Naresh Chand Vs. Smt. Premlata Bakshi - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/754469
SubjectTenancy
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided OnJan-20-2009
Judge Vineet Kothari, J.
Reported inRLW2009(1)Raj784; 2009(1)WLN266
AppellantNaresh Chand
RespondentSmt. Premlata Bakshi
Cases ReferredPreetam Singh v. Narendra Singh
Excerpt:
- - nemi chand chittora of which a registered notice was sent to the defendant naresh chand by the plaintiff on 26.1.2000 as well as by the purchaser through his advocate on 2.2.2000. copies of these documents are also placed on record along with said application under order 41 rule 27 c. is now well settled and by catena of judgments, it is well settled that the findings of fact about the personal bonafide necessity of the landlord do not give rise to any substantial question of law unless the said findings are perverse and based on no relevant evidence at all. it is also equally well settled that bonafide need of the landlord as on the date of filing of the suit for eviction is to be considered by the court and it is also equally well settled that question of title is irrelevant in the eviction proceedings under the rent control act. 10. since bonafide need was claimed by the landlord -plaintiff for her husband as well as her son as stated above on the date of filing of the suit and the courts below concurrently found that the said bonafide need existed on the date of filing suit and while the trial court granted the decree for partial eviction, the first appellate court granted the decree of entire residential house in question, the said findings of facts which are based on relevant evidence and material did not deserve to be disturbed at all and the second appeal was liable to be dismissed at the threshold as no substantial question of law could be said to be arising in the present appeal. 15.3.1999 and the purchaser stepped into her shoes entitled to all the rights and fruits to enjoy the said property thereafter. the question is, therefore, whether the defendant -tenant can be allowed to enjoy this property for all times to come at a nominal rent of rs. 5..it is well settled that a transferee of the landlord's right steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights arid liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. even the trial court while returning its findings on 3.11.2006 was very well aware of these facts, still the learned trial court found that the plaintiff failed to establish his bonafide need upon death of sons of plaintiff landlord brij mohan. reported in (2000) 1 scc 679, the hon'ble apex court held that it is settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement for residential or business purposes and has complete freedom in the matter and therefore, the appellant landlord stating in evidence that he owned several other shops and houses, but they were not vacant and also that the suit premises were suitable for the proposed business, the hon'ble apex court granted eviction decree and dismissed the tenant's appeal. this judgment relied upon by the counsel for the defendant -appellant clearly is distinguishable and turns upon the specific provisions in a. 19. therefore, this court is of the opinion that not only the question framed by this court while admitting the present appeal deserves to be answered against the appellant -defendant by holding that the bonafide need of the plaintiff continues even after death of her husband as the bonafide need was claimed for her husband as well as her son and it deserves to be further held that the purchaser of the suit property during the pendency of present second appeal who steps into the shoes of the plaintiff shall be entitled to vacant possession of the suit property in pursuance of the decree passed by two courts below which is liable to be upheld by this court as no perversity in those findings is found by this court. copy of this judgment may be sent to the parties as well as the purchaser or attorned landlord shanti lal chittora at his address given in sale-deed i.vineet kothari, j.1. this second appeal of the defendant - tenant pending for last 18 years in this court was admitted on the following substantial question of law framed by this court on 6.9.1991:can the dead-man's personal necessity be a ground for ejectment2. the plaintiff smt. premlata bakshi w/o sh. mangal singh bakshi, who expired before filing of the second appeal by the defendant filed the eviction suit against the defendant - appellant in the year 1981 on the ground of personal bonafide necessity of her husband and son who was engaged as inspector in the national insurance company in respect of residential house situated at 24, chitragupt marg, udaipur, which was let out under an oral agreement to the defenadnt on 15.3.1969 for a sum of r&.80/- per month as rent. the bonafide need of the landlord was claimed on the ground that her son is getting married on 1.7.1979 and after retirement of her husband, he intends to work as property valuer and consultant engineer, therefore, the suit property i.e. the said residential house would be required for residential and business need of the family members.3. after recording the evidence, the learned trial court granted partial eviction decree on 9.1.1985 directing eviction of the defendant from the room including latrine bathroom situated at the ground floor. the plaintiff filed first appeal against the said partial eviction decree before the first appellate court of additional civil judge no. 3, udaipur which came to be allowed on 10.7.1991 and instead of partial eviction, the appellate court granted eviction decree of the entire premises in favour of the plaintiff. the defendant does not appear to have filed any cross-appeal against the partial eviction decree by the learned trial court.4. the present second appeal was filed by the defendant - tenant in this court on 5.9.1991 and as already stated above was admitted on a limited substantial question of