before 30-6-1990. if it is a question of variation, modification etc. of a permit which had been granted earlier, before 30-6-1990, such variation or modification made before 31-7-1992 would be valid. while s. 3 of the impugned act refers to grant, renewal and variation, s. 6 refers only to renewal and variation. reading ss. 3 and 6 together, there can be no doubt that a fresh grant of permit cannot be made after 30-6-1990, whereas renewal or variation of a permit granted earlier could be made after the said date.an ingenious argument is sought to be advanced by submitting that the act does not prescribe any date for s. 7 to come into force. it is, therefore, submitted that s. 7 of the impugned act has not yet come into force and no proceeding will abate. there is no substance in this argument in as much as the provisions of the tamil nadu general clauses act would apply in the absence of any express provision in the act prescribing the date on which the section would come into force. section 5(1) of the tamil nadu general clauses act, 1891 provides that where any act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then, it shall come into operation on the day on which the assent thereto of the president is first published in the official gazette. we have omitted the other portion of the section as they are unnecessary for this case. the assent of the president was published on 31-7-1992 and therefore, we have no doubt that s. 7 of the impugned act has come into force on that date. we have no hesitation in holding that the permits granted by the state transport appellate tribunal in favour of the petitioners in w.p. nos. 2200 and 2418 of 1993 are not validated by s. 10 of the impugned act and consequently hit by the provisions of s.6(4) of the impugned act. consequently, the two permits are invalid.another contention is urged by learned counsel that s. 6(4) of the impugned act bars only grant of permits for the entirety of theroute from terminus to terminus and does not prevent the grant of permits for portions or sectors. it is contended that the section uses the expression 'any route' and route has been defined in s. 2(38) of the main act as meaning a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another. no doubt, the argument is attractive in the first blush, but there is no merit in it. the section clearly refers to any route covered by an approved scheme. it naturally means the route which is the subject matter of the approved scheme. the impugned act states that the expression 'modified route' shall have the same meaning as in s. 100 of the main act. section 100(3) of the main act reads thus :'the scheme relating to the proposal as approved or modified under sub-sec. (2) shall thus be published in the official gazette by the state government making such scheme and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route covered by such scheme and the same shall thereupon become final on the date of its publication in the official gazette and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route.'thus, the expression 'route' covered by the scheme is urged in s. 100(3) of the main act and it shall be called the notified route. hence, the expression 'route' in s. 6(4) of the impugned act must necessarily mean the 'notified route'. the provisions of chapter v of the main act as interpreted by the supreme court in egappan's case : [1987]2scr391 prohibited the grant of permits for any portion or sector of the route to small operators.learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned act is a beneficial legislation and s. 10 should be construed liberally as to benefit a larger group of persons similarly situated. according to him. s. 10 of the impugned act is a temporary provision for limited period and even after it expires, the benefit thereof will be available to alt persons who could have availed of it whenit was in force. reliance is placed on the following passage in the book 'principles of statutory interpretation' by g. p. singh, 5th edition, page362 :-- 'when a temporary act expires, s. 6 of the general clauses act, 1897, which in terms is limited to repeals has no application. the effect of expiry, therefore, depends upon the construction of the act itself. the leading authority on the point is the dicta of park. b. in stevenson v. oliver. 1841 151 er 1024. (pp. 1026, 1027). the extent of the restrictions imposed and the duration of its provision, are matters of construction'.he has also invited our attention to the rulings in (a) gopi chand v. delhi administration : 1959crilj782 , (b) state of orissa v. bhupendra kumar : air1962sc945 amirtham kudumbah v. sarnam kudumban (air 1991 sc 1256) and (d) shi-vaji dayana patil v. vatchala uttam more : [1991]3scr26a and contended that an unduly restrictive construction should be avoided. we cannot agree. the passage in the text book on the rulings cited have no application in this case. when the language of the statute is very clear, there is no escape from the rigour of it. hence, both the writ petitions have to be dismissed.accordingly, it is held that the grantees cannot take advantage of the provisions and the permits granted in their favour cannot be held to have been validated. point (iii) is answered accordingly.point iv15. in the light of the findings recorded on points (i) to (iii), point (iv) has also to be answered in favour of the writ petitioner in w.p. no. 10498 of 1993, in view of the fact that as the permits are invalid, no timings can be assigned and even if the timings are assigned, the grantees cannot be permitted to operate. the grantees have also produced an order dated 9-6-1993 passed by the secretary, regional transport authority, trichy, in r. no. 71571/a2/85 assigning certain timings to the stage carriage permits of the respondents 2 to 4 in writ petition 10498 of 1993. as the permits are held to be invalid, we take onrecord the order dated 9-6-1993 of the regional transport authority, which is produced before us by the grantees and hold that the timings granted in favour of grantees are liable to be quashed, as the permits to which the timings are assigned, are invalid. accordingly, the order dated 9-6-1993 passed by the secretary, regional transport authority, in r. no. 71571 /a2/ 85 is liable to be quashed.16. for the reasons stated above, these writ appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991 and writ petition 10498 of 1993 are allowed. the order dated 1907-1991 passed by the learned single judge dismissing writ petitions 9909, 9910 and 9911 of 1991 is set aside. the writ petitions are allowed. the order dated 24-4-1991 passed by the state transport appellate tribunal in appeals 710, 729 and 743 of 1987 is set aside. the appeals are dismissed.17. the permits granted pursuant to theorder dated 24-4-1991 passed in by the state transport appellate tribunal in appeals, 710, 729 and 743 of 1987 in favour of therespondent no. 1 in each of the writ appeals1011 to 1013 and respondents 2 to 4 in w.p. no. 10498 of 1993 are quashed. the proceedings dated 9-6-1993 bearing r. no. 71571/a285 of the secretary, regional transport authority trichy, assigning timings to thepermits in question are quashed w.a.. no.1111 of 1993 does not survive. it is accordingly, dismissed. however, there shall be noorder as to costs.18. order accordingly.

