Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and ors. Vs. Laxman Das Mali and anr. - Court Judgment

A.S. Godara, J.

1. This is Civil Revision Petition under Section 115, C.P.C. by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur (for short 'the Corporation' hereinafter) and its officers against the order dated April 15, 1996 passed by the learned District Judge, Sirohi in Civil Appeal against decree No. 9/1994 whereby the order and direction passed by the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Sirohi, in claim petition preferred by the non- petitioner No. 1 Laxman Das, workman, was affirmed resulting in dismissal of the appeal preferred by the petitioners.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the non-petitioner Laxman Das Malik filed three connected separate applications under the provisioas of Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (for short 'the Act of 1936') against the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 respectively on July 29, 1989, September 12, 1990 and May 19, 1993 which were, lastly, consolidated and were disposed of together by the impugned order.

3. The non-petitioner No. 1 alleged in the applications that he was in the employment of the petitioner-Corporation and was working on the post of Bus Conductor. On August 15, 1984 he was posted in the Kotputali Depot of the petitioner-Corporation. He was issued ticket-books to be issued to the bus passengers worth Rs. 20,367.30 along with way-bill etc. While he was operating on the bus of the Corporation plying on the Jaipur-Rohtak route on the aforesaid day, the rube-tyre of the bus got punctured and, as a result, the bus was left on the spot and instead he picked up bus of Haryana Roadways along with tool-box, bag etc. and he took his seat by the side of the driver of the bus. While alighting from the bus, he requested the driver of the bus to stop the bus for a while till he could return with a Mechanic and a new stepney. Before he could return, the bus departed from there towards Behrore and he picked up a taxi-car and gave a chase and after coverage of about 2 to 3 kms. he approached the bus and found that the bag which he left while alighting from the bus, was not there. Even after enquiry there was no trace of the bag. He informed about the loss of bag which contained the used/unused ticket-books, way-bill etc. having been so lost, to the Assistant Depot Manager at Kotputali and got an FIR also registered at the Police Station, Kotputali.

4. On the contrary, the Corporation started an enquiry against the non-petitioner-workman resulting in being served with a regular charge-sheet and, as a result of enquiry to the charges which were levelled against the non-petitioner-workman, on its completion, the Regional Manager, Jaipur, being an officer of the petitioner-Corporation, in the capacity of a Disciplinary Authority, in exercise of powers under the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and Workshop Employees Standing Orders, 1965 (for short 'the Standing Orders, 1965' hereinafter), ordered for termination of services of the non-petitioner-workman and, in addition thereto, it was further ordered that a sum of Rs. 19,717.30 be also realised from the non-petitioner-workman. Being aggrieved, the non-petitioner-workman preferred an appeal before the competent authority under the aforesaid Standing Orders, 1965, being the then Deputy General Manager (Personnel), Jaipur, who vide his order dated August 18, 1987, while upholding findings of the Disciplinary Authority dated July 27, 1987, as regards punishment imposed on the non-petitioner-workman, while modifying the order of punishment, instead stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect was ordered and it was also further ordered that loss of amount of tickets so lost by the non-petitioner-workman amounting to Rs. 19,717.30 shall also be realized from the workman having regard to the provisions of Circular No. 323 dated April 29, 1987 and the workman shall also not be entitled to Pay and Allowance for the period of his suspension.

5. Accordingly, while the non-petitioner-workman was working with the Depot of the Corporation at Sirohi, during the aforesaid period, a sum of Rs. 100/- p.m. was being deducted from his monthly wages which, lastly, aggregated to Rs. 6,300/-.

6. Being aggrieved, the non-petitioner-workman filed as many as three applications, as above, with the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Sirohi which were contested by the petitioners and it was denied that any illegal deduction was being made and instead the deductions so being made were claimed to be legal and authorised and, therefore, the maintainability of the applications by the non-petitioner-workman was also seriously challenged and it was further claimed that no such application was entertainable under the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act of 1936. Consequently, the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act framed as many as six issues and, lastly, vide impugned order dated January 28, 1994, held that the deductions so made during the period from February 1988 to April 1990 were illegal and unauthorized mainly on the ground that since all these recoveries have been ordered to be effected under the directions as are laid down in the Circular Ex.19 and since the disputed amount of Rs. 19,717.30 being the total worth of the lost unused tickets, has been so ordered to be realised from the non- petitioner-workman in absence of any proof of any unauthorised use of the lost tickets and so any loss having been incurred/caused to the Corporation and, therefore, there is absolutely no justification for recovery of this amount and the recovery being so unauthorised and invalid, resultantly, no deduction could be permissible and, accordingly, it was ordered that the total deductions being Rs. 6,300/- and an equal amount of compensation being Rs. 6,300/- along with Rs. HO/- as costs, totalling Rs. 12,710/- shall be paid by the Paying Authority within 30 days from the date of the order.

7. However, the petitioners challenged this order of the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act before the learned District Judge, Sirohi, who, vide his impugned order dated April 18, 1996, while upholding the said order, dismissed the appeal giving rise to the present petition, as above.

8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also have perused the regularity and legality of the impugned order passed by the lower Court along with the connected material and considered the same carefully.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently contended that, admittedly, a domestic enquiry was conducted by the Corporation in accordance with the Standing Orders, 1965 and, as a result of enquiry so conducted by the Disciplinary Authority and so also affirmed by the Appellate Authority, as above, the misconduct in regard to negligence and default of the non- petitioner-workman has been fully upheld and, consequently, the orders so passed by the Disciplinary Authority and so also by the Appellate Authority, having not been further challenged either under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or by way of invokingwrit jurisdiction of this Court, the same have become final and conclusive against the non-petitioner-workman and, therefore, the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, in exercise of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 15 of the Act of 1936 could not have entertained applications of the non-petitioner-workman 5 and to have passed the impugned order and the same being without jurisdiction is invalid and deserves to be set aside.

10. So also the learned District Judge, while disposing of the appeal preferred under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1936, similarly, committed a serious illegality while upholding the impugned order passed by the learned Authority and, consequently, it has been further submitted that since the competent authority, under the provisions of the Standing Orders, 1965 imposed inter alia the punishment or recovery of the disputed amount from the workman and, accordingly, the Paying Authority was deducting the said amount in the prescribed mode pursuant to the Circular dated April 29, 1987 (April 24, 1987) issued by the Corporation in continuation to its earlier Circular dated February 19, 1982 and, therefore, these deductions fell within the purview of Clauses (c) and (h) of Sub-section (2) of Section 7 and Section 10 of the Act of 1936 and, resultantly, the finding of the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, that these deductions were unauthorised and invalid, not falling within the purview of the aforesaid provisions, is wholly misconceived, unjustified, contrary to the legal provisions and the contrary view taken by the learned Authority resulting in impugned direction is not sustainable in the eye of law and so the petition deserves to be accepted.

11. On the opposite side, the learned counsel for the non- petitioner-workman has vehemently, in an attempt to controvert the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the impugned order suffers from no illegality or any jurisdictional error and on the contrary the order is legal and valid warranting no interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

12. While referring to the object and the purpose of the Act of 1936, it has been submitted that it is an advanced piece of social legislation enacted mainly with an object to check evil of delayed payment of wages and fines in industries and safeguard the rights and providing a self-contained regulation in respect of payment of wages to certain classes of persons employed in the industry. He further contended that so far as the non-petitioner-workman is concerned, he did not commit any misconduct or any negligence in discharging of duties resulting in any pecuniary loss to the employer-Corporation and even then he was departmentally, by way of full-fledged domestic enquiry, penalised and, lastly, by the Appellate Authority, a partial relief could be granted but, so far as order of deduction of the disputed amount of Rs. 19,717.30, alleged to be the amount of pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation as a result of so called negligent conduct of the non-petitioner-workman is concerned, the same could not be sustained, being ex-facie out of competence and authority of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority and the same is not covered by any of the provisions of the Standing Orders, 1965 and, therefore, no such unauthorised, illegal and invalid order of deduction could be acted upon and so the petitioner No. 2 has illegally resorted to deductions resulting hi the present controversy.

13. The non-petitioner-workman, due to puncture of the stepney of the bus of the Corporation in which he was employed and was working as a Conductor, immediately left for Kotputali and, while alighting from the Haryana Roadways bus, he left his bag along with the lost tickets, way-bill etc. and, on return, he found that the bus had already left from there to which he gave a hot chase while boarding a taxi-car and, on enquiry from the driver of the Haryana Roadways bus, it transpired that the bag as well as the ticket-books and so also the way-bill were missing. Consequently, non-petitioner-workman lost no tune to have immediately filed an F.I.R. with the Police Station, Kotputali. He also reported this matter to the then A.D.M., Kotputali. Therefore, there was no lapse or any negligence on the part of the non-petitioner-workman and whatever happened including the loss of used/unused ticket-books besides the way-bill, bag etc., it was beyond his control and he immediately reported the matter, as above. Besides he immediately deposited Rs. 650/-with the Corporation and the balance of Rs. 400/- was also deposited. As a result, since tickets worth Rs. 1,065/- only could be issued to the passengers travelling in the bus and the remaining tickets were unused and they were neither issued by the non-petitioner- workman nor there is an iota of evidence that the same were used by any passenger travelling in the bus of the Corporation resulting in pecuniary loss to the Corporation, there being complete absence of evidence in this respect, the loss of Rs. 19,717.30 could not have been so worked out before it was held that any pecuniary loss worth Rs. 19,717.30 was caused to the Corporation to have authorised the Disciplinary Authority and so also the Appellate Authority to have ordered for recovery of this amount as well from the non-petitioner-workman and, therefore, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner-workman has supported the legality and validity and so also the competence of the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act to have passed the impugned order and, consequently, its being affirmed by the appellate Court and, therefore, the impugned orders are wholly legal and justified warranting no interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

14. At the outset, suffice it to observe that the non-petitioner- workman was subjected to a domestic enquiry in accordance with the provisions as are laid down in the Standing Orders, 1965 and, after full-fledged enquiry so conducted by the competent authority under the said order, vide his order dated June 18, 1987 imposed the departmental penalty of termination of services of the workman-non-petitioner besides recovery of the disputed amount from him. As provided under the said Standing Orders, 1965, this order was appealed against and, lastly, the learned Appellate Authority, vide his appellate order dated August 18, 1987, did not agree with the finding of the Disciplinary Authority that the amount of Rs. 400/-, being balance of amount collected as a result of tickets issued to the passengers, was also misappropriated, since, it transpired that the sum of Rs. 650/- was deposited on August 18, 1984 with the UCO Bank, As regards balance of Rs. 400/-, a sum of Rs. 10/- was accounted for as having been paid as bus-stand fees and the balance of Rs. 390/- was lying in the bag which was reported to have been lost along with the tickets and way-bill. This led the learned Appellate Authority to disagree with the finding of the Disciplinary Authority that a sum of Rs. 400/-was, any how, misappropriated by the non-petitioner- workman.

15. However, as regards the charge of negligence and misconduct in regard to loss of tickets worth Rs. 19,717.30 which were alleged by the workman not to have been issued to any passengers, he was rightly found to be liable for commission of negligence and misconduct resulting in pecuniary loss to the Corporation and so the impugned appellate order, in modification of the impugned order passed by the DisciplinaryAuthority, was passed.

16. There is nothing on record to dispute that the matter was, just after the occurrence, reported to the A.D.M. at Kotputali and, sub-sequently, an F.I.R. was also lodged with the Police Station, Kotputali. It is not clear as to what happened to the F.I.R. lodged by the non-petitioner-workman. However, though there is no evidence nor it could be feasible to show that the tickets which were alleged by the workman not to have been issued by him and, consequently, no amount there against having been collected by the workman, as was natural, the Corporation has not been able to prove during the enquiry or at any subsequent stage that the alleged unused tickets of the Corporation were used by any employee of the Corporation or any passenger while travelling in the buses of the Corporation. Presently, it is also to be noted that there is no guarantee that those unused tickets could not have been used by any employee of the Corporation and/or the passengers while travelling in the bus of the Roadways thereby causing pecuniary loss to the Corporation. This was a potential loss since there is every possibility that the person who had stoten the bag along with the tickets and the way-bill etc., could have used the same for such purpose and this possibility cannot be ruled out. However, this conclusion is directly not relevant for disposal of the present petition.

17. The fact remains that the competent authority charge-sheeted the non-petitioner-workman and, consequently, he was subjected to a full-fledged domestic enquiry resulting in his punishment, as above, besides, the same having been with modification in the order of termination of services, in the order dated June 18, 1987. The appellate order dated June 18, 1987 has not so far been challenged before any legal authority and the same conclusions have become final for all purposes. This order could have been challenged as provided under the Industrial Disputes Act or by way of filing a writ petition there against but, instead, the non-petitioner-workman preferred to invoke provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act of 1936 culminating into present revision petition, as above.

18. The Appellate Authority did not sustain the objection of the petitioners against the maintainability and jurisdiction of the learned Authority to entertain such application in exercise of its power vested under Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act of 1936 mainly on the ground that since the deductions so being effected pursuant to the orders so passed by the departmental authorities in the domestic enquiry and the connected appeal were contrary to the provisions that are provided under the Standing Orders, 1965 and so also the provisions of Section 7(2)(c) of the Act of 1936 and so also the amount of loss, if any, could not have exceeded the actual loss or damage caused by the workman to his employer in view of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act of 1936, these recoveries being illegal and unauthorised, there was no bar against the entertainment of such applications and hence the objection of the petitioner was brushed aside.

19. Be that as it may, as regards the provisions of Section 7(2)(c) and (h) of the Act of 1936 are reproduced as below:

'7(2)(c). - deductions for damage to or loss of goods expressly entrusted to the employed person for custody, or for loss of money for which he is required to account, where such damage or loss is directly attributable to his neglect or default; 7(2)(h). - deductions required to be made by order of a Court or other authority competent to make such order.'

20. Similarly, Section 10 of the Act of 1936 regarding deductions for damages or loss caused by any workman runs as under:

'Section 10. Deductions for damage or loss. - (1) A deduction under Clause (c) or Clause (o) of Sub-section (2) of Section 7 shall not exceed the amount of the damage or loss caused to the employer by the neglect or default of the employed person.

(IA) A deduction shall not be made under Clause (c) or Clause (m) or Clause (n) or Clause (o) of Sub-section (2) of Section 7 until the employed person has been given an opportunity of showing cause against the deduction, or otherwise than in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed for the making of such deduction.'

21. On the basis of aforesaid legal provisions, the learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that since the authorities competent under the provisions of Standing Order, 1965 being applicable to the non-petitioner-workman as well, authorised the competent authority under Clause (h) of Sub-section (2) of Section 7 as well and the same read with the aforesaid provisions of Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 7, enabled the Paying Authority to deduct the disputed amount as ordered by the appellate authority in connection with disposal of the appeal preferred against the order arising out of the domestic enquiry conducted by the Disciplinary Authority of the Corporation and, therefore, since other part of the punishment so imposed by the Appellate Authority has remained intact, while so far as recovery of the disputed amount from the non-petitioner-workman is concerned, this part of the appellate order, in case the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority is sustained, amounts to partly resulting in further setting aside the appellate order passed by the competent authority and this could not have been the purpose of theaforesaid provisions of Section 7 of the Act of 1936 referred to above. This further did not empower or authorise the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act to have embarked upon adjudication as to whether the appellate order passed by the competent authority of the Corporation was valid or authorised and the course left for the aggrieved person was to have resorted to the provisions as are laid down under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or to have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court and the workman conveniently deviated therefrom and, instead, illegally invoked jurisdiction of the learned Appellate Authority.

22. Section 15(2) clearly lays down that the Payment of Wages Authority has only jurisdiction to hear and decide the claim arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment of wages which are not permissible under the provisions of the Act of 1936 and the Payment of Wages Act does not apply to the cases where the employer has withheld the wages on the ground of negligence, misappropriation and default, if any committed by the employee.

23. It has been observed by the Apex Court in A V.D' Costa, Divil. Engr. G.I.P. Rly. v. B. C. PatelAIR 1955 SC 412, that the authority set up under Section 15, Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is undisputably a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and its power to hear and determine disputes must necessarily be found in the provisions of the Act. Such a tribunal, cannot determine any controversy which is not within the ambit of those provisions of the Act.

24. The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied in the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shri S. B. Bhatt wherein it has been observed that the scheme of the Act is clear. The Act was intended to regulate the Payment of Wages to certain classes of persons employed in industry and its object is to provide for a speedy and effective remedy to the employees in respect of their claims arising out of illegal deductions or unjustitled delay made in paying wages to them. With that object Section 2(vi) of the Act has defined wages. Section 4 fixed the wage period. Section 5 prescribes the time of payment of wages; and Section 7 allows certain specified deductions to be made. Section 15 confers jurisdiction on the authority appointed under the said Section to hear and decide for any specified area claims arising out of deductions from wages, or delay in payment of wages, of persons employed or paid in that area. It is thus clear that the only claims which can be entertained by the authority are claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages. The jurisdiction thus conferred on the authority to deal with these two categories of claims is exclusive, for Section 22 of the Act provides that matters which lie within the jurisdiction of the authority are excluded from the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Courts. Thus in one sense the jurisdiction conferred on the authority is limited by Section 15, and in another sense it is exclusive as prescribed by Section 22.

25. It may also be observed that before any action under Section 15(2) of the Act of 1936, there must be pre-existing right or corresponding obligation of the employer for such payment and the alleged deductions, as is the case in hand, ought to have been contrary to the provisions that are prescribed under the provisions of Sections 7 to 13 of the Act of 1936.

26. However, as already observed above, since the deductions so admitted to have been made by the Paying Authority from the salaries of the non-petitioner-workman have resulted from the orders passed by the competent authorities of the Corporation in exercise of their powers as are vested under the Standing Orders, 1965 and its Section 37(viii) inter alia provided for deductions of wages required to be made by the order of Court or any other authority competent to make such order under any law for the time being in force.

27. As regards the authority, competency and effect of the Circular dated April 24. 1987 (April 29, 1987) which has been referred to by the Appellate Authority in its order dated Au gust 18, 1987, pertains to a mode of working out the amount of damages/loss caused or likely to result from the negligent conduct of the employee and, therefore, though this Circular itself speaks that the same has been issued in continuation of the previous Circular dated February 10, 1982 and, admittedly, subsequent to August 15, 1984 when the fatetul incident took place but, on the basis of this very Circular dated April 24,1987 (April 29,1987), no liability has been straightaway fixed and, instead, having regard to the provisions of Clause (h) read with Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 7 as well as Section 10 of the Act of 1936, besides, Clause (viii) of Section 37 of the Standing Orders, 1965 of the Corporation, it was within the power of the Disciplinary Authority and so also the Appellate Authority to have assessed the real/potential loss either having been caused or likely to be caused to the Corporation and to have ordered for deduction of the amount of loss so worked out from the salary of the defaulting workman and, consequently, in case the Disciplinary Authority as well as its Appellate Authority committed any illegality while awarding punishment on the basis of domestic enquiry conducted against the workman (employee), the same ought to have been further challenged as referred to herein before either before the Labour Court or by invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and, in its absence, the penalties so imposed by the departmental enquiries having become final and conclusive and, resultantly, so long as those findings are intact, in view of the limited scope of the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act of 1936, the same could not be further challenged on the ground that the same are illegal and unauthorised and the deductions of the amount of loss so worked out is invalid and contrary to the aforesaid provisions of the Act of 1936 to enable the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act to order for refund of the same.

28. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, since the employer who is the Corporation-petitioner before this Court, has clearly shown that it is authorised to make deductions as are permissible under the Standing Orders, 1965 having the force of law and there being nothing there against, looking to the contentions and claim of the employer, the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act did not have jurisdiction to entertain claim applications of the non-petitioner-workman and to have passed the impugned order and the same is found to be without jurisdiction and, consequently, the same suffers from illegality and invalidity besides usurpation of jurisdiction by the learned Authority warranting interference by this Court.

29. The impugned order passed by the learned Appellate Judge also suffers from the same infirmity.

30. Accordingly, this petition is accepted and the impugned order dated January 28, 1994 by the learned Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and so also the appellate order dated April 18, 1994 passed by the learned District Judge, Sirohi are hereby set aside. No order as to costs.

31. This revision petition along with connected stay petition is disposed of in the manner indicated herein before.