Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors. - Court Judgment

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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
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			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
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			'id' => '762824',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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Code Context
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			'id' => '762824',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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			'id' => '762824',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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Milap Chand Jain, J.

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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '762824',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.

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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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		'id' => '762824',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.

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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;

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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '762824',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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An order

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Code Context
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			'id' => '762824',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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		'id' => '762824',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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$caseref = 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta<br>'
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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(i) superseding an arbitration ;

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
			'sub' => 'Arbitration',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
		'sub' => 'Arbitration',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
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(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;

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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '762824',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
			'sub' => 'Arbitration',
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		'id' => '762824',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
		'sub' => 'Arbitration',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.

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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '762824',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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		'id' => '762824',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:

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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '762824',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
			'sub' => 'Arbitration',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '762824',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.

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			'id' => '762824',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:

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			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '762824',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
			'sub' => 'Arbitration',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '762824',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.

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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '762824',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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$i = (int) 24
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Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
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9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.

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Code Context
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
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			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
			'sub' => 'Arbitration',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '762824',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.

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			'id' => '762824',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
		'sub' => 'Arbitration',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.

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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '762824',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
			'sub' => 'Arbitration',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chhabil Das Vs Gokul Das ors - Citation 762824 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '762824',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
		'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1985-11-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.

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			'id' => '762824',
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			'appealno' => 'D.B. Special Appeal No. 26 of 1985',
			'appellant' => 'Chhabil Das',
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			'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
			'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta;',
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			'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">An order</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Chhabil Das Vs. Gokul Das ors.',
		'casenote' => 'Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 - Section 18 and Arbitration Act--Section 39(2)--Second appeal--Arbitration matter should be settled early--Held, second appeal to High Court is barred.;It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.; Appeal dismissed -  -  39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
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		'judge' => ' Milap Chand Jain and; Jas Raj Chopra, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.</p><p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.</p><p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.</p><p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.</p><p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;</p><p>An order</p><p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;</p><p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;</p><p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;</p><p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;</p><p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;</p><p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.</p><p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p><p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).</p><p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:</p><p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:</p><p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.</p><p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.</p><p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'</p><p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:</p><p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.</p><p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.</p><p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.</p><p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:</p><p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.</p><p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...</p><p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.</p><p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.</p><p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1985(2)WLN729',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Gokul Das ors.',
		'sub' => 'Arbitration',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Milap Chand Jain, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is an appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, this special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company : [1962]3SCR497 and the decision of this court in Sardarlal v. Umraolal Gupta 1981 RLW 530.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>31. Appealable orders (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders;',
	(int) 5 => '<p>An order',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) superseding an arbitration ;',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case ;',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) modifying or correcting an award ;',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ;',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the Section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(Substituted for 'His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950).',
	(int) 15 => '<p>4. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:',
	(int) 16 => '<p>18. Appeal shall lie to the High Court from Judges of the Court:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(2) Not with standing anything here in before provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>5. How the words 'second appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section.39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that 'in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression 'second appeal' used in Section (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under Section 39(1) and not in appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas : AIR1952Bom229 by Bavdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga v. Kissan Dass Girdhardass 74 Mad. L.W. 40B: 1961 I.L.R. 809 (FB). by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective 'imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal.'',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>7. Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of India's case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Section 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Section 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Section 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Section 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under Sub-section (2). Section 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Section 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Section 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred Under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in Sub-section (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication. Section 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that not with standing anything contained in Section 39(3), an appeal would be competent, under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implication, such a meaning cannot be given to Section 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Section 39(2) would remain unaffected. It may also be stated that the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted in Section 39(2) in the years 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into foce in the year 1949. Although, for the words 'His Majesty in Council' and the words 'Supreme Court' were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words 'Supreme Court' in Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra code, appeals, Letters Patent or special appeal were intended to be barred by Section 39.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantia] alteration in the law beyond what in explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the irrmediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matter outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness...',
	(int) 28 => '<p>11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Ors. v. Government of Madras and others : 1955CriLJ873 applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Section 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already at stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Section 18.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta 1981 RLW 530 cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Section 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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