Santa Singh Vs. Darbara Singh and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
specific relief act - section 16(1)(c)--suit for specific performance--requirements of--plaintiff to show that he was and is willing and ready to perform his part of agreement--held, readiness and willingness should be continuous till hearing of suit--past readiness is not sufficient--plaintiff not complying requirements of section 16(1)(c)--held, suit for specific performance should fail.;the plaintiff has to show that he was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and this readiness and willingness has to be continuous from the date of the execution of the agreement to the date of the hearing of the suit.;this readiness and willingness has to be averred and proved till the hearing of the suit. even the past readiness is not a sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 16(1)(c) of the act. in the evidence the plaintiff has not opened his mouth about his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. the requirements of section 16(1)(c) has not been duly complied with by the plaintiff-appellant and, therefore, the suit for specific performance on this account alone should fail.;(b) specific relief act - section 16(1)(c)--suit for specific performance--laches--agreement fixing 27-5-1965 as date for execution of sale deed--instalments not deposited by defendant no. 1 and plaintiff not doing anything for 5 years--held, plaintiff is guilty of laches.;in the agreemement a particular date. i.e. jeth sudi 11 samvat year 2022 which corresponds to 27-5-1965 was fixed for the execution of the sale deed. the plaintiff could have waited for the deposit of the instalments only upto that date & after that if the defendant no. 1 has failed to deposit the same he could as well have deposited the instalments in the custodian department on his behalf and adjusted that amount against the remainder of the sale consideration. in not doing so and in waiting for five years for the defendant no. 1 to deposit the instalments one can safely conclude that plaintiff has been guilty of laches.;(c) specific relief act - section 16(1)(c) and limitation act, 1963--artcles 54--limitation--period of--27-5-1965 fixed for execution of sale deed--plaintiff waiting for 5 years--held, limitation period of 3 years starts running from agreed date for execution of sale and suit is barred by limitation.;when once a period is fixed in an agreement for the execution of the sale deed, the period of limitation starts running against the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract from that particular date which happens to be 27-5-1965 in this case and suit for specific performance of that contract brought beyond a period of three years is definitely barred by limitation.;appeal dismissed with costs - section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect - appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age when the juvenile justice act, 2000, came into force - juvenile act, of 2000 has been given retrospective effect by rule 12 of juvenile justice rule, 2007 - as such, accused has to be treated as juvenile under the said act. - it was further laid down that if the plaintiff has failed to aver and prove his readiness and wilingness to carry out the contract, it should be held that the plaintiff does not disclose any cause of action for a suit for specific performance and, therefore, on this ground alone the suit should be dismissed. under these circumstances the learned first appellate court was perfectly justified in taking the view that the plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirement of section 16(1)(c) of the act. to quote-it is well settled that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation the suit is not maintainable. mehta that the learned lower court was justified in taking the view that the requirements of section 16(1)(c) has not been duly complied with by the plaintiff-appellant and, therefore, the suit for specific performance on this account alone should fail. 1 to get the outstanding instalments deposited and then alone his title could become perfect on grant of 'sanad' in his favour by the custodian department and so the plaintiff was not guilty of any laches in instituting the suit. 1 has failed to deposit the same he could as well have deposited the instalments in the custodian department on his behalf and adjusted that amount against the remainder of the sale consideration. 1 became perfect only in july 1968 cannot hold water because as per the above quoted three authorities of the rajasthan high court and hon'ble the supreme court, the contract entered between the parties was not a contingent contract and, therefore, the plaintiff is definitely guity of laches. he has also referred in this respect to the three authorities quoted above wherein it has been held that such a contract is not a contract but it is completed contract and so the plaintiff was perfectly within his right to file a suit for specific performance within three years from 27-5-1965. the notice alleged in para 5 of the plaintiff was given by him for the first time on 24-8-1968 i. he was obliged to file a suit on or before 26-5-1968 and if he has failed to do so, he must thank himself.jas raj chopra, j.1. this civil second appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned additional district judge, ganganagar dated 25-5-74 where by he has set aside the judgment of the trial court and has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for sepecific performance of contract with the direction that the plaintiff-vendee is entitled to receive back rs. 5500/- paid by him to defendant no. 1 gurdayal singh. the costs have been ordered to be easy.2. the facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this appeal briefly stated are that defendant no. 1 gurdayal singh entered into an agreement to sell 15 bighas of his land to the plaintiff santasingh situated in chak 4 sds for a sum of rs. 8250/-. a written agreement to that effect was executed by defendent no. 1 and was later got registered. this land has been allotted to the defendant no. 1 as a non-claimant displaced person. some of the instalments were still outstanding against defendant no. 1 and so it was agreed between the parties that the defendant no. 1 would pay the instalment to the custodian department. it was agreed between the parties that the sale deed will be got registered on jeth sudi 11, samvat year 2022 corresponding to the english date 27-5-1965. rs. 2750/- were made payable at the time of the execution of the sale deed. defendant no. 1, however, did not deposit the instalments in time and so the plaintiff could not get the sale deed registered. he however, cleared all the instalments by july 1968 and in august 1968 the plaintiff gave a notice to defendant no. 1 to execute the sale deed in his favour but it is alleged that on 9-9-1968 defendant no. 1 executed an agreement for sale in favour of defendant no. 2 nanak singh and later he executed the sale deed in favour of defendant no. 3 darbara singh, who purchased this land having notice of the fact that defendant no. 1 had already executed an agreement to sell this 15 bighas of land in favour of the plaintiff and has handed over the possession of the suit land earlier. the cause of action to file the suit arose to the plaintiff only in the month of july 1968 when all the instalments were deposited by defendant no. 1 i.e. gurdayal singh.3. the defendants in their separate written statements have denied that defendant no. 1 has executed an agreement to sell the land in favour of the plaintiff and has handed over the possession of the suit land to him after accepting rs. 5,500/- as advance. many other pleas were also taken but it is not necessary to mention all those pleas here in detcil because in the first appellate court the decree of the trial court was challenged only on three couuts, i.e. the suit is barred by limitation, the plaintiff is guilty of laches and the plaintiff has not averred and proved that he was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as per section 16(1)(c) of the specific relief act (for short 'the act'). the trial court has of course framed 15 issues in case and all the issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff and consequently the learned trial court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract. the first appellate court has however, held that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. it has further held that the plaintiff is guilty of laches and thirdly it has held that the plaintiff has not complied with the provisions of section 16(1)(c) of the act and, therefore, it has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff by accepting the appeal against the judgment of the learned trial court and hence darbara singh, the purchaser of the land has come up in appeal before this court.4. i have gone through the record of the case and have heard mr. s.k. goel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant and mr. rajendra mehta appearing for the defendant-respondents.5. mr. goyal first submitted that the learned first appellate court has erred in holding that the plaintiff has not averred and proved the fact that he was/is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. in this respect he drew my attention to paragraphs 3,5 and 7 of the plaint. in para 3 the plaintiff has averred that he told defendant no. 1 several times to receive the remaining amount from him and to get the sale deed registered in his favour but he did not get the sale deed registered on the appointed date after depositing the instalments which were due against him. he, therefore, gave one registered notice to him on 24-8-1968 but that notice was refused by defendant no. 1. in para 5 the plaintiff has averred that he told the defendant a number of times to receive from him the remaining amount of the consideration and to get the sale deed registered in his favour but he did not pay any heed to his request and ultimately on 4-11-1968 he refused to get the sale-deed registered in his favour. in para 7 it has been pleaded that certain instalments were to be paid by the defendant no. 1 to the custodian department in order to complete his title on the disputed land. the defendant could not have transferred this land without obtaining a 'sanad' from the custodian dpart-ment. defendant no. 1 did not deposit all the instalments upto jeth sudi 11, samvat year 2022, rather he deposited all the instalments by july, 1968 and, therefore, the valid cause of action arose in favour of the plaintiff to get the contract specifically performed only in july, 1968. as soon as this cause of action accrued to him, he gave a notice on 24-8-1968 and after that on 6-11-68 the suit was filed. this is the sum and substance of the averments made by the plaintiff in his suit to show his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.6. so far as the evidence is concerned, the plaintiff examined himself as pw 1. he has not said a word in his examination-in-chief that he was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. in the cross-examination of course he has stated that he told defendant no. 1 several times to get the sale deed registered in his favour but he told him that first he will pay the outstanding instalments and then the sale deed will be executed in favour of the plaintiff. nothing also is contained in his statement regarding his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.7. now this has to be seen whether these averments in the plaint and this particular assertion made in the cross-examination by pw 1 santa singh is sufficient to meet the requirements of section 16(1)(c) of the act. mr. goyal argued that these averments and this particular piece of evidence are sufficient. in this respect he placed reliance on a division bench decision of this court in kripalsingh v. kataro . in this decision the division bench presided over by g.m. lodha the then c.j. held that in a suit for specific performance of the contract it is the duty of the plaintiff to aver and prove that he was and is ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract. before granting specific performance the court has to see whether the plaintiff has complied with the condition precedent laid down in clause (c) of section 16 which is based on the maxim 'he who seeks equity, must do equity', where the allegations of the plaintiff in support of the pleas that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract are denied merely generally and evasively and not specifically by the defendant, the same cannot be lost sight of while determining whether the plaintiff has proved that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. it was further held that omission to purchase stamps and prepare draft sale-deed do not disentitle the plaintiff to specific performance. the entirety of circumstances, conduct of parties and essential terms of contract are to be taken into consideration to determine whether the plaintiff has complied with the condition precedent laid down in section 16(1)(c) of the act. mr. goyal further relied on a division bench decision of the madras high court in lakshminarayana v. singarvelu : air1963mad24 where in it has been held that once the cause of action is complete and effective remedy is available for the party who relies upon the cause of action; suspension of the causr of action during any period after the cause of action has arisen can only be justified under the various exemptions specified in the sections of the limitation act mr. goyal also drew my attention to para 112 of a division bench decision of the andhra pradesh high court in subbayya v. garikapati air 1957 ap 307. of course it was admitted that it should be specifically pleaded that the purchaser was continuously ready and willing to perform the contract but it was held that the recitals in para 6 to 8 of the plaint are sufficient to show that the plaint was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. this ruling therefore, applies to the facts of that particular case.8. mr. mehta has however, submitted that in this case the only averments made in the plaint by the plaintiff related to the fact that he asked the defendant no. 1 to execute the sale deed on the date fixed in the agreement by receiving the remainder of the consideration from him. this particular averment made in para 3 does not specify the requirements of section 16(1)(c) of the act. the plaintiff has to show that he was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and this readiness and willingness has to be continuous from the date of the execution of the agreement to the date of the hearing of the suit. in this respect he drew my attention to a decision of their lordships of the supreme court in gamuthi-mayagam pillai v. palaniswami nadar : [1967]1scr227 wherein their lordships observed as under:the respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit.he further drew my attention to a single bench decision of this court in dhanbai v. pherozshah 1970 rlw 594 wherein hon'ble singhal, j. as he then was, has held as under:the plaintiff in an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land must plead that he is ready and willing to carry out the contract. the repudation of the contract by the defendant will not relieve him of this obligation.in paragraph 2 of the plaint it has been stated that inspite of reminder and demand, the defendant did not execute and register the sale-deed and that on the other hand, she gave a notice to the plaintiff on february 3, 1959 refusing to execute the document and that the plaintiff therefore stated in his reply dated february 7, 1959 that if she would not at once execute the sale-deed after registering it, and take rs. 3,400/- from the plaintiff, proper action would be taken against her. but such an averment cannot be said to fulfil the above mentioned requirement. then in paragraph 5 of the plaint the plaintiff has stated that he was entitled to have the sale deed executed by the defendant and to get it registered, and to pay her rs. 3,400/. this is also not an averment of the kind of readiness and wilingness required in such a case. parapraph 8(1) of the plaint relates to the relief claimed by the plaintiff but, even so, its relevant portion relied upon merely contains the prayer that the sale-deed should be got executed by the plaintiff on a stamp paper, that it should be registered after attestation and thereafter rs. 3,400/- should be ordered to be paid to the defendant this