Babu Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/764497
SubjectCriminal
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided OnMar-27-2009
Judge Raghuvendra S. Rathore, J.
Reported in2009CriLJ4362; 2009(3)WLN9
AppellantBabu Lal
RespondentState of Rajasthan and ors.
Cases ReferredSubodh Chandra v. Jamser Mandal
Excerpt:
criminal procedure code, 1973 - section 156(3)--application under--how to be treated--where an aggrieved person files an application under sec. 156(3) disclosing cognizable offence, magistrate concerned has no option but to direct the police to register the case and investigate the matter--magistrate cannot transform an application under sec. 156(3) into a one under section 2(d) cr.p.c. as complaint on his own. - - 1. this case is classic example of gross abuse of process of the court as well as flagrant miscarriage of justice. therefore, the petitioner requested the police that he is a poor scheduled caste person and sher singh wants to dispossess him, whereas he has no concern with the plot in question. 03.03.2009, the deputy registrar (judicial) of this court had sent a letter to the.....raghuvendra s. rathore, j.1. this case is classic example of gross abuse of process of the court as well as flagrant miscarriage of justice. the proceedings before the learned magistrate concerned, for doing justice to the victim, had rather added to his miseries.2. the brief and relevant facts of this case are that an application was filed by the petitioner, under section 156(3) cr.p.c., in the court of learned judicial magistrate, chirawa, district jhunjhunu praying that by passing an order under section 156(3) cr.p.c. direction be issued to the police to register a case at police station, chirawa for the offence under sections 379, 447/147 and 188 ipc and section 3(v)(x) and section 4 of the sc/st act.3. the petitioner had filed a report to the police with the averments that in the.....
Judgment:

Raghuvendra S. Rathore, J.

1. This case is classic example of gross abuse of process of the Court as well as flagrant miscarriage of justice. The proceedings before the learned Magistrate concerned, for doing justice to the victim, had rather added to his miseries.

2. The brief and relevant facts of this case are that an application was filed by the petitioner, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Chirawa, District Jhunjhunu praying that by passing an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. direction be issued to the police to register a case at Police Station, Chirawa for the offence under Sections 379, 447/147 and 188 IPC and Section 3(v)(x) and Section 4 of the SC/ST Act.

3. The petitioner had filed a report to the police with the averments that in the town of Chirawa, he had purchased a plot and was in possession of the same. The petitioner further averred that the said purchase was by way of an agreement executed on 11.07.2008 with one Chatar Singh son of Geegraj Meghwal and thereafter he had got 20 trolleys of stones unloaded on it. On 25.01.2009 at about 8.00 am., the petitioner further averred in the report, non-petitioner Sher Singh Jat with his 10-15 companions, started removing the stones, which were lying on the plot. As soon as the petitioner received the information, he went to the site and found that Sher Singh and his companions were removing the stones from his plot. Sher Singh, Suresh, Sampat, Ramavtar and Anil herald abuses, sooner they saw the petitioner and his wife. Sher Singh, in particular, stated that being a policeman, he is not afraid of taking possession of plots, which is his business and the police cannot do anything against him. Therefore, the petitioner requested the police that he is a poor scheduled caste person and Sher Singh wants to dispossess him, whereas he has no concern with the plot in question. Accordingly, it was prayed that action, in accordance with law, be taken against the guilty persons.

4. When the aforesaid report was not registered at Police Station, Chirawa, falling under the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate non-petitioner No. 2, the petitioner filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before him. After filing of the application on 27.01.2009, the matter was posted for 29.01.2009 as the Presiding Officer was away to Pilani for a Camp Court. On 29.01.2009, the learned Magistrate did not pass the appropriate order in accordance to law but had called for a report under Section 154(3). Again on 30.01.2009, the matter was ordered to be posted on the next day, for compliance of 154(3) Cr.P.C. On 31.01.2009, the petitioner filed a postal receipt of a registered letter and some other documents in the Court of learned Magistrate. For further proceedings, the matter was kept on 03.02.2009. On that day, the case was again adjourned to 12.02.2009, for compliance under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. It is to be noted that the petitioner had submitted a number of documents with a list, totaling to nine, before the learned Magistrate on 27.01.2009 itself, on the day of filing the application under Section 156(3).

5. When the learned Magistrate did not pass the appropriate orders under Section 156(3) to the Police Station concerned, on the application filed since 27.01.2009, the petitioner preferred this miscellaneous petition on 27.02.2009. On 03.03.2009, it was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the application filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., which disclosed the commission of cognizable offence, is still pending and the learned Magistrate had not passed the appropriate orders to the police for registration of an FIR and investigation, till date. Further, it was contended that the Magistrate should have proceeded in accordance with law and he cannot travel beyond the scope of the power conferred on him under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Accordingly, he has submitted that once a cognizable offence is disclosed in an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is left with no option but to order for investigation, as the application had invoked the administrative jurisdiction of the Magistrate for issuance of a direction the Police to register a First Information Report under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, it is submitted that the Magistrate has acted illegally in not issuing such orders.

6. After having considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the orders passed by the learned Magistrate subsequent to filing of the application under Section 156(3) on 27.01.2009, it was thought proper by this Court that before proceeding further an explanation be called from the concerning Magistrate for not sending the application to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., for such a long time. The case was ordered to be listed, thereafter, on 09.03.2009. In compliance of the order dt. 03.03.2009, the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court had sent a letter to the Magistrate concerned alongwith the copy of the order as well as the miscellaneous petition on the same day. The learned Magistrate had sent his explanation on 05.03.2009, mentioning that the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been sent to the Police Station, Chirawa on 05.03.2009 for registration of the case and an FIR No. 51/2009 has been registered.

In other words, after receiving the copy of the order of this Court, which was sent through Fax on 03.03.2009, the learned Magistrate had ordered to send the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the concerning Police Station on 05.03.2009, and the First Information Report (51/2009) was registered on that day. Then the explanation was sent, to this Court, by the learned Magistrate on 05.03.2009. These facts are fortified from the First Information Report dt. 05.03.2009, copy of which had been placed on record by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The record of the Court below was also summoned by this Court on 20.03.2009. A perusal of the explanation given by the Magistrate shows that it is not at all satisfactory and nothing has been said as to why he had not promptly acted in accordance to law, when the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed before him. Sooner such an application was received by the Magistrate, he ought to have issued directions to the police to register a First Information Report under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

7. However, though the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has now been sent to the Police Station concerned where a report has been registered after seeking explanation on 03.03.2009 from the Magistrate concerned, to reiterate the settled principles of law; to clear the clouds from the minds of the Presiding Officers in respect of it and for guidance of the Magistrates upto the rank of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, that this Court would proceed further to deal with the question of law involved in the present matter. In my view, it is of great significance for the subordinate judiciary. The question mainly revolves around the point as to what is the scope of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the powers of the Magistrate thereunder. An ancillary question which arises is as to whether a Magistrate can refuse the prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or he can proceed on his own in the manner, other than provided under the relevant provisions, or he can direct the applicant to take recourse to a particular forum of litigation that is to say to proceed under the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure considering the application as a complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C., onwards.

8. When an application is filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it has a limited purpose that is to seek indulgence of the concerning Court of Magistrate for issuing direction to the police to register a case and investigate the cognizable case, which is disclosed from the contents of such application. The provisions of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. are contained in Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the information to the police officers and their powers for investigation. For the sake of analysis and determination of the question involved, the relevant provisions of the Code needs to be reproduced hereunder:

154. Information in cognizable cases.-(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informants and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.

(2) A copy of the information as recorded under Sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.

(3) Any person, aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a Police Station to record the information referred to in Sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.

155. Information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases.-(1) When information is given to an officer in charge of a Police Station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer, the informant to the Magistrate.

(2) No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial.

(3) Any police officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer in charge of a Police Station may exercise in a cognizable case.

(4) Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable.

156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable cases.

(1) Any officer in charge of a Police Station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one, which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned.