Judgment:
ORDER

K. A. Swami, CJ.

1. The first three writ appeals are preferred against the common order dated 19-7-1991 passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petitions 9909 to 9911/91, whereas Writ Appeal 1111 of 1993 is preferred against the order dated 21-9-1993 rejecting W.M.P. 16050 of 1993 filed in Writ Petition 10498 of 1993. When Writ Appeal 1111 of 1993 came up for consideration, it was brought to our notice that Writ Appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991 also involve the same point and are concerned with the validity of the permits granted in favour of the 1st respondent in each one of the appeals. It was also submitted that the arguments in Writ Appeal 1111 of 1993 and Writ Petition 10498 of 1993 will be the same. Therefore, we directed the writ appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991 and Writ Petition 10498 of 1993 be posted with Writ Appeal 1111 of 1993.

2. All these matters had come up on anearlier occasion for hearing, but at the requestof the learned counsel appearing for thegrantees of the permits, they were adjourned.Accordingly, these matters have come uptoday for final disposal.

3. The facts necessary for the purpose ofdeciding the contentions urged, which are common to all these matters are as follows: The Regional Transport Authority, Trichy, invited applications for grant of stage carriage permit on the route Tiruvanaikoil to Regional Engineering College, Trichy, in the year 1982. There were about 14 applications filed by various operators. The appellants in Writ Appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991 and the 1st respondent in each one of them were also the applicants. The petitioner in W.P. No. 10498 of 1993 was not an applicant. It may be pointed out that the petitioner in Writ Petition 10498 of 1993 and the appellant in Writ Appeal 1111 of 1993 are the same, viz., Dheeran Chinnamalai Transport Corporation.

4. The Regional Transport Authority by its resolution dated 13-3-1986 rejected all the applications except that of Annamalai Transports, applicant No. 11 in the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority. The application of Cholan Roadways Transport Corporation was rejected on the ground that there was a bifurcation of the Cholan Roadways Transport Corporation into two corporations, viz., Cholan Roadways Corporation and Deeran Chinnamalai Transport Corporation Limited, that Deeran Chinnamalai Transport Corporation Limited was not an applicant and the request of Cholan' Roadways Transport Corporation for granting the permit in favour of Deeran Chinnamalai Transport Corporation could not be granted. As far as Annamalai Transport is concerned, the Regional Transport Authority taking into consideration the experience both in town and mofussil bus services, sector qualification in between Gandhi Market and R.E.C. and also the fact that after 1975, it has not been granted any permit, preferred Annamalai Transport, Trichy and granted the permit on the route T. V. Koil to Regional Engineering College, via K..G. Gate, Butter-worth Road, E.B. Road, Market, Ariyamangaiam, Tiruverumbur and B.H.E.L. Training Centre.

4.1. Aggrieved by the aforesaid grant, three unsuccessful applicants, viz., Thiru Asa Johan Divianathan, Tvl. PL.A. Service andThiru S. Chandrasekharan, preferred appeals 710, 729 and 743 of 1981 respectively. An-namalai Transport was the respondent. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal by the order dated 24-4-1991 allowed all the appeals on the basis of the joint memo filed by the appellants and the respondent therein and granted permits to all the three appellants and confirmed the one granted in favour of Annamalai Transport.

4.2. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the Cholan Roadways Corporation preferred Writ Petitions 9909, 9910, 9911 of 1991. Learned single Judge by the order dated 19-7-1991 rejected the writ petitions on the ground that there was a bifurcation of the Corporation into two, viz., Cholan Roadways, Corporation and Deeran Chinnamalai Transport Corporation, that it did not challenge the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority rejecting its application and granting the permit in favour of Annamalai Transport Corporation.

5. Aggrieved by the order dated 19-7-1991, passed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid three petitions. Writ Appeals 1011, 3012 and 1013 of 1991 are preferred.

6. It may be relevant to notice that even though the grant was made as long back as 24-4-91 in favour of 1st respondent in all the three appeals, W.A. Nos. 1011 to 1013 of 1991, the permits have not yet been issued, as the timings conference, had not taken place till 9-6-1993.

7. Writ Petition 10498 of 1993 is filed by Deeran Chinnamalai Transport Corporation seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the 1st respondent dated 11-5-1993 made in R. No. 71571 / A2/85. As the interim prayer made in W.M.P. 16050 of 1993 has been refused, Writ Appeal 1111 of 1993 is filed.

8. One more circumstance which requires to be noticed at this stage is that on 10-11-82 the Cholan Roadways Transport Corporation published two draft schemes relating to two routes Woraiyur to B.H.E.L. (via) Puthur, Court. Junction, Karai. Ghandhi Market and Thiruverumhur for 20.6 kms. and K. K. Nagar to Srirangam (Via) Simca MotorJunction, Central Bus Stand, Palakkarai, Marakkadai Gate, Chinthamani Bus Stand and Tiruvanaikoil for 15.6 kms. Both the Schemes were approved unde,r G.O. Ms. 1341, Home (Transport-D) dated 23rd June, 1990 and G.O. Ms. 1439, Home (Transport-D) dated 25th June, 1990 respectively and were published in the Government Gazette Extraordinary on 27-6-1990. The validity of the approved schemes was challenged in W.Ps. 7201 of 1990 etc., The writ petition were allowed on 31-10-1990 by a Division Bench of this Court and the schemes were declared invalid. However, the Cholan Roadways Transport Corporation approached the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal on 16-4-1993, set aside the order of the High Court dated 31-10-1990 and declared the approved schemes as valid. The result is that from 10-11-1982 the draft scheme is operating, covering the two routes mentioned above and both the schemes have been approved on 27-6-1990. Therefore, on the date the State Transport Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeals 710, 729 and 743 of 1987 and granted the permits to respondents 2 to 4 in writ petition 10948 of 1993 and the 1st respondent in each of the writ appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991, the approved schemes must be held to have been in operation.

9. It is not disputed before us that the route Thiruvanakoil to Regional Engineering College, Trichy overlaps the two routes, viz., Woraiyur to BHEL and K. K. Nagar to Srirangam covered by the approved schemes.

10. In the background of these undisputed facts and in the light of the contentions urged on both sides, the following points arise for consideration.

(i) Whether the Cholan Roadways Transport Corporation can be considered to be an aggrieved party?

(ii) Whether the permits granted in favour of respondents 2 to 4 in Writ Petition 10498 of 1993, who are also 1st respondent in each of the Writ Appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991 respectively are liable to be quashed, as the same overlap the routes covered by the two approved schemes, viz., Woraiyur to BHELand K.K. Nagar to Srirangam.

(iii) What is the effect of Act 41 of 1992 on the proceedings in question?

(iv) Whether the petitioner in Writ Petition 10498 of 1993 is entitled to the relief sought for?

Point (i):

11. The contention of Dr. V. Subramaniam, learned counsel appearing for the grantees is that as the permits granted in favour of them were not challenged by the Cholan Roadways Transport Corporation by preferring an appeal and as it is not operating any service on the routes of the approved scheme in question, it cannot be considered to be an aggrieved person. It is not possible to accept this argument. It is the Cholan Roadways Transport Corporation which has prepared and published the approved scheme. Therefore, it is entitled to ensure that the scheme is not violated. In addition to this, Section 103 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) specifically provides that where in pursuance of an approved scheme, any State transport undertaking applies in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf for a stage carriage permit or a goods carriage permit or a contract carriage permit in respect of a notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority in any case where the said area or route lies in more than one region and the Regional Transport Authority in any other case shall issue such permits to the State Transport undertaking, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter V. Therefore, apart from the fact that it has prepared and published the schemes, even if there is a bifurcation in the Corporation and accordingly,' Deeran Chinnamalai Transport Corporation is to operate on the routes covered by the Schemes, it does not in any way affect the right of the Cholan Roadways Transport Corporation to challenge the permits granted contrary to the approved schemes in question. A Division Bench of this Court has also considered the question of locus standi more or less under the similar circumstances in Review Application 8 of 1993 and WritPetition 10091 of 1993 decided on 28-7-1993 (Sri Ardhanari Transports Pvt. Ltd. v. Cheran Transport Corporation Ltd. In paragraph No. 19 of the Judgment, it has been held as follows:--

