Purushottam Nagar (Dr.) Vs. Raj. Hindi Granth Academy and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect - appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age when the juvenile justice act, 2000, came into force - juvenile act, of 2000 has been given retrospective effect by rule 12 of juvenile justice rule, 2007 - as such, accused has to be treated as juvenile under the said act. - it is also well settled proposition of law that principles of natural justice are not attracted in the matters of non-extension of period of probation.ashok parihar, j.1. the matter appears to be having a chequered history. the petitioner was initially appointed as director of the respondent-academy on probation for two years vide order dated 30.12.1981. the period of probation came to be extended from time to time till 8.1.1985 when the period of probation came to be an end. the order of non-extension passed on 8.1.1985 came to be challenged by the petitioner by way of filing a writ petition before this court. during the pendency of the above writ petition, the petitioner was allowed to join his duties as director of the academy in pursuance to orders passed by the state government on 2.1.1990. after joining his duties on 2.1.1990, apprehending his termination, the petitioner again preferred a writ petition before this court. apart from holding the respondent-academy as not a state so as to attract article 12 of the constitution of india, the writ petition was dismissed by this court vide order dated 7.3.1991. however, an observation was also made that inspite of order dated 2.1.1990 passed in favour of the petitioner by the concerning authorities, the petitioner can only be treated as a probationer. it may also be pertinent to mention here that after passing of the order dated 2.1.1990, the petitioner withdrew his writ petition on 2.3.1990. the legality of termination order initially passed on 8.1.1985, remained undecided. while dismissing the writ petition on 7.3.1991, this court also without deciding the legality of order dated 2.1.1990 gave liberty to the respondents to take fresh action against the petitioner in accordance with law. the order dated 7.3.1991 passed by this court was affirmed by the division bench vide order dated 24.1.1992, the slp filed by the petitioner also came to be dismissed by the supreme court vide order dated 25.3.1992. however, the question in regard to the respondent-academy been a state or not was left open.2. it appears that in the context of order dated 2.1.1990, another resolution was passed by the executive committee of the respondent-academy on 8.5.1990. however, the same could not be given effect to in view of pendency of litigation before this court as also the supreme court. after dismissal of the slp by the supreme court on 25.3.1992, the impugned order dated 31.3.1992 came to be passed by the respondents holding the order dated 2.1.1990 to be wholly without jurisdiction and non-est and further treating the services of the petitioner having terminated w.e.f. 8.1.1985, the salary paid to the petitioner in pursuance to order dated 2.1.1990 was also ordered to be recovered.3. in view of division bench judgment of this court passed earlier on 24.1.1992 holding the respondent-academy as not a state within article 12 of the constitution, the matter was referred by this court to the larger bench on the above issue. the larger bench has held the respondent academy as state within article 12 of the constitution vide order dated 25.7.2005.4. after hearing learned counsel for the parties, i have carefully gone through entire material on record.5. the observations of the learned single judge made earlier in the judgment dated 7.3.1991 have not and could not be challenged by the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner been treated as probationer. it is also well settled proposition of law that principles of natural justice are not attracted in the matters of non-extension of period of probation. admittedly, no rules and regulations have been framed by the respondent-academy regulating the service conditions of the employees of the academy. a bare reading of the article of association of the academy would show that all the powers regulating the functions of the academy have been given to the executive committee of the academy. no independent right or discretion has been given to the state government in interfering with the affairs of the academy. under the constitutions, it is not known as to how the petitioner could be reinstated in service as per order passed on 2.1.1990 at the instance of the minister concerned. without making any further observation on the manner in which the alleged order dated 2.1.1990 has been passed, in my opinion, the petitioner has no right to continue on the post of director because of non-extension of his probationary period. even no inference of stigma can be drawn on the basis of material available on record since the impugned order dated 31.3.1992 has been passed as per resolution of the executive committee of the academy taking note of the observations made by this court in the judgment dated 7.3.1991 giving liberty to take action in accordance with law. i find no error or illegality in the same.6. having considered entire facts and circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed accordingly as having no merits. however, in the interest of justice, with the lapse of time it will not be proper to recover the amount already paid to the petitioner in pursuance to the alleged order dated 2.1.1990. it is expected from the respondents to pass necessary orders in regard to waiving the amount already paid to the petitioner.