again is not an averment of the plaintiff's continuous readiness and wilingness to perform his part of the contract.it will this appear that the plaintiff has not made an averment in the plaint regarding his readiness and wilingness to perform his part of the contract. the plaint does not therefore, disclose a cause of action for the suit and there is jurisdiction for the argument that it should be dismissed for that reason.it was further laid down that if the plaintiff has failed to aver and prove his readiness and wilingness to carry out the contract, it should be held that the plaintiff does not disclose any cause of action for a suit for specific performance and, therefore, on this ground alone the suit should be dismissed.9. mr. mehta further drew my attention to a division bench ruling of the allahabad high court in jagannath v. umar 1984 all lj 1 where in the facts were almost similar to the facts mentioned here in above. the allegations regarding readiness and willingness to perform his pan of the contract were contained in para 6 of the plaint. the english translation of which reads thus:that we the plaintiffs asked the defendant first set several times to execute the sale deed but he continued to prevaricate. at last the plaintiffs gave a registered notice dt. 19-7-1968 with acknowledgement due in which they made it clear that the defendant first set should execute the sale deed in their favour within a week and that the said notice was refused by him on 20-6-1968.in the case in hand also the plaintiff has stated that he asked the defendants several times to execute the sale deed but he continued to prevaricate and postponed the execution on the ground that he will get it registered after the instalments are paid to the custodian department. in para 3 the plaintiff has only mentioned that he was ready to pay the remainder of consideration before the date fixed in the agreement for execution of the sale deed. after that date expired, nothing is contained in para 3 of the plaint that he was ready and willing to pay the remainder of the consideration to defendant no. 1. in the case in hand also the plaintiff has stated that he asked the defendant several times to execute the sale deed but he did not do so. this averment in paras 3 and 5 actually does not comply with the requirements of section 16(1)(c) of the act as interpreted by the their lordships of the supreme court in gomathina-yagam pillai v. palaniswami nadar (supra). this readiness and willingness has to be averred and proved till the hearing of the suit. even the past readiness is not a sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 16(1)(c) of the act. in the evidence the plaintiff has not opened his mouth about his ready-ness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and in cross examination he has only stated that he asked the defendant several times to get the sale deed registered. he even did not say that he was ready to pay him the remainder of the consideration. he also did no say that he was ready to accompany him for the execution of the sale deed and to get it registered before the sub-registrar. under these circumstances the learned first appellate court was perfectly justified in taking the view that the plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirement of section 16(1)(c) of the act. their lordships of the supreme court have been pleased to lay down in ouseph varghese v. joseph aley and ors. : [1970]1scr921 that when the plaintiff fails to inform the court that he was and is ready and willing to accept the agreement pleaded by the defendant and to perform his part of the agreement no decree for specific performance can be granted in his favour.to quote-it is well settled that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation the suit is not maintainable.i, therefore, agree with mr. mehta that the learned lower court was justified in taking the view that the requirements of section 16(1)(c) has not been duly complied with by the plaintiff-appellant and, therefore, the suit for specific performance on this account alone should fail.10. i next take up the point of laches. mr. goel has strenuously argued that it was the duty of the defendant no. 1 to get the outstanding instalments deposited and then alone his title could become perfect on grant of 'sanad' in his favour by the custodian department and so the plaintiff was not guilty of any laches in instituting the suit. in this respect we may gainfully refer to condition no. 6 of the agreement marked ex. 1, which reads as under:;g cdk;k fd'r og vnk djsxk ;fn og vnk ugh djsxk rks rks es vnk d:axk aalthough initially the burden to deposit the outstanding instalments was placed on gurdayal singh executant of the agreement but in para 6 it has been mentioned that if he does not pay or deposit the instalments in the custodian department, even the plaintiff could deposit them and get them adjusted against the outstanding amount of the consideration. the document was executed on 27-11-1963. the plaintiff has admitted in his statement that he has never enquired from the custodian department as to how many instalment were due, what was the amount of the instalments and whether defendent no. 1, was paying them or not. he only issued a notice to him which has been marked ex. 3 on 22-8-1968, i.e. almost after five years to get the sale deed registered in his favour. before that he made no effort to see that the instalments are either deposited by gurdayal singh or if he has not done so, he may himself deposit