Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Plastopacks International (P) Ltd. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect - appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age when the juvenile justice act, 2000, came into force - juvenile act, of 2000 has been given retrospective effect by rule 12 of juvenile justice rule, 2007 - as such, accused has to be treated as juvenile under the said act. - , 2004, passed in two cross-appeals filed by the revenue as well as the assessee relating to the asst. however, the tribunal has clearly found that the liability for discharge of which the provision was made, was not liability relating to any payment of tax to which the petitioner is subjected to any excise duty. that being the position, the question of application of section 43b does not arise clearly on the terms of section 43b itself and the case does not call for interference on this aspect also.rajesh balia, j.1. heard learned counsel for the appellant.2. the appeal is directed against the order of the tribunal, jodhpur bench, jodhpur, dt. 13th sept., 2004, passed in two cross-appeals filed by the revenue as well as the assessee relating to the asst. yr. 1992-93.3. the assessee [sic-revenue] has sought to raise following two questions as substantial question of law which arise for consideration in this appeal:'i. whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned tribunal was justified in deleting the addition of rs. 8 lakhs made by the ao on account of disallowance of provision for excise and job charges ?ii. whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the learned tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the learned cit(a) directing the ao to allow the deduction under section 80i of the it act on the income before allowing deduction under section 80hh ?'4. having heard learned counsel and perused the record placed before us which has been referred to by the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal.5. so far as the second question is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant has candidly stated that a division bench decision of this court in cit v. shree engineers d.b. ref. no. 38 of 1995, decided on dt. 10th jan., 1996, supports the decision taken by the tribunal about the computation of the gross income for the purpose of deduction under section 80hh.6. since the matter is already covered by the decision of the division bench of this court, it cannot be said to be a substantial question of law arising in this case for deciding the same issue again. the learned counsel does not show that the operation of the judgment has been stayed either by the supreme court or any decision contrary to that has been taken by the supreme court so as to consider that the decision of this court has been impliedly overruled.7. so far as the first question is concerned, it relates to disallowance of the addition made by the ao. for the purpose of deleting the addition, the provisions under which undischarged liability incurred by the assessee has been disallowed is stated to be section 43b of the it act, 1961, which relates to disallowance of outstanding tax due on a particular date on the basis of mere accruing of the tax liability. however, the tribunal has clearly found that the liability for discharge of which the provision was made, was not liability relating to any payment of tax to which the petitioner is subjected to any excise duty. therefore, no liability in respect of excise duty payable by the person for whom the petitioner has undertaken job work can be said to be liability outstanding on account of excise, duty. that being the position, the question of application of section 43b does not arise clearly on the terms of section 43b itself and the case does not call for interference on this aspect also.therefore, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.