Beguram Vs. Jaipur Udhyog Ltd. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
words and phrases - 'property' under section 630 of companies act--means to include both movable as well as immovable property;the word 'property used in section 630 of the companies act includes within its purview both the movable as well as immovable property and there are no words express or implied in this section which can restrict the application of the word 'property' to only movable property. the words 'deliver up' very welt applies to the delivering up of the possession of immovable property. the words are, on the other hand, indicative of the fact that the immovable properties are also covered in the scope of section 630 of the companies act.;(b) criminal procedure code - sections 468(2) and 472--period of limitation-computation--petitioner occupying company's quarter as trespasser--trespass being continuing offence--held, period of limitation computable under section 472 and not under section 468;;the occupation of the petitioner of the quarter was in the capacity of a trespasser. trespass is a continuing offence and the matter is covered by section 472 of the criminal procedure code which expressly provides that in the case of continuing offence a fresh period of limitation shall to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance as is distinguishable from one which is committed once and for all. trespass is susceptible of continuance and does not end one the date on which it is initially committed.;(c) criminal procedure code - section 389(i)--suspension of sentence--power under section 389(i) is discretion any--held, sessions judge rightly rejected petitioner's application;section 389, cr.p.c. gives discretionary power to the appellate court and the discretion has to be exercised judicially. the sessions judge was right in rejecting the application of the petitioner under section 389, cr.p.c.;(d) companies act, 1966 - section 630--quarter allotted to petitioner employee--not vacated by him after retirement--held, he was trespasser--his conviction under section 630 is therefore valid;petition dismissed - section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect - appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age when the juvenile justice act, 2000, came into force - juvenile act, of 2000 has been given retrospective effect by rule 12 of juvenile justice rule, 2007 - as such, accused has to be treated as juvenile under the said act. - the word 'property' used in section 630 of the companies act includes within its purview both the movable as well as immovable property and there are no words express or implied in this section which can restrict the application of the word property to only movable property. the words 'deliver up' very well apply to the delivering up of the possession of immovable property.ordernavin chandra sharma, j.1. i have heard shri r.p. garg appearing for the petitioner beguram.2. facts in brief are that beguram was employed as fitter (maintenance) in m/s. jaipur udhyog sawai madhopur. he retired on sept. 7,1978 but did not vacate the free quarter of the company bearing no. 101/200 which had been allotted to him while he was in service. consequently jaipur udhyog ltd filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner in the court of the chief judicial magistrate, sawai madhopur for the offence under section 630(l)(b) of the companies act. the chief judicial magistrate, sawai madhopur by his judgment dated sept. 11,1986 held the petitioner guilty for the said offence and punished him with a fine of rs. 200/-. along with this sentence, the chief judicial magistrate also passed an order under sub-section (2) of section 630 of the companies act ordering the petitioner to deliver up the said quarter to m/s. jaipur udhyog ltd. within three months of the date of his judgment and in default thereof the petitioner was to undergo simple imprisonment for a term up to two months. against this conviction and sentence, the petitioner filed criminal appeal no. 53 of 1986 before the sessions judge sawai madhopur. along with the appeal he filed an application under section 389, cr.p.c. for suspension of the sentence and also of the order passed by the chief judicial magistrate under sub-section (2) of section 630 of the companies act.3. the first contention advanced by mr. garg is that section 630 of the companies act is only applicable with respect to movable property because sub-section (2) of the said section used the words 'deliver up' or'refund' and these words, according to him, can relate only to movable property. there is no force in this contention. the word 'property' used in section 630 of the companies act includes within its purview both the movable as well as immovable property and there are no words express or implied in this section which can restrict the application of the word property to only movable property. the words 'deliver up' very well apply to the delivering up of the possession of immovable property. these words are, on the other hand, indicative of he fact that the immovable properties are also covered in the scope of section 630 of the companies act.4. the next contention of mr. garg was that the petitioner had retired from the service of the company on sept. 1, 1978 and he continued to occupy quarter no. 101/200 even after his retirement. according to him, the offence was committed by the petitioner on sept. 1, 1978 when despite his retirement from the employment of the company, he did not deliver the possession of the quarter which had been allotted to him. the learned counsel relied on section 468(2) of the cr. p.c. and contended that the period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offence which was punishable with the fine only was six months, and, therefore, the criminal complaint no. 226 of 1982 filed by m/s. jaipur udyog ltd., was barred by limitation. i equally do not find any force in this contention. the petitioner was allotted company's quarter no. 101/200 free of any rents so long as he was in the employment of the company. it was a case where the petitioner having been in possession lawfully in the said quarter up to feb. 1, 1978, wrongfully withheld the possession of the quarter. after sept. 1, 1978, the occupation of the petitioner of the quarter was in the capacity of a trespasser. trespass is a continuing offence and the matter is covered by section 472 of the cr. p.c. which expressly provides that in the case of continuing offence a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from one which is committed once and for all. trespass is susceptible of continuance and does not end on the date on which it is initially committed.5. last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the sessions judge, sawai madhopur was under a duty to suspend the order in pursuance of section 389 cr. p.c. and he urged that the word 'may' used in section 389(1) cr. p.c. should be interpreted as containing a mandatory provision. there is no force in this argument also. section 389 cr. p.c. gives discretionary power to the appellate court and the discretion has to be exercised judicially. admittedly, the petitioner had retired from the employment of the company on sept. 1, 1978 and it would amount to giving him a forward (reward) for his trespass if he is allowed to continue a moment more. the sessions judge was right in rejecting the application of the petitioner under section 389 cr; p.c. this petition has no merit in it and it is hereby dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

Navin Chandra Sharma, J.

1. I have heard Shri R.P. Garg appearing for the petitioner Beguram.

2. Facts in brief are that Beguram was employed as Fitter (Maintenance) in M/s. Jaipur Udhyog Sawai Madhopur. He retired on Sept. 7,1978 but did not vacate the free quarter of the company bearing No. 101/200 which had been allotted to him while he was in service. Consequently Jaipur Udhyog Ltd filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur for the offence under Section 630(l)(b) of the Companies Act. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur by his judgment dated Sept. 11,1986 held the petitioner guilty for the said offence and punished him with a fine of Rs. 200/-. Along with this sentence, the Chief Judicial Magistrate also passed an order under Sub-section (2) of Section 630 of the Companies Act ordering the petitioner to deliver up the said quarter to M/s. Jaipur Udhyog Ltd. within three months of the date of his judgment and in default thereof the petitioner was to undergo simple imprisonment for a term up to two months. Against this conviction and sentence, the petitioner filed criminal appeal No. 53 of 1986 before the Sessions Judge Sawai Madhopur. Along with the appeal he filed an application under Section 389, Cr.P.C. for suspension of the sentence and also of the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Sub-section (2) of Section 630 of the Companies Act.

3. The first contention advanced by Mr. Garg is that Section 630 of the Companies Act is only applicable with respect to movable property because Sub-section (2) of the said section used the words 'deliver up' or'refund' and these words, according to him, can relate only to movable property. There is no force in this contention. The word 'property' used in Section 630 of the Companies Act includes within its purview both the movable as well as immovable property and there are no words express or implied in this section which can restrict the application of the word property to only movable property. The words 'deliver up' very well apply to the delivering up of the possession of immovable property. These words are, on the other hand, indicative of he fact that the immovable properties are also covered in the scope of Section 630 of the Companies Act.

4. The next contention of Mr. Garg was that the petitioner had retired from the service of the Company on Sept. 1, 1978 and he continued to occupy quarter No. 101/200 even after his retirement. According to him, the offence was committed by the petitioner on Sept. 1, 1978 when despite his retirement from the employment of the company, he did not deliver the possession of the quarter which had been allotted to him. The learned Counsel relied on Section 468(2) of the Cr. P.C. and contended that the period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offence which was punishable with the fine only was six months, and, therefore, the criminal complaint No. 226 of 1982 filed by M/s. Jaipur Udyog Ltd., was barred by limitation. I equally do not find any force in this contention. The petitioner was allotted Company's quarter No. 101/200 free of any rents so long as he was in the employment of the Company. It was a case where the petitioner having been in possession lawfully in the said quarter up to Feb. 1, 1978, wrongfully withheld the possession of the quarter. After Sept. 1, 1978, the occupation of the petitioner of the quarter was in the capacity of a trespasser. Trespass is a continuing offence and the matter is covered by Section 472 of the Cr. P.C. which expressly provides that in the case of continuing offence a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from one which is committed once and for all. Trespass is susceptible of continuance and does not end on the date on which it is initially committed.

5. Last contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur was under a duty to suspend the order in pursuance of Section 389 Cr. P.C. and he urged that the word 'may' used in Section 389(1) Cr. P.C. should be interpreted as containing a mandatory provision. There is no force in this argument also. Section 389 Cr. P.C. gives discretionary power to the appellate court and the discretion has to be exercised judicially. Admittedly, the petitioner had retired from the employment of the Company on Sept. 1, 1978 and it would amount to giving him a forward (reward) for his trespass if he is allowed to continue a moment more. The Sessions Judge was right in rejecting the application of the petitioner under Section 389 Cr; P.C. This petition has no merit in it and it is hereby dismissed.