Noor Mohammed Vs. Satish Kumar and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/773328
SubjectLimitation
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided OnFeb-11-2002
Case NumberD.B. Civil Special Appeal (W) Nos. 90, 100 of 2001
Judge B.S. Chauhan and; D.N. Joshi, JJ.
Reported in2003(2)WLC87; 2002(3)WLN530
AppellantNoor Mohammed
RespondentSatish Kumar and ors.
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Cases ReferredIn Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors.
Excerpt:
rajasthan high court ordinance, 1949 - section 18--ex-parte award under motor vehicles act, 1988 qua appellant--appeal against award dismissed being time barred by 1625 days--special appeal--held, ex-parte award was made only after service of notice--no sufficient cause shown for delay--appellant cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong--rules of limitation are not means to destroy the rights of parties rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time--time barred cases should not be entertained by courts as the rights which have accrued to other by reason of delay in approaching the court cannot be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for it--justice pleaded should not cause great injustice to other party--appellant not entitled for any relief in equity as he lacks bonafides of prosecuting his case properly--no special feature presented to warrant condonation of delay--appeal devoid of merit.;special appeal dismissed - - 480/1989 and 482/1989 before the motor accident claims tribunal and the tribunal issued notices to the appellant as well as other parties. 5. the issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every day by the courts. justice itself, which we are want to appeal to as a test as well as an ideal, may mean different things to different minds and at different times. 223-24; fallon publications, 1947). 14. therefore, the court must consider all pros and cons and inconvenience caused to the other side as well as to the courts which are over-burdened with this kind of litigations for the fault of the litigants not taking proper care in the due time.b.s. chauhan, j.1. these appeals have been filed against the order dated 14.2.2001 passed in s.b. civil misc. appeals no. 1553/1999 and 1654/1999 by a learned single judge of this court, by which the appeals have been dismissed being time-barred by 1625 days having shown no sufficient cause.2. the matter originated from the proceedings under the provisions of the motor vehicles act, 1988 as the victims of the accident filed claim petitions no. 480/1989 and 482/1989 before the motor accident claims tribunal and the tribunal issued notices to the appellant as well as other parties. inspite of service, the appellant did not enter appearance and he was proceeded ex-parte. after hearing the other parties, the award was made on 13.2.1995 in both, the claim petitions. appellant preferred first appeals against the said award, which have been dismissed by the learned single judge vide impugned judgment and order dated 14.2.2001 being hopelessly time barred and not showing any sufficient cause. hence these special appeals.3. mrs. naina saraf, learned counsel for appellant, has vehemently submitted that these were the fit cases wherein the learned single judge ought to have condoned the delay of 1625 days and entertained the appeals on merit. however, she has been fair enough in admitting the factual position that the appellant had received the notices from the tribunal and did not enter appearance for the reason that he handed over the notice to other person, viz., nawab khan and believed that nawab khan will take care of the cases. it is not a case where the ex-parte award qua the appellant had been made without serving notice upon him.4. the explanation furnished by the appellant that he came to know about the award only on 30.10.1999 is also far from satisfaction. thus, no 'sufficient cause' has properly been shown by the appellant, nor there is any satisfactory explanation of such inordinate delay of four years, five and half months. appellant cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong and burden this court with such cases without realising that he was solely responsible for the ex-parte award qua him as he did not enter appearance inspite of notice.5. the issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every day by the courts. mrs. naina saraf, learned counsel for the appellant placed very heavy reliance upon the judgment of the hon'ble supreme court in collector, land acquisition, anantnag and anr. v. mst. katiji and ors. : (1987)illj500sc , wherein the court has observed that when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the reason that other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay.6. the law of limitation is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). rules of limitation are not means to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.7. time-barred