law as quoted above on 6.9.1991 and interim order against dispossession was also granted in favour of the defendant on 6:9.1991 which has continued throughout. the defendant - appellant has filed an application under order 41 rule 27 c.p.c. in this court on 14.3.2000 with the averment that the plaintiff had sold the said suit property on 15.9.1999 to one shanti lal s/o sh. nemi chand chittora of which a registered notice was sent to the defendant naresh chand by the plaintiff on 26.1.2000 as well as by the purchaser through his advocate on 2.2.2000. copies of these documents are also placed on record along with said application under order 41 rule 27 c.p.c.5. mr. r.k. thanvi, learned counsel for the appellant - defendant urged that since the property in question has already been sold, therefore, the defendant cannot be now evicted from the suit premises as the personal need of erstwhile owner - plaintiff no more exists. he relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:1) preetam singh v. narendra kumar and ors. 1998 dnj (raj.) 293.2) sheikh jehangir v. smt. s. kaushilyabal and ors. : jt1987(2)sc101 .3) rakesh gupta v. ahmed farooq 1992 (2) rlw 398.6. mr. sajjan singh and mr. b.k. bhatnagar, the learned counsel for the respondent - plaintiff on the other hand opposed these submissions and relied upon following judgments in support of his submissions:1) dharam chand v. karam chand 2001 (3) rlr 713 : rlw 2002 (1) raj. 6572) mahendra raghunathdas gupta v. vishvanath bhlkaji mogul and ors. 1997 acj 10 (s.c.).3) ram saran sharma v. smt. kamla acharya 2001 (2) wlc (raj.) 565 : rlw 2001 (4) raj. 198.7. i have heard the learned counsels at length and given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and judgments cited at the bar and record of the case.8. at the outset, the application under order 41 rule 27 c.p.c. bringing on record the fact that the suit property in question was sold by the plaintiff oh 15.9.1999 during the pendency of this second appeal before this court deserves to be allowed and the same is hereby allowed and the documents placed on record therewith are liable to be considered by this court.9. law about entertaining second appeal on substantial question of law under section 100 c.p.c. is now well settled and by catena of judgments, it is well settled that the findings of fact about the personal bonafide necessity of the landlord do not give rise to any substantial question of law unless the said findings are perverse and based on no relevant evidence at all. it is also equally well settled that bonafide need of the landlord as on the date of filing of the suit for eviction is to be considered by the court and it is also equally well settled that question of title is irrelevant in the eviction proceedings under the rent control act.10. since bonafide need was claimed by the landlord - plaintiff for her husband as well as her son as stated above on the date of filing of the suit and the courts below concurrently found that the said bonafide need existed on the date of filing suit and while the trial court granted the decree for partial eviction, the first appellate court granted the decree of entire residential house in question, the said findings of facts which are based on relevant evidence and material did not deserve to be disturbed at all and the second appeal was liable to be dismissed at the threshold as no substantial question of law could be said to be arising in the present appeal. however, the fact remains that since this appeal came to be admitted by this court by framing the aforesaid question of law and which remained pending here for long number of 18 years in this court, subsequent developments in the form of death of husband of the plaintiff and sale of property by her arose. the 'question which arises now in these circumstances for consideration by this court in the changed circumstances is as to whether now the purchaser of the suit property can get fruits of the decree passed by the courts below and can get the suit premises evicted or not or whether the defendant - tenant should be allowed to remain in the property for next 20 to 30 years after the new purchaser of the property is asked to file a fresh suit establishing his own bonafide need of the said suit property or on other grounds of eviction as as specified in the rent control act.11. a perusal of the sale-deed produced along with the application under order 41 rule 27 c.p.c. shows that the said property was sold by the plaintiff to the purchaser with clear stipulation that the said property is in possession of the tenant since 15^3.1969 and therefore, the vacant possession cannot be handed over to the purchaser and only symbolic possession is being handed over and the purchaser will be treated to be in possession of the property in the same manner in which the plaintiff was. this was para 5 of the sale-deed and para 10 of the sale-deed also states that the eviction decree in respect of said suit property has already been passed by the first appellate cdurt against which the defendant has filed second appeal before high court. para 3 of the sale-deed also stipulates that the seller is transferring all her rights in the suit property including the easementary rights to the purchaser. thus, the right of the plaintiff which vested in her including the right to get the vacant possession of the. suit property stood vested in the purchaser on the date of sale i.e. 15.3.1999 and the purchaser stepped into her shoes entitled to all the rights and fruits to enjoy the said property thereafter.12. it is not in dispute that the defendant - appellant in full know of this sale of property through the notice served upon him in the year 2000 which are placed by the appellant along with the application under order 41 rule 27 c.p.c, did not take any steps to implead the purchaser of the property as party in the present second appeal though this development took place during the pendency of this appeal. therefore, the purchaser