Subhash Chandra Meena Vs. Madan Mohan Sood and ors. - Court Judgment

G.M. Lodha, J.

1. The only point which has been raised and pressed by Mr, Mehrish in this appeal is that Subhash Chand Meena alone has been held liable for the compensation but in fact the compensation should also be paid by the State of Rajasthan, who was owner of the vehicle. The case which is now in dispute before this court is that the jeep belonged to State of Rajasthan and the jeep met an accident by rolling down in the canal, resulting in death of Rajiv to whom compensation has been allowed.

2. The State of Rajasthan was owner of the jeep but the claim has been disallowed on the ground that jeep was not driven by the authorised driver Prem Chand At the time of the accident the appellant was going on the work of the State. The appellant is holding that the post of Assistant Engineer and since he was going on the work of the State, even if it is assumed that it was not Prem Chand but the appellant who was driving then also the State would be liable, because for one reason he was going on the work of the State and secondly Prem Chand who was sitting as a driver in the vehicle allowed the appellant to drive the vehicle and the appellant drove the vehicle on behalf of Prem Chand and the State.

3. In this connection Mr. Mehrish has relied upon the judgment of this court in Smt. Gyarshi Devi, AIR 1982 Raj 30 in which this court has held :

'Primarily a person can only be held responsible for the consequence of his own action. That in certain circumstances by reason of a particular legal relationship to the wrong-door a person may be held liable for the wrongful act of another persona Such a liability which is shown as vicarious liability in the law of tort arises when there is a relationship of master and servant and agent between the person held liable and the person who had committed the wrongful acts in order that the master may be held vicariously liable or the wrongful act of a servant, it is necessary that the wrongful act of the servant must fall within course of servant's employment. Similarly the principal can be held to be vicariously liable for the wrongful act of agent provided that the wrongful act falls within this category of vicarious liability.

Masterwould, however, not be liable if the servant at the time of accident is not acting in the course of employment but is doing something for himself. A presumption has to be drawn that the vehicle is driven on the master's business and by his authorised agent or servant and then it is for the master to rebut the presumption. The master can be held vicariously liable even though the servant has usurped the job of another provided what he does is sufficiently clear connected in master's business and is not too gross a departure from the kind of thing he is employed to do.'

The above principles laid down in the above judgment would show that even when in that case driver of the truck let the loaded truck in charge of the cleaner, and the cleaner drove the vehicle resulting in accident then also it was held that the master was liable.

4. Mr. Mehrish has also relied upon the other judgment of various High Courts. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in 1979 Acc CJ 58 : (AIR 1979 Andh Pra 75) observed that a third person sitting in the vehicle and was not without the licence to drive started the vehicle and drove of resulting in the accident. Held the master was liable for negligent act of his driver and insurance is liable to pay compensation.

5. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Tara Singh v. Mangal Singh, 1978 Acc CJ 53 held the same when the vehicle given for repair and unlicenced worker drove the truck. and caused accident It was held that the driver was within the scope of workers employment so as to find the employer's claim. Para 4 of the above judgment discusses the liability of insurance company in this respect. It has been held that so far as respondent No. 3 in that case is concerned he cannot escape the liability on this ground when he gave his truck for rapair to Jernail Singh, who was running a workshop with the assistance of unlicenced workers, if any of such workers drove the truck, the truck would be deemed to have been driven in the course of employment. Reference was made to Gopal Krishan v. Krishnankutty, (1966 Acc CJ 262) : (AIR 1967 Ker 19).

6. In the decision of Sita Ram v. Santana Prasad, 1966 Acc CJ 89 : (AIR 1966 SC 1697) again the question of liability being vicarious was considered. The appellant entrusted his car to the second respondent for being plied as a taxi. He managed the taxi and was paid for it on monthly basis. He gave the taxi to third respondent who was engaged as a cleaner for the purpose of taking a driving test to obtain a driving licence. While taking the test he knocked down and injured the first respondent. The Supreme Court held that there is a presumption that the vehicle is driven on the master's business by the authorised agent or servant but the presumption can be met. Para 8 of the judgment reads as under : --

'Similarly, in Engelhart's case (1897-1 QB 240) two servants were engaged upon their master's business. One was to drive a cart and mind the horses and the other-a boy-travelling in the cart was to deliver parcels. The driver left the cart unattended and the boy drove it to deliver the parcels and caused the accident. The master was held responsible. The driver ought to have known that if he left the cart the boy would drive it in the fulfilment of the work of the master. When the driver left the cart in the charge of the boy he acted negligently in the course of his master's business. No doubt the effective cause was the negligence of the servant which made the master responsible but that is not the whole of the matter.'

7. On a re'sume' of the above authorities and the principles laid dowa since in the present case the jeep was of the State of Rajasthan and Subhash Chandra Meena was employee of the State of Rajasthan and was going for the work of the State of Rajasthan and since Prem Chand authorised driver of the State of Rajasthan was sitting by the side of Subhash Chandra Meena and allow Subhash Chandra Meena to drive the vehicle. Therefore, on all counts whatever may be relationship and the context it is established that Subhash Chandra Meena drove the vehicle on behalf of the State of Rajasthan and Prem Chand and therefore, State of Rajasthan cannot escape the liability. Thus, it is held that the liability would be of State of Rajasthan also in addition to the liability fasten on Subhash Chandra Meena. Consequently the appeal is accepted and it is held that the State of Rajasthan respondent No. 2 would also be liable for the amount of the award. The parties would bear their own costs.