cases should not be entertained by courts as the rights which have accrued to others by reason of delay in approaching the court, cannot be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. the vested rights of the parties should not be disrupted at the instance of a person who is a guilty of culpable negligence. (vide r.s. deodhar v. state of maharashtra : (1974)illj221sc ; and k.r. mudgal v. r.p. singh : (1987)illj214sc ). the privy council in general fire and life assurance corporation ltd. v. janmahomed abdul rahim, air 1941 pc 6, relied upon the writings of mr. mitra in tagore law lectures 1932 wherein it has been said that 'a law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the judge cannot, on applicable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law.'8. in n. balakrishnan v. m. krishnamurthy (1998) 7 scc 133, the apex court explained the scope of limitation and condonation of delay, observing as under:the primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. the time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. they are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. the law of limitation is thus founded on public policy.9. in smt. prabha v. ram parkash kalra 1987 (suppl) scc 338, the supreme court took the view that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay.10. in vedabai alias vaijayanatabai baburao patil v. shantaram baburao patil and ors. : 2001(132)elt15(sc) , the apex court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under:in exercising discretion under section 5 of the limitation act, the courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the otherwise will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach...in g. ramegowda, major and ors. v. special land acquisition officer, bangalore : [1988]3scr198 , it was observed that the expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delay in preferring the appeal is required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.11. in p.k. ramachandran v. state of kerala and anr. : 1997ecr785(sc) , the hon'ble apex court held as under:law of limitation harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation as equitable grounds. the discretion exercised by the high court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. the order condoning the delay cannot be sustained.12. this judgment was followed by the division bench of this court in the case of jaya bhaduri v. state of rqjasthan and anr., 2001 (3) rlw 1594.13. much has been emphasised that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach while considering the application for condonation of delay. justice is the virtue, by which the society/court/tribunal gives to a man what is his due, opposed to injury or wrong. (wharton's law lexicon, 1976 reprint edn., p. 552). justice is an act of rendering what is right and equitable towards one who has suffered a wrong. therefore, while tempering the justice with mercy, the court has to be very conscious that it has to do justice in exact conformity to some obligatory law for the reason that human actions are found to be just or unjust as they are in conformity with or in opposition to the law. in delhi administration v. gurdip singh uban and ors. : (2000)7scc296 , the hon'ble apex court observed as under:the words 'justice' and 'injustice', in our view, are sometimes loosely used and have different meanings to different persons, particularly to those arrayed on opposite sides....justice cardozo said, the web is tangled and obscure, shot through with a multitude of shades and colours, the skeins irregular and broken. many hues that seems to be simple, are found, any when analysed, to be complex and uncertain blend. justice itself, which we are want to appeal to as a test as well as an ideal, may mean different things to different minds and at different times. attempts to objectify its standards or even to describe them, have never wholly succeeded.' (selected writings of cardozo, p. 223-24; fallon publications, 1947).14. therefore, the court must consider all pros and cons and inconvenience caused to the other side as well as to the courts which are over-burdened with this kind of litigations for the fault of the litigants not taking proper care in the due time.15. firstly, the appellant has been guilty of culpable negligence and there is no explanation as to why he did not take proper care of his case though he was the owner of the vehicle which met the accident and he was fully aware of pendency of the claim petitions. moreso, the court should not'lose sight of the fact that so-pleaded justice would cause great injustice to the other party. appellant lacks bonafides of prosecuting his case properly, thus, he is not entitled for any relief whatsoever in equity. facts of these appeals do not present special features warranting condonation of delay.16. the appeals are devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed.
Judgment:

