Lt. Col. P.L. Bawa Vs. Lt. Col. Bhawani Singh - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
(a) civil procedure code, 1908 - order 6 rule 14 & order 29 rule 1--power of attorney holder--pleadings of plaintiff either in the plaint and evidence stood signed and verified by its general power of attorney holder subsequently his services as power of attorney holder revoked--effect--held, pleadings duly signed and verified by the competent person, who was general power of attorney holder of the plaintiff under order 6 rule 14 and order 29 rule 1 cannot be overlooked or brushed aside from consideration merely by subsequent termination of services of general power of attorney holder by plaintiff.;(b) evidence act, 1872 - sections 66 & 118--general power of attorney holder--competency--general power of attorney holder is a competent witness and is entitled to appear as such and his deposition will be read in evidence on record.;(c) civil procedure code, 1908 - section 96 and order 41 rule 1--civil first appeal--defendant-appellant filed suit for permanent injunction for restraining plaintiff-respondent to evict him from suit premises unauthorisedly--subsequently compromise entered between the parties by way of agreement and defendant-appellant withdrew the suit however not evicted the suit premises hence plaintiff-respondent filed suit for eviction and mesne profits which was decreed--plea of the defendant-appellant that since he was not paid all the dues against his salaries etc. as per agreement suit is not maintainable--plea not maintainable as the defendant has withdrew the suit as per agreement and there was no clause that if dues were not paid he will entitled to hold suit premises--further there was no pleading in this regard in defence and no separate suit was filed by him for this relief;civil first appeal dismissed - - bawa were both fellow colleagues in the military service and having good friendship, so p. sharma appearing for the plaintiff respondent contended that power of attorney holder is a competent witness and merely because the plaintiff did not get himself examined in evidence, adverse inference has not to be drawn, inasmuch as it is not essential that landlord must enter witness box to support his case and further that in the fact of admissions as to initial appointment, institution as well as withdrawal of his suit by virtue of execution of an agreement dated 27.6.90 (ann. the best construction of the deeds is to make one part of the deed expound the other and so to make all the parts agree. in other words, the terms of the agreement never intended that in case of failure to perform or comply with either any one or all of its terms, what would be its effect either relinquishment of a known right or such conduct as warrants the inference of the relinquishment of such right. 3) and admits the terms of agreement (supra) object of which was not that upon failure to pay his dues by the plaintiff, he will have a right either to continue with suit premises or not to hand over his charge to the offices which he has been holding on behalf of the plaintiff as detailed out in term clause (3), meaning thereby relinquishment of plaintiff's right to get back possession of the suit premises. in case the plaintiff fails to act upon his part of duty as per terms of the agreement, then the defendant could have resorted to legal remedy as has been dime by the plaintiff against non performance of his part upon failure to vacate the suit premises pursuant to clause (5) of the agreement, but the defendant cannot be allowed to take somersault for non compliance of any of terms of compromise. 14. under order 6, rule 14 cpc every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any) and according to its proviso, where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf. there is sufficient power in the courts, under the cpc to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just cause, inasmuch as a substantive right as far as possible should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable. hence in my considered view, merely because power of attorney holder was removed from service of the plaintiff during trial, the suit itself stood dismissed by procedural defects which too are not held as such, rather such are not sustainable to throw the pleadings duly signed & verified by a competent person under order 6, rule 14 read with order 29 rule 1 cpc, over the board in the facts and circumstances of the case, inasmuch as the pleadings duly signed and verified by the competent person like dr. what precaution which requires to be taken is that it is for the court to draw necessary inference in case of failure of the party to appear in person in the matter and it will consider the burden so discharged by the person appearing and whether power of attorney holder has personal knowledge of the matter in issue is a question which is to be thrashed by cross examination. that being so, the learned trial court has committed ho error of law in having granted decree of eviction alongwith mesne profits under the impugned judgment which is based on well appreciation of evidence admissible on record under the law, warranting no interference by this court in this first appeal. 