157. Procedure for investigations.-(1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a Police Station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may by general order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate circumstances of the case, and, if necessary to take measures for the discovery of the offender:

Provided that:

(a) When information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the office in-charge of a Police Station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot;

(b) If it appears to the officer-in-charge of a Police Station that there is sufficient ground for entering off an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.

(2) In each of the cases mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso Sub-section (1), the officer-in-charge of the Police Station shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements to that Sub-section, and, in the case mentioned in Clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the information, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case of cause it to be investigated.

In other words, provisions of Section 156 Cr.P.C. empowers an officer-in-charge of a Police Station to investigate any cognizable case without the orders of the Magistrate. Sectio0n 156(3) empowers a Magistrate to order for investigation of a cognizable offence. Therefore, provision of Section 156(3) relates to the registration and investigation of cases. When an order is passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the police would follow the procedure contained in Section 156(1) Cr.P.C. and thereafter submit a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The procedure for taking cognizance on such report is under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. Accordingly, separate procedure for trial of such cases is provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. But on filing of a complaint, the Magistrate has to adopt the procedure laid under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where he takes cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. and separate procedure is provided for trial of a complaint case. Therefore, separate procedures are to be follows in both type of cases and the procedure of one cannot be converted into another. It is a settled principle of law that a Magistrate has no power to register an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint.

9. An information, which discloses commission of a cognizable offence, has to be registered under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. and to be investigated under Section 156(1) Cr.P.C., except when the officer-in-charge of Police Station decides not to investigate into the matter under Section 157(2) of the Code for which reasons has to be mentioned and the informant is to be conveyed about such decision. The informant can then take recourse to the remedy available to him under the law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court have elaborately dealt with this aspect of the matter in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. : AIR 1992 SC 604 as under:

The legal mandate enshrined in Section 154(1) is that every information relating to the commission of a 'cognizable offence' (as defined under Section 2(c) of the Code) if given orally (in which case it is to be reduced into writing) or in writing to 'an officer-in-charge of a Police Station' (within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the Code) and signed by the informant should be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe which form is commonly called as 'First Information Report' and which act of entering the information in the said form is known as registration of a crime or a case.

At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer-in-charge of a Police Station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157. In case, an officer-in-charge of a Police Station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on the information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the superintendent of police concerned who is satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by Sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code....

It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer-in-charge of a Police Station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.

10. In the case of Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar and Ors. : AIR 1997 SC 3104, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para 10, held as under:

The provisions of the Code, therefore, do not in any way stand in the way of a Magistrate to direct the police to register a case at the Police Station and then investigate into the same. In our opinion when an order for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code is to be made the proper direction to the police would be 'to register a case at the Police Station treating the complaint as the first information report and investigate into the same.

Further, it has been held that:

Indeed, even if a Magistrate does not pass a direction to register a case, still in view of the provisions of Section 156(1) of the Code which empowers the police to investigate into a cognizable 'case' and the rules framed under the Indian Police Act, 1861 it (the police) is duty-bound to formally register a case and then investigate into the same.

11. Further, in the case of Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam AIR 1961 SC 986, the Supreme Court had observed that:

There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in a case involving cognizable offence is with the police.

12. Similarly, in the case of Lakshaminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. Narayana Reddy and Ors. : 1997(2) R.Cr.D. 26 (SC) : AIR 1976 SC 1672, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had laid down the scope of Magistrate's power under Section 156(3) of the Code, concisely as under:

Peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1).

13. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. : 2001(2) R.Cr.D. 241 (SC) : AIR 2001 SC 571 as follows:

Section 156, falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences. True, Section 202 which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to 'direct an investigation by a police officer'. But the investigation envisaged in Section 202 is different from the investigation contemplated in Section 156 of the Code.

Further, it has been held that:

But the significant point to be noticed is when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance.

14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation through S.P. Jaipur v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. : AIR 2001 SC 668 as follows:

What is contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 156, is the power to order the investigation referred to in Sub-section (1), because the words 'order such an investigation as above mentioned' in Sub-section (3) are unmistakably clear as referring to the other Sub-section. Thus the power is to order an 'officer-in-charge of a Police Station' to conduct investigation.

Further, it has been held, in para 16, as follows:

We, therefore, reiterate, that the magisterial power cannot be stretched under the said Sub-section beyond directing the officer-in-charge of a Police Station to conduct the investigation.

15. In view of the principle of law consistently laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, as mentioned above, it is the responsibility of the Magistrate to direct the police to follow the mandate of law and if it is not so done, then it gives the police a long rope to act arbitrarily and at its whims. Whenever an aggrieved person approaches a Magistrate with the prayer that the police has refused to register his report in respect of a cognizable offence, then the Magistrate is required to look into his application only to determine whether any cognizable offence is disclosed thereby or not. In case it is so disclosed, then the Magistrate has no option but to direct the police to register an FIR and investigate the case.

16. Reverting back to the facts of this case, as mentioned above, the learned Magistrate did not pass an appropriate order directing the police to register a case on the application under Section 156(3) which was filed, as back as, on 27.01.2009 and it was only after the explanation was called by this Court that he had passed an appropriate order on 05.03.2009 and the FIR came to be registered on that day. The learned Magistrate had prolonged the matter on the ground of compliance of Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. It may be pointed out that a Magistrate is not required to conduct an enquiry whatsoever under Section 156(3) of the Code and he is not expected to act in any other manner but to order the police for registration of a report and to investigate the matter. In case, any other enquiry is conducted and the matter is delayed on account of calling of report from the police, it would rather tantamount to encroach upon the function of the police and the same is not to be undertaken by a Judicial Court.

The principle of law had been laid down, long back, in the celebrated judgment of Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 17, which reads thus:

The function of the judiciary and the police are complementary and not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise it's own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in appropriate case when moved under Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, to give direction in the nature of Habeas Corpus.

17. Coming to the ancillary question, referred to above, it is necessary to mention here the relevant provisions of law. Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines 'complaint' as under:

2(d):-'complaint' means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.

In other words, complaint is (i) any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate; (ii) with a view to his taking action under the Code; (iii) allegation are against some persons, whether known or unknown and (iv) does not include a police report.

18. The ingredient No. (ii), mentioned above, of taking action by the Magistrate himself under the Code is sine-quo-non for any Magistrate to take action on a complaint. The complainant makes an express or implied intention for the Magistrate to take action himself. Ingredient No. (iv) makes it crystal clear that a complaint does not include a police report. A police report is defined under Section 2(r) of the Code, which reads as under:

2(r) 'police report' means a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under Sub-section (2) of Section 173;

19. The action which is required to be taken by a Magistrate on a complaint is provided under Chapter XV of the Code. Needless to say that under the said provisions, the subsequent action is by way of recording of the statements of the complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and that of his witnesses under Section 202 of the Code. Therefore, it is clear that if a complaint makes any other prayer, then the one mentioned in the aforesaid definition, does not fall under the category of complaint. It may be mentioned here that every application is not a complaint which does not empower the Magistrate to take cognizance on it under Section 190(1)(a). An application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. falls within the category of such applications, which is not a complaint under the Code. In the case of Dinesh Chandra and Ors. v. State of U.P. 2001 (1) JIC 942 (All), it had been held as under:

The Apex Court has definitely not used the term complaint to thwart or defeat the purpose behind the enactment of Section 156(3) itself. The term was never used with any intention that the reference order appears to channelise. Thus, in my view it should be an application and not a complaint.

20. In the case of Bharat Kishore Lal Singh Dev v. Judhistir Modak : AIR 1929 Patna 473, it had been held as follows:

The definition of a complaint is to be found in Section 4(h), Criminal P.C. and is as follows:

Complaint means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some persons, whether known or unknown has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police officer.In my opinion these words mean this. First of all there must be an allegation of an offence, and it is true that the petition in this case does contain that requirement, but secondly, the allegation of the specific offence must be with a give to action being taken under the Code, that is to say action being taken for the prosecution of the offender for having committed the specific offence, and it must be made to the Magistrate in his judicial capacity so that he may exercise his power of taking cognizance of that specific offence and proceed in respect of it against the person accused. In this case and examination of the petition shows clearly that the object of the petition was not that the particular offence should be punished but rather the mention of the particular offence is put in with a view to illustrate the kind of conduct which is the accused person is supposed to be following and against which kind of conduct the petitioner seeks protection. The whole tenor of the petitioner shows that what is super most in the mind of the petitioner is the anticipated conduct of the person whom he mentions and against that conduct he asked the Deputy Commissioner in his executive capacity to make enquiry and protect him against a repetition of such conduct.