B.S. Chauhan, J.

1. These appeals have been filed against the order dated 14.2.2001 passed in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeals No. 1553/1999 and 1654/1999 by a learned Single Judge of this Court, by which the appeals have been dismissed being time-barred by 1625 days having shown no sufficient cause.

2. The matter originated from the proceedings under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as the victims of the accident filed Claim Petitions No. 480/1989 and 482/1989 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and the Tribunal issued notices to the appellant as well as other parties. Inspite of service, the appellant did not enter appearance and he was proceeded ex-parte. After hearing the other parties, the Award was made on 13.2.1995 in both, the claim petitions. Appellant preferred first appeals against the said Award, which have been dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide impugned judgment and order dated 14.2.2001 being hopelessly time barred and not showing any sufficient cause. Hence these special appeals.

3. Mrs. Naina Saraf, learned Counsel for appellant, has vehemently submitted that these were the fit cases wherein the learned Single Judge ought to have condoned the delay of 1625 days and entertained the appeals on merit. However, she has been fair enough in admitting the factual position that the appellant had received the notices from the Tribunal and did not enter appearance for the reason that he handed over the notice to other person, viz., Nawab Khan and believed that Nawab Khan will take care of the cases. It is not a case where the ex-parte award qua the appellant had been made without serving notice upon him.

4. The explanation furnished by the appellant that he came to know about the award only on 30.10.1999 is also far from satisfaction. Thus, no 'sufficient cause' has properly been shown by the appellant, nor there is any satisfactory explanation of such inordinate delay of four years, five and half months. Appellant cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong and burden this Court with such cases without realising that he was solely responsible for the ex-parte award qua him as he did not enter appearance inspite of notice.

5. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every day by the Courts. Mrs. Naina Saraf, learned Counsel for the appellant placed very heavy reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. : (1987)ILLJ500SC , wherein the Court has observed that when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the reason that other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay.

6. The law of limitation is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of Limitation are not means to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

7. Time-barred cases should not be entertained by Courts as the rights which have accrued to others by reason of delay in approaching the Court, cannot be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The vested rights of the parties should not be disrupted at the instance of a person who is a guilty of culpable negligence. (Vide R.S. Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra : (1974)ILLJ221SC ; and K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh : (1987)ILLJ214SC ). The Privy Council in General Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures 1932 wherein it has been said that 'a law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on applicable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law.'

8. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 133, the Apex Court explained the scope of limitation and condonation of delay, observing as under:

The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy.

9. In Smt. Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra 1987 (Suppl) SCC 338, the Supreme Court took the view that the Court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay.

10. In Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and Ors. : 2001(132)ELT15(SC) , the Apex Court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under:

In exercising discretion Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the otherwise will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach...

In G. Ramegowda, Major and Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore : [1988]3SCR198 , it was observed that the expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delay in preferring the appeal is required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.

11. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. : 1997ECR785(SC) , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:

Law of limitation harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation as equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained.

12. This judgment was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jaya Bhaduri v. State of Rqjasthan and Anr., 2001 (3) RLW 1594.

13. Much has been emphasised that Courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach while considering the application for condonation of delay. Justice is the virtue, by which the society/court/Tribunal gives to a man what is his due, opposed to injury or wrong. (Wharton's Law Lexicon, 1976 Reprint Edn., p. 552). Justice is an act of rendering what is right and equitable towards one who has suffered a wrong. Therefore, while tempering the justice with mercy, the Court has to be very conscious that it has to do justice in exact conformity to some obligatory law for the reason that human actions are found to be just or unjust as they are in conformity with or in opposition to the law. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. : (2000)7SCC296 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:

The words 'justice' and 'Injustice', in our view, are sometimes loosely used and have different meanings to different persons, particularly to those arrayed on opposite sides....Justice Cardozo said, The Web is tangled and obscure, shot through with a multitude of shades and colours, the skeins irregular and broken. Many hues that seems to be simple, are found, any when analysed, to be complex and uncertain blend. Justice itself, which we are want to appeal to as a test as well as an ideal, may mean different things to different minds and at different times. Attempts to objectify its standards or even to describe them, have never wholly succeeded.' (Selected Writings of Cardozo, P. 223-24; Fallon Publications, 1947).

14. Therefore, the Court must consider all pros and cons and inconvenience caused to the other side as well as to the Courts which are over-burdened with this kind of litigations for the fault of the litigants not taking proper care in the due time.

15. Firstly, the appellant has been guilty of culpable negligence and there is no explanation as to why he did not take proper care of his case though he was the owner of the vehicle which met the accident and he was fully aware of pendency of the claim petitions. Moreso, the Court should not'lose sight of the fact that so-pleaded justice would cause great injustice to the other party. Appellant lacks bonafides of prosecuting his case properly, thus, he is not entitled for any relief whatsoever in equity. Facts of these appeals do not present special features warranting condonation of delay.

16. The appeals are devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed.