Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors. - Court Judgment

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
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			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
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			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
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			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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Madan, J.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.

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			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
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		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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			'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.

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Code Context
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
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		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
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		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.

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			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.

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			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	'casename_url' => 'shyam-lal-soni-vs-j-d-a-ors',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '767431',
		(int) 1 => 'shyam-lal-soni-vs-j-d-a-ors'
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 1 => 'shyam-lal-soni-vs-j-d-a-ors'
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
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		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
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		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
)
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15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	'casename_url' => 'shyam-lal-soni-vs-j-d-a-ors',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '767431',
		(int) 1 => 'shyam-lal-soni-vs-j-d-a-ors'
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
)
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18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.

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			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.

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			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
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		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
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		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
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$caseref = 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
)
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21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs J D a and ors - Citation 767431 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '767431',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

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			'id' => '767431',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
			'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Madan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2 and 25',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1988 of 1989',
		'appellant' => 'Shyam Lal Soni',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Shyam Lal Soni Vs. J.D.A. and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. 12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account. ' 18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I. 19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.K. Mathur, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sanjay Pareek, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-03-15',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Arun Madan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Madan, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.</p><p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.</p><p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.</p><p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.</p><p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.</p><p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.</p><p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-</p><p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,</p><p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.</p><p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.</p><p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.</p><p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.</p><p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.</p><p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.</p><p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.</p><p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.</p><p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.</p><p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.</p><p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.</p><p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).</p><p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-</p><p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'</p><p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.</p><p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.</p><p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.</p><p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.</p><p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'RLW2003(1)Raj171; 2002(5)WLC455',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'J.D.A. and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 1 => 'shyam-lal-soni-vs-j-d-a-ors'
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Madan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner as per his case was engaged as Electrical Supervisor on work charge basis by Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'the Authority' of JDA) (respondent) with effect from 1.12.1983. His work was discontinued after some time as it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed period and he worked on the said post upto February, 1984. Thereafter in January, 1985 he was again engaged on muster roll basis and he worked as such for the period January, 1985, February, 1985, March, 1985 and May 1985 only. Thereafter he was time and again engaged by the respondent Authority for a few days as and when required. Thereafter on 27.7.1987 by an order passed by the Executive Engineer of the Authority, it was directed that the petitioner should not be engaged on muster roll basis as he has been working with the Authority for some time and from date of issuance of the aforesaid order, no functionary of the Authority shall henceforth be authorised to give appointment afresh to the petitioner or anyone else on muster roll basis and if it is done, the entire responsibility would be that of the individual official concerned and not of the Authority. A list of 34 such employees was issued in which the petitioner's name figures at serial No. 8.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Notwithstanding alone on 15.9.1987, the petitioner was again appointed on contract basis at the rate of Rs. 750A per month for a period of three months only and the said appointment same to an end with effect from the forenoon of 15.12.1987 when he was relieved as such vide Annexure-3.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Thereafter on 25.2.1988 he was once again appointed for a period of six months for inspecting the road lights. The appointment was on contract basis again for a fixed duration as aforesaid. Since six months came to an end with effect from 25.8.1988, his service stood terminated. He was not allowed to work thereafter.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The petitioner having gladly accepted the appointment though made from time to time and having raised an industrial dispute under the Act by way of Reference to the Labour Court, it is not open to him at this stage to take somersault on the plea that his services should have been regularised or that the temporary break in service was not permissible under the Rules. The law is well settled that once an industrial dispute is raised by the workman by invoking the relevant provisions of the Act, it is not open to such an employee to claim continuity of service since it is always open to the employer either to retain the employee or not and the principle that he had completed more than 240 days of service and therefore, his services ought to have been regularised, is not attracted to such matters. The law governing the employee is covered by the service jurisprudence is practically different than the principle applicable to the workman under the Act.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. From the perusal of the above appointment orders issued from time to time by the Authority, it is thus crystal clear that the appointment of the petitioner though made from time to time, was discontinued every time after the expiry of the respective period as he was engaged as and when he was required subject to exigency of services. It is also clear that by order dated 27.7.87 (Ann. 2) the Executive Engineer had issued a specific order that he should not be engaged on muster roll basis and in the event of any such appointment made contrary to the aforesaid Circular of the JDA, the Authority shall not be responsible in any manner whatsoever. Consequently, the appointment being on contractual basis for a fixed term automatically came to an end on the expiry of the respective period as aforesaid. According to the petitioner, it is a case of retrenchment b the Authority and not a contractual appointment as he had completed more than 240 days and his services could not be terminated though it has not been disputed that his appointment was of temporary in nature, yet he is entitled to be continued in services as it was a case of retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> (for short 'the Act') since the requisite procedure had not been followed by the Authority, he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity in service and also with backwages.