21. Similarly, in the case of Subodh Chandra v. Jamser Mandal AIR 1949 Cal 55, it has been held as under:

It has been urged by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the petitioner that the so-called petition was not a complaint within the meaning of Section 4(1)(h), Criminal P.C. 'Complaint' is there defined as an allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person whether known or unknown had committed an offence, but it does not include a report by a police officer. In short to amount to a complaint the allegation must be made with a view to the recipient taking action under the Code charging some person with a particular offence.

It is clear that the petition or complaint of the opposite party was not presented to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate with a view to the latter taking action under the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Magistrate is in terms asked to take administrative action. Therefore, the petition or complaint was not such a complaint as a Magistrate could act upon under Section 190(1), Criminal P.C.

22. Therefore, it is more than clear that a complaint must be made before the Magistrate for his taking action in accordance to Chapter XV of the Code, after taking cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). Thus, there lies a distinction between a complaint and an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and that is with regard to the intention and prayer of the applicant. When an applicant desires that the Magistrate should take action against the persons then it is a 'complaint'. But when no action is to be taken by the Magistrate and the intention is for some other kind of action, such a direction to the police to take action, then it will certainly not amount to a 'complaint'. In other words, an application with a prayer for direction to register an FIR for investigation cannot be registered as a 'complaint' by the Magistrate because, doing so, would be contrary to law. As mentioned above, the purpose of complaint and an application Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. are totally different and such application cannot be treated to be a complaint by the Magistrate, on his own.

23. In a case, where an aggrieved person files an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. then it is to be proceeded in accordance to the prayer made therein and within the relevant provisions of law, which has been mentioned above, The Magistrate is not to go beyond the scope of the afore-referred Section, on his own. As a matter of fact, a Magistrate cannot transform an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. into a one under Section 2(d) Cr.P.C., as a complaint. It is not for the Magistrate concerned to start the lis in his own way but it is the aggrieved person who has to do it in the form and forum, which he deems fit and proper. In the recent past, it has been noted by this Court that where cognizable offence is disclosed in the application, the Magistrates do not pass orders to the police for registration and investigation, as prayed for. In some cases, they even refuse to do so. In my considered opinion, if a cognizable offence is disclosed in an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate concerned has no option but to direct the police to register and investigate the case.

24. Where the Magistrate is of the view that matter does not require any investigation and he would inquire himself then it would amount to prejudging the issue of investigation. If in an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., an aggrieved person does not want the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence and inquire into the matter himself then by declining to pass an order to the police to register an FIR and investigation, would rather cause injustice to the victim. Sometimes, it may be difficult for the complainant to prosecute. The complainant may not be able to lead evidence because of a number of reasons, socially or otherwise and he would not be able to bring the witnesses to the Court. In such case, the complainant may not be able to establish his case. Therefore, an incorrect approach by a Magistrate may lead to miscarriage of justice.

25. The aforesaid discussion has been made keeping in view the trend which has been recently developed at the Courts of Magistrate. In view of the relevant provisions of law and the consistent principle being followed, a Magistrate is to proceed accordingly, whenever an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is filed before him. So far as the instant case is concerned, as mentioned above, Magistrate had passed the order for registration and investigation of the case, to the Police Station concerned. Therefore, no further directions are required to be given to the learned Judicial Magistrate, Chirawa so far as the application filed by the petitioner Babu Lal is concerned.

Accordingly, this criminal miscellaneous petition stands disposed of.

A copy of this order be sent to the Registrar General, High Court, who shall circulate the same to all the Magistrate in the State, up to the rank of the Chief Judicial Magistrate.