State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr. - Court Judgment

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
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			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
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			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
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		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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Code Context
                                echo "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";

                                    if (trim($desc['Judgement']['casenote'])) {

                                        echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['casenote']))), $query);
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.<br>'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/768836/state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.<br>'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
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			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
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			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
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			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
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		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
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		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
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		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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			'circuit' => null
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	'casename_url' => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '768836',
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
)
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H.R. Panwar, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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			'circuit' => null
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		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
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			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
)
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2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '768836',
		(int) 1 => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram'
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram',
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
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		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
)
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4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	),
	'casename_url' => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram',
	'args' => array(
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		(int) 1 => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram'
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
)
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7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	'args' => array(
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		(int) 1 => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram'
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		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
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		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
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			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
)
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'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
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$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '768836',
		(int) 1 => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
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		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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			'circuit' => null
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	'args' => array(
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		(int) 1 => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram'
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
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			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
)
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11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
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			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
)
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12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '768836',
		(int) 1 => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram'
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
)
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'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
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			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 20
$i = (int) 16
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View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
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$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '768836',
		(int) 1 => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
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		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.

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Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '768836',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
			'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
			'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	),
	'casename_url' => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '768836',
		(int) 1 => 'state-rajasthan-anr-vs-panna-ram'
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$title_for_layout = 'State of Rajasthan and anr Vs Panna Ram and anr - Citation 768836 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '768836',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 17, 17A and 17(2); Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 - Rule 22A',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1106 of 1998',
		'appellant' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'State of Rajasthan and anr. Vs. Panna Ram and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I. 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court. , 1981 SCC (L&S) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. 's case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.P. Vyas, Additional Adv. General',
		'counseldef' => ' S.N. Trivedi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-11-21',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Anil Dev Singh, C.J. and; H.R. Panwar, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.</p><p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.</p><p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.</p><p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.</p><p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.</p><p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.</p><p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.</p><p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.</p><p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-</p><p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'</p><p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-</p><p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'</p><p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.</p><p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.</p><p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-</p><p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'</p><p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993</p><p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.</p><p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '[2004(102)FLR842]; RLW2004(3)Raj1681; 2004(2)WLC537',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Panna Ram and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>H.R. Panwar, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The instant special appeal is directed against the order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the present appellants and maintained the ex- parte Award dated 28.6.1993 passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, 'the Labour Court) in favour of the respondent-workman.