Mohd. YamIn Vs. State of Rajasthan and anr. - Court Judgment

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rajasthan premises (control of rent and eviction) act, 1950 - section 2(3)--validity of--exemption granted to religious and charitable institutions where whole income is utilized for purpose of institution--held, classification of landlords is permissible and section 2(3) is not invalid.;it is permissible to classify the landlords in this manner for the purpose of granting exemption from the provisions of the act only in respect of premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution, the whole of the income derived from which is utilized for the purpose of institution.;this expression has a legal connotation which sufficiently provides guidelines to regulate the exercise of this power. there is thus no invalidity in sub-section (3) of section 2 of the act.;(b) rajasthan premises (control of rent and eviction) act, 1950 - section 2(3)--exemption--whole income derived from rent of premises utilized for religious purpose of institution--held, exemption of premises is justified.;exemption can be given in respect of premises owned by any such institution when the whole of the income derived there from is utilized for the purpose of the institution.;since the whole income derived from the shop is utilized for the purpose of the religious institution it is undoubtedly in public interest that the shop be not continued on such a meagre rent when it can fetch a much higher amount as rent to be utilized for the purpose of the institution.;appeal dismissed - industrial disputes act, 1947. section 2(s): [m.s. shah, sharad d. dave & k.s. jhaveri,jj] workman part time employees held, part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. the ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the legislature in the definition of working journalist in the working journalists and other newspaper employees (conditions of service and miscellaneous provisions) act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior act i.e. industrial disputes act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. the expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. if a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. however, the court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. the control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. it is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. the other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. a full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. if a person falls under the definition of workman under section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the i.d. act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said act. a perusal of section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the i.d. act. however, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. the control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under section 2 (s) of the i.d. act. sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. however, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the i.d. act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. if a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. however, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the court will take these facts into consideration. - 3. sub-section (3) of section 2 of the act is as under :the state government if it is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in public interest may, by notification in the official gazette, exempt from all or any of the provisions of this act any premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable 'institution the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of the institution. being satisfied that it is necessary so to do in public interest exempts all the premises situated in the areas to which the said act, applies vesting in the deity of shri srinathji and administration of which vests in the nathdwara temple board established and constituted under the nathdwara temple act,1949. from all the provisions of the rajasthan premises (control of rent and eviction) act,1950. (pub. 145).'it is the validity of sub-section (3) of section 2 as well as the above quoted notification issued thereunder which is challenged herein. 30/- since 1979. it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice can also be taken of the escalation of prices as well as considerable increase in rental.j.s. verma, c.j.1. this special appeal under section 18 of the rajasthan high court ordinance, 1949 is against the judgment of a learned single judge dismissing the appellant's writ petition. the questions involved for decision are the validity of sub-section (3) of section 2 of the rajasthan premises (control of rent and eviction) act, 1950 (for short 'the act') and also of the notification no. f3(4)(3)h/vii/70-ii dt. july 19, 1976 published in the rajasthan gazette dt, aug. 15, 1976 issued by the state government under this provision.2. the brief facts on the basis of which the points urged in this petition are to be decided are now stated : the appellant is a tenant in a shop at jaipur of respondent no. 2 nathdwara temple board established and constituted under the nathdwara temple act, 1949. all properties given or endowed for the registration or start of the temple or any service connected with it or for the benefit etc. or the pilgrims visiting the temple shall be treated as endowment within the meaning of section 2(ii) of the nathdwara temple act, 1949.under section 3 of this act the ownership of temple and all its endowments shall vest in a deity pfshrinathji and the poard constituted under the temple act shall be entitled to their possession. administrationiof,the templetisto be carried on by the board in the manner provided in the act, the board so constituted is a body corporate known as nathdwara temple board having perpetual succession and common seal with power to acquire and hold properties and it may sue or be sued in that name. it is in this manner that the appellant is the tenant of respondent 2 in a shop at jaipur.3. sub-section (3) of section 2 of the act is as under :--'the state government if it is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in public interest may, by notification in the official gazette, exempt