of the property naturally could not have any say in this litigation. this court is of the opinion that it was incumbent upon the appellant to implead the purchaser of the property as respondent after coming to know of the sale of the property to him and in absence of the same, adverse inference against the appellant - defendant deserves to be drawn. naturally after sale of the property, the plaintiff or original owner lost her interest in pursuing this litigation in this court, which could have been pursued by the new purchaser and the owner of the property only if he had been impleaded as respondent at the instance of appellant - defendant. the question is, therefore, whether the defendant - tenant can be allowed to enjoy this property for all times to come at a nominal rent of rs. 80 per month which also it is not known whether he is paying to the new landlord of the property or not. it has been held by the hon'ble supreme court in the case of mahendra raghunathdas gupta (supra) that attornment by the tenant is not necessary upon transfer of landlord's right and it is automatic. in para 5 and 6 of the said judgment; the hon'ble supreme court has held as under:5.... it is well settled that a transferee of the landlord's right steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights arid liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. the section does not require that the transfer of the right of the landlord can take effect only if the tenant's attorn to him. attornment by the tenant is not necessary to confer validity of the transfer of the landlord's rights. since attornment by the tenant is not required, a notice under section 106 in terms of the old terms of lease by the transferor landlord would be proper and so also the suit for ejectment.6. attornment would, however, be desirable as it means the acknowledgement of relation of a tenant to a new landlord. it also implies continuity of tenancy.13. this court in the case of ram saran sharma (supra) has also held that upon transfer of property through gift and where the tenant was served with a notice intimating the fact of gift, the plaintiff was vested with all rights of original landlord and was entitled to evict the tenant. in para 17 of the said judgment, this court has held as under:section 109 of the act of 1882, it is held that section 109 of the said act does not require service of notice on the tenant, or alienation of property, to create relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee landlord, and the existing tenant. the transferee of the lessor steps into the shoes and possess all the rights which the transferor has and the attornment is not a condition precedent, to give validity to the transfer made in favour of the transferee. section 2 of the act of 1882 specifically provided that a transfer of property interests, which the transferor is capable of passing in the property, including the legal incidents thereof and such incidents include the rents and profits thereof. once the title of the assignee is complete, the attornment is automatic not dependent on the tenant's attorning or agreeing to the attornment.14. in the case of dharam chand v. karam chand (supra) this court also held referring to decision of hon'ble supreme court in the case of gaya prasad v. pradeep srivastava reported in (2001) 2 scc 604 that it would be pernicious and unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of litigation reaching final stage merely on the ground that certain development occurred pendente lite because the opposite party succeeds in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. para 5 of the said judgment quoted below for ready reference:5. admittedly the plaintiff instituted the suit for eviction on april 22,1982. the plaintiff could not see the final result of the litigation in his life time and died on january 21, 2000 during the pendency of this second appeal. their lordships of the supreme court in gaya prasad v. pradee srivastava (2001) 2 scc 604 had occasion to consider the similar situation. it was urged on behalf of the tenant before the hon'ble supreme court to take into account the subsequent events. dismissing the appeal the hon'ble supreme court indicated that the crucial date for deciding the bonafides of the requirements of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. the antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. if every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bonafides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in the litigative slow process subsists. during 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his sort is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the perils of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. it is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnums. it would be pernicious and unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendencte lite, because the opposite party succeeds in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.15. this court in the case of ratan lal v. brij mohan s.b. civil second appeal no. 319/2009 decided on 7.11.2008 held as under:6. ...after death of elder son dinesh on 1.11.1996, the bonafide need which was claimed for elder son dinesh should be deemed to continue for his widow and grand-son. such subsequent event could definitely be taken into account by the first appellate court while deciding the appeal. even the trial court while returning its findings on 3.11.2006 was very well aware of these facts, still the learned trial court found that the plaintiff failed to establish his bonafide need upon death of sons of plaintiff landlord brij mohan. the bonafide need of the plaintiff - respondent in the present case could not be said to be mere whims and desire of the landlord, but bonafide need further aggravated on the death of sons of the landlord. it is indeed unfortunate that the learned trial court instead of appreciating these facts in correct perspective....16. in a