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in a nut shell, are that on reference having been made, respondents- workman filed a claim petition before the Labour Court stating therein that he was engaged as Beldar by the present appellants on 1.8.1987 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 29.3.89 without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short, 'the I.D. Act'). It was further averred in the claim petition that the principle of 'last come, first go' has not been followed by the appellants and as such the termination of services of the respondent-workman was also in violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the I.D. Act. Despite service of notice by registered post, the appellants did not put-in appearance before the Labour Court and as such, vide order dated 9.2.93, the trial proceeded ex-parte. The Labour Court, vide ex-parte Award dated 28.6.93, held that termination of the workman was neither proper nor valid and, therefore, declared the workman in continuity of service with wages. On having come to know of ex-parte award, the appellants filed an application on 28.12.93 under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules, 1958') for setting-aside the ex-parte order and award, which was dismissed by the Labour Court on 1.1.1998 on the ground that the said application was filed after expiry of period of one months from the date of publication of the award. Aggrieved of the award dated 28.6.93 and the order dated 1.1.1998, the appellants preferred S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2996/1998, which stood dismissed, vide impugned Order dated 7.10.98, on the ground that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, the Award become final after expiry of thirty days from its publication; the award was published on 25.10.1993 and, thus, it was held that the finality of the Award cannot be called in question. Hence this special appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned as also the record.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. It has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in fact, the respondent-workman had not completed 240 days in a calender year preceeding the date of retrenchment; the learned Single Judge has not considered the provision of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, which provides for setting aside of the ex-parte decision; the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have taken a technical view to prevail over the merits of the case by giving emphasis on the period of limitation in filing an application for setting-aside the award and the delay had been sufficiently explained by an affidavit, it has further been submitted that Section 17 of the I.D. Act does not create an embargo in filing an application under Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958 and both these provisions have their own way, expression, meaning and object sought to be achieved and as such filing the application supported by an affidavit under Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 could not have been seen with reference to the award becoming final.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent-workman has supported the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Labour Court.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. From the facts available on record, it is clear that the ex- parte award was passed on 28.6.93 and the same was published on 25.10.1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award became final within the meaning of Section 17(2). The application for setting-aside ex-parte award was made on 28.12.93. As per the provision of Rule 22-A (1) of the Rules, 1958, the application for setting-aside the ex-parte decision could be made within fifteen days. However, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A of the Rule, 1958 provides that the period of 15 days may, on an application, be extended on sufficient cause being shown by an affidavit. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17A of the I.D. Act create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting the Court of Law or Tribunal to call in question any award, whether on merit or ex-parte, after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. As per Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 'Award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A. In Technological Institute of Textiles, Bhiwani v. Labour Court, 1994(3) LLJ (Suppl.) 1965, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that an ex-parte order is not an Award and cannot be gazetted as such and it can be set-aside on an application duly made. Dismissal of reference for non-prosecution without going into the merits of the case, cannot be treated as interim or final determination of the industrial dispute or final determination of the industrial dispute or any question relating thereto so as to constitute an Award. The Division Bench of P&H; High Court further observed that Rule 22 does not enable the Labour Court either to do away with the enquiry or to straightway pass an Award without giving a finding on the merits of the dispute. Only an Award once published, and after 30 days have expired from the date of publication, is final and enforceable and not any other order made by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court. For the porpoise of finality, Section 20(3) of the I.D. Act relates to an Award alone as only an award becomes enforceable under Section 17A.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1981 SCC (L&S;) 309 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal is competent to set-aside its ex-parte award if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party was prevented from appearing by sufficient cause because it is a procedural review and not a review on merits. The Apex Court further observed that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Although there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set-aside its ex-parte Award, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the Statute to the contrary. The Apex Court further held as under:-',
	(int) 9 => '<p>'The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there was sufficient case shown which prevented the party from appearing, then the party is visited with an Award without a notice which is a nullity and, therefore, under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set-aside the ex-parte award. The Tribunal's order setting-aside its ex-parte award amounts to procedural review.'',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. At this stage, it is noteworthy that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of I.D. Act, the State Government made the Rules, 1958. Rule 22 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Hoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Rule 22-A provides setting-aside ex-parte decision which reads as under:-',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision.'',
	(int) 12 => '<p>10. Rule 24 provides that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Court and Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>11. From the plain reading of afore-noticed rule, it is abundantly clear that these rules provide the procedure to be followed by Labour Court when trying a claim of industrial dispute on reference being made by the Appropriate Government. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.'s case (supra), a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota & Anr., 1997 WLC (Raj.) UC 137 this Court observed that the finality that may be claimed under the provisions of Section 17(2) of the I.D. Act in respect of an award, by virtue of Section 17 and 17A, can be subjected to the result of determination of the application in case the matter is pending in an appeal or it can be challenged before the Court in the writ jurisdiction or by an application if so filed for setting-aside the ex-parte award. Section 17(2) only deals with the commencement of the award subject to the conditions envisaged in Section 17A, but do not restrict the powers of the Tribunal to consider an application for setting-aside the award because the award has been published and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. The Court held as under:-',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'In view of the provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 17A, the enforceability is subject to the various conditions and the application for setting-aside the award cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that it was not filed within thirty days. The Tribunal has power to consider and adjudicate the application for setting-aside the ex-parte award even after the expiry of thirty days.'',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. In Assistant Engineer PWD v. Khalid Ahmed and Anr., 1987 WLN (UC) 217 the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court despite notice and no efforts were made by him for setting aside ex parte decision and this Court held that interference with ex-parte decision in writ jurisdiction is not justified and as per the provisions of Rule 22-A of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner should move the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte decision on sufficient cause being shown. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Amar Singh and Anr. v. Deputy Conservator of Forest Churu, SBCWP No. 1772/2000and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram and Ors., SBCWP No. 2295/1993',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court has neither followed the procedure provided by the Rules, 1958, nor the labour Court exercised the incidental or ancillary power while deciding the claim petition. Thus, the Labour Court has not considered the case in the right perspective and the impugned orders passed by it cannot be sustained in the eye of law.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated 7.10.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned ex-parte award dated 28.6.93 passed by the labour Court are set-aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge of the Labour Court, Bikaner with the direction to consider and decide the application of the appellant State for setting aside the ex- parte order and the award after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 19 => '<p>'
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