them. the fact that instalments were due, was known to the defendants and the plaintiff because this fact has been mentioned in the agreement ex. 1 itself. in the agreement a particular date, i.e. jeth sudi 11 samvat year 2022 which corresponds to 27-5-1965 was fixed for the execution of the sale deed. the plaintiff could have waited for the deposit of the instalment only upto that date and after that if the defendant no. 1 has failed to deposit the same he could as well have deposited the instalments in the custodian department on his behalf and adjusted that amount against the remainder of the sale consideration. in not doing so and in waiting for five years for the defendant no. 1 to deposit the instalment one can safely conclude that plaintiff has been guilty of laches and that is what was held by the learned first appellate court. i have no reason to differ from that finding of the learned first appellate court. the first notice regarding the execution of the sale deed has been given by the plaintiff after almost five years of the execution of the agreement. the plaintiff was not required to wait for that long time. in a similar case a single bench of this court in balwant singh v. rajaram 1974 rlw 482 modi, j. has been pleased to lay down that agreement to sell agricultural land which could be sold only after taking the 'sanad' by the vendor and which the vendor was entitled to get after payment of some dues-vendor failing to take sanad-it was held that the contract was not a contingent contract, and the plaintiff could have sued for the specific performance of the contract requesting the court to order the defendant to pay the instalments and obtain the 'sanad'. similarly their lordships of the supreme court in mrs. chandnee vidyavati v. dr. c.l. katial : [1964]2scr495 have been pleased to lay down that where obtaining of permission of the government by the vendor was essential before he executed the sale deed and the vendor made an application for such a permission but for reasons of her own, withdrew the same, the vendees were not barred from seeking the specific performance of such a contract because the contract was not a contingent contract and the parties had agreed to bind themselves by the terms of the document executed between them. it was not some unforeseen event which had made the contract contingent. the permission was to be obtained by the vendor and he should have applied for obtaining the permission and so the contract was a completed contract and not a contingent contract and hence it could be specifically enforced. similar view has been taken in remesh chandr v. chunni lal : [1971]2scr573 . in this view of the matter the plaintiff was not required to wait for all these years to ensure that the defendant no. 1 deposited all the instalments in the custodian department and obtained the 'sanad'. as per condittion no. 6 of the agreement he should have deposited the instalments and obtained the 'sanad' in favour of defendant no. 1 and so the learned lower court has rightly held him guilty of laches. the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the title of defendant no. 1 became perfect only in july 1968 cannot hold water because as per the above quoted three authorities of the rajasthan high court and hon'ble the supreme court, the contract entered between the parties was not a contingent contract and, therefore, the plaintiff is definitely guity of laches.11. now i take up the question of limitation mr. goel has tried to argue that the title of defendant no. 1 perfected only in july 1968 & therefore, his suit is within limitation. according to him the time was not the essence of the contract. in this respect he placed reliance on the decision of this court in bhuramal v. godul narain reported in ilr 1952 raj 1 wherein sharma, j. has been pleased to lay down that as a general rule, contracts for sale of immovable property, time is not deemed to be of the essence of the contract. there is no quarrel about this principle. the question is that in ex. 1 jeth sudi 11 samvat year 2022 corresponding to 27-5-1965 was fixed as the date for the execution of the sale deed. whether time will start running against the plaintiff for the specific performance of the contract from this date or from july 1968.12. m. mehta appearing for the respondents has submitted that in contract for sale of immovable property time is not the essence but when time is fixed for the execution of the sale deed then time starts running against the plaintiff for the specific performance of the contract from the date fixed in the agreement. in this respect he drew my attention to article 54 of the limitation act which is equivalent to article 113 of the old limitation act wherein it has been provided that for a specific performance of the contract the period of limitation is three years from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed; when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused. the case in hand is not covered by second part of the article but it is covered by the first part of the article because the date has been fixed for the performance of the contract in the agreement itself which happened to be jeth sudi 11, samvat year 2022 equivalent to 27-5-1965. regarding interpretation of the provisions of the limitation act my attention was drawn to a decision of their lordships of the supreme court in siraj-ul-haq v. s.c. board of waqf : [1959]1scr1287 wherein their lordships of the supreme court relying on the dictum laid down in narendra nath dey