recent decision in the case of lrs. of smt. bilam kanwar v. pushp chand s.b. civil second appeal no. 110/2005 decided on 17.1.2009, this court again held in para 5 as under:5.... it was not in dispute before the learned trial court that after death of her son plaintiff bilam kanwar sought to add grounds for eviction of personal bonafide necessity for the business of her grand-son gautam, who was 10th class pass. there was no evidence on record to show that the plaintiff - respondent had any alternative shop or was in possession of so called shop situated at ada bazar, jodhpur. the fact that the said grand-son gautam was carrying on the business in a shop owned by one bhagat singh surana in a small shop of 6ft x 6ft was proved and could not be controverted before the learned trial court....6. in the case of ragavendra kumar v. firm prem machinery and co. reported in (2000) 1 scc 679, the hon'ble apex court held that it is settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement for residential or business purposes and has complete freedom in the matter and therefore, the appellant landlord stating in evidence that he owned several other shops and houses, but they were not vacant and also that the suit premises were suitable for the proposed business, the hon'ble apex court granted eviction decree and dismissed the tenant's appeal.17. the hon'ble supreme court in the case of sheikh jehangir v. smt. s. kaushilyabai and ors. (supra) in view of clear inhibition contained in section 10(3)(iii) of the a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960 held that in view of, clear inhibition in the said provisions against institution of a suit by a purchaser on the ground of bonafide personal necessity for a period of three months from the date of purchase, therefore, the suit could not be brought by the purchaser till the expiry of the said period calculated from the date of sale-deed. the supreme court therefore held that the suit for eviction was liable to be withdrawn with a liberty to the purchaser to file a fresh suit. this judgment relied upon by the counsel for the defendant - appellant clearly is distinguishable and turns upon the specific provisions in a.p. act prohibiting 'the purchaser to institute a suit within 3 months from the date of purchase of the said property. there is no such provision in rajasthan rent control act, 1950. therefore, the said judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is of no help.18. similarly, the judgment in the case of preetam singh v. narendra singh, this court dealing with the issue in revislonal jurisdiction held that where the plaintiff had sold out the demise premises, the purchaser should establish his own bonafide need and therefore, had right to be impleaded under order 22 rule 10 c.p.c. in the suit filed by the erstwhile owner. the court further observed that the purchaser could not evict the tenant on the bonafide need of the erstwhile owner and therefore, was liable to be impleaded arid the revision petition filed by the defendant was dismissed. this case is also distinguishable inasmuch as this court only allowed the new purchaser to join the litigation at the trial stage under order 22 rule 10 c.p.c. this case supports the conclusion drawn 'by this court that purchaser steps into the shoes of the existing landlord - plaintiff and could be allowed to have fruits of the said decree as property rights including the right of vacant possession of the suit property stood transferred under the sale-deed.19. therefore, this court is of the opinion that not only the question framed by this court while admitting the present appeal deserves to be answered against the appellant - defendant by holding that the bonafide need of the plaintiff continues even after death of her husband as the bonafide need was claimed for her husband as well as her son and it deserves to be further held that the purchaser of the suit property during the pendency of present second appeal who steps into the shoes of the plaintiff shall be entitled to vacant possession of the suit property in pursuance of the decree passed by two courts below which is liable to be upheld by this court as no perversity in those findings is found by this court. in view of the fact that the bonafide need of the plaintiff - landlord on the date of filing of the suit is relevant, subsequent events in the form of sale of said property does not ipso facto up-set the decree of eviction. the attornment in favour of purchaser was automatic and did not depend upon the acceptance of the same by the defendant - tenant. the appellant - defendant is, therefore, not entitled to any relief in the present second appeal, which is sound to be devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.20. the appellant - defendant shall handover vacant and peaceful possession of the suit house in question to the purchaser, the new landlord within a period of two months from today. the appellant - defendant shall also pay arrears of rent and mesne profits if any within two months and further enhanced mesne profit of rs. 1000/- per month to him with effect from january, 2009 payable every month before 15th of succeeding month till the actual handing over of the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the landlord shanti lal chlttora. the decree be made accordingly. if the appellant - defendant fails to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the suit house in question to him within a period of two months from today as aforesaid or fails to pay mesne profit including the arrears of rent and mesne profit as directed above, the landlord shall not only be entitled to seek execution of the decree in normal course, but the appellant - defendant may also render himself liable for action under the contempt law.copy of this judgment may be sent to the parties as well as the purchaser or attorned landlord shanti lal chittora at his address given in sale-deed i.e. 92, mandi ki nal, udaipur, immediately.
Judgment:

Vineet Kothari, J.

1. This second appeal of the defendant - tenant pending for last 18 years in this Court was admitted on the following substantial question of law framed by this Court on 6.9.1991:

Can the dead-man's personal necessity be a ground for ejectment

2. The plaintiff Smt. Premlata Bakshi W/o Sh. Mangal Singh Bakshi, who expired before filing of the second appeal by the defendant filed the eviction suit against the defendant - appellant in the year 1981 on the ground of personal bonafide necessity of her husband and son who was engaged as Inspector in the National Insurance Company in respect of residential house situated at 24, Chitragupt Marg, Udaipur, which was let out under an oral agreement to the defenadnt on 15.3.1969 for a sum of R&.80/- per month as rent. The bonafide need of the landlord was claimed on the ground that her son is getting married on 1.7.1979 and after retirement of her husband, he intends to work as property valuer and consultant Engineer, therefore, the suit property i.e. the said residential house would be required for residential and business need of the family members.

3. After recording the evidence, the learned trial Court granted partial eviction decree on 9.1.1985 directing eviction of the defendant from the room including latrine bathroom situated at the ground floor. The plaintiff filed first appeal against the said partial eviction decree before the first appellate Court of Additional Civil Judge No. 3, Udaipur which came to be allowed on 10.7.1991 and instead of partial eviction, the appellate Court granted eviction decree of the entire premises in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant does not appear to have filed any cross-appeal against the partial eviction decree by the learned trial Court.

4. The present second appeal was filed by the defendant - tenant in this Court on 5.9.1991 and as already stated above was admitted on a limited substantial question of law as quoted above on 6.9.1991 and Interim order against dispossession was also granted in favour of the defendant on 6:9.1991 which has continued throughout. The defendant - appellant has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. in this Court on 14.3.2000 with the averment that the plaintiff had sold the said suit property on 15.9.1999 to one Shanti Lal S/o Sh. Nemi Chand Chittora of which a registered notice was sent to the defendant Naresh Chand by the plaintiff on 26.1.2000 as well as by the purchaser through his advocate on 2.2.2000. Copies of these documents are also placed on record along with said application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C.

5. Mr. R.K. Thanvi, learned Counsel for the appellant - defendant urged that since the property in question has already been sold, therefore, the defendant cannot be now evicted from the suit premises as the personal need of erstwhile owner - plaintiff no more exists. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:

1) Preetam Singh v. Narendra Kumar and Ors. 1998 DNJ (Raj.) 293.

2) Sheikh Jehangir v. Smt. S. Kaushilyabal and Ors. : JT1987(2)SC101 .

3) Rakesh Gupta v. Ahmed Farooq 1992 (2) RLW 398.

6. Mr. Sajjan Singh and Mr. B.K. Bhatnagar, the learned Counsel for the respondent - plaintiff on the other hand opposed these submissions and relied upon following judgments in support of his submissions:

1) Dharam Chand v. Karam Chand 2001 (3) RLR 713 : RLW 2002 (1) Raj. 657

2) Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta v. Vishvanath Bhlkaji Mogul and Ors. 1997 ACJ 10 (S.C.).

3) Ram Saran Sharma v. Smt. Kamla Acharya 2001 (2) WLC (Raj.) 565 : RLW 2001 (4) Raj. 198.

7. I have heard the learned Counsels at length and given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and judgments cited at the Bar and record of the case.

8. At the outset, the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. bringing on record the fact that the suit property in question was sold by the plaintiff oh 15.9.1999 during the pendency of this second appeal before this Court deserves to be allowed and the same is hereby allowed and the documents placed on record therewith are liable to be considered by this Court.

9. Law about entertaining second appeal on substantial question of law under Section 100 C.P.C. is now well settled and by catena of judgments, it is well settled that the findings of fact about the personal bonafide necessity of the landlord do not give rise to any substantial question of law unless the said findings are perverse and based on no relevant evidence at all. It is also equally well settled that bonafide need of the landlord as on the date of filing of the suit for eviction is to be considered by the Court and it is also equally well settled that question of title is irrelevant in the eviction proceedings under the Rent Control Act.

10. Since bonafide need was claimed by the landlord - plaintiff for her husband as well as her son as stated above on the date of filing of the suit and the Courts below concurrently found that the said bonafide need existed on the date of filing suit and while the trial Court granted the decree for partial eviction, the first appellate Court granted the decree of entire residential house in question, the said findings of facts which are based on relevant evidence and material did not deserve to be disturbed at all and the second appeal was liable to be dismissed at the threshold as no substantial question of law could be said to be arising in the present appeal. However, the fact remains that since this appeal came to be admitted by this Court by framing the aforesaid question of law and which remained pending here for long number of 18 years in this Court, subsequent developments in the form of death of husband of the plaintiff and sale of property by her arose. The 'question which arises now in these circumstances for consideration by this Court In the changed circumstances is as to whether now the purchaser of the suit property can get fruits of the decree passed by the Courts below and can get the suit premises evicted or not or whether the defendant - tenant should be allowed to remain In the property for next 20 to 30 years after the new purchaser of the property is asked to file a fresh suit establishing his own bonafide need of the said suit property or on other grounds of eviction as as specified in the Rent Control Act.

11. A perusal of the sale-deed produced along with the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. shows that the said property was sold by the plaintiff to the purchaser with clear stipulation that the said property Is In possession of the tenant since 15^3.1969 and therefore, the vacant possession cannot be handed over to the purchaser and only symbolic possession is being handed over and the purchaser will be treated to be in possession of the property in the same manner in which the plaintiff was. This was para 5 of the sale-deed and para 10 of the sale-deed also states that the eviction decree In respect of said suit property has already been passed by the first appellate Cdurt against which the defendant has filed second appeal before High Court. Para 3 of the sale-deed also stipulates that the seller Is transferring all her rights in the suit property including the easementary rights to the purchaser. Thus, the right of the plaintiff which vested in her Including the right to get the vacant possession of the. suit property Stood vested in the purchaser on the date of sale i.e. 15.3.1999 and the purchaser stepped into her shoes entitled to all the rights and fruits to enjoy the said property thereafter.

