Om Prakash and Others Vs. Regional Transport Authority and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
constitution of india, 1950 - article 226--writ--route permit matter--application for grant of permit--no vacancy as per inter-state reciprocal agreement--rejection of application by rta--transport tribunal set aside the order of rta and directed it to consider the application--tribunal committed error--no permit can be granted over and above ceiling fixed by reciprocal agreement.;writ petition allowed - - failure toobserve requirements by statutory bodies is enforced by courts by declaring (action) in violation of rules and regulations to be void.orderchauhan, j.(1). the instant writ petition has been filed for setting aside the judgment and order of the state transport appellate tribunal (s.t.a.t.) dated 24.7.2000 (annx.6) by which the learned tribunal has quashed the resolution of the regional transport authority (r.t.a.) dated 2.4.1998 (annex. 5) by which the r.t.a. had rejected the applications for grant of permit on the route on the ground that there was no vacancy as per the inter-state reciprocal agreement.(2). the facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner no.l and the predecessor in interest of petitioner no.2 had been granted permit on the route sidhmukh- hisarvia gorchi inter state route lying between the state of rajas than and haryana, in view of the provisions of reciprocal inter-state agreement dated 8.2.1968 which provided that the rajasthan state shall grant two permits and each permit holder shall have a single trip daily on the aforesaid route. the said permits had been countersigned by the competent authority in the state of haryana. the said permits stood renewed from time to time and are valid upto 6.4.2003. the states entered into a new agreement which was finalised on 9.7.1997 and was published in the gazettee on 15.7.1997 (annx. 4) which provided only two permits on the aforesaid route with two single tripes for the state of rajasthan. the relevant clauses of the said agreement have been that the said agreement shall supersede all earlier agreements and conditions set-out therein. however, so far as the stage carriage permits are concerned it provided inter alia as under: -(iv) all the previous stage carnage permits which are counlersigned by either state before coming in force of this agreement, shall remain in force.(3). after the publication of the said agreement the respondent no.3 and others filed applicalions for grant of permits on the said route, however the r.t.a. vide its resolution dated 2.4.1998 rejecied the applications on the ground that there was novacancy against which these applications could be considered. being aggrieved and dissatisfied respondent no.3 challenged the said resolution by filing appeal no. 116/2000 which has been allowed vide impugned judgment and order dated 24,7.2000 (annx. 6) holding that though the permits granted under the old agreement had been saved and protected but they shall not be included in the strength fixed by the agreement dated 15.7.1997, hence it quashed the resolution dated 2.4.98 and directed the r.t.a. to consider the applications. hence this petition.(4). it is settled legal proposition that law does not permit an authority to grant permit over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter-state agreement (vide ashawani kumar & anr. vs. r.t.a. (1), and zamindara motor transport co-operative societies vs. r.t.a. (2).(5). if the permits granted under the agreement of 1968 had been saved and protected by the new agreement of 1997 and no permit can-be granted over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter- state agreement, the view taken by the learned tribunal cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.(6). the interpretation put to the said agreement by the learned tribunal tanta-rnounts to grant of permit over and above the ceiling fixed by the reciprocal agreement and such an interpretation is not permissible.(7). thus, in view of the above the authority has no competence to grant a permit over and above the ceiling fixed by reciprocal agreement as it would violate the mandate of law laid down in ashawani kumar (supra) and zamindara motor transport co-operative societies (supra).(8). therefore, clause (iv) of the agreement which was published on 15.7.97 cannot be interpreted in a way that the permits granted and countersigned under the old agreement of 1968 would be in addition to the number fixed by the said agreement.(9). shri r.p. dave, learned counsel for the respondents has raised the issue that in many cases prior to the said judgments in ashawani kumar and zamindara motor transport co-operative societies (supra) permits had been granted over and above the ceiling fixed by the reciprocal agreement and had been countersigned by the other state and even now the vehicles plying on the route may be over and above the ceiling fixed by the reciprocal agreement. when the hon'ble supreme court interprets the provisions of law it is presumed that it is an interpretation of law from its very inception and all the acts done in contravention thereof cannot be purported to have passed or done under the statute and such permits cannot be protected/saved.(10). it is settled law that when the action of the state or its instrumentalities is not as per the rules or regulations or supported by a statue, the court must exercise its jurisdiction to declare such an act to be illegal and invalid. in sirsi municipality vs. cecelia kom francis tellis (3), the supreme court observed that 'the ratio is that the rules or the regulations arc binding on the authorities.'(11). similarly, a constitution bench of the hon'ble supreme court, in sukhdev singh & ors. vs. bhagatram sardar singh raghuvanshi & anr. (4), has observed as under:-'the statutory authorities cannot deviate from the conditions of service. any deviation will be enforced by legal sanction of declaration by courts to invalidate actions in violation of rules and regulations. the existence of rules and regulations under statute is to ensure regular conduct with a distinctive attitude to that conduct as a standard. the statutory regulations in the cases under consideration give the employees a statutory status and impose restrictions on the employer and the employee with no option to vary the condititions....in cases of statutory bodies there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies....the element of public employment or service and the support of statute require observance of rules and regulations. failure toobserve requirements by statutory bodies is enforced by courts by declaring (action) in violation of rules and regulations to be void.'(12). similar view has been laken by the supreme court in ambica quarry works etc. vs. slate of gujarat & ors. (5), and commissioner of police, bombay vs. gordhan-das bhanji (6).(13). in dr. meera massey vs. dr. s.r. mehrotra & ors. (7), the apex court observed as under:-'if the laws and principles are eroded by such institutions, it not only pollutes its functioning deteriorating its standard but also exhibits .....wrong channel adopted....if there is any erosion or descending by those who control the activities all expectations and hopes are destroyed. if the institutions perform dedicated and sincere service with the highest morality it would not only up-lift many but bring back even a limping society to its normalcy.'(14). the hon'bfe supreme court has reiterated the same view in ram chand & ors. vs. union of india & ors. (8), and held that 'the exercise of power should not made against the spirit of the provisions of the statute, otherwise it would tent towards arbitrariness.' similar view has been expressed by the apex court in virender s. hooda vs. state of haryana & ors. (9), a.p. agarwal vs. government of n.c.t. of delhi (10), and s. ramanathan vs. union of india & ors. (11).(15). the hon'ble supreme court, in poona city municipal corporation vs. datta-traya nagesh deodher (12), while interpreting the provision under the bombay provincial municipal corporation act, 1949, observed as under:-'the benefit of this section would be available to the corporation only if it was held that this deduction of ten per cent, was 'an act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this act.' we have already held that this levy was not in pursuance or execution of the act. it is equally clear that in view of the provisions of section 127(4)(to which we have already referred) the levy could nol be said to be 'purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the act.' for, what is plainly prohibited by the act cannot be claimed to be purported to be done in pursuance or intended execution of the act.'(16). the hon'ble supreme court, in municipal corporation, indore vs. sri ni-yamatulla (13), interpreted section 135(2) of the indore municipal act, 1909, which is similar to section 233(1)(a) of the act in the following terms:-'the provisions contained in section 135 of the indore municipal act will be applicable to things done under the act. it is manifest that in the present case the order of dismissal passed by shri ghatpande was beyond his jurisdiction and is, therefore, not an act done under the acl.'(17). the aforesaid judgments were reconsidered and approved by the hon'ble supreme court in j.n. ganatravs. morvi municipality, morvi (14). thus, in a given case if permits had been granted over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter-state agreement and have been countersigned by the other state the said permits cannot be held to have been granted/countersigned under the act and the authority has to deal with the same in accordance with law.(18). in the instant case, such a fact-situation doas not exist. thus, in view of the above the petition succeeds and is allowed. the judgment and order of the learned tribunal dated 24.7.2000 (annx. 6) is hereby set aside and the resolution of the r.t.a. dated 2.4.1998 (annex. 5) is restored. there shall be no order as to costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

Chauhan, J.

(1). The instant writ petition has been filed for setting aside the judgment and order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (S.T.A.T.) dated 24.7.2000 (Annx.6) by which the learned Tribunal has quashed the Resolution of the Regional Transport Authority (R.T.A.) dated 2.4.1998 (Annex. 5) by which the R.T.A. had rejected the applications for grant of permit on the route on the ground that there was no vacancy as per the inter-state reciprocal agreement.

(2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner No.l and the predecessor in interest of petitioner No.2 had been granted permit on the route Sidhmukh- Hisarvia Gorchi inter state route lying between the State of Rajas than and Haryana, in view of the provisions of reciprocal inter-state agreement dated 8.2.1968 which provided that the Rajasthan State shall grant two permits and each permit holder shall have a single trip daily on the aforesaid route. The said permits had been countersigned by the competent authority in the State of Haryana. The said permits stood renewed from time to time and are valid upto 6.4.2003. The States entered into a new agreement which was finalised on 9.7.1997 and was published in the Gazettee on 15.7.1997 (Annx. 4) which provided only two permits on the aforesaid route with two single tripes for the State of Rajasthan. The relevant clauses of the said agreement have been that the said agreement shall supersede all earlier agreements and conditions set-out therein. However, so far as the Stage Carriage Permits are concerned it provided inter alia as under: -

(iv) All the previous Stage Carnage Permits which are counlersigned by either State before coming in force of this agreement, shall remain in force.

(3). After the publication of the said agreement the respondent No.3 and others filed applicalions for grant of permits on the said route, however the R.T.A. vide its Resolution dated 2.4.1998 rejecied the applications on the ground that there was novacancy against which these applications could be considered. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied respondent No.3 challenged the said Resolution by filing appeal No. 116/2000 which has been allowed vide impugned judgment and order dated 24,7.2000 (Annx. 6) holding that though the permits granted under the old agreement had been saved and protected but they shall not be included in the strength fixed by the agreement dated 15.7.1997, hence it quashed the Resolution dated 2.4.98 and directed the R.T.A. to consider the applications. Hence this petition.

(4). It is settled legal proposition that law does not permit an Authority to grant permit over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter-state agreement (vide Ashawani Kumar & Anr. vs. R.T.A. (1), and Zamindara Motor Transport Co-operative Societies vs. R.T.A. (2).

(5). If the permits granted under the agreement of 1968 had been saved and protected by the new agreement of 1997 and no permit can-be granted over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter- state agreement, the view taken by the learned Tribunal cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

(6). The interpretation put to the said agreement by the learned Tribunal tanta-rnounts to grant of permit over and above the ceiling fixed by the reciprocal agreement and such an interpretation is not permissible.

(7). Thus, in view of the above the authority has no competence to grant a permit over and above the ceiling fixed by reciprocal agreement as it would violate the mandate of law laid down in Ashawani Kumar (supra) and Zamindara Motor Transport Co-operative Societies (supra).

(8). Therefore, clause (iv) of the agreement which was published on 15.7.97 cannot be interpreted in a way that the permits granted and countersigned under the old agreement of 1968 would be in addition to the number fixed by the said agreement.

(9). Shri R.P. Dave, learned counsel for the respondents has raised the issue that in many cases prior to the said judgments in Ashawani Kumar and Zamindara Motor Transport Co-operative Societies (supra) permits had been granted over and above the ceiling fixed by the reciprocal agreement and had been countersigned by the other State and even now the vehicles plying on the route may be over and above the ceiling fixed by the reciprocal agreement. When the Hon'ble Supreme Court interprets the provisions of law it is presumed that it is an interpretation of law from its very inception and all the acts done in contravention thereof cannot be purported to have passed or done under the Statute and such permits cannot be protected/saved.

(10). It is settled law that when the action of the State or its instrumentalities is not as per the rules or regulations or supported by a statue, the Court must exercise its jurisdiction to declare such an act to be illegal and invalid. In Sirsi Municipality vs. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis (3), the Supreme Court observed that 'the ratio is that the rules or the regulations arc binding on the authorities.'

(11). Similarly, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Sukhdev Singh & Ors. vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr. (4), has observed as under:-

'The statutory authorities cannot deviate from the conditions of service. Any deviation will be enforced by legal sanction of declaration by Courts to invalidate actions in violation of rules and regulations. The existence of rules and regulations under statute is to ensure regular conduct with a distinctive attitude to that conduct as a standard. The statutory regulations in the cases under consideration give the employees a statutory status and impose restrictions on the employer and the employee with no option to vary the condititions....In cases of statutory bodies there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies....the element of public employment or service and the support of statute require observance of rules and regulations. Failure toobserve requirements by statutory bodies is enforced by courts by declaring (action) in violation of rules and regulations to be void.'

(12). Similar view has been laken by the Supreme Court in Ambica Quarry Works etc. vs. Slate of Gujarat & Ors. (5), and Commissioner of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhan-das Bhanji (6).

(13). In Dr. Meera Massey vs. Dr. S.R. Mehrotra & ors. (7), the Apex Court observed as under:-

'If the laws and principles are eroded by such institutions, it not only pollutes its functioning deteriorating its standard but also exhibits .....wrong channel adopted....If there is any erosion or descending by those who control the activities all expectations and hopes are destroyed. If the institutions perform dedicated and sincere service with the highest morality it would not only up-lift many but bring back even a limping society to its normalcy.'

(14). The Hon'bfe Supreme Court has reiterated the same view in Ram Chand & ors. vs. Union of India & ors. (8), and held that 'the exercise of power should not made against the spirit of the provisions of the statute, otherwise it would tent towards arbitrariness.' Similar view has been expressed by the Apex Court in Virender S. Hooda vs. State of Haryana & ors. (9), A.P. Agarwal vs. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi (10), and S. Ramanathan vs. Union of India & ors. (11).

(15). The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Poona City Municipal Corporation vs. Datta-traya Nagesh Deodher (12), while interpreting the provision under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, observed as under:-

'The benefit of this section would be available to the Corporation only if it was held that this deduction of ten per cent, was 'an act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act.' We have already held that this levy was not in pursuance or execution of the Act. It is equally clear that in view of the provisions of Section 127(4)(to which we have already referred) the levy could nol be said to be 'purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Act.' For, what is plainly prohibited by the Act cannot be claimed to be purported to be done in pursuance or intended execution of the Act.'

(16). The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Municipal Corporation, Indore vs. Sri Ni-yamatulla (13), interpreted Section 135(2) of the Indore Municipal Act, 1909, which is similar to Section 233(1)(a) of the Act in the following terms:-

'The provisions contained in Section 135 of the indore Municipal Act will be applicable to things done under the Act. It is manifest that in the present case the order of dismissal passed by Shri Ghatpande was beyond his jurisdiction and is, therefore, not an act done under the Acl.'

(17). The aforesaid judgments were reconsidered and approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J.N. Ganatravs. Morvi Municipality, Morvi (14). Thus, in a given case if permits had been granted over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter-state agreement and have been countersigned by the other State the said permits cannot be held to have been granted/countersigned under the Act and the Authority has to deal with the same in accordance with law.

(18). In the instant case, such a fact-situation doas not exist. Thus, in view of the above the petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Tribunal dated 24.7.2000 (Annx. 6) is hereby set aside and the Resolution of the R.T.A. dated 2.4.1998 (Annex. 5) is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.