v. suresh chandra dey air 1932 pc 165 have been pleased to lay down as under:it is true that rules of limitation are to some extent arbitrary and may frequently lead to hardship; but there can be no doubt that, in construing provisions of limitation, equitable considerations are immaterial and irrelevant, and in applying them effect must be given to the strict grammatical meaning of the words used by them.in narayan patil v. puttabai air 1945 pc 5 their lordships have held that the institution of a suit could not be said to be futile, if it would thereby prevent the running of limitation only because the title of the parties was involved in the suit. relying on this citation mr. mehta has argued that simply because the defendant no. 1 has not deposited the outstanding instalments and has not obtained the 'sanad' it would not prevent the plaintiff from filing the suit for specific performance if that would have prevented the running of the limitation against him. he has also referred in this respect to the three authorities quoted above wherein it has been held that such a contract is not a contract but it is completed contract and so the plaintiff was perfectly within his right to file a suit for specific performance within three years from 27-5-1965. the notice alleged in para 5 of the plaintiff was given by him for the first time on 24-8-1968 i.e. after three years of 27-5-1965 and so ex.3 given by him cannot help his case. he was obliged to file a suit on or before 26-5-1968 and if he has failed to do so, he must thank himself. in this respect my attention was drawn to a decision of the madhya pradesh high court in sumer chand v. hukum chand : air1965mp177 wherein it has been held that where time for performance of the contract is fixed limitation for suit for specific performance begins to run as from that time, i.e. the time fixed for performance, irrespective of the question of notice or refusal to perform the contract. the question whether time was the essence of the contract is not at all relevant for determining whether the first or the second part of column 3 in article 113 applies to such a case. in c.v.s. murthey v. appanaveerraju : air1980ap32 it was argued before the division bench that a suit regarding the title of the seller was pending in a court of law and so it was urged that in the circumstances of the case it should be held that the cause of action arose on the day when the suit was finally decided in favour of the vendees as laying a suit for specific performance earlier to the date would have been infructuous.this contention was rejected and it was held that the cause of action arose on the date fixed for the execution of the sale deed in the agreement which was 1-6-1961 and so the suit filed on 4-9-68 was held to be time barred. the pendency of the title suit from 20-1-61 to 1-7-68 did not save the limitation. in this authority of the a.p. high court reliance has been placed on air 1945 pc 5 and : [1959]1scr1287 regarding interpretation of the provision of limitation act. my attention was also drawn to a decision of the calcutta high court in sambhunath v. sushama : air1980cal5 wherein it has been held that where a particular date is fixed for execution of sale deed the suit for specific performance can only be brought within three years from the date so fixed for performance. both these rulings of the calcutta and andhra pradesh came up for consideration before a single bench of karnataka high court in k. kallaiah v. ningegewda : air1982kant93 . relying on both these rulings k.s. puttaswany, j. has held as under:when once a date is fixed for performance of contract, as in this case, the suit is necessarily regulated by the former part of the article and not by the latter part of the article. in a given case both the situations may inter-mix or be present. but, that is not really decisive in ascertaining the true scope and ambit of article 54. what is decisive is the date stipulated for the performance of the contract;the principle that time stipulated in a contract for sale of immovable property is not the essence of contract has nothing to do with the period of limitation within which a suit for specific performance of contract has to be filed. one touches on the right to enforce the contract and the other touches on the period within which that right has to be enforced. by ignoring the period stipulated in the contract or by holding that the time stipulated in a contract for sale of immovable property is not the essence of the contract in a given case, as in the present case itself, the period of limitation stipulated in the act, can neither be ignored nor extended by courts.13. from all the above said authorities it is transparently clear that when once a period is fixed in an agreement for the execution of the sale deed, the period of limitation starts running against the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract from that particular date which happens to be 27-5-1965 in this case and suit for specific performance of that contract brought beyond a period of three years is definitely barred by limitation and so i entirely agree with the finding of the lower court that this suit filed by santa singh for the specific performance of the contract dated 27-11-1963 in which the date for the execution of the sale deed was fixed as 27-5-1965 was definitely barred by limitation on 6-11-1968 when the plaintiff's suit was filed in the court of civil judge, 14. in the result i find no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs.