Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment

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			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
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			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
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			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
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		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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- industrial disputes act, 1947. section 2(s): [m.s. shah, sharad d. dave & k.s. jhaveri,jj] workman part time employees held, part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. the ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the legislature in the definition of working journalist in the working journalists and other newspaper employees (conditions of service and miscellaneous provisions) act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior act i.e. industrial disputes act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. the expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the.....

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			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
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		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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s.k. mal lodha, j. 1. respondent no. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner no. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated april 14. 1954. the suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee ratanlal. the appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of ratanlal. the suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. they obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner no. 1. these receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is rs. 5,500. the receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. the learned civil judge, jodhpur, by his.....

Judgment:

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			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
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$title_for_layout = 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750822',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
)
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S.K. Mal Lodha, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750822',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
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			'respondent' => 'Bhairoon Dutta',
			'sub' => 'Civil',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750822',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
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1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750822',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
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2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).

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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
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			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Bhairoon Dutta',
			'sub' => 'Civil',
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			'circuit' => null
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	),
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		(int) 0 => '750822',
		(int) 1 => 'kailash-narain-ors-vs-bhairoon-dutta'
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$title_for_layout = 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750822',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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$caseref = 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
)
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3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750822',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
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4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.

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			'id' => '750822',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
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		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
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		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
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		'respondent' => 'Bhairoon Dutta',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
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5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750822',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '750822',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
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6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.

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			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
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$title_for_layout = 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750822',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
)
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7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750822',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
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			'respondent' => 'Bhairoon Dutta',
			'sub' => 'Civil',
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			'circuit' => null
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		'id' => '750822',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Bhairoon Dutta',
		'sub' => 'Civil',
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		'circuit' => null
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
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'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750822',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '750822',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
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Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--

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			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
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$title_for_layout = 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750822',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
)
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'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750822',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
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			'respondent' => 'Bhairoon Dutta',
			'sub' => 'Civil',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750822',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
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		'respondent' => 'Bhairoon Dutta',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
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8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750822',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
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9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.

