Resham Devi and ors. Vs. Chandra Prakash and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - counsel's file remained with respondent's counsel from 12.8.97 to 30.9.97 and alleging such facts as false, frivolous and unconvincing. thus it is crystal clear that ordinarily interest can be awarded form the date of making the claim but the tribunal or the court is otherwise required to be satisfied in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. 24.4.93 and not from the date of claim petition as the claimants failed to satisfy otherwise.madan, j.1. this review petition having been filed with a delay of six days, arises out of judgment of this court passed on 20.8.97 in misc. appeal no. 828/94 whereby the appeal was partly allowed enhancing the compensation amount to rs. 2,66,000/- from rs. 75,000/- awarded by the motor accident claims tribunal, dholpur under award dated 5.3.94 in mac no. 86/93.2. as regards the delay of six days in filing the review petition, the cause stated for condonation of the delay is that the file was taken by the learned advocate for insurance company, from the counsel of the appellant. in support of such an assertion shri anil jain, counsel has filed an affidavit. in reply to the aforesaid submission shri vinod tyagi advocate for the insurance company (respondent no. 2) also filed his affidavit controverting the grounds taken for condoning the delay viz. counsel's file remained with respondent's counsel from 12.8.97 to 30.9.97 and alleging such facts as false, frivolous and unconvincing. however it has been stated in para 2 of the reply, 'it shall be contextual to note that the review petition though not maintainable has been filed on 1.10.97, that is, on the last date of expiry of period of limitation of 30 days from the concocted dated 30.9.97'.3. it was the case on behalf of the petitioner that since shri vinod tyagi advocate appearing for the insurance company had taken the petitioner's counsel's file on 12.8.97 for seeking instructions from the insurance company and shri tyagi returned the file only on 30.9.97, therefore, the delay caused is bonafide and not intentional one. albeit this fact has been denied by shri vinod tyagi in his affidavit stating it to be false but it is the case on behalf of the insurance companion the reply that the company's counsel had asked for copy of the award so as to take proper action pursuant to to the appellant judgment. be that as it may, having considered these facts and keeping in view the delay of only six days, i find sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the review petition.4. in review petition the only contention raised is as to quantum of period of interest awarded by the tribunal. shri anil jain learned counsel for the petitioners claimants contended that though the appeal was partly allowed enhancing the compensation to rs. 2,66,000/- but there was no order as to the grant of interest with effect from 7.8.89 (the date of presentation of claim petition before the tribunal), whereas according to shri jain, the petitioners are entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum form the date of presentation of claim petition.5. per contra shri vinod tyagi counsel for the insurance company contended that there is no error apparent on the face to review the judgment. he laid much emphasis to the observations made by this court in the judgment under review in its penultimate para viz. 'no other point has been urged and pressed'.6. shri tyagi further contended that as per operative part of the judgment, whereby this court maintained terms and conditions and other part of the award while modifying the award for enhancing the compensation, it stands concluded that the award of the tribunal as regards denial of interest from 7.8.89 to 24.4.93 was not interfered with in appeal and the discretionary powers exercised by the tribunal concurred by this court in appeal cannot be interfered with by this court of review.7. having heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered the rival contentions with reference to the conclusions drawn under the award by the tribunal, prima facie i am of the view that once the tribunal under issue no. 5 has exercised its discretion though denying a part of the pendente- lite interest but granted interest form 24.4.93 till the date of realisation and such a conclusion was not seriously pressed into at the final hearing of the appeal, i do not find that this an be a ground for review of the judgment having been rendered after consideration of the rival contentions raised at the time of final hearing in the appeal.8. under section 171 of the motor vehicles act, 1988, if the claims tribunal allows a claim for compensation then it can award simple interest in addition to the compensation amount, at such rate from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify. thus it is crystal clear that ordinarily interest can be awarded form the date of making the claim but the tribunal or the court is otherwise required to be satisfied in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. in the instant case, albeit the tribunal has awarded the interest but from a date i.e. 24.4.93 and not from the date of claim petition as the claimants failed to satisfy otherwise. such a discretion cannot be questioned in the review petition.9. the appellate court in its judgment under review has not interfered with the conclusion of the tribunal as to denial of interest from the date of claim petition but allowing it from a date i.e. 24.4.93 subsequent to the date of claim petition, whilemaintaining such an award of interest. i do not find that there is material error manifest on the face of the order undermining its soundness or resulting in miscarriage of justice, a review cannot be sought merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier. the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law of fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it.10. resultantly, while condoning the delay of six days, but this review petition being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.