12. It is not in dispute that the defendant - appellant in full know of this sale of property through the notice served upon him in the year 2000 which are placed by the appellant along with the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C, did not take any steps to implead the purchaser of the property as party in the present second appeal though this development took place during the pendency of this appeal. Therefore, the purchaser of the property naturally could not have any say in this litigation. This Court is of the opinion that it was incumbent upon the appellant to implead the purchaser of the property as respondent after coming to know of the sale of the property to him and in absence of the same, adverse inference against the appellant - defendant deserves to be drawn. Naturally after sale of the property, the plaintiff or original owner lost her interest in pursuing this litigation in this Court, which could have been pursued by the new purchaser and the owner of the property only if he had been impleaded as respondent at the instance of appellant - defendant. The question is, therefore, whether the defendant - tenant can be allowed to enjoy this property for all times to come at a nominal rent of Rs. 80 per month which also it is not known whether he is paying to the new landlord of the property or not. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta (supra) that attornment by the tenant is not necessary upon transfer of landlord's right and it is automatic. In para 5 and 6 of the said judgment; the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

5.... It is well settled that a transferee of the landlord's right steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights arid liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. The section does not require that the transfer of the right of the landlord can take effect only if the tenant's attorn to him. Attornment by the tenant is not necessary to confer validity of the transfer of the landlord's rights. Since attornment by the tenant is not required, a notice under Section 106 in terms of the old terms of lease by the transferor landlord would be proper and so also the suit for ejectment.

6. Attornment would, however, be desirable as it means the acknowledgement of relation of a tenant to a new landlord. It also implies continuity of tenancy.

13. This Court in the case of Ram Saran Sharma (supra) has also held that upon transfer of property through gift and where the tenant was served with a notice intimating the fact of gift, the plaintiff was vested with all rights of original landlord and was entitled to evict the tenant. In para 17 of the said judgment, this Court has held as under:

Section 109 of the Act of 1882, it is held that Section 109 of the said Act does not require service of notice on the tenant, or alienation of property, to create relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee landlord, and the existing tenant. The transferee of the lessor steps into the shoes and possess all the rights which the transferor has and the attornment is not a condition precedent, to give validity to the transfer made in favour of the transferee. Section 2 of the Act of 1882 specifically provided that a transfer of property interests, which the transferor is capable of passing in the property, including the legal incidents thereof and such incidents include the rents and profits thereof. Once the title of the assignee is complete, the attornment is automatic not dependent on the tenant's attorning or agreeing to the attornment.

14. In the case of Dharam Chand v. Karam Chand (supra) this Court also held referring to decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava reported in (2001) 2 SCC 604 that it would be pernicious and unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of litigation reaching final stage merely on the ground that certain development occurred pendente lite because the opposite party succeeds in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. Para 5 of the said judgment quoted below for ready reference:

5. Admittedly the plaintiff instituted the suit for eviction on April 22,1982. The plaintiff could not see the final result of the litigation in his life time and died on January 21, 2000 during the pendency of this second appeal. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad v. Pradee Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604 had occasion to consider the similar situation. It was urged on behalf of the tenant before the Hon'ble Supreme Court to take into account the subsequent events. Dismissing the appeal the Hon'ble Supreme Court indicated that the crucial date for deciding the bonafides of the requirements of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to be taken into account for Judging the bonafides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in the litigative slow process subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his sort is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the perils Of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long Interregnums. It would be pernicious and unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendencte lite, because the opposite party succeeds in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.

15. This Court in the case Of Ratan Lal v. Brij Mohan S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 319/2009 decided on 7.11.2008 held as under:

6. ...After death of elder son Dinesh on 1.11.1996, the bonafide need which was claimed for elder son Dinesh should be deemed to continue for his widow and grand-son. Such subsequent event could definitely be taken into account by the first appellate Court while deciding the appeal. Even the trial Court while returning Its findings on 3.11.2006 was very well aware of these facts, still the learned trial Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish his bonafide need upon death of sons of plaintiff landlord Brij Mohan. The bonafide need of the plaintiff - respondent in the present case could not be said to be mere whims and desire of the landlord, but bonafide need further aggravated on the death of sons of the landlord. It Is indeed unfortunate that the learned trial Court Instead of appreciating these facts in correct perspective....

16. In a recent decision in the case of LRs. of Smt. Bilam Kanwar v. Pushp Chand S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 110/2005 decided on 17.1.2009, this Court again held in para 5 as under:

5.... It was not in dispute before the learned trial Court that after death of her son plaintiff Bilam Kanwar sought to add grounds for eviction of personal bonafide necessity for the business of her grand-son Gautam, who was 10th class pass. There was no evidence on record to show that the plaintiff - respondent had any alternative shop or was in possession of so called shop situated at Ada Bazar, Jodhpur. The fact that the said grand-son Gautam was carrying on the business in a shop owned by one Bhagat Singh Surana in a small shop of 6ft x 6ft was proved and could not be controverted before the learned trial Court....

6. In the case of Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. reported in (2000) 1 SCC 679, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is settled position of law that the landlord Is the best judge of his own requirement for residential or business purposes and has complete freedom in the matter and therefore, the appellant landlord stating in evidence that he owned several other shops and houses, but they were not vacant and also that the suit premises were suitable for the proposed business, the Hon'ble Apex Court granted eviction decree and dismissed the tenant's appeal.

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheikh Jehangir v. Smt. S. Kaushilyabai and Ors. (supra) in view of clear inhibition contained in Section 10(3)(iii) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 held that In view of, clear inhibition in the said provisions against institution of a suit by a purchaser on the ground of bonafide personal necessity for a period of three months from the date of purchase, therefore, the suit could not be brought by the purchaser till the expiry of the said period calculated from the date of sale-deed. The Supreme Court therefore held that the suit for eviction was liable to be withdrawn with a liberty to the purchaser to file a fresh suit. This judgment relied upon by the counsel for the defendant - appellant clearly is distinguishable and turns upon the specific provisions in A.P. Act prohibiting 'the purchaser to institute a suit within 3 months from the date of purchase of the said property. There is no such provision In Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950. Therefore, the said judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant is of no help.

18. Similarly, the judgment in the case of Preetam Singh v. Narendra Singh, this Court dealing with the issue in revislonal jurisdiction held that where the plaintiff had sold out the demise premises, the purchaser should establish his own bonafide need and therefore, had right to be impleaded under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. In the suit filed by the erstwhile owner. The Court further observed that the purchaser could not evict the tenant on the bonafide need of the erstwhile owner and therefore, was liable to be impleaded arid the revision petition filed by the defendant was dismissed. This case is also distinguishable inasmuch as this Court only allowed the new purchaser to join the litigation at the trial stage under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. This case supports the conclusion drawn 'by this Court that purchaser steps into the shoes of the existing landlord - plaintiff and could be allowed to have fruits of the said decree as property rights Including the right of vacant possession of the suit property stood transferred under the sale-deed.

19. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that not only the question framed by this Court while admitting the present appeal deserves to be answered against the appellant - defendant by holding that the bonafide need of the plaintiff continues even after death of her husband as the bonafide need was claimed for her husband as well as her son and It deserves to be further held that the purchaser of the suit property during the pendency of present second appeal who steps into the shoes of the plaintiff shall be entitled to vacant possession of the suit property In pursuance of the decree passed by two Courts below which is liable to be upheld by this Court as no perversity In those findings is found by this Court. In view of the fact that the bonafide need of the plaintiff - landlord on the date of filing of the suit is relevant, subsequent events in the form of sale of said property does not Ipso facto up-set the decree of eviction. The attornment in favour of purchaser was automatic and did not depend upon the acceptance of the same by the defendant - tenant. The appellant - defendant is, therefore, not entitled to any relief in the present second appeal, which is sound to be devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

20. The appellant - defendant shall handover vacant and peaceful possession of the suit house In question to the purchaser, the new landlord within a period of two months from today. The appellant - defendant shall also pay arrears of rent and mesne profits if any within two months and further enhanced mesne profit of Rs. 1000/- per month to him with effect from January, 2009 payable every month before 15th of succeeding month till the actual handing over of the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the landlord Shanti Lal Chlttora. The decree be made accordingly. If the appellant - defendant fails to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the suit house in question to him within a period of two months from today as aforesaid or fails to pay mesne profit including the arrears of rent and mesne profit as directed above, the landlord shall not only be entitled to seek execution of the decree in normal course, but the appellant - defendant may also render himself liable for action under the contempt law.

Copy of this judgment may be sent to the parties as well as the purchaser or attorned landlord Shanti Lal Chittora at his address given in sale-deed i.e. 92, Mandi Ki Nal, Udaipur, immediately.