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			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
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			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1983Raj27',
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			'respondent' => 'Bhairoon Dutta',
			'sub' => 'Civil',
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$title_for_layout = 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750822',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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$caseref = 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
)
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10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kailash Narain and ors Vs Bhairoon Dutta - Citation 750822 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750822',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
			'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226; <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 35',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981',
		'appellant' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' M.D. Calla, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.R. Singhvi, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1981-12-11',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => ' S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. </p><p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.</p><p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).</p><p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.</p><p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.</p><p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.</p><p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:</p><p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'</p><p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--</p><p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'</p><p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.</p><p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.</p><p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p></p><p>',
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$caseref = 'In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.<br>'
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.K. Mal Lodha, J. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1) instituted a suit for redemption of mortgage dated April 14. 1954. The suit was filed against the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagee Ratanlal. The appellants (defendant-petitioners) are sons of Ratanlal. The suit was contested by the defendants (petitioners). Their case was that they had undertaken the repairs with the concurrence of the plaintiff-mortgagor in the years 1958-1961, 1965 and .1971. They obtained receipts for the amounts spent by them on repairs from the plaintiff-non-peti-tioner No. 1. These receipts were filed along with the written statement and the amount involved is Rs. 5,500. The receipts produced by the defendant-petitioners were unstamped. The learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his order dated Nov. 12, 1980, held that by virtue of Section 35 of the Stamp Act as existed then. these receipts cannot be admitted in evidence. The defendant petitioners filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated Nov. 12, 198o of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner No. 1 that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 by which the learned Civil Judge held that the four receipts are inadmissible in evidence. The learned single Judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. Hence this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Mr. M. Rule Singhvi has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bhairon Datta (Caveator).',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. We have heard Mr. M. D. Calls for the appellants and Mr. M. Rule Singhvi for respondent No, 1.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. M. D. Calla. on the basis of the decision reported in Firm Poonam Natha v. Amarchand, 1972 WLN 1124 contended before us that the learned single Judge was not right in declining to entertain the writ petition, for the writ petition was maintainable against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. M. Rule Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed in view of Motilal v District Judge, Pali, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker v.Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. A Full Bench of this Court in Harakchand v. State of Rajasthan ILR (1970) 20 Raj 88 held that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question oi law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal. AIR 1968 Gul 236, it was held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Stamp Act or not was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C.P.C. were attracted to the case. The Full Bench in Harakchand's case followed Shah Prabhudas's case. It is clear from the Full Bench decision that the construction of a document is a question of law, but that by itself does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the court construing it acts with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Section 105, C.P.C. provides that every order whether appealable or not except an order of remand, can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the ground (1) that there is an error, defect or irregularity in the order: and (2) that such error, defect or irregularity in the order: affects the decision of the case. In other words, it enacts that an interlocutory order which has not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or because even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order provided that it affects or is likely to affect the decision of the case. It is well settled that the words 'affecting the decision of the case' mean affecting the decision of the case on the merits. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if the order dated November 12, 1980 is erroneous, holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence, it. can be attacked in an appeal from the final decree on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down inSection 105(1), C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not final in the sense that it cannot be attacked in an appeal from the final decree.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. M.D. Calla on Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124. This decision was considered in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 and Shiv Shanker's case, 1978 WLN (UC) 376. In Firm Poonam Natha's case, an issue was framed by the trial court and after examining the documents, the learned Addl. District Judge held that the instruments were bonds in respect of the amounts Rs. 39,500, Rs. 11,000 and Rupees 31,000 respectively and since they were not properly stamped, they could not bo admitted in evidence unless the stamp duty along with the penalty was paid by the petitioner. The proper stamp duty and penalty payable on the instruments were Rs. 11,000. It was contended, in that case, on behalf of the petitioner that demand of such a huge penalty and stamp duty against the provisions of the Stamp Act would result in gross injustice to him as the documents are rendered ineffective as the petitioner is precluded to base his claim on these documents without paying Rs. 11,000 and that this situation puts the petitioner in such a position that he cannot get his claim established to the property attached in the suit unless he pays a heavy amount of stamp duty and penalty. In those circumstances, the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to avoid the perpetuation of injustice. The learned Judge observed as follows:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'It is true that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 cannot assume the role of appellate authority, but if the mistake of law patent on the face of the record and if that error is likely to perpetuate gross injustice to the parties then in extraordinary circumstances this Court has been vested with a jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct such errors of law.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p>Before D.P. Gupta, J., in Motilal's case, the District Judge decided issues holding that the documents in question were bonds and they could be admitted inevidence on payment of proper stamp duty and penalty. The learned Judge declined to entertain the writ petitions observing as under:--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'In my view these writ petitions cannot be entertained by this Court against the decision of a single issue in the two civil suits which are still pending before the trial court. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a Civil Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The law is well settled thatwhere there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, this Court should not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. With respect of Firm Poonam Natha's case, 1972 WLN 1124, the learned Judge observed that looking to the special circumstances of that case, the learned Judge thought it proper to avoid the perpetuation of injustice in that case. The decision in Motilal's case, 1977 WLN (UC) 281 was followed by one of us in Shiv Shanker's case. 1978 WLN (UC) 376.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It is clear from the discussion made hereinabove that the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 of the Civil Judge, Jodh-pur holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence can be challenged in an appeal that may be preferred against the final decree by setting forth a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Further, it would not be proper to this Court to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the question relating to admissibility of a document, which does not relate to the jurisdiction of that Court. There are no special circumstances so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For all these reasons, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right when he upheld the preliminary objection and held that the writ petition against the order dated Nov. 12, 1980 holding the four receipts to be inadmissible in evidence is not maintainable.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly, dismissed summarily.<p>',
	(int) 14 => '<p>'
)
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Subject	Civil
Court	Rajasthan High Court
Decided On	Dec-11-1981
Case Number	Civil Special Appeal No. 380 of 1981
Judge	S.L. Mal Lodha and; Kanta Bhatnagar, JJ.
Reported in	AIR1983Raj27
Acts	Constitution of India - Articles 226; Stamp Act, 1899 - Sections 35
Appellant	Kailash NaraIn and ors.
Respondent	Bhairoon Dutta
Appellant Advocate	M.D. Calla, Adv.
Respondent Advocate	M.R. Singhvi, Adv.
Disposition	Appeal dismissed
Cases Referred	In Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal.

Kailash NaraIn and ors. Vs. Bhairoon Dutta - Court Judgment