Heera Lal Vs Board of Revenue and ors - Citation 760081 - Court Judgment

Judgment:
ORDER

Lakshmanan, C.J.

(1). The unsuccessful petitioner in the wril petition is the appellant in this appeal. The appellant filed the writ petition to quash the judgment of the Board of Revenue dated 28.6.74 (Anx. 5). and to restore the judgment of the Sub Divisional Officer, Udaipur dated 18.12.1968 (Anx. 3) and to dismiss the suil of the respondent No. 4 Shanker Lal (Plaintiff).

(2). The dispute in this appeal lies in a very narrow compass. The facts found by the courts below have not been disputed before us. Before proceeding further to deal with the facts of this case it is better to refer to the family tree.

Gangal Ram

______________________|__________________________

| | | |

Prithvi Raj Girdhari | |

| | | |

Dev Kishan Hari Lal Gulab Bhagwan

(Son) (Son) (son) (died in 1910)

(petitioner (petnr. No. 2 (Resp. No. 5 Champa

No. 1 in in writ in writ (widow)

writ petition) petition) |

Petition) Shanker Lal

(adopted on

12.12.1959

for herself

and to her

deceased

husband)

(Plaintiff)

It is seen from the above family tree that Ganga Ram had three sons Pritnvi Raj, Girdhari and Bhagwan. Prithvi Raj's son is Dev Kishan who is petitioner No. 1 -defendant No.1 in the writ petition. Girdhari had two sons, Hecra Lal (petitioner No.2 in the writ petition) and Gulab (respondent No.5 in the writ petition), Bhagwan, the third son of Ganga Ram died in the year 1910 leaving behind his widow Champa. On 12.12.1959, Champa adopted Shanker Lal, the fourth respondent herein-plaintiff in the suit.

(3). Shanker Lal filed the suil for division of holding on the allegation that the suit land originally belonged to their ancester Ganga Ram and it has devolved on the parties who were co-tenants. However, after the death of Dhagwan his two brothers got the land in dispute entered in their own names and during the life time of Smt, Champa widow of Bhagwan they continued to put her off on the pretext that she was a widow and whenever she made adoption Bhagwan's 1/3rd share would be got entered in the name of the adopted son. However, even after his adoption Prithvi Raj and Girdhari put Shanker Lal and his mother off on the pretext that they would give possession of their l/3rd share when Shanker Lal comes up of age but when they did not do so even after Shanker Lal attained majority it compelled Shanker Lal to file this suit for division of holding. The defendants No.1 and 2 i.e. the petitioners contested the suit. However the defendant No.3 admitted the plaintiff's claim.

(4). The trial court found that Shanker Lal's adoption was proved but as the adoption took place in 1959 after the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act had come into force Shanker Lai could not divest the property which had already vested in the other two coparceners i.e. Prithvi Raj and Girdhari on the death of Bhagwan in 1910 A.D. The trial court held that under Section 12(c) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act the adopted son Shankerlal was debarred from divesting the property which had already vested in the other two coparceners. The suit was, therefore, dismissed. The dismissal was upheld by the Revenue Appellate Authority by judgment dated 9.7.1969. Shanker Lal filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue held that even though the number of male coparceners is reduced to one the property which was jointly owned by the coparceners at the time of death of one or more of them will still continue to be a joint family property and that the property jointly belonged to Prithvi Raj, Girdhari and Bhagwan and, therefore, on the death of Bhagwan the character of the property in the hands of Prithvi Raj, Girdhari alongwith the widow of Bhagwan was still that of joint family property. The Board of Revenue also answered the further question whether on his adoption Shanker Lal became coparcener with the successors of Prithvi Raj and Girdhari. The Board of Revenue held that on the adoption by Srnt. Champa, Shanker Lal became the son of Bhagwan and, therefore, a coparcener with the heirs of Prithvi Raj and Girdhari and being a coparcener Shanker Lal becomes contenant and was therefore entitled to ask for a division of holding under Section 53 of the Rajas than Tenancy Act. In this context the Board of Revenue has placed relied on few judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the result the Board of Revenue had accepted the appeal filed by Shanker Lal and set aside the judgment and decrees of the courts below and passed a preliminary decree in favour of the fourth respondent Shanker Lal against the defendants declaring that Shanker Lal will have l/3rd share in the property described in Schedule 'A' appended to the plaint.

(5). Being aggrieved, the legal representatives of Prithvi Raj and Girdhari filed Writ Petition No. 3140/74 and urged that the joint family property in question had already vested in the remaining coparceners Prithvi Raj and Girdhari on the death of Bhagwan in 1910 and, therefore, heirs of Prilhvi Raj and Girdhari could not be divested of the said property on account of adoption of Shanker Lal by the widow of Bhagwan in view of the provisions of clause (c) of proviso to Section 12 of the Act. Before the learned Single Judge following judgments were cited and relied on by the parties-Sawan Ram vs. Mst. Kalawanti & Ors. (I), Sita Bai vs. Ramchandra (2), Anant Bhik-kappa Patil vs. Shanker Ramchandra Patil (3), Srinivas Krishnarao Kango vs. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors (4), Krishnamurthi Vasudeorao Deshpande & anr. vs. Phruwaraj (5), Sripad Gajanan Suthankar vs. Dattaram Kashinath Suthankar & ors. (6), Gowli Buddanna vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Mysore (7), Attorney General of Ceylon vs. Arunachalam Chettlar & ors. (8), Moti Lal & ors. vs. Sardarmal & ors. (9), V.K. Nalvade & ors. vs. Ananda G. Chavan & ors. (10), Krishnabai Shivram Patil vs. Ananda Shivram Patil (11), Yarlagadda Nayudamma etc. vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh & ors. (12), Shrisailappa & anr. vs. Muttawwa & ors. (13), and Dunichand etc. vs. Paras Ram etc. (14). The learned Single Judge after considering the rival submissions made by both parties and after analysing various judgments cited before him on the principles laid down therein came to the conclusion that there is no question of divesting of any coparcener of the properly vested in him would arise in this case and so long as the property retains the character of a joint family properly each coparcener has only fluctuating interest in such property which is liable to increase or decrease by addition or diminution in the joint family. Construing Section 12(c) the learned Judge held that clause (c) of the proviso to Section 12 does not refer to increase and diminution in the value of the interest of a coparcener in the Hindu joint family property and it only prohibits divesting of any person from the estate vested in him before the adoption of a child and if a fluctuating interest has vested in a member of the Joint Hindu family, the same would be crystalised only upon partition and separation of theshares of the members of the joint Hindu family. The learned Judge has further observed that so long as joint family continues to exist and the disputed property reiains the character of joint family property on the dale when the widow of the deceased coparcener adopted a son to herself and her deceased husband, then the adopted son acquires his interest in the joint family properly and does not divest the surviving coparceners of any estate vested in them, inasmuch as, their fluctuating interest in the joint family properly is still retained and continues to vesl in them. The learned Judge upheld the order of the Board of Revenue in holding that Shanker Lal could maintain a suit for partition and had l/3rd share in'the joint family properties which he could get separated by partition. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.

(6). Aggrieved by the order dated 29.7.1983 passed in the writ petition the above special appeal was filed in the year 1984 which was now Us ted for final hearing before us.

(7). We heard Mr. M.C. Bhoot for the appellant and Mr. Dinesh Maheshwari for the contesting 4th respondent. Mr. M.C. Bhoot after stating the facts of the case raised a point of law as to whether the 4th respondent Shanker Lal can divest the property vested in two brothers of late Bhagwan as back as in 1910 when he was alleged (o be adopted on 12.12.1959. He has also cited the following five decisions before us:

1. AnanI Bhikkappa Patil vs. Shanker Ramchandra Patil (supra)

2. Krishnamurthi Vasudeorao Deshpande & anr. vs. Dhruwaraj (supra)

3. Sawan Ram vs. Mst. Kalawanti & ors. (supra)

4. Sita Bai vs. Ramchandra (supra)

5. Dina Ji & ors. vs. Daddi & ors. (15)

Mr. Bhoot, learned counsel for the appellant urged that the joint family properly in question had already vested in the remaining coparceners Prithvi Raj and Girdhari on the death of Bhagwan in the year 1910 and now the dependents of Prithvi Raj and Girdhari could not be divested of the said property on account of adoption of Shanker Lal, 4th respondent by the widow of Bhagwan in view of the provisions of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 12 of the Act.

(8). Per contra, it was urged by Mr. Dinesh Maheshwari that so long as the property in dispute continues to be a joint family properly there was no question of divesting the parties from their interest in the joint family property but the 4th respondent-plaintiff as a member of the joint family was entitled to seek a division of the joint family property including the agricultural land in question and seek separate possession of his share.

(9). Section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 runs as follows;-

'12. Effect of Adoption.-An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of, his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be served and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family.

Provided that-

(A) The child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth;

(B) Any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth;

This section, in its one aspect, confirms the pre-Act position that on adoption a child for all intents and purposes becomes the child of not merely of adopters or adopter but also of the adoptive family and all his ties with the natural family come to an end from the date of adoption. Thus adoption will have the following effects :

(a) The adopted child for all purposes be deemed to be the child of its adoptive parent or parents;

(b) All the ties of the child in the nalural family will stand terminated from the date of adoption, except the ties of blood for the purposes of marriage.

The adopted child is deemed to be the child of the adopter for all purposes and his posilion for all intends and purposes is that of a natural born son. He has the same right, privilege and the same obligation in the adoptive family as held by the High Court of Bombay in Kesharpai vs. State of Maharashtra (16). In the instant case the adoption was made by the widow of Bhagwan who is also a coparcener with others. It is well established proposition of law that when a coparcener dies his individual interest devolves on surviving coparceners by survivorship. Moment the widow of a coparcener adopts a son, the adopted son becomes a coparcener with the surviving coparceners of the adoptive father and consequently acquires the same interest which his adoptive father would have in the property had he been living. This was on account of the doctrine of relating back. The child adopted by the widow of the coparcener became the child of the deceased coparcener from the dale of the death of the coparcener. Mr. Bhoot relied on certain passages in Anant Bhikkappa Patil vs. Shankar Ramchandra Patil (supra). In the above case the position of a son adopted by a Hindu widow under the Shastric Hindu Law, with respect to his rights in the joint family properties of the adoptive father, was explained by the Privy Council. The Privy Council held that the power of a Hindu widow to adopt a son does not come to an end on the death of the sole surviving coparcener. It does not depend upon vesting or divesting of the estate nor the right to adopt is defeated by partition between the coparceners. The Privy Council also held that on the death of a sole surviving coparcener a Hindu Joint Family cannot be finally brought to an end while it is possible in nature or law to add a male member to it. The joint family cannot come to an end while there is still potential mother and that mother can by nature or by law can bring a new male member in the joint family. The fact that the property had vested in the mean time in the heir of the sole surviving coparceners would not itself affect the right of the adopted son and the adoption of a son by a widow of the deceased coparcener would have the effect of divesting the surviving coparceners and vesting the property in the adopted son to the extent of his adoptive father's share in the joint family property. Thus in our view the adoption by the widow Champa will divest the other coparceners and their legal representatives of the interest of her husband Bhagwan in the joint family property notwithstanding a partition amongst the surviving coparceners after the death of her husband. However, the aforesaid Privy Council judgment was not followed by the Supreme Court in Srinivas Krishnarao Kango vs. Narayan Devji Kango (supra). Mr. Bhoot also relied on the judgment in Krishnamurthi Vasudeorao Deshpande & anr. vs. Dhruwaraj (supra), The Supreme Court in this judgment has summarised the principles deducible from its decision in Srinivas Krishnarao Kango vs. Narayan Devji Kango (supra) as under:-

'(i) An adopted son is held entitled to take in defeasance of the rights acquired prior to his adoption relates bak, by a legal fiction, to the dale of the death of his adoptive father, he being put in the position of a posthumous son.

(ii) As a preferential heir, an adopted son (a) divests his mother of the estate of his adoptive father; (b) divests his adoptive mother of the estate she gets as an heir of her son who died after the death of her husband;

(iii) A coparcenary continues to subsist so long as there is in existence a widow of a coparcener capable of bringing a son into existence by adoption; and if the widow made an adoption, the rights of the adopted son are the same as if he had been in existence at the time when his adoptive father died arid that his title as coparcener prevailed as against the tiile of any person claiming as heir to the last coparcener.

(iv) The principle of relation back applies only when the claim made by the adopted son relates to the estate of his adoptive father. The estate may be definite and ascertained, as when, he is the sole and absolute owner of the properties, or it may be fluctuating as when he is a member of a joint Hindu family in which the interest of the coparceners is liable to increase by death or decrease by birth. In either case, it is the interest of the adoptive father which he adopted son is declared entitled to take as on the dale of his death. This principle of relation back cannot be applied when the claim made by the adopled son relates not to the estate of his adoptive father but to that of a collateral, with reference to the claim with respect to the estale of a collateral, the governing principle is that inheritance can never be in abeyance, and that once il devolves on a person who is the nearest heir under the law, it is thereafler not liable to be divested when succession to the properties of a person other than an adoptive father is involved. The principle applicable is not the rule of relation back but the rule that inheritance once vested could not be divested.'

(10). The principle of relation back was further considered by the Supreme Court in Shripad Gajanan Suthankar vs. Dattaram Kashinath Suthankar & Ors, (supra). Mr. Bhoot next cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Sawan Ram vs. Smt. Kalawanti (supra), wherein it was held that on adoption by a widow the adopted son must be deemed to be a member of the family of the deceased husband of the widow more so because he loses all his rights in the family of his birth and the rights are replaced by the rights created by adoption in the adoptive family. The adopted son obtains the right to succeed to the property in the adoptive family in his capacity as the adopted son of the deceased husband of the widow and thereby becomes a member of the family. Mr. Bhoot further relied upon the observations made in para 9 of the above judgment (Sawan Ram's case) wherein the Supreme Court explained the effect of Section 12(c) of the Act by making the following observations;

'It appears that by making such a provision, the Act has narrowed down the rights of a child born posthumously. Under the Shaslric Law, if a child was adopted by a widow, he was treated as a natural-born child and, consequently, he could divest other members of the family of rights vested in them prior to his adoption. It was only with the limited object of avoiding any such consequence on the adoption of a child by a Hindu widow that these provisions in Cl. (c) of the proviso to Sec. 12 and Sec. 13 of the Act were incorporated. In thai respect, the rights of the adopted child were restricted. It is to be noted that this restriction was placed on the rights of a child adopted by either a male Hindu or a female Hindu and not merely in a case of adoption by a female Hindu.'

Mr. Bhoot next relied upon a decision in Sita Bai vs. Ramchandra (supra). In this case the provisions of Section 12 of the Act were again considered by the Supreme Court.In the said case the facts were that the properties consisting of agricultural lands and a house was jointly held by one Bhagirath and his brother Dulichand. Bhagiralh died sometime in the year 1930 leaving his widow Sita Bai and after the dealh of Bhagirath Dulichand became me sole surviving coparcener of the joint family. Sita Bai adopted Suresh Chandra on 4.3.1958 after coming into force of the Act. The Supreme Court noled the fact that at the time Suresh Chandra was adopted the joint family still continued to exist and the disputed properties retained their character of coparcenary property. Relying upon Gowli Buddanna vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra), the Supreme Court observed that under the Hindu system of law a joint family may consist of a single male member and widows of deceased male members and that the property of a join! family did not cease to belong to the joint family merely because the family is represented by a single coparcener who possesses rights which an absolute owner of the property may possess. A judgment of the Supreme Court in Dina Ji & ors. vs. Daddi & ors. (supra), was also cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. In that case one Dinaji filed a suit for injunclon and possession on the basis of registered sale-deed executed by one Yashoda Bai in his favour with respect of immovable property including agricultural land and houses. The property originally belonged to Yashoda Bai's husband and after his death she got it as limited owner and by influx of time and by coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, she acquired the rights of an absolute owner. On 24.3.1963, she adopted respondent Nain Singh as her son and executed a adoption document which was not registered. The trial court admitted the same in evidence in proof of adoption. In the adoption deed it is stated that the adopted son will be entitled to the whole property including movable and immovable and adoptive mother will have no right to alienate any part of the property after the deed of adoption, the trial court decreed the suit. The appellate court dismissed the suit setting aside the decree passed by the trial court. The learned Single Judge of the High Court considering the impact of Section 12 of the Act held that the adopted son in view of the proviso (c) to Section 12 of the Act will only be entitled to properly after the death of the adoptive mother, but the learned Judge felt that the further covenant in the adoption deed deprived her of that right and conferred that right on the adopted son. On this basis the High Court came to the conclusion that the widow after executing this deed of adoption had no right left in the properly and therefore a transfer executed by her will not confer any title on the plaintiff. It is on this basis that the High Court maintained the judgment of the lower appellate court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff appellant. By special leave the appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court construed Section 12(c) of the Act and held that this proviso departs from the Hindu General Law and makes it clear that the adopted child shall not divest any person of the estate which has vesled in him or her before the adoption. Construing the facts and circumstances of the said case, the Supreme Court held that in the said case Yashoda Bai who was the limited owner of the property after the death of her husband and after the Hindu Succession Act came into force, has become an absolute owner and therefore, the properly of her husband vested in her and therefore merely by adopting a child she could not be deprived of any of her rights in the properly and the adoption would come into play and the adopted child could get the rights for which he is entitled after her death as is clear from the scheme of Section 12 Proviso (C). The Supreme Court in this case after construing Section 12 of the Act and Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act set aside the judgments of the High Court and of the lower appellate court and restored the judgment of the trial court. This judgment, in our opinion, is distinguishable on facts and law with' the case on hand.

(11). Mr. Dinesh Maheshwari, learned counsel for the fourth respondent took us through the pleadings and the judgments rendered by the courts below and of the learned Single Judge and submilted that the question involved in Ihis case now stands conclusively answered by the Supreme Court in the two decisions in Vasant & anr. vs. Dattu & ors. (17), and Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe (18),In Vasant vs. Dattu (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the .scope of the jointfamily and the effect of the adoption of a child. The Supreme Court held that the sharesof other members of family get decreased because of the adoption and that they arehowever not divested of any estate vested In them. It is also held that provision (c) toSection 12 does not preclude the adopted child from claiming his share in joint familyproperties. Paras 1 and 5 of the said judgment can be usefully reproduced hereunder:

'We are concerned wilb proviso (c) to S. 12. The introduction of amember into a joint family, by birth or adoption, may have the effectof decreasing the share of the rest of the members of the joint family,but it certainty does not involve any question of divesting any personof any estate vested in him. The joint family continues to hold theestate, but, with more members, than before. There is no freshvesting or divesting of the estate in anyone.

5. The learned counsel for the appellants have urged that on the death of a member of a joint family the property must be considered to have vesled in the remaining members by survivorship. It is not possible to agree with this argument. The property, no doubt passes by survivorship, but there is no question of any vesting or divesting in the sense contemplated by Sec. 12 of the Act. To interpret Sec, 12 to include cases of devolution by survivorship on the death of a member of the joint family would be to deny any practical effect to the adoption made by the widow of a member of the joint family. We do not think that such a result was in the contemplation of Parliament at all.'

(12). In Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe and Ors, (supra), the Supreme Court was consideryig the question whether a person adopted by Hindu widow after coming into force of the Hindu Adoption nnd Maintenance Act, 1956 can claim a share in the properly which had devolved on sole surviving coparcener on the death of the husband of the widow who took him in adoption, fn this case one Shamrao died leaving behind him two sons Dharma and Miragu. Miragu died issueless in the year 1928 leaving behind him his widow Champabai, The properties owned by the joint family of Dharma and Miragu passed on to the hands of Dharma who was the sole surviving coparcener on the death of Miragu. Under the law as it stood then, Champabai had only a right of maintenance in the joint Family property. The Act came into force on 21st December, 1956. On 9.8.1968 Champabai took one Pandurang in adoption and immediately thereafter a suit was filed by Pandurang and Champabai for partition and separate possession of one-half share in the properties of the joinl family, of which Dharma and Miragu were coparceners? the suit was resisted by Dharma on the ground thai Pandurang was not entitled to claim any share in the properlies which originally belonged to the joint family in view of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 12 of the Act and the properlies which had been sold by him in favour of third parlies could not in any event be the subject-matter of the partition suit. The trial court dismissed the suit. The appeal filed by the widow and the adopted son before the Dislrict Judge was allowed and the preliminary decree for partition in favour of Pandurang and Champabai and separate possession of one-half share of the joint family properties except the two fields which had been sold earlier in favour of their parlies. Aggrieved by the decree of the District Judge, an appeal was filed before the High Court which affirmed the decree passed by the District Court following the decision in Y.K. Nalavade vs. Ananda G. Chavan (supra), in which it was observed that clause (c) of the proviso to section 12 of the Act was not a bar to such a suit for partition. An appeal by special leave was filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay before the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court the appellant urged only the question that the suit for partiiion should have been dismissed by the High Court as the adopted child Pandurang could not divest Dharma of any part of theestate which had been vested in him before the adoption in view of clause (c) of proviso to section 12 of the Act. The Supreme Court in this judgment approved the decisions in Y.K. Nalavade vs. Ananda G. Chavan (supra) and Vasant vs. Daltu (supra) and relied on Sita Bai vs. Ram Chandra (supra).

(13). In this case it was argued before the Supreme Court that Pandurang became the child of the adoptive molher for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption and only from that dale all the ties of Pandurang in the family of his birth should be deemed to have been severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family and, therefore, Pandurang, the adopted son could not claim a share in the joint family properlies which had devolved on the appellanl by survivorship on the death of Miragu, In support of this conlention, the judgment in Sawan Ram's (supra) was relied upon. The Supreme Court after analysing the facts involved in Sawan Ram's case (supra) and the facts and circumstances of the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Narra Hanumantha Rao vs. Narra Hanumayya (19), which was cited before the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the observations at page 1765 of Sawan Ram's case (supra) appear to support the case of the appellant. Rut however the Court was of the view that these observations were not necessary for deciding the case which was before the court and, Iherefore, they have to be held obiter dicta. As already noticed the Supreme Court in this case has approved the decision in Vasant vs. Dattu (supra), wherein the effect of Section 12 of the Act was considered. The Supreme Court in that case interpreting clause (c) of proviso to Section 12 of the Act observed that a case of this nature where the joint family properly passed on to the hands of the remaining members of the coparcenery on the death of one of the coparceners, no vesting of property actually took place in the remaining coparceners while their share in the joint family property may have increased on the death of one of the coparceners which was bound to decrease on the introduction of one more member into the family either by birth or by adoption*.

(14). Before us Mr. M.C. Bhoot, counsel for the appellant urged ttiat on the death of a member of joint family the property must be considered to have vested in the remaining members by survivorship. Similar argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant in Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe & ors. (supra), also. The Supreme Court rejected the said conlention. 11 was held that property no doubt passes by survivorship but there is no question of any vesting or divesting in the sense contemplated by Sec. 12 of the Act. To interpret Sec. 12 to include cases of devolution by survivorship on the death of a member of the joint family would be to deny any practical effect to the adoption made by the widow of a member of the joint family. The Supreme Court was of the view that such result was not in the contemplation of the Parliament at all. The Supreme Court in Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs. Pandurang Miragu Agaiawe (supra), had agreed with the observations of the Supreme Court in Vasant's case (supra) and had observed lhal the joint family properly does not cease to be joint family property when it passes to the hands of sole surviving coparceners. The Supreme Court also approved the decision in Y.K. Nalavade's case (supra). The Supreme Court had agreed with the reasons given by the High Court of Bombay in that decision in taking the view that clause (c) of proviso to Section 12 of the Act would not be attracted to a case of this nature since as observed by the Supreme Court in Vasant's case (supra) no vesting of joint family property in Dharma the appellant took place on the death of Miragu and no divesting of property took place when Pandurang was adopted. In this view of the matter the Supreme Court has overruled the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Narra Hanumantha Rao's case (supra) which takes a contrary view.

(15). Thus as rightly pointed out by Mr. Dinesh Maheshwari the question involved in this case now stands conclusively answered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the two decisions in Vasant vs. Dattu (supra) and Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe (supra).

(16). It cannol be lost sight of that the undivided interest of a deceased coparcener passes to other coparceners by survivorship and not by succession. Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 12 lays down in express and explicit terms that the adoption of a son or daughter by a male or female Hindu would not have the effect of divesting of any estate vested in any person prior to the adoption. In our view the individed interest in the surviving coparceners of a joint Hindu family is not divested on the introduction of an adopted son in the joint Hindu family but only the extent of his interest therein is affected by such adoption. It can, therefore, be legitimately held that if on the date of adoption the family still continues to be joint and owns joint family property, the adoptive child would acquire an interest in the joint family property and the same would not have the effect of divesting the surviving coparceners,

(17). In the result the appeal fails and the suit filed by the plaintiff Shanker Lal the 4th respondent herein stands decreed and the order of the Board of Revenue as affirmed by the learned Single Judge in his judgment dated 29.7.83 in writ petition No. 3140/74 are confirmed and we declare that a preliminary decree be passed in favour of the 4th respondent plaintiff Shanker Lal against the defendants that he will have l/3rd share in the property described in Schedule 'A' appended to the plaint. The appeal is dismissed. In our view because of refusal to give the due share to the 4th respondent Shankerlal he was compelled to approach the civi! Court on 7.2,1966 and was litigating in court up til now nearly for 35 years to get his lawful share in the property as the adopted son. In our opinion, it is an eminently fit case for awarding examplary costs. We, therefore, dismissed the appeal by awarding costs of Rs. 5000.

Subject	Family
Court	Rajasthan High Court
Decided On	Feb-05-2001
Case Number	D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 459 of 1984
Judge	Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan &;Himmat Ram Panwar, JJ.
Reported in	AIR2001Raj318; 2001(2)WLC32; 2001(2)WLN201
Acts	Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 - Sections 12 and 13; Rajasthan Tenancy Act - Sections 53; Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Registration Act, 1908 - Sections 17(1)
Appellant	Heera Lal
Respondent	Board of Revenue and ors.
Appellant Advocate	M.C. Bhoot, Adv.
Respondent Advocate	Dinesh Maheshwari, Adv.
Cases Referred	Vasant vs. Dattu (supra) and Dharma Shamrao Agalawe

Heera Lal Vs. Board of Revenue and ors. - Court Judgment