Rajendra Baboo Srivastava Vs. University of Rajasthan - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/763061
SubjectService;Constitution
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided OnJan-18-2002
Case NumberS.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1495 of 1991
Judge Arun Madan, J.
Reported in2002(2)WLC12
ActsUniversity of Rajasthan Employees (Non-Teaching) Recruitment Rules, 1974 - Rules 16, 17 and 31
AppellantRajendra Baboo Srivastava
RespondentUniversity of Rajasthan
Appellant Advocate Virendra Dangi, Adv.
Respondent Advocate Y.C. Sharma, Adv.
DispositionWrit petition dismissed
Cases ReferredRudra Kumar Sain v. Union of India (supra
Excerpt:
- - besides claiming his cr as outstanding or very good throughout apart from more than sufficient experience (as provided in ann. 9 and posts of general category were only seven, he was not appointed and promoted as section officer on merit quota under the impugned order dated 31.12.83, against which he had consistently made representation despite having been rejected from time to time but he approached this court by way of this writ petition for promotion on merit quota after seven years on 13.3.1991. 6. at the very threshold, i must hasten to observe that the petitioner though claimed seniority as well as promotion but has intermingled the controversy bymisjoinder of issues having distinct and irrelevant consideration to each others, inasmuch as relief or issue of promotion raised being of merit quota has no nexus or relation with another issue of seniority herein, having different criteria for consideration as to the process under the university of rajasthan employees (non-teaching) recruitment rules, 1974 (for brevity the recruitment rules). admittedly, the challenge to the impugned order dated 31.12.83 r in absence of any fresh cause of action or any legislation a person who has lost his remedy by lapse of time looses his right as well. thus in my considered opinion here also the impact on the administrative set up and on other employees is a strong reason to decline consideration of such a stale claim. union of india (supra), i must hold that the delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in the circumstances referred to above, itself, deprives him of his remedy under law and he has lost his remedy by lapse of time and also lost his right as well. 31.12.83 on the post of section officer, in my considered view, the petitioner has no case, because mere inclusion of the name of a candidate like petitioner in a merit list does not confer any right to be selected or appointed unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate (which in the instant case also does not indicate); and further that the state is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies reserved or otherwise even though the state acts in any arbitrary manner. banerjee (6) wherein, it has been laid down that a person selected or empanelled does not alone acquire any indefeasible right to appointment, because empanellment or selection, is at the best, a condition of eligibility for the purposes of appointment and that by itself does not amount to selection or creation of a vested right to appointment unless relevant rules state to the contrary. and had the selection committee applied/adopted criteria for awarding awards as stipulated by syndicate's resolutions (supra), the petitioner would have secured in all 52.5 marks according to which the selection committee would have found much meritorious than others selected under 34% merit quota and by not doing so, the selection committee as well as the university have acted in an arbitrary manner depriving the petitioner of his right to the promotion. r/1) but also in this writ petition, his confidential report and interview were not so bad than others selected and so, atleast 15 marks ought to have been awarded to him on the basis of c. 5.4.81 having been passed by the syndicate have not been denied but the petitioner failed to produce any document showing that any notification has been issued by the university for having adopted the scheme of marks for selection for promotion under 34% merit quota as approved by aforesaid two resolutions no. in other words, in exceptional cases, the assessment of merit made by the dpcs/selection committees is liable to be scrutinised by courts within the narrow wednesbury principles or on the ground of malafides, inasmuch as courts and tribunals can neither sit as appellate authorities nor substitute their own views to the views of the dpcs, otherwise interference by courts will result in paralysing recommendations of the dpcs and promotions. 20. the present issue of impugned promotion under 34% merit quota as per advertisement itself relates to the direct recruitment the procedure therefor is prescribed in chapter iii of the recruitment rules, and the relevant provision is contained in rule 16 in terms thereof the selection committee met on 26th & 27th december, 1983. as per rule 17, selection committee, referred to in rule 16 & as mentioned in schedule iv, is required to adjudge suitability of the candidates for appointment to the posts and has to prepare a list of candidates recommended by it for direct recruitment in order of merit as adjudged by it. 21. in the instant case, the petitioner failed to show that the vice chancellor of the university who is appointing authority for appointment of section officer (as per schedule iii to the recruitment rules) has adopted any other method (as suggested by the petitioner in pursuance of resolution no. to select the persons called for interview as per rule 15 of the rules, 1974, before the impugned selection process has ended on 31.12.83. the petitioner further failed to establish that awarding of marks was made mandatory either under recruitment rules or by adopting method after being approved by the syndicate of the university for such selection under 34% merit quota posts. 8 (just above to the petitioner) was promoted on or about 28.6.86. albeit the petitioner challenged the process of impugned selection on the ground of having not awarded marks or not disclosed criteria in the selection proceeding for having found merits of selected candidates, but curiously enough, he failed to establish or show any rule of the recruitment rules 1974 contemplating procedure as suggested by him, being mandatory for the selection committee to record reasons for selecting or not selecting a particular candidate in the merit list. union of india (supra), since the recruitment rules 1974 do not so require, in the instant case also the selection committee was not obliged to adopt any procedure as suggested by the petitioner and thus viewed, i find no merit in any of the contentions of the petitioner so as to hold the impugned selection of 1983 as arbitrary or bad in law. suffice is to reiterate in a nut shell that this is necessary to avoid dislocating the administrative set up after it has been functioning on a certain basis of years and during the interregnum those who have been working gain more experience and acquire rights which cannot be defeated casually by collateral entry of a person at a higher point without the benefit of actual experience during the period of his absence when he chose to remain silent for years before making the claim. 1 may also reiterate that apart from the consequential benefits in case of allowing him seniority as claimed by the petitioner, the impact on the administrative set up and on other employees who will be lowered down in seniority by putting the petitioner as per his case, is a strong reason to decline consideration of stale claim especially in the absence of persons being impleaded as party to this petition. merely because final seniority list was issued in the year 1993 after the writ petition was filed, in my view, he has no strong case for belatedly questioning seniority especially when first representation against provisional seniority issued on 20.9.1980 stood rejected by virtue of another provisional seniority list issued on 3.4.84 so also by further rejection of representation dt. in my opinion, such a lapse on the part of the petitioner by keeping reticence for years together is a strong reason not to entitle him for any relief by this court. 32. the petitioner failed to show that post on which initially was appointed as asstt.madan, j.1. the petitioner by way of this writ petition has sought two fold reliefs (1) seniority on the post of assistant/accountant from 30.8.76 and (2) promotion/appointment on the post of section officer on 34% merit quota of direct recruitment under advertisement dated 15.9.1983 (ann.l).2. facts in brief relevant for controversy of seniority are thus. the petitioner entered in services of the university of rajasthan (respondent) on the post of ldc in 1961 whereafter undoubtedly he was promoted as udc and confirmed. admittedly, the petitioner was appointed as assistant by order dated 30.8.76 (though its copy was not filed by the petitioner but by the respondent alongwith minutes of the selection committee) - a bare perusal of which shows that though the petitioner was promoted as assistant on the recommendation of the dpc but purely on temporary basis only for six months or till duly selected candidates join as assistant/accountant, and on which post he continued but was put on probation w.e.f. 28.6.78 which ultimately resulted in confirmation on the post of assistant/accountant on 28.12.1978 vide order dated 5.1.79.3. provisional seniority list of asstt./acctt. was issued on 20.9.80 against which the petitioner represented on 3.6.83 alleging his seniority having wrongly been assigned. another representation was made on 10.3.84 for wrong assignment of seniority but also for appointrnent on the post of section officer. again, on 3.4.84 the university issued provisional seniority list of asstt./acctt. but as per the petitioner, wrongly assigning his seniority so again it resulted into his representation on 12.4.84 followed by reminder on 8.1.86 so also for appointment since 3.12.83 as section officer.4. it is the case of the petitioner that as per letter dated 29.1.86 (ann. 10) of the university his representation was pending consideration and awaiting decision thereon but it was not communicated so the petitioner sent reminder on 5.1.90 (ann. 16) on which rejection was conveyed by the university on 21.1.91 (ann.20).5. a brief resume of facts relevant for controversy as to the promotion on the post of section officer on 34% merit quota. the university admittedly issued an advertisement for nine posts of section officer against 345 merit quota (out of which seven posts were of general category while one for sc and another for st candidates). since the petitioner belonged to general category, he applied for that category post of section officer claiming himself eligible and qualified as b.a. & m.a. besides claiming his cr as outstanding or very good throughout apart from more than sufficient experience (as provided in ann.2 - merit criteria i.e. syndicate resolution no. 31 dated 23.5.80 and 35 of 5.4.1981 given so also of training on 24.5.80 having acquired merit no. 2 with cash award). admittedly the interviews were held by the selection committee on 26th & 27th december, 1983 for selection under 34% direct recruitment merit quota. on 31.12.83 on the recommendation of the selection committee, the university issued order appointing seven meritorious employees (holding posts of asstt./acctt.) as section officer but since the petitioner was found lesser meritorious having merit at no. 9 and posts of general category were only seven, he was not appointed and promoted as section officer on merit quota under the impugned order dated 31.12.83, against which he had consistently made representation despite having been rejected from time to time but he approached this court by way of this writ petition for promotion on merit quota after seven years on 13.3.1991.6. at the very threshold, i must hasten to observe that the petitioner though claimed seniority as well as promotion but has intermingled the controversy bymisjoinder of issues having distinct and irrelevant consideration to each others, inasmuch as relief or issue of promotion raised being of merit quota has no nexus or relation with another issue of seniority herein, having different criteria for consideration as to the process under the university of rajasthan employees (non-teaching) recruitment rules, 1974 (for brevity the recruitment rules). admittedly, the challenge to the impugned order dated 31.12.83 relates to the promotion having been considered by the selection committee of the university for the posts of section officer under advertisement dated 15.9.83 (ann.l), as per which these posts being of 34% merit quota were advertised inviting applications for direct recruitment of the university's employees holding posts of asstt./acctt. and it has no nexus, with seniority of any of them. hence, for disposal of this writ petition, these two issues being distinct to each others are being dealt with separately. first of all, 1 advert to the issue of promotion on 34% merit quota. but, here i firstly think it proper to consider objection of the university as to the delay & laches. so, let me have a resume of decisions in this regard cited by mr.sharma.7. in administrator of u.t. daman & diu v. r.d. valand (1) there was belated application for promotion; applicant was reverted from the post of section officer (junior engineer) but again promoted to that post in the year 1979 w.e.f. 28.9.1972; representation made in the year 1985 for promotion to the post of assistant engineer w.e.f. august 1977 when some persons junior to him had been promoted, was rejected and further representation was also rejected and in such circumstances, application filed by him before the cat in 1990 was held time barred by the apex court holding that making successive representation was inconsequential. the apex court observed as under:-'in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the tribunal was not justified in putting the clock back by more than 15 years. the tribunal fell into patent error in brushing aside the question of limitation by observing that the respondent has been making representation from time to time and as such the limitation would not come in his way.'8. in bhoop singh v. union of india (2), the petitioner challenged his termination after 22 years without offering any explanation for such delay and, therefore, as held, his challenge cannot be allowed merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated inasmuch as refusal of relief cannot be said to be discriminatory.9. in ratan chandra sammanta v. union of india (3) the apex court held that a writ is issued by the court in favour of a person who has some right. and not for sake of roving enquiry leaving scope for manoeuvring. delay itself deprives a person of his remedy available in law. in absence of any fresh cause of action or any legislation a person who has lost his remedy by lapse of time looses his right as well. it was a case of casual labourer employed between 1964 to 1969 and retrenched between 1975 to 1979 but approached the court of law after a lapse of period of more than 15 years, therefore, the apex court observed that in case the prayer of the petitioners is accepted then it would result in depriving a host of others who in the meantime have become eligible and are entitled to claim to be employed.10. in the instant case also, the impugned order dated 31.12.83 of 34%, merit quota promotion on the posts of section officer has been challenged after a lapse of seven years by way of this petition on 13.3.91 with an untenable explanation that he has been consistently making representations one by one from time to time by way of reminders (dated 12.4.84, 7.11.87, 14.3.88 and 5.1.90). similar is the explanation as to the delay on the issue of seniority. his first representation dt. 3.6.83 against seniority so also merit quota promotion was rejected and conveyed by letter dt. 9.2.84 (ann.7). his consequential representation dt.12.4.84 was also responded by conveying rejection again under letter dt.26.5.84 (ann.rl) specifically stating therein that havingsecured lesser marks in comparison to other candidates, he has no case for promotion. his further case is that three consecutive representations dated 7.11.87, (ann.14), 14.3.88 (ann. 15) & 5.1.90 (ann. 16) were also sent but he was not promoted under merit quota. curiously enough, though his representations dated 7.11.87 (ann.14) & 14.3.88 (ann.15) were rejected and communicated by letter dt. 20.5.88 (ann.r/2) stating that the appointments on the post of section officer in the year 1983 were made in accordance with the rules and keeping in view the vacancies considered by the selection committee at that time, and, therefore, his claim for giving appointment as section officer from 31.12.83 did not stand, but this letter was not disclosed and stated by the petitioner but was produced by the university with its reply. even in this letter dt.20.5.88 (ann.r/3) it was specifically added by pointing out that this matter be treated as closed so far as office of the university is concerned, but again the petitioner sent representation on 5.1.90 (ann.16) despite successive rejection of his reminders-cum-representations having been communicated to him and further the university conveyed another rejection on 21.1.91 by order (ann.20) stating therein that his request through representation dt.5.1.90 (ann.16) is not justified, hence cannot be accepted.11. in view of aforestated facts appearing from various annexures on record, it is crystal clear that despite consistent and categorical communication of rejection of his representations right from 31.12.83 the petitioner adamantly continued to make reiteration of his representations one after the other on the same reasonings which the university turned down every time by rejection, but mere successive representation or pendency thereof would not entitle him to get rid of the delay & laches by not approaching the court for the relief or grievance within a reasonable time, which is necessary to avoid dislocating administrative set up. ever after 31.12.83 admittedly many of acctt./asstts. including the petitioner have been promoted to the post of section officer, though may be temporarily or till the selected candidates are available and that apart further promotion to the posts of asstt. registrars has also been accorded to eligible and suitable section officers till date. the petitioner alongwith other asstt./acctts. was firstly promoted as section officer by order dt. 23.6.90 till duly selected candidates joined and whereafter by order dated 3.3.93 on the recommendation of the dpc he was regularly appointed as section officer and later on also he was further promoted alongwith others as asstt. registrar though purely on temporary basis till duly selected persons are appointed by order dated 15.11.95 on which he has been continuing as such. thus in my considered opinion here also the impact on the administrative set up and on other employees is a strong reason to decline consideration of such a stale claim. the only cause for showing & explaining the inordinate delay was that the petitioner has been persistently making representations but the court cannot brush aside the respondents case that each and every representation of the petitioner was rejected and conveyed but he continued to make representation by way of mere reiteration of his claim without any new claim. so in fact, in my considered view, the petitioner was faulty in delay and for laches on his part.12. applying the ratio decendi in administrator of ut daman & dieu v. r.d. valand; bhoop singh v. union of india and ratan chandra v. union of india (supra), i must hold that the delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in the circumstances referred to above, itself, deprives him of his remedy under law and he has lost his remedy by lapse of time and also lost his right as well. secondly, inordinate delay is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner inasmuch as his successive representations despite having been rejected time & again, were inconsequential, irrespective of the merit of his claim. further grant of the relief of promotion with retrospective date 31.12.83 in the present case of the petitioner would be inequitable.13. as regards merits on claim of the petitioner for promotion w.e.f. 31.12.83 on the post of section officer, in my considered view, the petitioner has no case, because mere inclusion of the name of a candidate like petitioner in a merit list does not confer any right to be selected or appointed unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate (which in the instant case also does not indicate); and further that the state is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies reserved or otherwise even though the state acts in any arbitrary manner. i find support from the decisions in shankarson dash v. union of india (4), ut chandigarh v. dilbagh singh (5) followed in union of india v. n.r. banerjee (6) wherein, it has been laid down that a person selected or empanelled does not alone acquire any indefeasible right to appointment, because empanellment or selection, is at the best, a condition of eligibility for the purposes of appointment and that by itself does not amount to selection or creation of a vested right to appointment unless relevant rules state to the contrary.14. it is the case of the petitioner that the university did not implement criteria laid down under syndicate's resolution no. 31 dated 23.5.80 so also no. 35 dated 4/5th april 1981 inasmuch as the selection committee while considering candidatures of aspirant applied for promotion on the posts of section officer under impugned advertisement dt. 15.9.83 (ann.l) of 31% merit quota, did not award marks according to aforesaid syndicate's resolutions, in case of the petitioner; and had the selection committee applied/adopted criteria for awarding awards as stipulated by syndicate's resolutions (supra), the petitioner would have secured in all 52.5 marks according to which the selection committee would have found much meritorious than others selected under 34% merit quota and by not doing so, the selection committee as well as the university have acted in an arbitrary manner depriving the petitioner of his right to the promotion. the petitioner in this regard has also produced a comparative chart prepared by him in the light of syndicate's resolutions (supra) in respect of the 9 candidates selected by the committee. according to the petitioner as contended not only in his first representation dated 12.4.84 (which was rejected by order dt. 26.5.84) (ann.r/1) but also in this writ petition, his confidential report and interview were not so bad than others selected and so, atleast 15 marks ought to have been awarded to him on the basis of c.r. only and by adding 15 marks, his total marks would be 37.54-15 = 52.5 as per syndicate's resolutions dt.23.5.80 & 5.4.81, and his merit as per 34% merit quota post would have been at no. 5. if this case of the petitioner is accepted then also it would result in disturbing merit of 5th to 7th candidates selected by the selection committee and then these 5th to 7th selected ones are necessary parties in this writ petition but in the absence of the selected candidates having been impleaded as respondents herein, this court cannot grant relief to the petitioner in the matter of promotion in question.15. though two resolutions nos.31/dt.23.5.80 and 35/dt. 5.4.81 having been passed by the syndicate have not been denied but the petitioner failed to produce any document showing that any notification has been issued by the university for having adopted the scheme of marks for selection for promotion under 34% merit quota as approved by aforesaid two resolutions no. 31 & 35 of its syndicate. only notification dt.29.7.86 (ann. 11) has been produced but it being not retrospective rather prospective in nature cannot be made applicable to the posts advertised on 15.9.83 for 34% merit quota posts of section officer in dispute.16. even otherwise, since it is the case of the university that finalisation of the rules regarding awarding of marks by the selection committee was decided only by order no.estt./ii/86/ 16404/dt. 1.9.86 (pursuant to syndicate's resolution no.35 dt. 4/5th april, 1981) much after the selection having ended on 31.12.83 by appointing selected asstt./acctts. for promotion to the post of section officer, therefore, these resolutions nos.31 dt. 23.5.80 or 35/dt.5.4.81 cannot be acted upon or relied upon for promotion under 34% merit quota under advertisement dated 15.9.83 (ann.l) as is being claimed by the petitioner in this writ petition.17. be that as it may, the courts cannot arrogate the power to judge the comparative merits of the candidates and consider the fitness and suitability for appointment because that was the function of the selection committee (see durgadevi v. state of hp (7). further, as held in major general ips dewan v. union ofindia (8), unless the rules so require, the selection committee is not obliged to record reasons why they are not selecting a particular person and/or why they are selecting a particular person, as the case may be.18. judicial review is permissible only as to the finding whether the process in reaching decision has been observed correctly and not the decision as such. moreover, it is trite administrative law that when relevant considerations have been taken note of and irrelevant aspects have been eschewed from consideration and that no relevant aspect, has been ignored and the administrative decisions have nexus with the facts on record, it cannot be attacked on merit.19. only in rare cases if the assessment is either proved to be mala fide or is found based on inadmissible or irrelevant or insignificant & trivial material or if there is illegality attached to the decision, then powers of judicial review under article 226 of the constitution are not foreclosed. in other words, in exceptional cases, the assessment of merit made by the dpcs/selection committees is liable to be scrutinised by courts within the narrow wednesbury principles or on the ground of malafides, inasmuch as courts and tribunals can neither sit as appellate authorities nor substitute their own views to the views of the dpcs, otherwise interference by courts will result in paralysing recommendations of the dpcs and promotions.20. the present issue of impugned promotion under 34% merit quota as per advertisement itself relates to the direct recruitment the procedure therefor is prescribed in chapter iii of the recruitment rules, and the relevant provision is contained in rule 16 in terms thereof the selection committee met on 26th & 27th december, 1983. as per rule 17, selection committee, referred to in rule 16 & as mentioned in schedule iv, is required to adjudge suitability of the candidates for appointment to the posts and has to prepare a list of candidates recommended by it for direct recruitment in order of merit as adjudged by it. a look at the provisions contained in rule 15 shows that only in case of written test, persons to be called for interview may be selected on the basis of marks secured in the said written test, and that in order to enable the appointing authority to select the persons called for interview, among other methods (which may be so adopted to screen the candidates) it may also decide to hold a written test.21. in the instant case, the petitioner failed to show that the vice chancellor of the university who is appointing authority for appointment of section officer (as per schedule iii to the recruitment rules) has adopted any other method (as suggested by the petitioner in pursuance of resolution no.31/dt.23.5.80 or 35/dt.5.4.81) to screen the candidates in order to enable the v.c. to select the persons called for interview as per rule 15 of the rules, 1974, before the impugned selection process has ended on 31.12.83. the petitioner further failed to establish that awarding of marks was made mandatory either under recruitment rules or by adopting method after being approved by the syndicate of the university for such selection under 34% merit quota posts. no such notification adopting award of marks or guidelines for recruitment applicable to the impugned promotion of merit quota on 15.9.93 (ann.1) has been produced on record.22. the notification filed with this petition is of 29.7.86 (ann.11) and 1.9.86 (ann.13) having been passed subsequent to the impugned process of selection for promotion on the post of section officer advertised long back on 15.9.83 (ann.l) and this cannot be made applicable to the selection of earlier year 1983, and as stated above, as per the university, itself, finalisation of the rules regarding awarding of marks for being allocated by the selection committee was finally decided only by aforesaid notification dated 29.7.86 (ann.ll) or dated 1.9.86 (ann.13) 'even as per notification dated 1.9.86 (annex. 13) it superseded earlier notification dated 29.7.86 (ann.11). however, it is crystal clear that syndicate's resolution nos.31/dt.23.5.80 and 35/dt.5.4.81 were taken into account the decision being adopted by the university'saforesaid notifications dated 29.7.86 & 1.9.86 (ann.11 & 13), only after the impugned selection ended on 31.12.83, therefore, these two aforesaid notifications cannot be made applicable to the impugned selection of 1983 rather can be acted upon for the post advertised on or after 1.9.86.23. upon careful perusal of relevant record called for by this court, xerox copy of relevant proceedings drawn by the selection committee in respect of the process of selection for the merit quota promotional post in dispute of 1983, 1 find that the selection committee scrutinise candidature of 62 persons holding posts of acctt./asstt./stenos gr.i who were also interviewed and after adjuding their suitability, it found fallowings in the order of merit as suitable for the merit quota post of section officer:-l.shri d.n. goyal2. shri s.k. banerjee3. shri s.s. rathore4. shri j.k. dhamani5. (mrs.) janak sharma6. shri s.k. paliwal7. shri v.k. ratnani8. shri r.c. sharma9. shri rajendra baboo10. shri r.a. akar11. shri b.s. pareek12. shri b.s. pareek13. shri g.s. srivastava14. shri d.p. sharma24. though in this merit list, name of the petitioner finds place at s.no. 9 but since-the posts advertised for general category to which he belonged, were seven, first seven (excluding him being at merit no. 9) were appointed as section officer under merit quota by order dated 31.12.83 (xerox copy whereof has been filed as document b during hearing and not with writ petition). according to which also, next candidate having merit no. 6 (s.k. paliwal) was reverted and in place of whom, shri r.c. sharma having merit no. 8 (just above to the petitioner) was promoted on or about 28.6.86. albeit the petitioner challenged the process of impugned selection on the ground of having not awarded marks or not disclosed criteria in the selection proceeding for having found merits of selected candidates, but curiously enough, he failed to establish or show any rule of the recruitment rules 1974 contemplating procedure as suggested by him, being mandatory for the selection committee to record reasons for selecting or not selecting a particular candidate in the merit list. 1 have also carefully considered the relevant rules for the impugned selection and find that these rules do not require to record reasons or awarding of marks before holding any aspirant as suitable for including his name in the merit list. hence as held in durgadevi v. state of h.p. and major general ips dewan v. union of india (supra), since the recruitment rules 1974 do not so require, in the instant case also the selection committee was not obliged to adopt any procedure as suggested by the petitioner and thus viewed, i find no merit in any of the contentions of the petitioner so as to hold the impugned selection of 1983 as arbitrary or bad in law.25. further, there is no rule of thumb with regard to allocation or allotment of percentage or awarding of marks for interview. it depends upon several factors and the question of permissible percentage or awarding of marks for an interview has to be decided on the facts of each case but subject to the relevant selection process rules. where oral interview alone has been the criteria for selection/promotion to any posts in senior positions the question of higher percentage of marks for interview does not arise. in the instant case, as held above, there is no necessity for the selection committee under the recruitment rules, 1974 to have allocated marks as suggestedby the petitioner, therefore, the members of the selection committee interviewed the candidates and evaluated the candidates on the basis of their service record and the factors including the qualification, experience etc. which the committee deemed proper for selection (as the committee is a statutory body consisting of experts so it was open for them as to how it should proceed with the method of recruitment and promotion for the posts in dispute). there is no illegality in the procedure for overall evaluation of the candidate by the selection committee without fixing or awarding marks for each of the items as suggested by the petitioner and on this ground the selection cannot be held to be arbitrary. the allegation made by the petitioner is too wild and preposterous to be entertained in the absence of any incontrovertible and irregragable material to support it and to rebut the presumption of regularity of the official record and is outrightly rejected. inasmuch as i am not concerned with the non-selection of reserved quota posts if not taken into consideration either by the selection committee or by the appointing authority since the petitioner belongs to the general category, i do not further probe into the matter, except to say that even if against reserved merit quota promotional post the appointing authority has given temporary appointment on promotion to the post of section officer to others than him, such promotion cannot be questioned or disturbed by this court unless the petitioner impleaded those temporary appointees or promotees as party to this petition.26. as regards next prung of attack and challenge to the seniority claimed by the petitioner, in my considered view, he has no merit in any of his contentions, inasmuch as his case as to claim of seniority & treating him substantive on the post of asstt./acctt. w.e.f. 30.8.76 does also deserves to be outrightly rejected on the ground of laches and delay on the same anology and reasons assigned by me herein before while dealing with prime issue of merit quota promotional post. suffice is to reiterate in a nut shell that this is necessary to avoid dislocating the administrative set up after it has been functioning on a certain basis of years and during the interregnum those who have been working gain more experience and acquire rights which cannot be defeated casually by collateral entry of a person at a higher point without the benefit of actual experience during the period of his absence when he chose to remain silent for years before making the claim. 1 may also reiterate that apart from the consequential benefits in case of allowing him seniority as claimed by the petitioner, the impact on the administrative set up and on other employees who will be lowered down in seniority by putting the petitioner as per his case, is a strong reason to decline consideration of stale claim especially in the absence of persons being impleaded as party to this petition. merely because final seniority list was issued in the year 1993 after the writ petition was filed, in my view, he has no strong case for belatedly questioning seniority especially when first representation against provisional seniority issued on 20.9.1980 stood rejected by virtue of another provisional seniority list issued on 3.4.84 so also by further rejection of representation dt.8.2.86 through letter of 19.3.86 (ann.r/2) whereby it has specifically been made clear that with reference to representation dated february 8, 1986 regarding seniority, a reply had already been given to the petitioner vide office letter no.estt./ii/86/2561 dated 29.1.86 and there was nothing new in his representation for reviewing his seniority position. thus not only in the year 1984 but also thereafter on 19.3.86, it was clear to the petitioner that his representation claiming seniority w.e.f. 28.8.76 (his temporary appointment date as asstt./acctt. only for six months) has persistently been rejected, against which he will have to file a petition in a court of law, even then he chose to wait till issuance of final seniority. in my opinion, such a lapse on the part of the petitioner by keeping reticence for years together is a strong reason not to entitle him for any relief by this court. that apart, even in the first provisional seniority list, itself, dated 20.9.1980 (produced as document c during hearing) it was made explicit clear that provisional seniority list of assistant/accountant in the university as on 1st september, 1980 was notified for general information of all the employees and such a list was determined from the date of substantive appointment (i.e. date of taking on probation) in the cadre and in order of merit, as per recommendations of dpc/selection committee held for the post, as provided in rule 31 of the recruitment rules of 1974, itself, for the non-teaching employees. in this seniority list of 1980, name of the petitioner stood at no. 39 showing date of his probation from 28.6.78. similar specification as made clear in earlier list of 1980 has been mentioned in subsequent provisional seniority list issued on 3.4.84 again showing the petitioner at no.38 with date of his substantive appointment as 28.6:78 (i.e. date of taking him on probation) by following same anology in subsequent provisional seniority list either issued on 1.5.88 or before it with no change as claimed by the petitioner. thus mere successive representation is inconsequential. accepting the petitioner's contention would upset the entire administrative set up and i am unable to construe the petitioner in the manner suggested by him.27. 1 am also conscious of the fact and may hasten to show anguishment on the attitude of the respondent that the university itself had not finalised the seniority list for a period of more than ten years and this practice deserves to be deprecated by the departments which instead of finalising provisional seniority list, have used to issue successive provisional seniority lists. be that as it may in the instant case though provisional seniority lists were issued time and again and finalised after ten years but in case of the seniority to the petitioner, his representations stood rejected whenever made by way of fresh provisional seniority list with no change to his seniority, and those representations did yield response and reply from time to time as established on record.28. albeit various decisions have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner but after careful perusal whereof shows that in each and every decision cited, principles as to the test of determination of seniority were reiterated and followed time and again. instead of dealing with each of cited decisions, i think it proper to have a resume of principles of law laid down in hallmark decision of the apex court (5 judge constitution bench) in direct recruits class ii engg. officers' association v. state of maharashtra (9) followed in rudra kumar sain v. union of india (10). relevant test for the purpose of present controversy laid down in aforecited decision is quoted as under:-(a) once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. the corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority.(b) if the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counter.(c) when appointments are made from more than one source, it is permissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from the different sources, and if rules are framed in this regard they must ordinarily be followed strictly.'29. in latest decision of rudra kumar sain v. union of india (supra) it has been specifically been laid down that if the appointment order itself indicates that the post is created to meet a particular temporary contingency and for a period specified in the order, then the appointment to such a post can be aptly described as 'adhoc' or 'stop-gap'. the apex court observed as under:-'if a post is created to meet a situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature then the appointment of such a post can aptly be describes as 'fortuitous' in nature. if any appointment is made to meet the contingency arising on account of delay in completing the process of regular recruitment to the post due to an reason and it is not possible to leave the post vacant till then, and to meet the contingency an appointment is made then it can appropriately be called as a 'stop-gap' arrangement and appointment in the post as 'ad hoc' appointment.30. shri dangi laid much emphasis on the following observation made in rudra kumar sain v. union of india (supra)-'in the service jurisprudence, a person who possesses the requisite qualification for being appointed to a particular post and then he is appointed with the approval and consultation of the appropriate authority and continues in the post for a fairly long period, then such appointment cannot be held to be 'stop- gap' or fortuitous or purely ad-hoc.'31. further once seniority rule prescribed in rule 31 of the recruitment rules, 1974 makes it explicit that seniority in each class of post shall be determined by the date of order of substantive appointment to the class of post, as has been made clear in each and every provisional seniority list issued right from 1980 till 1988 that the date of substantive appointment means date of taking the employee on probation, the petitioner cannot claim seniority from the date of his temporary appointment may be on the recommendation of the selection committee/dpc because even as per rule 29 of the recruitment rules, 1974 a vacant post may be filled temporarily on adhoc basis by the appointing authority by direct recruitment or by promotion provided that no such appointment shall be continued beyond a period of 6 months without referring it to the selection committee/departmental promotion committee and shall be terminated immediately if the said person is not selected by these committees. further rule 28 provides that appointment to the post shall be made by the appointing authority on occurrence of a vacancy from amongst the list prepared by the selection committee under rule 18 or by the dpc under rule 23 or in accordance with the provisions prescribed under rule 29 as the case may be. in this view of specific provisions contemplated for appointment in case of temporary or adhoc one under rule 29 which was likely to continue beyond six months, it was to be filled up as per recommendations of the selection committee/dpc.32. the petitioner failed to show that post on which initially was appointed as asstt./acctt. by order dated 28.8.76 only for six months or till selected joins, was not ad-hoc but substantive. contrarily as is apparent from categorical language of temporary appointment dated 28.8.76 so also it is case of the respondent university in its reply at para 2 that it was stop gap arrangement for disposal of urgent work that the petitioner & others were temporarily appointed for six months or till selected candidates joins though on the recommendation of the dpc but subject to the provisions in rules 28 & 29 of the recruitment rules, 1974, but regular selection on this post took place later on whereunder on the recommendations of the dpc held under rule 20 of the recruitment rules, 1974, he was selected and appointed on probation for one year on regular basis vide order dated 28.6.78 from which date he was made and treated substantively and rightly so by the university by reckoning his seniority as such. there was no illegality therein.33. in the result, this writ petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
Judgment:

Madan, J.

1. The petitioner by way of this writ petition has sought two fold reliefs (1) seniority on the post of Assistant/Accountant from 30.8.76 and (2) promotion/appointment on the post of Section Officer on 34% merit quota of direct recruitment under advertisement dated 15.9.1983 (Ann.l).

2. Facts in brief relevant for controversy of seniority are thus. The petitioner entered in services of the University of Rajasthan (respondent) on the post of LDC in 1961 whereafter undoubtedly he was promoted as UDC and confirmed. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed as Assistant by order dated 30.8.76 (though its copy was not filed by the petitioner but by the respondent alongwith minutes of the Selection Committee) - a bare perusal of which shows that though the petitioner was promoted as Assistant on the recommendation of the DPC but purely on temporary basis only for six months or till duly selected candidates join as Assistant/Accountant, and on which post he continued but was put on probation w.e.f. 28.6.78 which ultimately resulted in confirmation on the post of Assistant/Accountant on 28.12.1978 vide order dated 5.1.79.

3. Provisional Seniority list of Asstt./Acctt. was issued on 20.9.80 against which the petitioner represented on 3.6.83 alleging his seniority having wrongly been assigned. Another representation was made on 10.3.84 for wrong assignment of seniority but also for appointrnent on the post of Section Officer. Again, on 3.4.84 the University issued provisional seniority list of Asstt./Acctt. but as per the petitioner, wrongly assigning his seniority so again it resulted into his representation on 12.4.84 followed by reminder on 8.1.86 so also for appointment since 3.12.83 as Section Officer.

4. It is the case of the petitioner that as per letter dated 29.1.86 (Ann. 10) of the University his representation was pending consideration and awaiting decision thereon but it was not communicated so the petitioner sent reminder on 5.1.90 (Ann. 16) on which rejection was conveyed by the University on 21.1.91 (Ann.20).

5. A brief resume of facts relevant for controversy as to the promotion on the post of Section Officer on 34% merit quota. The University admittedly issued an advertisement for nine posts of Section Officer against 345 merit quota (out of which seven posts were of General Category while one for SC and another for ST candidates). Since the petitioner belonged to General Category, he applied for that category post of Section Officer claiming himself eligible and qualified as B.A. & M.A. besides claiming his CR as outstanding or very good throughout apart from more than sufficient experience (as provided in Ann.2 - merit criteria i.e. Syndicate Resolution No. 31 dated 23.5.80 and 35 of 5.4.1981 given so also of training on 24.5.80 having acquired merit No. 2 with cash award). Admittedly the interviews were held by the Selection Committee on 26th & 27th December, 1983 for selection under 34% direct recruitment merit quota. On 31.12.83 on the recommendation of the Selection Committee, the University issued order appointing seven meritorious employees (holding posts of Asstt./Acctt.) as Section Officer but since the petitioner was found lesser meritorious having merit at No. 9 and posts of general category were only seven, he was not appointed and promoted as Section Officer on merit quota under the impugned order dated 31.12.83, against which he had consistently made representation despite having been rejected from time to time but he approached this Court by way of this writ petition for promotion on merit quota after seven years on 13.3.1991.

6. At the very threshold, I must hasten to observe that the petitioner though claimed seniority as well as promotion but has intermingled the controversy bymisjoinder of issues having distinct and irrelevant consideration to each others, inasmuch as relief or issue of promotion raised being of merit quota has no nexus or relation with another issue of seniority herein, having different criteria for consideration as to the process under the University of Rajasthan Employees (Non-Teaching) Recruitment Rules, 1974 (for brevity the Recruitment Rules). Admittedly, the challenge to the impugned order dated 31.12.83 relates to the promotion having been considered by the Selection Committee of the University for the posts of Section Officer under advertisement dated 15.9.83 (Ann.l), as per which these posts being of 34% merit quota were advertised inviting applications for direct recruitment of the University's employees holding posts of Asstt./Acctt. and it has no nexus, with seniority of any of them. Hence, for disposal of this writ petition, these two issues being distinct to each others are being dealt with separately. First of all, 1 advert to the issue of promotion on 34% merit quota. But, here I firstly think it proper to consider objection of the University as to the delay & laches. So, let me have a resume of decisions in this regard cited by Mr.Sharma.

7. In Administrator of U.T. Daman & Diu v. R.D. Valand (1) there was belated application for promotion; applicant was reverted from the post of Section Officer (Junior Engineer) but again promoted to that post in the year 1979 w.e.f. 28.9.1972; representation made in the year 1985 for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer w.e.f. August 1977 when some persons junior to him had been promoted, was rejected and further representation was also rejected and in such circumstances, application filed by him before the CAT in 1990 was held time barred by the Apex Court holding that making successive representation was inconsequential. The Apex Court observed as under:-

'In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Tribunal was not justified in putting the clock back by more than 15 years. The Tribunal fell into patent error in brushing aside the question of limitation by observing that the respondent has been making representation from time to time and as such the limitation would not come in his way.'

8. In Bhoop Singh v. Union of India (2), the petitioner challenged his termination after 22 years without offering any explanation for such delay and, therefore, as held, his challenge cannot be allowed merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated inasmuch as refusal of relief cannot be said to be discriminatory.

9. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta v. Union of India (3) the Apex Court held that a writ is issued by the Court in favour of a person who has some right. And not for sake of roving enquiry leaving scope for manoeuvring. Delay itself deprives a person of his remedy available in law. In absence of any fresh cause of action or any legislation a person who has lost his remedy by lapse of time looses his right as well. It was a case of casual labourer employed between 1964 to 1969 and retrenched between 1975 to 1979 but approached the Court of law after a lapse of period of more than 15 years, therefore, the Apex Court observed that in case the prayer of the petitioners is accepted then it would result in depriving a host of others who in the meantime have become eligible and are entitled to claim to be employed.

10. In the instant case also, the impugned order dated 31.12.83 of 34%, merit quota promotion on the posts of Section Officer has been challenged after a lapse of seven years by way of this petition on 13.3.91 with an untenable explanation that he has been consistently making representations one by one from time to time by way of reminders (dated 12.4.84, 7.11.87, 14.3.88 and 5.1.90). Similar is the explanation as to the delay on the issue of seniority. His first representation dt. 3.6.83 against seniority so also merit quota promotion was rejected and conveyed by letter dt. 9.2.84 (Ann.7). His consequential representation dt.12.4.84 was also responded by conveying rejection again under letter dt.26.5.84 (Ann.Rl) specifically stating therein that havingsecured lesser marks in comparison to other candidates, he has no case for promotion. His further case is that three consecutive representations dated 7.11.87, (Ann.14), 14.3.88 (Ann. 15) & 5.1.90 (Ann. 16) were also sent but he was not promoted under merit quota. Curiously enough, though his representations dated 7.11.87 (Ann.14) & 14.3.88 (Ann.15) were rejected and communicated by letter dt. 20.5.88 (Ann.R/2) stating that the appointments on the post of Section Officer in the year 1983 were made in accordance with the Rules and keeping in view the vacancies considered by the Selection Committee at that time, and, therefore, his claim for giving appointment as Section Officer from 31.12.83 did not stand, but this letter was not disclosed and stated by the petitioner but was produced by the University with its reply. Even in this letter dt.20.5.88 (Ann.R/3) it was specifically added by pointing out that this matter be treated as closed so far as office of the University is concerned, but again the petitioner sent representation on 5.1.90 (Ann.16) despite successive rejection of his reminders-cum-representations having been communicated to him and further the University conveyed another rejection on 21.1.91 by order (Ann.20) stating therein that his request through representation dt.5.1.90 (Ann.16) is not justified, hence cannot be accepted.

11. In view of aforestated facts appearing from various annexures on record, it is crystal clear that despite consistent and categorical communication of rejection of his representations right from 31.12.83 the petitioner adamantly continued to make reiteration of his representations one after the other on the same reasonings which the University turned down every time by rejection, but mere successive representation or pendency thereof would not entitle him to get rid of the delay & laches by not approaching the court for the relief or grievance within a reasonable time, which is necessary to avoid dislocating administrative set up. Ever after 31.12.83 admittedly many of Acctt./Asstts. including the petitioner have been promoted to the post of Section Officer, though may be temporarily or till the selected candidates are available and that apart further promotion to the posts of Asstt. Registrars has also been accorded to eligible and suitable Section Officers till date. The petitioner alongwith other Asstt./Acctts. was firstly promoted as Section Officer by order dt. 23.6.90 till duly selected candidates joined and whereafter by order dated 3.3.93 on the recommendation of the DPC he was regularly appointed as Section Officer and later on also he was further promoted alongwith others as Asstt. Registrar though purely on temporary basis till duly selected persons are appointed by order dated 15.11.95 on which he has been continuing as such. Thus in my considered opinion here also the impact on the administrative set up and on other employees is a strong reason to decline consideration of such a stale claim. The only cause for showing & explaining the inordinate delay was that the petitioner has been persistently making representations but the court cannot brush aside the respondents case that each and every representation of the petitioner was rejected and conveyed but he continued to make representation by way of mere reiteration of his claim without any new claim. So in fact, in my considered view, the petitioner was faulty in delay and for laches on his part.

12. Applying the ratio decendi in Administrator of UT Daman & Dieu v. R.D. Valand; Bhoop Singh v. Union of India and Ratan Chandra v. Union of India (supra), I must hold that the delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in the circumstances referred to above, itself, deprives him of his remedy under law and he has lost his remedy by lapse of time and also lost his right as well. Secondly, inordinate delay is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner inasmuch as his successive representations despite having been rejected time & again, were inconsequential, irrespective of the merit of his claim. Further grant of the relief of promotion with retrospective date 31.12.83 in the present case of the petitioner would be inequitable.

13. As regards merits on claim of the petitioner for promotion w.e.f. 31.12.83 on the post of Section Officer, in my considered view, the petitioner has no case, because mere inclusion of the name of a candidate like petitioner in a merit list does not confer any right to be selected or appointed unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate (which in the instant case also does not indicate); and further that the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies reserved or otherwise even though the State acts in any arbitrary manner. I find support from the decisions in Shankarson Dash v. Union of India (4), UT Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh (5) followed in Union of India v. N.R. Banerjee (6) wherein, it has been laid down that a person selected or empanelled does not alone acquire any indefeasible right to appointment, because empanellment or selection, is at the best, a condition of eligibility for the purposes of appointment and that by itself does not amount to selection or creation of a vested right to appointment unless relevant rules state to the contrary.

14. It is the case of the petitioner that the University did not implement criteria laid down under Syndicate's resolution No. 31 dated 23.5.80 so also No. 35 dated 4/5th April 1981 inasmuch as the Selection Committee while considering candidatures of aspirant applied for promotion on the posts of Section Officer under impugned advertisement dt. 15.9.83 (Ann.l) of 31% merit quota, did not award marks according to aforesaid Syndicate's resolutions, in case of the petitioner; and had the Selection Committee applied/adopted criteria for awarding awards as stipulated by Syndicate's resolutions (supra), the petitioner would have secured in all 52.5 marks according to which the Selection Committee would have found much meritorious than others selected under 34% merit quota and by not doing so, the Selection Committee as well as the University have acted in an arbitrary manner depriving the petitioner of his right to the promotion. The petitioner in this regard has also produced a comparative chart prepared by him in the light of Syndicate's resolutions (supra) in respect of the 9 candidates selected by the Committee. According to the petitioner as contended not only in his first representation dated 12.4.84 (which was rejected by order dt. 26.5.84) (Ann.R/1) but also in this writ petition, his confidential report and interview were not so bad than others selected and so, atleast 15 marks ought to have been awarded to him on the basis of C.R. only and by adding 15 marks, his total marks would be 37.54-15 = 52.5 as per Syndicate's resolutions dt.23.5.80 & 5.4.81, and his merit as per 34% merit quota post would have been at No. 5. If this case of the petitioner is accepted then also it would result in disturbing merit of 5th to 7th candidates selected by the Selection Committee and then these 5th to 7th selected ones are necessary parties in this writ petition but in the absence of the selected candidates having been impleaded as respondents herein, this Court cannot grant relief to the petitioner in the matter of promotion in question.

15. Though two resolutions Nos.31/dt.23.5.80 and 35/dt. 5.4.81 having been passed by the Syndicate have not been denied but the petitioner failed to produce any document showing that any notification has been issued by the University for having adopted the Scheme of marks for selection for promotion under 34% merit quota as approved by aforesaid two resolutions No. 31 & 35 of its Syndicate. Only notification dt.29.7.86 (Ann. 11) has been produced but it being not retrospective rather prospective in nature cannot be made applicable to the posts advertised on 15.9.83 for 34% merit quota posts of Section Officer in dispute.

16. Even otherwise, since it is the case of the University that finalisation of the Rules regarding awarding of marks by the Selection Committee was decided only by order No.Estt./II/86/ 16404/dt. 1.9.86 (pursuant to Syndicate's Resolution No.35 dt. 4/5th April, 1981) much after the selection having ended on 31.12.83 by appointing selected Asstt./Acctts. for promotion to the post of Section Officer, therefore, these Resolutions Nos.31 dt. 23.5.80 or 35/dt.5.4.81 cannot be acted upon or relied upon for promotion under 34% merit quota under advertisement dated 15.9.83 (Ann.l) as is being claimed by the petitioner in this writ petition.

17. Be that as it may, the Courts cannot arrogate the power to judge the comparative merits of the candidates and consider the fitness and suitability for appointment because that was the function of the Selection Committee (see Durgadevi v. State of HP (7). Further, as held in Major General IPS Dewan v. Union ofIndia (8), unless the rules so require, the Selection Committee is not obliged to record reasons why they are not selecting a particular person and/or why they are selecting a particular person, as the case may be.

18. Judicial review is permissible only as to the finding whether the process in reaching decision has been observed correctly and not the decision as such. Moreover, it is trite administrative law that when relevant considerations have been taken note of and irrelevant aspects have been eschewed from consideration and that no relevant aspect, has been ignored and the administrative decisions have nexus with the facts on record, it cannot be attacked on merit.

19. Only in rare cases if the assessment is either proved to be mala fide or is found based on inadmissible or irrelevant or insignificant & trivial material or if there is illegality attached to the decision, then powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution are not foreclosed. In other words, in exceptional cases, the assessment of merit made by the DPCs/Selection Committees is liable to be scrutinised by Courts within the narrow Wednesbury principles or on the ground of malafides, inasmuch as Courts and Tribunals can neither sit as appellate authorities nor substitute their own views to the views of the DPCs, otherwise interference by Courts will result in paralysing recommendations of the DPCs and promotions.

20. The present issue of impugned promotion under 34% merit quota as per advertisement itself relates to the direct recruitment the procedure therefor is prescribed in Chapter III of the Recruitment Rules, and the relevant provision is contained in Rule 16 in terms thereof the Selection Committee met on 26th & 27th December, 1983. As per Rule 17, Selection Committee, referred to in rule 16 & as mentioned in Schedule IV, is required to adjudge suitability of the candidates for appointment to the posts and has to prepare a list of candidates recommended by it for direct recruitment in order of merit as adjudged by it. A look at the provisions contained in Rule 15 shows that only in case of written test, persons to be called for interview may be selected on the basis of marks secured in the said written test, and that in order to enable the appointing authority to select the persons called for interview, among other methods (which may be so adopted to screen the candidates) it may also decide to hold a written test.

21. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to show that the Vice Chancellor of the University who is appointing authority for appointment of Section Officer (as per Schedule III to the Recruitment Rules) has adopted any other method (as suggested by the petitioner in pursuance of Resolution No.31/dt.23.5.80 or 35/dt.5.4.81) to screen the candidates in order to enable the V.C. to select the persons called for interview as per Rule 15 of the Rules, 1974, before the impugned selection process has ended on 31.12.83. The petitioner further failed to establish that awarding of marks was made mandatory either under Recruitment Rules or by adopting method after being approved by the Syndicate of the University for such selection under 34% merit quota posts. No such notification adopting award of marks or guidelines for recruitment applicable to the impugned promotion of merit quota on 15.9.93 (Ann.1) has been produced on record.

22. The notification filed with this petition is of 29.7.86 (Ann.11) and 1.9.86 (Ann.13) having been passed subsequent to the impugned process of selection for promotion on the post of Section Officer advertised long back on 15.9.83 (Ann.l) and this cannot be made applicable to the selection of earlier year 1983, and as stated above, as per the University, itself, finalisation of the Rules regarding awarding of marks for being allocated by the Selection Committee was finally decided only by aforesaid notification dated 29.7.86 (Ann.ll) or dated 1.9.86 (Ann.13) 'Even as per notification dated 1.9.86 (Annex. 13) it superseded earlier notification dated 29.7.86 (Ann.11). However, it is crystal clear that Syndicate's Resolution Nos.31/dt.23.5.80 and 35/dt.5.4.81 were taken into account the decision being adopted by the University'saforesaid notifications dated 29.7.86 & 1.9.86 (Ann.11 & 13), only after the impugned selection ended on 31.12.83, therefore, these two aforesaid notifications cannot be made applicable to the impugned selection of 1983 rather can be acted upon for the post advertised on or after 1.9.86.

23. Upon careful perusal of relevant record called for by this Court, xerox copy of relevant proceedings drawn by the Selection Committee in respect of the process of selection for the merit quota promotional post in dispute of 1983, 1 find that the Selection Committee scrutinise candidature of 62 persons holding posts of Acctt./Asstt./Stenos Gr.I who were also interviewed and after adjuding their suitability, it found fallowings in the order of merit as suitable for the merit quota post of Section Officer:-

l.Shri D.N. Goyal

2. Shri S.K. Banerjee

3. Shri S.S. Rathore

4. Shri J.K. Dhamani

5. (Mrs.) Janak Sharma

6. Shri S.K. Paliwal

7. Shri V.K. Ratnani

8. Shri R.C. Sharma

9. Shri Rajendra Baboo

10. Shri R.A. Akar

11. Shri B.S. Pareek

12. Shri B.S. Pareek

13. Shri G.S. Srivastava

14. Shri D.P. Sharma

24. Though in this merit list, name of the petitioner finds place at S.No. 9 but since-the posts advertised for general category to which he belonged, were seven, first seven (excluding him being at merit No. 9) were appointed as Section Officer under merit quota by order dated 31.12.83 (xerox copy whereof has been filed as Document B during hearing and not with writ petition). According to which also, next candidate having merit No. 6 (S.K. Paliwal) was reverted and in place of whom, Shri R.C. Sharma having merit No. 8 (just above to the petitioner) was promoted on or about 28.6.86. Albeit the petitioner challenged the process of impugned selection on the ground of having not awarded marks or not disclosed criteria in the selection proceeding for having found merits of selected candidates, but curiously enough, he failed to establish or show any rule of the Recruitment Rules 1974 contemplating procedure as suggested by him, being mandatory for the Selection Committee to record reasons for selecting or not selecting a particular candidate in the merit list. 1 have also carefully considered the relevant rules for the impugned selection and find that these Rules do not require to record reasons or awarding of marks before holding any aspirant as suitable for including his name in the merit list. Hence as held in Durgadevi v. State of H.P. and Major General IPS Dewan v. Union of India (supra), since the Recruitment Rules 1974 do not so require, in the instant case also the Selection Committee was not obliged to adopt any procedure as suggested by the petitioner and thus viewed, I find no merit in any of the contentions of the petitioner so as to hold the impugned selection of 1983 as arbitrary or bad in law.

25. Further, there is no rule of thumb with regard to allocation or allotment of percentage or awarding of marks for interview. It depends upon several factors and the question of permissible percentage or awarding of marks for an interview has to be decided on the facts of each case but subject to the relevant selection process rules. Where oral interview alone has been the criteria for selection/promotion to any posts in senior positions the question of higher percentage of marks for interview does not arise. In the instant case, as held above, there is no necessity for the Selection Committee under the Recruitment Rules, 1974 to have allocated marks as suggestedby the petitioner, therefore, the members of the Selection Committee interviewed the candidates and evaluated the candidates on the basis of their service record and the factors including the qualification, experience etc. which the Committee deemed proper for selection (as the Committee is a statutory body consisting of experts so it was open for them as to how it should proceed with the method of recruitment and promotion for the posts in dispute). There is no illegality in the procedure for overall evaluation of the candidate by the Selection Committee without fixing or awarding marks for each of the items as suggested by the petitioner and on this ground the selection cannot be held to be arbitrary. The allegation made by the petitioner is too wild and preposterous to be entertained in the absence of any incontrovertible and irregragable material to support it and to rebut the presumption of regularity of the official record and is outrightly rejected. Inasmuch as I am not concerned with the non-selection of reserved quota posts if not taken into consideration either by the Selection Committee or by the appointing authority since the petitioner belongs to the general category, I do not further probe into the matter, except to say that even if against reserved merit quota promotional post the appointing authority has given temporary appointment on promotion to the post of Section Officer to others than him, such promotion cannot be questioned or disturbed by this Court unless the petitioner impleaded those temporary appointees or promotees as party to this petition.

26. As regards next prung of attack and challenge to the seniority claimed by the petitioner, in my considered view, he has no merit in any of his contentions, inasmuch as his case as to claim of seniority & treating him substantive on the post of Asstt./Acctt. w.e.f. 30.8.76 does also deserves to be outrightly rejected on the ground of laches and delay on the same anology and reasons assigned by me herein before while dealing with prime issue of merit quota promotional post. Suffice is to reiterate in a nut shell that this is necessary to avoid dislocating the administrative set up after it has been functioning on a certain basis of years and during the interregnum those who have been working gain more experience and acquire rights which cannot be defeated casually by collateral entry of a person at a higher point without the benefit of actual experience during the period of his absence when he chose to remain silent for years before making the claim. 1 may also reiterate that apart from the consequential benefits in case of allowing him seniority as claimed by the petitioner, the impact on the administrative set up and on other employees who will be lowered down in seniority by putting the petitioner as per his case, is a strong reason to decline consideration of stale claim especially in the absence of persons being impleaded as party to this petition. Merely because final seniority list was issued in the year 1993 after the writ petition was filed, in my view, he has no strong case for belatedly questioning seniority especially when first representation against provisional seniority issued on 20.9.1980 stood rejected by virtue of another provisional seniority list issued on 3.4.84 so also by further rejection of representation dt.8.2.86 through letter of 19.3.86 (Ann.R/2) whereby it has specifically been made clear that with reference to representation dated February 8, 1986 regarding seniority, a reply had already been given to the petitioner vide office letter No.Estt./II/86/2561 dated 29.1.86 and there was nothing new in his representation for reviewing his seniority position. Thus not only in the year 1984 but also thereafter on 19.3.86, it was clear to the petitioner that his representation claiming seniority w.e.f. 28.8.76 (his temporary appointment date as Asstt./Acctt. only for six months) has persistently been rejected, against which he will have to file a petition in a Court of law, even then he chose to wait till issuance of final seniority. In my opinion, such a lapse on the part of the petitioner by keeping reticence for years together is a strong reason not to entitle him for any relief by this Court. That apart, even in the first provisional seniority list, itself, dated 20.9.1980 (produced as document C during hearing) it was made explicit clear that provisional seniority list of Assistant/Accountant in the University as on 1st September, 1980 was notified for general information of all the employees and such a list was determined from the date of substantive appointment (i.e. date of taking on probation) in the cadre and in order of merit, as per recommendations of DPC/Selection Committee held for the post, as provided in Rule 31 of the Recruitment Rules of 1974, itself, for the non-teaching employees. In this seniority list of 1980, name of the petitioner stood at No. 39 showing date of his probation from 28.6.78. Similar specification as made clear in earlier list of 1980 has been mentioned in subsequent provisional seniority list issued on 3.4.84 again showing the petitioner at No.38 with date of his substantive appointment as 28.6:78 (i.e. date of taking him on probation) by following same anology in subsequent provisional seniority list either issued on 1.5.88 or before it with no change as claimed by the petitioner. Thus mere successive representation is inconsequential. Accepting the petitioner's contention would upset the entire administrative set up and I am unable to construe the petitioner in the manner suggested by him.

27. 1 am also conscious of the fact and may hasten to show anguishment on the attitude of the respondent that the University itself had not finalised the seniority list for a period of more than ten years and this practice deserves to be deprecated by the departments which instead of finalising provisional seniority list, have used to issue successive provisional seniority lists. Be that as it may in the instant case though provisional seniority lists were issued time and again and finalised after ten years but in case of the seniority to the petitioner, his representations stood rejected whenever made by way of fresh provisional seniority list with no change to his seniority, and those representations did yield response and reply from time to time as established on record.

28. Albeit various decisions have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner but after careful perusal whereof shows that in each and every decision cited, principles as to the test of determination of seniority were reiterated and followed time and again. Instead of dealing with each of cited decisions, I think it proper to have a resume of principles of law laid down in hallmark decision of the Apex Court (5 Judge constitution bench) in Direct Recruits Class II Engg. Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra (9) followed in Rudra Kumar Sain v. Union of India (10). Relevant test for the purpose of present controversy laid down in aforecited decision is quoted as under:-

(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority.

(B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counter.

(C) When appointments are made from more than one source, it is permissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from the different sources, and if rules are framed in this regard they must ordinarily be followed strictly.'

29. In latest decision of Rudra Kumar Sain v. Union of India (supra) it has been specifically been laid down that if the appointment order itself indicates that the post is created to meet a particular temporary contingency and for a period specified in the order, then the appointment to such a post can be aptly described as 'adhoc' or 'stop-gap'. The Apex Court observed as under:-

'If a post is created to meet a situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature then the appointment of such a post can aptly be describes as 'fortuitous' in nature. If any appointment is made to meet the contingency arising on account of delay in completing the process of regular recruitment to the post due to an reason and it is not possible to leave the post vacant till then, and to meet the contingency an appointment is made then it can appropriately be called as a 'stop-gap' arrangement and appointment in the post as 'ad hoc' appointment.

30. Shri Dangi laid much emphasis on the following Observation made in Rudra Kumar Sain v. Union of India (supra)-

'In the service jurisprudence, a person who possesses the requisite qualification for being appointed to a particular post and then he is appointed with the approval and consultation of the appropriate authority and continues in the post for a fairly long period, then such appointment cannot be held to be 'stop- gap' or fortuitous or purely ad-hoc.'

31. Further once seniority rule prescribed in Rule 31 of the Recruitment Rules, 1974 makes it explicit that seniority in each class of post shall be determined by the date of order of substantive appointment to the class of post, as has been made clear in each and every provisional seniority list issued right from 1980 till 1988 that the date of substantive appointment means date of taking the employee on probation, the petitioner cannot claim seniority from the date of his temporary appointment may be on the recommendation of the Selection Committee/DPC because even as per Rule 29 of the Recruitment Rules, 1974 a vacant post may be filled temporarily on adhoc basis by the appointing authority by direct recruitment or by promotion provided that no such appointment shall be continued beyond a period of 6 months without referring it to the Selection Committee/Departmental Promotion Committee and shall be terminated immediately if the said person is not selected by these Committees. Further Rule 28 provides that appointment to the post shall be made by the appointing authority on occurrence of a vacancy from amongst the list prepared by the Selection Committee under Rule 18 or by the DPC under Rule 23 or in accordance with the provisions prescribed under Rule 29 as the case may be. In this view of specific provisions contemplated for appointment in case of temporary or adhoc one under Rule 29 which was likely to continue beyond six months, it was to be filled up as per recommendations of the Selection Committee/DPC.

32. The petitioner failed to show that post on which initially was appointed as Asstt./Acctt. by order dated 28.8.76 only for six months or till selected joins, was not ad-hoc but substantive. Contrarily as is apparent from categorical language of temporary appointment dated 28.8.76 so also it is case of the respondent University in its reply at para 2 that it was stop gap arrangement for disposal of urgent work that the petitioner & others were temporarily appointed for six months or till selected candidates joins though on the recommendation of the DPC but subject to the provisions in Rules 28 & 29 of the Recruitment Rules, 1974, but regular selection on this post took place later on whereunder on the recommendations of the DPC held under Rule 20 of the Recruitment Rules, 1974, he was selected and appointed on probation for one year on regular basis vide order dated 28.6.78 from which date he was made and treated substantively and rightly so by the University by reckoning his seniority as such. There was no illegality therein.

33. In the result, this writ petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.