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. His further contention is that the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman under Sec. 25F of the Act has also been violated.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. In the relief clause, the petitioner sought directions to the following effect:-',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to allow to continue the petitioner to perform the duties as Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor without any break or loss,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(ii) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction to the respondent JDA to make the payment of wages with effect from 25.8.1988.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to make payment of arrears of salary on regular basis since his initial appointment.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent JDA to regularation the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer/Electrical Supervisor.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. In reply to show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that since the petitioner has got alternate remedy before the Industrial Tribunal, which having not been exhausted, the petitioner is not entitled to filed the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>9. On merits, it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief because it is an admitted position that in view of the order dated 25.2.88 (Ann. 4), the services of the petitioner stood terminated on the expiry of the contractual period of appointment with effect from 25.8.88 but he having neither challenged the said order nor the action of the respondent-Authority by which he was not allowed to work with effect from the said date, since his services having not been extended thereafter it being a contractual appointment for period of six months only, his services automatically came to an end after the expiry of the said period.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>10. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that unless and until the order dated 25.2.1988 is challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court, since neither the order of appointment dated 25.2.1988 by which he was appointed for a period of six months has been challenged nor the order of termination dated 25.8.88 by which his services came to an end on the expiry of six months.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>11. As regards the regularisation of the petitioner, I am of the view that since it was a case of contractual appointment for a fixed duration as per Section 2(oo)(gg) of the Act and the petitioner having gladly accepted such an appointment though extended time and again, his services cannot be regularised nor any such direction can be given since the appointment was purely on temporary and contract basis. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that he should have been granted the relief in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Kamal Kumar Kaushik v. JDA (1) decided by this Court on 29.11.1991, being identical. Another contention which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Authority wanted to regularise petitioner's services but since the decision was not given effect to and he having completed more than 240 days before terminating the services of the petitioner, the provisions of the Act should have been followed.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>12. I nave heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused relevant documents and also examined their rival submissions and also perused authoritative pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Apex Court.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>13. Prima facie, 1 am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. From the perusal of the appointment order dated 25.2.1987 (Ann. 4), it is clear that no right accrues to the petitioner, on the basis of the above order since the same was again for a fixed term of six months only, which came to an end on 25.8.88 and his services stood terminated.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>14. From the above discussion the termination of the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances cannot be treated as a case of retrenchment so as to attract the provisions of Section 2(oo) of the Act as per which 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or retirement of the workman or reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>15. It is very clear that termination of service of an employee by an employer for any reason whatsoever moreso, in the instant case, where it is for a fixed duration, being contractual appointment, is not open to challenge since, it cannot be construed as a punishment inflicted by way of a disciplinary action by the competent authority.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>16. 1 am fortified in my observations from the ratio of the decision in Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. (2), M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India (3), and Marmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen (4).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>17. In M.P.H.S.N. Ltd.'s case (supra), the concerned employee were appointed by the appellant a Government Company, on purely temporary and contractual basis in terms of the appointment order. Their services were terminable at any time without notice or assigning any reason. The order was earlier challenged by the petitioners before the M.P. High Court and thereafter in appeal before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court observed as under :-',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'A temporary government servant does not become a permanent servant unless he acquires that capacity by force of any rule or he is declared or appointed as a permanent servant. In the present case there is no rule under which the respondents may be deemed to have become permanent by force of such rule nor they were so declared by any subsequent order of the appellant- Company to have acquired that status. On the contrary, the respondents all along continued to be temporary and according to the terms of the order of appointment their services could be terminated at any time without any notice or assigning any reasons. In such a case it is not necessary to follow the formalities contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. In these facts and circumstances the High Court was not right in holding that the respondents were entitled for being heard before passing the said order of termination of their services and that the order of termination was bad in law on that account.'',
	(int) 23 => '<p>18. In Venugopal's case (supra), the services of the probationer were terminated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India without giving any notice as per term of contract of employment for the reason that he had failed to achieve the requisite target stipulated-in the contract within the period of probation. The question which arose for consideration earlier before the High Court and subsequently before the Apex Court was as to whether such termination was open to challenge for want of compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. As per terms of contract, the Corporation was entitled to refuse confirmation without giving any notice to the probationer since he has failed to achieve the requisite target as fixed by the Corporation. It was observed, that his termination effected under the Regulation 14 shall not be deemed to be 'retrenchment' within Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act being covered exemption Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Act validating such termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. The Apex Court further observed in this context that the amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act has clearly excluded the provisions of I.D. Act so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(oo), the result whereof will be that termination of the services of the appellant shall not be deemed to a 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo), even if Sub section (bb) of Section 2 of the Act had not been introduced in the said section. Once the conclusion logically so arrived at is that Section 2(oo) is not attracted to such cases, in my view, there is no question of application of Section 25-F of the Act on the basis of which the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to be invalid.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>19. Even under the service jurisprudence, it is well settled by a Catena of decision that the service of a probationer can be terminated after making over all assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before terminating his service.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>20. In Harmohinder Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was pertaining to a matter of contractual appointment as per which the services stood terminated immediately on the expiry of the contractual period, which was challenged. It was held by the Apex Court that non renewal of the contractual period could not be claimed as a matter of right as in the event of its non-renewal would stand excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo) of the Act.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. The Apex Court further held in this regard that the argument on the basis of extending any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act was equally misconceived. This section deals with conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. It would not apply to para 3-A because of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, which expressly excludes 'termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contracts being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained there in'. Contracts of service for a fixed term are, therefore, excluded. The Apex Court also held in Uptron Ltd. v. Shammi Bhans (5), that the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such cases where the termination takes place on the expiry of the contract.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>22. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 28 => '<p>'
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