24. resultantly, this appeal must fail and is hereby dismissed.madan, j.1. p.l. bawa (defendant) has challenged judgment & decree dated 23.2.99 in civil suit no. 249/95 passed by the additional district judge no.7, jaipur city for his eviction.2. facts complexed by the parties are epitomised thus. admittedly, bhawani singh & p.l. bawa were both fellow colleagues in the military service and having good friendship, so p.l. bawa (defendant-appellant) was appointed by bhawani singh as his principal private secretary on 6.11.85 followed by further assignments as financial controller-cum-chief administrator of the jaipur palace hotels ltd., managing trustee-cum-secretary of shri shiella mala trust & sawai jaipur relief trust. accordingly, both of them had admittedly their relationship as employer and employee and the defendant was put in use & occupation of kothi no. 16, civil lines, jaipur (suit premises) by way of allotment.3. however, the defendant was terminated from services of bhawani singh on 14.6.90 directing him to hand over vacant possession of the suit premises to dr. a.s. paul, financial & legal affairs controller of the plaintiff, and his office was allegedly sealed during his leave in between 3.6.90 to 13.6.90 so he (pl bawa) instituted a suitno. 196/90 seeking mandatory injunction on 19.6.90 wherein an agreement (ex.3) undisputably was entered into between both of them out of court on 27.6.90 on the terms and conditions amongst others-pursuant thereto the defendant withdrew his suit no. 196/90 but did not hand over plaintiff's kothi no. 16 (suit premises) civil lines, jaipur by vacating it. thus, such an act of not vacating the suit premises constrained the plaintiff to file present suit through dr. a.s. paul his power of attorney against the defendant with the prayer to grant decree for eviction being entitled under section 13(1)(g) of the rajasthan premises (control of rent & eviction) act, 1950 (for short 'the act') & mesne profits for use & occupation of suit premises @ rs. 2000/- per month w.e.f. 27.8.90.4. in written statement, the defendant denied the factum of his services being terminated on 14.6.90, but in additional pleas it was his case that he was employed on 6.11.85 at a salary of rs. 3000/- per month plus other allowances including residential accommodation, and further holding charge of various companies/trusts. it was further contended that since during his leave his office was sealed on 7.6.90, he had filed a suit for permanent injunction but on 27.6.90 an agreement was executed between them. according to the defendant a sum of rs. 3,41,462/- were outstanding against the plaintiff and until such an amount could have been paid, the present suit could not be filed inasmuch as he was continuing in service and further the plaintiff ought to have filed suit either for possession by paying proper court fees or for compliance of the agreement (ex.3) and not for eviction and thus this suit was premature.5. as against the pleadings of the parties on record, nine issues were framed. in support of the pleadings, the plaintiff examined dr. as paul (power of attorney holder) as pw1, besides narayan singh (pw2) whereas the defendant appeared as dw1 alongwith other two witnesses. upon hearing arguments of both the parties trial court by its judgment dated 23.2.99 decreed the suit for eviction and grant of mesne profits for use & occupation of 6.7.91 till vacation payment of rs. 2000/- w.e.f. 6.7.91 till vacation provided proper court fees is paid within 15 days and two months' time was granted to the defendant for vacation of the suit premises, hence, this first appeal.6. first contention raised by the defendant is that since services of dr. a.s, paul power of attorney holder of the plaintiff who has signed the plaint and appeared in the witness box, have been terminated by revocation deed dated 28.11.96, neither the suit could have proceeded with effect from 18.11.96 but also his evidence ought out have been read or admissible in evidence in support of the plaintiff's suit, as dr. a.s. paul was not competent witness and thus the suit ought to have been dismissed. as regards construction of deed viz. agreement (ex.3), shri j.k. singhi on behalf of the defendant cited decisions in state v. motiram, air 1973 raj 233, prem agnani v. sub-registrar bangalore, air 1975 karn. 1, provash chandra dalui v. biswanath banerjee, air 1989 sc 1984, kailash devi v. matadeen agarwal, 2001 dnj (raj.) 516, uttam singh dugal v. union bank of india, air 2000 sc 2740, ram kubai v. hajarimal dhokal chandak, air 1999 sc 3089, govind bhai v. new sharrock mills, air 1984 guj. 182, ramavtar kailash chand v. suraj bai, 1986 rlr 919, shri r.c. sharma appearing for the plaintiff respondent contended that power of attorney holder is a competent witness and merely because the plaintiff did not get himself examined in evidence, adverse inference has not to be drawn, inasmuch as it is not essential that landlord must enter witness box to support his case and further that in the fact of admissions as to initial appointment, institution as well as withdrawal of his suit by virtue of execution of an agreement dated 27.6.90 (ann. 3) between him and the plaintiff, it is impossible for party making such admission to succeed and thereby the decree cannot be challenged on the ground that the agreement (ex.3) was not made in the course of pleadings of the parties or otherwise in any suit.7. here i must have a resume of cited decisions in order to decide the issue at hand. in state v. motiram (supra), this court held as under :-'it is an elementary rule of construction that when a single transaction is carried into effect by several instruments, the whole aretreated as one instrument. another rule of construction applicable to all written instruments is that the instrument must be construed as a whole in order to ascertain the true meaning of its several clauses and the words of each clause must be so interpreted as to bring them into harmony with the other clauses of the instrument if that interpretation does no violence to [he meaning of which they are naturally susceptible. the best construction of the deeds is to make one part of the deed expound the other and so to make all the parts agree.'8. in prem agnani v. sub registrar (supra) a three judge special bench of karnataka high court observed that it is a cardinal rule of construction that the instrument has to be considered as a whole and the intention of the parties has to be ascertained by the terms thereof and not by extraneous circumstances or evidence. similarly in provash chandra v. bishwanath bancrjee (supra), the apex court while interpreting construction of a lease deed, observed that the whole context must be considered to ascertain the intention of the parties and it is an accepted principle of construction that the sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of instrument may be collected. thus, in construing a contract the court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. and, in the construction of a written instrument it is legitimate in order to ascertain true meaning of the words used and if that be doubtful it is legitimate to have regard to the circumstances surrounding their creation and the subject matter to which it was designed and intended they should apply.9. in the instant case, an agreement deed (ex.3) dated 27.6.90. construction whereof is required to be made to ascertain the intention of the parties as to the dispute on which fate of the suit hinges, is quoted as under:-'we, his highness lt. col, bhawani singh, m.v.c. and lt. col. p.l. bawa (s.m.) have agreed to settle the matter out of court on the following terms: (1) lt. col. p.l. bawa will be paid all his dues towards unpaid salary and allowances, as payable to him. (2) lt. col. p.l. bawa (s.m.) will be paid for two months salary and allowances of principal private secretary, in lieu of the two month's notice as per the appointment letter. (3) lt. col. p.l. bawa will hand over the charge of the following offices, which he is holding on behalf of h.h. lt. col. bhawani singhas under:- (a) principal private secretary to shri j.k. chatterji, private secretary to his highness. (b) financial controller and chief administrator of jaipur palace hotel ltd., to shri h.d. chakarwarty. accountant j.p.h.l. (c) managing trustee-cum-secretary, shri shila mata trust to shri g.r. bhatt trustee of the said trust. (d) sawai jaipur relief trust to shri j.k. chatterjee, private secretary to h.h. (4) lt. col. p.l. bawa (s.m.) will withdraw the suit filed in the district court jaipur city, jaipur filed against lt. col. sawai bhawani singh. (5) lt. col. p.l. bawa, (s.m.) allowed to retain the house for a period of two months, as mentioned in the appointment letter. after two months he will hand over the possession to lt. col. bhawani singh. (6) the above terms and conditions will be binding on both the parties.27.6.90' 10. upon construction of aforequoted agreement (ex.3), the intention of the parties to the instrument by the terms thereof was to settle the matter out of court. the issue and dispute on the day of execution of the instrument dated 27.6.90 was that the defendant was restrained to enter into the offices charge of which was with him, as the same were admittedly sealed on 7.6.90 during his absence being on leave, so he instituted suit for mandatory injunction. thus, to settle the issue i.e. not allowing the defendant in the offices of the plaintiff, an instrument by virtue of an agreement was executed admittedly on 27.6.90 with the aforequoted terms, which are binding on both the parties as per its clause (6) inasmuch as according to term clause (4) the defendant was to withdraw the suit filed against the plaintiff and which was withdrawn as is evident from order dated 27.6.90 of the district court which also proved that the parties had settled the matter by arriving at a compromise so the defendant had moved an application in his suit for mandatory injunction and thereby got his suit withdrawn.11. be that as it may, by aforesaid term clause (3), the defendant was to hand over the charge of the offices named at (a) to (d) (supra), which he held and was assigned by the plaintiff and thereby the intention and object was to relinquish the charge of the offices under the agreement (ex.3) whereunder as per its term clause (2) the defendant would be paid two months salary and allowances for his post of pps in lieu of two month's notice as per his appointment letter for relinquishment of the offices and further as per clause (5) the defendant was allowed to retain the house viz. suit premises only for two months as mentioned in his appointment letter and after two months whereof, the defendant had to hand over suit premises to the plaintiff (bhawani singh). the intention of the parties, (if whole context of the agreement (ex.3) is considered with reference to its object and whole of its terms) was that parties to the agreement (viz. plaintiff & defendant herein) had decided to discontinue and break their relationship either as friend or employer & employee and thereby he (defendant) agreed to relinquish the office and assignment holding during employment with the plaintiff and the agreement (ex.3) was designed and intended with no agreement (ex.3) was designed and intended with no defaulting or non obstante clause. in other words, the terms of the agreement never intended that in case of failure to perform or comply with either any one or all of its terms, what would be its effect either relinquishment of a known right or such conduct as warrants the inference of the relinquishment of such right. thus, in the absence of such intention or object of the parties, the instrument viz. agreement (ex.3) cannot be construed as is being contended by the defendant meaning thereby forsaking the assertion of a right accrued at the proper opportunity.12. albeit it is the case of defendant that since the plaintiff did not pay all dues towards unpaid salary & allowances payable to him pursuant to agreement (ex.3)'s clause (1) and as his termination was illegal being violative of principles of natural justice and non-compliance of two month's salary in lieu of notice for termination, he has right to continue with suit premises, but in my considered view, the defendant cannot take somersault nor blow hot & cold in same breath. once the defendant withdrew his suit pursuant to the agreement clause (4) (ex.3) and admits the terms of agreement (supra) object of which was not that upon failure to pay his dues by the plaintiff, he will have a right either to continue with suit premises or not to hand over his charge to the offices which he has been holding on behalf of the plaintiff as detailed out in term clause (3), meaning thereby relinquishment of plaintiff's right to get back possession of the suit premises. as per intent and object of the agreement (ex.3) as i find from a careful reading whereof upon its clear construction that each and every clause has independent meaning by creation of distinct and independent meaning by creation of distinct and independent right inasmuch as they are clear as to the intention of the parties and not inter-dependant, hence deserve to be accepted having regardto the circumstances surrounding their creation & the subject matter to which it was designed and intended, they are applied.13. there has been total admission on the part of the defendant as regards terms of the agreement (ex.3) when 1 find pleadings in his written statement to the effect that the appellant (defendant) continues in services of the plaintiff as the conditions mentioned in the agreement dt. 27.6.90 (ex.3) with regard to settlement of his total dues as per first clause has not been complied with. once the defendant admits and places reliance upon the conditions of the agreement (ex.3) in his own pleadings and evidence on record, then he cannot be allowed not to rely upon other conditions to which he was also bound. in case the plaintiff fails to act upon his part of duty as per terms of the agreement, then the defendant could have resorted to legal remedy as has been dime by the plaintiff against non performance of his part upon failure to vacate the suit premises pursuant to clause (5) of the agreement, but the defendant cannot be allowed to take somersault for non compliance of any of terms of compromise. had there been grievance for non-performance of part of the plaintiff in compliance of any terms of the agreement, the defendant ought to have made counter claim in this suit or by way of separate suit but he has no right to retain the suit premises beyond two months stipulated not only in the appointment letter itself but also in the agreement clause (5) so also termination letter dt. 14.6.90 (ex.2) even being operative w.e.f. 27.6.90 (ex. 3), inasmuch as the defendant cannot be allowed to raise or challenge his termination in these proceedings for his eviction, even (on the grounds that no notice or opportunity was given or termination order was never served) especially in view of his admission as to the execution of the agreement (ex.3) itself.14. under order 6, rule 14 cpc every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any) and according to its proviso, where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf. similarly under order 29, rule 1 cpc is suit by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case. upon a reading of order 6 rule 14 cpc together with order 29, rule1 cpc it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in rule 1, of order 29 cpc can by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. i lend support from the decision of the apex court in united bank of india v. naresh kumar (supra), according to which also in addition thereto and dehors order 29, rule1, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with provisions of order 6 rule 14 cpc. it has further been held that procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. there is sufficient power in the courts, under the cpc to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just cause, inasmuch as a substantive right as far as possible should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable.15. in the instant case, the defendant was admittedly appointed by letter dated 6th november, 1985 (ex.a1) as principal private secretary to sawai bhawani singh of jaipur mvc (plaintiff herein) whereafter also, by communications (exa3 to exa5) of the chairman of the jaipur palace hotels co. ltd. & shri shila mata trust amber, he was assigned other duties to various posts named in agreement (ex3). these assignments were also terminated as conveyed by communications dated 14.6.90 (ex.2). general power of attorney (ex.1) dated 25.4.86 executed in favour of dr. a.-s. paul (pw1) has been proved in evidence, to which no objection was raised by the defendant till the same was revoked even during completion of the trial except for moving an application under order 6 rule 17 cpc for amendment in written statement on 20.1.98 which was dismissed by the trial court on 25.3,98. even as is apparent from a carefulperusal of the record of the trial court it shows that on 17.7.98 when an application was moved under order 26 rule 1 cpc on behalf of the plaintiff through his pleader for recording his evidence by appointing a commissioner and in support thereof narain singh (pw2) staling himself as adc and power of attorney holder of the plaintiff had given his affidavit, the defendant opposed thereto by filing his reply on 6.8.98, inasmuch as this application of the plaintiff was allowed by order dated 27.8.98 to get plaintiff's evidence recorded by a commissioner, to which a stay was obtained by filing a revision petition by the defendant before this court by order dated 4.9.98. thereupon narain singh (pw2) was examined and ultimately the plaintiff closed his evidence on 28.10.98 and did not choose to appear in the witness box.16. be that as it may till the power of attorney in favour of dr. a.s. paul (pw1) was revoked, the pleadings of the plaintiff either in the plaint or evidence stood signed and verified by dr. a.s. paul so also by plaintiff's pleader. after dr. a.s. paul appeared in the witnesses box and gave his evidence in support of the pleadings signed and verified on behalf of the plaintiff, his power of attorney was revoked and thereupon the pleadings were being signed and verified not only by narain singh (pw2) but also by his pleader. hence in my considered view, merely because power of attorney holder was removed from service of the plaintiff during trial, the suit itself stood dismissed by procedural defects which too are not held as such, rather such are not sustainable to throw the pleadings duly signed & verified by a competent person under order 6, rule 14 read with order 29 rule 1 cpc, over the board in the facts and circumstances of the case, inasmuch as the pleadings duly signed and verified by the competent person like dr. a.s. paul who was general power of attorney holder of the plaintiff under order 6, rule 14 & order 29 rule 1 cpc cannot be over looked or brushed aside from consideration merely by subsequent termination of the services of the general power of attorney holder by the plaintiff.17. further, as per section 60 of the evidence act so also order 3 rule 1 cpc, competency of a person to testify as a witness is different from that of credibility of the testimony of the witness inasmuch as order 3 rule 1 cpc does not restrict a holder of power of attorney to depose on behalf of the plaintiff (party) in relation to the matter in issue and more over deposition of the power of attorney holder is not a part of the pleadings, as it is a part of the procedure for proving a case according to section 118 of the evidence act, and that being so, in view of sections 118 & 66 of the evidence act, power of attorney holder is a competent witness and is entitled to appear as such and his deposition will be read in evidence on record. what precaution which requires to be taken is that it is for the court to draw necessary inference in case of failure of the party to appear in person in the matter and it will consider the burden so discharged by the person appearing and whether power of attorney holder has personal knowledge of the matter in issue is a question which is to be thrashed by cross examination. i am fortified from the view taken by this court in kailashi devi v. matadeen agarwal (supra) which was based on a catena of decisions referred to therein.18. as regards challenge to the impugned decree of his eviction with mesne profits for use & occupation, much emphasis was laid by shri j.k. singhi appearing for the defendant (appellant) that section 13(1)(g) of the act is not applicable because there was no cessation of relationship of master & servant in between the parties and such relationship has been continuing for the reason that clause (5) of the agreement (ex.3) will have application only when its clauses (1) & (2) are complied with.19. 1 do not find any merit in the contention of the appellant as regards challenge to the order terminating services of the defendant for which his case is that his services were not terminated on 14.6.90 as this order was not served on him nor any notice or inquiry or opportunity of hearing was given or held before issuing such termination order and that apart such termination was no more in existence after agreement (ex.3) dated 27.6.90. merely because the termination order was not served on him or anyshow cause notice or opportunity of hearing was not given or any inquiry was not conducted, he cannot be deemed to be in service thereby disentitling plaintiff to grant of decree for his eviction. unless the defendant presented counter claim challenging his termination from service either in this suit or by way of separate suit or resorting to proper remedy under relevant law in the absence whereof, the defendant cannot be allowed to non-suit the plaintiff for his eviction in these suit proceedings. since it is not the issue in this suit for eviction as to adjudge the validity of the termination of the defendant, therefore, i refrain from doing so. the issue was with regard to eviction' sought in view of section 13(1)(g) of the rent act. even as per defendant's case his termination dated 14.6.90 had merged in subsequent compromise cum agreement (ex3) dated 27.6.90 as even otherwise according to him (as contended in para 9 of his reply to the submissions of the plaintiff presented on 7.11,2001) his termination became redunant because the compromise in the form of agreement was entered into on 27.6.90 i.e. subsequent to his termination dated 14.6.90 and therefore, the agreement was the only document as to the relationship of master & servant.20. further it is the case of the defendant that since pursuant to clauses (1) & (2) of the agreement dues payable to him either against unpaid salary with allowances or two month's salary in lieu of notice as per initial appointment, were not paid by the plaintiff nor any evidence was led to prove compliance of these terms clauses (1) & (2) despite specific pleading in his written statement for such dues to the tune of rs. 3,41,000/-, the suit itself being premature was liable to be dismissed.21. albeit, i have already dealt with this point but i may reiterate that once it is crystal clear upon construction of the agreement that there was neither any intention nor object of the parties nor there was any non-obstante clause that if a party fails to comply with any one or all of agreement's terms clause, he will relinquish his right created under other clauses, or would abstain from resorting to legal remedy nor there was any term in the agreement (ex.3) that unless dues are paid to the defendant, the plaintiff will have no right to claim vacation of the suit premises or that the defendant will be continuing in service until dues are paid by the plaintiff. moreover, in view of specific clause (3) and having regard to the circumstances surrounding their creation and subject matter of the agreement to which it was designed & intended to apply, the defendant was to hand over the charge of offices named in sub-clause (a) to (d) including the post of pps to the plaintiff (to which residential house (suit premises was attached) within two months as he was to be paid two months notice salary as per clause (2), inasmuch as as per clause (5), he was allowed only two months to retain the suit house as per appointment letter whereafter he was to vacate & hand over the possession to the plaintiff. therefore, as per intent and object with which the agreement was created, as collected therefrom, the plaintiff never intended to continue the defendant in service with immediate effect from 27.6.90 itself the date of execution of agreement in the form of compromise having arrived at out of court by both the parties-pursuant to which defendant on the very day 27.6.90 got his earlier suit withdrawn.22. according to the letter appointing the defendant as pps to the plaintiff which has been produced in evidence by the defendant as ex.a1, it was for three years with a free residential accommodation (suit premises) as contemplated in its service condition no.5 during service tenure only. the plaintiff produced an order dated 14.6.90 (ex.2) which established that service of the defendant stood terminated w.e.f. 14.6.90 and he was directed to hand over possession of the suit premises to dr. a.s. paul (pwi) with immediate effect. as regards termination of other services assigned by the plaintiff after initial appointment as pps, though various letters and orders terminating his other service assignments were produced in evidence, but as rightly held by trial court, since the suit premises related to the initial appointment as pps, there was no necessity to deal with in details in this suit. dr. a.s. paul (pw1) has appeared in the witness box and proved termination order dated 14.6.90 (ex.2) havingbeen passed by the plaintiff and further proved agreement (ex.3) having been signed by both the defendant and plaintiff. thus on the basis of these facts proved in evidence on record, and in view of the evidence on record including the agreement & admission on the part of the defendant himself not only during pleading in his written statement but also his evidence. i am of the considered opinion that as soon as the compromise cum agreement (ex.3) came into operation w.e.f. 27.6.90, the defendant had ceased to hold any office especially the post of pps to the plaintiff and therefore, i have no hesitation to hold that there was cessation of relationship of master & servant between the plaintiff & defendant and accordingly the defendant had got no right to continue either in service or in the suit premises and as such the plaintiff is entitled to decree of his eviction by invoking section 13(1)(g) of the rent act, as per which if the court satisfies that the premises were let to the defendant for use as a tenant by reasons of his being in the service or employment of the landlord and that the defendant has ceased to be in such services or employment, a decree of eviction under section 13(1) can be passed against the defendant. that being so, the learned trial court has committed ho error of law in having granted decree of eviction alongwith mesne profits under the impugned judgment which is based on well appreciation of evidence admissible on record under the law, warranting no interference by this court in this first appeal. the conclusions drawn by the trial court are totally sustainable in law, being based on plaintiff's evidence i.e. of dr. a.s. paul (pw1) & narain singh (pw2) and pleadings on record. the evidence of these two plaintiff's witnesses (pw1) and (pw2) inspire credence and they have duly proved plaintiff's case. the entire evidence on record has not been misread by the trial court while deciding each of the issues so as to issue the impugned decree of eviction and mesne profits. this impugned decree does not warrant any interference so as to invoke jurisdiction of this court in any manner whatsoever, and it deserves to be upheld in toto.23. no other point was pressed during hearing.24. resultantly, this appeal must fail and is hereby dismissed. the impugned judgment & decree referred to above are upheld. no order as to costs.