'Taking the question of locus standi in the first instance, we find that there is no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the applicant. We have already referred to the fact that the Tribunal dismissed the application of first respondent to implead itself as a party to the appeal on the ground that the matter would be considered under the old Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 and any order in the appeal would only result in only one person being entitled to the permit on the route in question. The said reasoning of the Tribunal was expressly approved by this Court in its order in the writ petition and only because of that, the writ petition was dismissed. But when the Tribunal acted contrary to what was stated earlier and applied the provisions of the new Motor Vehicles Act of 1988, accepting the joint memo of compromise filed by the parties and also taking a wrong view of the ruling in Bappan's case : [1987]2SCR391 , the first respondents is undoubtely entitled to challenge the order of the Tribunal inasmuch as the grant of permit in favour of the applicant herein offends the provisions of the Act as well as the approved schemes. As stated already, the schemes were prepared and published by the first respondent and approved by the Government under the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no dispute at any stage that the route in question viz., Srurnugai to Coimbatore overlaps the two approved scheme routes. Even the order of the Tribunal says so. Hence, there can be no doubt whatever that the first respondent has locus standi to maintain the writ petition.'

Therefore, we are of the view that a mere fact that Cholan Roadways Transport Corporation did not challenge the permits granted in favour of respondents 2 to 4 in Writ Petition No. 10498 of 1993 before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal did not in any way affect its right to challenge the permits on the ground that those permits were violativeof the schemes, Accordingly, the first point is answered in the affirmative and it is held that the Cholan Roadways Transport Corporation is an aggrieved person and has locus standi to challenge the same......

Point (ii) --

12. The contention of learned counsel appearing for the grantees is that the approved schemes in question cannot at all be considered as schemes of total exclusion, therefore the permits that have been granted covering a portion of the route of the approved schemes cannot be held to have contravened the schemes and as such, the Tribunal cannot be held to have exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the permits. On the contrary, it is the contention of the appellant that both the approved schemes are the schemes of total exclusion and that there is no scope whatsoever to contend that the schemes are not of total exclusion, but are of only partial exclusion. In order to determine the validity of the rival contentions, it is relevant to refer to the relevant portion of both the approved schemes:--

Approval of Scheme of State Transport Undertaking

(G. O. Ms. No. 1341, Home (Transport-D), 23rd June. 1990.No.II(1)/IIO/100(33-4)/90

Whereas the Cholan Transport Corporation Limited prepared and published the scheme relating to the route Woraiyur to B.H.E.L. under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) in Part VI -- Section of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, dated 10th November, 1982. The scheme is now held by the Deeran Chinnamalai Transport Corporation Limited.

And whereas no objection with reference to sub-section (1) of Section 68-D of the said Act (Section 100 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Central Act 59 of 1988 to the said scheme has been received by the Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu in the Home Department, who is empowered to exercise the powers of the State Government under Section 100 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Central Act 59 of 1988) in pursuance of Rule 24 of the Tamil Nadu Government Business Rules, 1978 (sic).

Now, therefore, I, R. Nagarajan, Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, in the Home Department hereby approve as modified the said scheme under sub-section (2) of Section 100 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1983 (Central Act 59 of 1988).

Approval of Scheme of State Transport

Undertakings

(G. O. Ms. No. 1438, Home (Transport-D),

25th June, 1990

Whereas the Cholan Roadways Corporation Limited prepared and published the-scheme relating to the route K. K. Nagar to Srirangam under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) at page of Part VI -- Section 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, dated 9th November, 1983. The scheme is now held by the Peeran Chinnamalai Transport Corporation Limited.

Whereas no objection with reference to sub-section (1) of Section 68-D of the said Act (Section 100 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 Central Act 59 of 1988) to the said scheme has been received by the secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu in the Home Department, whois empowered to exercise the powers of the State Government under Section 100 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Central Act 59 of 1988) in pursuance of Rule 24 of the Tamil Nadu Government Business Rules, 1978 :

Now, therefore, I, R. Nagarajan, Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu in the Home Department hereby approve the said sub Section (2) of Section 100 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Central Act 59 of 1988).

It is clear that both the schemes are the schemes of complete exclusion of the persons operating on the route except the State Transport Undertakings of the State. The schemes give the length and the other details of the route, in other words, the stages of the route from the starting point to terminal. When the scheme says that it is to the total exclusion of other persons operating on theroute except two State Transport Undertakings of the State, it means that private operators are not allowed to operate on any portion of the route. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the grantees is that normally, the schemes will contain the other details such as to the complete exclusion ofother persons operating on the entire route except the State Transport Undertakings of the State and other persons of the other Statesoperating under any permit or the entire route, etc. and the scheme will also State whether it covers the sector also. As, in the instant case, only the route is mentioned fromthe mere fact that in columns No. 4 and 5, it is stated that it is to the complete exclusion of other persons operating on the route, it cannot be held that the scheme is one of total exclusion. In our view, there is no ambiguity in the scheme, in-as-much-as it specifically states that it is to the complete exclusion of other persons operating on the route except the State Transport undertakings of the State, learned counsel for the grantees, however, tried to contend that the scheme is not formulated as per the provisions contained in Section 99 of the Act, therefore, it cannot be held to be a valid scheme. This argument can only be stated to be rejected, in as much as the validity of the scheme is not challenged before us. In the absence of any challenge to the scheme, if the scheme has to be interpreted and enforced, as the scheme is the law, it is the duty of the Court to enforce the law. The scheme does not leave any scope for contending that it is not a scheme of total exclusion. In such a situation, no private operator is allowed to operate his stage carriage on any portion of the route. This legal position as stated in Section 104 of the Act is also no more res integra, in the light of the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in M/s. Adarsh Travels Bus Service v. State of U. P. : AIR1986SC319 . The relevant portions of the decision as found in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are as follows :--

Paragraph 5:

'It is thus seen that while the provisions of Chapter IV-A are devised to override the provisions of Chapter IV and is expressly so enacted, the provisions of Chapter-IV-A are clear and complete regarding 'the manner and effect of' the 'take over' of the operation of a road transport undertaking in relation to any area or route or portion thereof. While on the one hand, the paramount consideration is the public interests, the interest of the existing operators are sufficiently taken care of and such slight inconvenience to the travelling public as may be inevitable are sought to be reduced to a minimum......'

Paragraph 6 :

'A careful and diligent perusal of S. 68 C,S. 68 D (3) and S. 68FF in the light of the definition of the expression 'route' in S. 2 (28 A) appears to make it manifestly clear that once a scheme is published under S. 68-D in relation to any area or route or portion thereof, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of other persons or otherwise, no person other than the State Transport undertaking may operate on the notified area or notified route except as provided in the scheme itself. A necessary consequence of these provisions is that no private operator can operate his vehicle on any part or portion of a notified area or notified route unless authorised so to do by the terms of the scheme itself. He may not operate on any part or portion of the notified route or area on the mere ground that the permit as originally granted to him covered the notified route or area ......' ..... 'It is also well known that often times permits for plying stage carriages from a point a short distance beyond another terminus of a notified route have been applied for and granted subject to the so called 'corridor restrictions' which are but mere ruses or traps to obtain permits and to frustrate the scheme. If indeed there is any need for protecting the travelling public from inconvenience as suggested by the learned counsel we have no doubt that the State Transport undertaking and the Government will make a sufficient provision in the scheme itself to avoid inconvenience being caused to the travelling public.'

Paragraph 7 :

'One of the submissions urged was that a route, according to definition, meant a line drawn between two terminal and, therefore, route AB cannot be the same route as CD even if C & D happened to be two points on the highway from A to B. It was argued that if route AB was different from route CD, the nationalisation of route CD had no effect whatsoever on the permits to ply stage carriages on the route AB, This argument is specious and is only to be stated to be rejected. In fact, whatever argument was open to the learned counsel on the basis of the decision of the Privy Council in Kelani Valley Motor Transit Co. Ltd. v. Colombo RatnapuraOmnibus Co. Ltd., AIR 1946 PC 137(supra) is no longer open to them in view ofthe definition of route inserted in S. 2(28-A)of the Motor Vehicles Act by the AmendingAct of 1969). We do not have the slightestdoubt that route AB covers and includesevery part of the particular highway from A toB traversed by the Motor vehicle along thatroute. It is impossible to accept the argumentthat only the termini have to be looked at andthe rest of the highway ignored in order todiscover a route for the purposes of the MotorVehicles Act. Equally without substance is theplea that if an operator does not pick up or setdown any passenger between the two pointsof the common sector he cannot be said to beplying a stage carriage between those twopoints. The argument is entirely devoid ofsubstance for the simple reason that theoperator does charge the passenger for thedistance travelled along the highway between these two points also. Another argument which was advanced and which is also lackingin substance is that a complete exclusion ofprivate operators from the common sectorwould be violative of Article 14 and that itwould be ultra vires S. 68-D. We are unable tosee how either Article 14 or S. 68-D of theMotor Vehicles Act hit a scheme whichprovides for complete exclusion of privateoperators from the whole or any part of thenotified area. Almost all these submissionshave been considered and met by the majorityjudgment in Mysore State Road TransportCorpn. v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, : [1975]1SCR493 towhich we shall presently refer.'

12.1. Subsequent to this case, ah effort appears to have been made before the Supreme Court to dilute the legal position stated herein in Bihar State Road Transport Corporation v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, : [1991]1SCR667 , but the said effort has not received the approval of the Supreme Court. On the contrary, Adarsh Travels case, : AIR1986SC319 has been approved. The relevant portions of that decision are as follows (at pp.702, 703 of AIR SCW) :--

'5. We have had the advantage of hearingMr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant only since no one appeared either on behalf of the State of Bihar nor for the permit holders respondents 3 and 4. The sole point for consideration is whether the view taken by the Patna High Court in Marwari Motor Service case AIR 1973 Patna 273 is any more relevant in view of the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Adarsh Travels Bus Service v. State of U. P. : AIR1986SC319 .

6. In Adarsh Travels case : AIR1986SC319 , this court ruled that if the route has been nationalised under Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, a private operator with a permit to ply stage carriage for another route, which has a common overlapping sector with the nationalised route can ply his vehicle over that part of the overlapping common sector if he does not pick up or drop passengers on the overlapping part of the route, and the question would really get the right answer on the terms of the scheme rather than on the provision of the statute. The word 'route' was introduced to be defined in Section 2(29-A) of the Act by amendment from March 2, 1970 to mean the line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another. Spelling out the necessity for its so defining it was recorded (SCC p. 562, para 4) : (at pp. 32], 322 of AIR 1986) :

'The introduction of Section 2(28-A) defining the expression 'Route' appears to have been necessitated to dispel the seeming acceptance by this Court in Nilkanth Prasad v. State of Bihar : AIR1962SC1135 of the suggested difference between 'route' and 'highway' by the Privy Council in Kelani Valley Motor Transit Co. Ltd. v. Colombo- Ratnapura Omnibus Co. Ltd., 1946 AC 338 : AIR 1946 PC 137 where it was said,

'A 'highway' the physical track along which an omnibus runs, whilst a 'route' appears to their Lordships to be an abstract conception of line of travel between one terminus and another and to be something distinct from the highway traversed.... theremay be alternative roads leading from one terminous to another but that does not make the route and highway the same.'

The present definition of route makes it a physical reality instead of an abstract conception and no- longer makes it something distinct from the highway traversed.'

7. In the light of the above observations Ranchi-Chaibasa route is identified as the line of travel on which State Transport Undertaking on nationalisation is allowed to run its vehicles. The bracketed words 'direct service' occurring in Serial No. 7 when contrasted with entries in Serial Nos. 1 to 6 reveal that the total route of Ranchi-Chaibasa, without leaving any portion, stood nationalised signifying by its name that Ranchi-Chaibasa route is a straight and direct line of travel which would be traversed by a vehicle by the State Transport Undertaking between two termini rendering all kinds of services. Any further interpretation would frustrate the object of Chapter IV-A whereunder the scheme is prepared. It was observed in Adarsh Travels case : AIR1986SC319 :--

'It is quite well known that under the guise of the so-called 'corridor restrictions' permits over longer routes which cover shorter notified routes or 'overlapping' parts of notified routes are more often than not mis-utilsed since it is well impossible to keep a proper check at every point of the route. Often times permits for plying stage carriages from a point a short distance beyond one terminus to a point at a short distance beyond another terminus of a notified route have been applied for and granted subject to the so-called 'corridor restrictions' which are but mere ruses or traps to obtain permits and to frustrate the scheme. If indeed there is any need for protecting the travelling public from inconvenience, the State Transport Undertaking and the government will have to make sufficient provision in the scheme itself to avoid inconvenience being caused to the travelling public.'

8. If the interpretation put by the Patna High Court in Marwari Motor Service case : AIR1973Pat273 to the bracketed words 'direct service' is to be kept valid it would frustrate the very purpose of nationalisation, for any person in that event could operate on a nationalised route by adding thereto, or subtracting therefrom, some kileanmetre-roge and keep one terminus as a point of start, or a point of ending, on an unnotified route and put forward his willingness to submit himself to the discipline called 'corridor restrictions' which practice has been deprecated by this Court.'

12.2. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the grantees that the permits granted to respondents 2 to 4 in Writ Petition 10498 of 1992 are not violative of the two approved schemes referred to above.

13. Learned counsel for the grantees also placed reliance on a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Erode Service, Coimbatore v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras-5 (W.P. Nos. 973, 979, 1447, 1499 etc. of 1964 and 1965) dated 23rd August 1965. On the basis of this decision, it is contended that the operation on a portion of the route covered by the approved scheme is permissible in the light .of the wordings contained in the ..... scheme.We have gone through the decision carefully. We are of the view that the decision takes a view totally contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in Adarsh Travels case (AIR 1986 SC 319). Therefore, we overrule the said decision. Point (ii) is, accordingly, answered in the affirmative.

Point (iii) :

14. This Point need not detain us any longer, because a Division Bench of this Court has also considered the validity and effect of S. 10 of Act 41 of 1992. Learned counsel for the grantees relying on S. 10 of Act 41 of 1992, contended, that the permits granted in favour of respondents 2 to 4 on 24-4-1991 by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in Appeals 710, 729 and 743 are validated. A Division Bench of this Court in a batch of Writ Petitions 1221 to 1223 of 1991 /1992 etc. (M/s. Jeeva Transport Corpn.Ltd. v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras-104) decided on 30th April, 1993 has held that Act 41 of 1991 is valid and it has also been further held as to the scope of S. 10 of Act 41 of 1991 as follows :--

'In W.P. Nos. 2200 and 2418 of 1993, the petitioners are intra-State operators. An alternative contention is raised by the petitioners in these petitions. They have also challenged the validity of the provisions of Ss. 1(3), 6(4) and 7 of the impugned Act. In both the cases, permits have been granted to them by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 28-2-1992. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that both the cases are governed by Sec. 10 of the impugned Act and that the permits have been validated by the provisions of the said section. It is contended that the section is operative from 4-6-1976 to the date of publication of the Act viz., 31-7-1992. There is no merit in this contention. Section 1(3) of the impugned Act provides that all the provisions of the Act except Ss. 6 and 7 shall be deemed to have come into force on 4th June, 1976 and remained in force up to and inclusive of 30th June, 1990. Hence, S. 19 of the impugned Act also ceased to be in force after 30th June 1990. On the date of publication of the Act, viz., 30-7-1992 the section was not in existence. Section 6(4) of the impugned Act Expressly prohibits grant of new permit to any person on any route covered by a draft Scheme. Admittedly, the route for which the petitioners in both these writ petitions have obtained permits is covered by an approved scheme. No new permit could have been granted to the petitioners in these petitions on and after 1-7-1990. It is submitted that S. 10 of the impugned Act expressly refers to the date of the publication of the Act and all proceedings taken for grant of permits during the period 4-6-1976 to 31-7-1992 be deemed to be and to have always been taken in accordance with the provisions of the impugned Act, as if the Act had been in force at all material times. Unless the grant or variation of a permit could have been made between 1-7-1990 and 31-7-1992, there is no question of validation of each permit. Obviously the section being applicable to grant, variation,modification, extension or curtailment of the route has to be read in two parts. If it is a question of grant of permit, it can validate only any grant made on and before 30-6-1990. If it is a question of variation, modification etc. of a permit which had been granted earlier, before 30-6-1990, such variation or modification made before 31-7-1992 would be valid. While S. 3 of the impugned Act refers to grant, renewal and variation, S. 6 refers only to renewal and variation. Reading Ss. 3 and 6 together, there can be no doubt that a fresh grant of permit cannot be made after 30-6-1990, whereas renewal or variation of a permit granted earlier could be made after the said date.

An ingenious argument is sought to be advanced by submitting that the Act does not prescribe any date for S. 7 to come into force. It is, therefore, submitted that S. 7 of the impugned Act has not yet come into force and no proceeding will abate. There is no substance in this argument in as much as the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act would apply in the absence of any express provision in the Act prescribing the date on which the section would come into force. Section 5(1) of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891 provides that where any Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then, it shall come into operation on the day on which the assent thereto of the President is first published in the Official Gazette. We have omitted the other portion of the section as they are unnecessary for this case. The assent of the President was published on 31-7-1992 and therefore, we have no doubt that S. 7 of the impugned Act has come into force on that date. We have no hesitation in holding that the permits granted by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in favour of the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 2200 and 2418 of 1993 are not validated by S. 10 of the impugned Act and consequently hit by the provisions of S.6(4) of the impugned Act. Consequently, the two permits are invalid.

Another contention is urged by learned counsel that S. 6(4) of the impugned Act bars only grant of permits for the entirety of theroute from terminus to terminus and does not prevent the grant of permits for portions or sectors. It is contended that the section uses the expression 'any route' and route has been defined in S. 2(38) of the main Act as meaning a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another. No doubt, the argument is attractive in the first blush, but there is no merit in it. The section clearly refers to any route covered by an approved scheme. It naturally means the route which is the subject matter of the approved scheme. The impugned Act states that the expression 'modified route' shall have the same meaning as in S. 100 of the main Act. Section 100(3) of the main Act reads thus :

'The scheme relating to the proposal as approved or modified under sub-sec. (2) shall thus be published in the Official Gazette by the State Government making such scheme and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route covered by such scheme and the same shall thereupon become final on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route.'

Thus, the expression 'route' covered by the scheme is urged in S. 100(3) of the main Act and it shall be called the notified route. Hence, the expression 'route' in S. 6(4) of the impugned Act must necessarily mean the 'notified route'. The provisions of Chapter V of the main Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Egappan's case : [1987]2SCR391 prohibited the grant of permits for any portion or sector of the route to small operators.

Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned Act is a beneficial legislation and S. 10 should be construed liberally as to benefit a larger group of persons similarly situated. According to him. S. 10 of the impugned Act is a temporary provision for limited period and even after it expires, the benefit thereof will be available to alt persons who could have availed of it whenit was in force. Reliance is placed on the following passage in the book 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' by G. P. Singh, 5th Edition, page362 :--

'When a temporary Act expires, S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which in terms is limited to repeals has no application. The effect of expiry, therefore, depends upon the construction of the Act itself. The leading authority on the point is the dicta of Park. B. in Stevenson v. Oliver. 1841 151 ER 1024. (pp. 1026, 1027). The extent of the restrictions imposed and the duration of its provision, are matters of construction'.He has also invited our attention to the rulings in (a) Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration : 1959CriLJ782 , (b) State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar : AIR1962SC945 Amirtham Kudumbah v. Sarnam Kudumban (AIR 1991 SC 1256) and (d) Shi-vaji Dayana Patil v. Vatchala Uttam More : [1991]3SCR26a and contended that an unduly restrictive construction should be avoided. We cannot agree. The passage in the text book on the rulings cited have no application in this case. When the language of the statute is very clear, there is no escape from the rigour of it. Hence, both the writ petitions have to be dismissed.

Accordingly, it is held that the grantees cannot take advantage of the provisions and the permits granted in their favour cannot be held to have been validated. Point (iii) is answered accordingly.

Point IV

15. In the light of the findings recorded on Points (i) to (iii), Point (iv) has also to be answered in favour of the writ petitioner in W.P. No. 10498 of 1993, in view of the fact that as the permits are invalid, no timings can be assigned and even if the timings are assigned, the grantees cannot be permitted to operate. The grantees have also produced an order dated 9-6-1993 passed by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Trichy, in R. No. 71571/A2/85 assigning certain timings to the stage carriage permits of the respondents 2 to 4 in Writ Petition 10498 of 1993. As the permits are held to be invalid, we take onrecord the order dated 9-6-1993 of the Regional Transport Authority, which is produced before us by the grantees and hold that the timings granted in favour of grantees are liable to be quashed, as the permits to which the timings are assigned, are invalid. Accordingly, the order dated 9-6-1993 passed by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, in R. No. 71571 /A2/ 85 is liable to be quashed.

16. For the reasons stated above, these writ appeals 1011 to 1013 of 1991 and writ petition 10498 of 1993 are allowed. The order dated 1907-1991 passed by the learned single Judge dismissing writ petitions 9909, 9910 and 9911 of 1991 is set aside. The writ petitions are allowed. The order dated 24-4-1991 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in Appeals 710, 729 and 743 of 1987 is set aside. The appeals are dismissed.

17. The permits granted pursuant to theorder dated 24-4-1991 passed in by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in Appeals, 710, 729 and 743 of 1987 in favour of therespondent No. 1 in each of the writ appeals1011 to 1013 and respondents 2 to 4 in W.P. No. 10498 of 1993 are quashed. The proceedings dated 9-6-1993 bearing R. No. 71571/A285 of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority Trichy, assigning timings to thepermits in question are quashed W.A.. No.1111 of 1993 does not survive. It is accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be noorder as to costs.

18. Order accordingly.