from all or any of the provisions of this act any premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable 'institution the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of the institution.'in exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (3) of section 2 of the act the state government issued a notification as under : --'notification- (no. f-3(4)(3)h/viii/70-ii, dt. july 19, 1976) s.o, 182. in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section 2 of the rajasthan premises (control of rent and eviction) act, 1950 (rajasthan act 17 of 1950) the state govt. being satisfied that it is necessary so to do in public interest exempts all the premises situated in the areas to which the said act, applies vesting in the deity of shri srinathji and administration of which vests in the nathdwara temple board established and constituted under the nathdwara temple act,1949. from all the provisions of the rajasthan premises (control of rent and eviction) act,1950. (pub. in raj. gaz. part-iv dt. 15-8-1976 p. 145).' it is the validity of sub-section (3) of section 2 as well as the above quoted notification issued thereunder which is challenged herein.4. the first qontention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that sub-section (3) of section 2 is unconstitutional inasmuch as it discriminates between landlords by granting exemption only to the landlords falling within the ambit of sub-section (3) of section 2 while denying that benefit to other landlords. in our, opinion, there is no merit in this contention. it is permissible to classify the landlords in this manner for the purpose of granting exemption from the provisions of the act only in respect of premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution, the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of institution. it is obvious that the income derived from any premises belonging to any educational, religious or charitable institution when utilised wholly for the purpose of the institution is in fact spent for public benefit as distinguished from the income derived from a premises belonging to any other person which is utilised for private gain.5. classification of premises for the purpose of exemption under a similar enactment in tamil nadu giving the benefit of exemption to buildings owned by cooperative societies was upheld as reasonable classification in m/s. s. m. mahendru and company v. state of tamil nadu, (1985) 1 rent lr 719 : air 1985 sc 270. similarly it has been held that a classification between landlords is permissible to uphold the provision for beneficial procedure for eviction of tenants on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord applicable only to some landlords whose need for expeditious decision of the eviction proceedings was greater (see air 1984 sc 458). it cannot, therefore, be doubted that such a classification is permissible provided there is a rational nexus of the classification with the object sought to be achieved. in the present case exemption from the provisions of the act is given in respect of premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of institution. we have already indicated that this category stands apart from the other category of landlords who utilise the income derived from the premises wholly for private gain.6. it is also provided in sub-section (3) of section 2 that the exemption is to be granted only on the state government's satisfaction that it is necessary or expedient so to do in 'public interest'. this expression has a legal connotation which sufficiently provides guidelines to regulate the exercise of this power. there is thus no invalidity in sub-section (3) of section 2 of the act.7. the other contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that it was not necessary to grant exemption in respect of properties at jaipur when the temple itself is situate at nathdwara near udaipur. on this basis it is urged that grant of partial exemption under section 2(3) of the act only in respect of premises situated at nathdwara was sufficient for the purpose of this provision and it was necessary to grant exemption in respect of properties situate at jaipur. it is argued that the notification shows non-application of mind for this reason and in response to the notice the respondents have also not disclosed the reasons leading to the issue of the notification. on this basis the validity of the notification is assailed. in our opinion, there is no merit even in this contention.8. section 2(3) itself indicates that exemption can be given in respect of premises owned by any such institution when the whole of the income derived therefrom is utilised for the purpose of the institution. it is not the appellant's case that the whole of the income derived from the properties situate at jaipur are not utilised for the purpose of the institution. this being so location of the premises is inconsequential in this context since the relevance is only of utilisation of whole of its income for the purpose of institution and this applies equally to all the properties owned by the institution irrespective of the location of any such property. the argument that issue of partial exemption alone would have been sufficient has, therefore, no application in this matter.9. it is also a case where no further reasons except those mentiened in the notification were required to be disclosed to support the notification. it is not suggested as to what particular reason in addition was necessary to justify issue of the notification. the appellant himself has stated in the writ petition that he was initially a tenant on a monthlyrent of rs. 10/- which had been increased to rs. 30/- since 1979. it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice can also be taken of the escalation of prices as well as considerable increase in rental. the fact that a shop in the city of jaipur would fetch a much higher rent now also does not need any imagination. since the whole income derived from the shop is utilised for the purpose oi the religious institution it is undoubtedly in public interest that the shop be not continued on such a meagre rent when it can fetch a much higher amount as rent to be utilised for the purpose of the institution. this contention also, therefore, fails.10. consequently, the appeal is dismissed. no costs.