Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
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			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
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		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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ORDER

Dave, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '750619',
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			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
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		'id' => '750619',
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		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
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			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
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		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.

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			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '750619',
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		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
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		'id' => '750619',
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		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
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			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.

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			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'lumbaram-vs-state',
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		(int) 1 => 'lumbaram-vs-state'
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).

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			'id' => '750619',
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			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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			'respondent' => 'The State',
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		'id' => '750619',
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		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
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			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
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			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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			'respondent' => 'The State',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'lumbaram-vs-state',
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '750619',
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			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
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			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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			'respondent' => 'The State',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'lumbaram-vs-state',
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.

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			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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		'respondent' => 'The State',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
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		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.

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			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '750619',
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		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
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		'id' => '750619',
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		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
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		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.

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			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
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			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'lumbaram-vs-state',
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '750619',
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			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'id' => '750619',
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		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
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			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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			'respondent' => 'The State',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'lumbaram-vs-state',
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '750619',
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			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
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			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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			'respondent' => 'The State',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'lumbaram-vs-state',
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '750619',
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			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'id' => '750619',
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		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
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			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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			'respondent' => 'The State',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'lumbaram-vs-state',
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'The State',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
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He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
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7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750619',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Dave, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
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			'respondent' => 'The State',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'lumbaram-vs-state',
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$title_for_layout = 'Lumbaram Vs the State - Citation 750619 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '750619',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Lumbaram',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Lumbaram Vs. the State',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded. ' With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1955-12-21',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Dave, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.</p><p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.</p><p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.</p><p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.</p><p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.</p><p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.</p><p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).</p><p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.</p><p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:</p><p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-</p><p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.</p><p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;</p><p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.</p><p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.</p><p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.</p><p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.</p><p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:</p><p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.</p><p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.</p><p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.</p><p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'</p><p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.</p><p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.</p><p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).</p><p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that</p><p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.</p><p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.</p><p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.</p><p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.</p><p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1957CriLJ231',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'The State',
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Dave, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This reference comes on the report of the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dated the 16th of August 1955.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts giving rise to it are that four persons namely Lumbaram, Kheraj, Pitha and Ghewaria were arrested by the Police on 2nd of May 1955 because they were suspected of committing the murder of one Nawalaram Jat on the previous day. After investigation, the Police challanged three of them. Against the fourth, namely Lumbaram, it was reported that the evidence against him was not sufficient for his prosecution and therefore, he should be discharged.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>The negative report against Lumbaram was rejected by the First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur on the ground that no evidence was recorded till then in the court. He ordered that the accused would stand his trial along with others. Against this order, Lumbaram filed an application in revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The learned Sessions Judge has expressed a doubt if the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is correct. He has requested this Court to lay down the procedure to be followed in such cases.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Magistrate should have either accepted the Police report or rejected it taut he should not have taken cognizance of the offence, It is contended that the Magistrate could take cognizance on the Police report only if the Police had challenged the accused and made it clear that the facts found against him constituted an offence.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>According to learned Counsel, the Magistrate could not take cognizance on a negative report of the Police in any case. In support of his contention he has referred to - 'Harbir Singh v. The State' AIR 1952 Pepsu 29 (A); and - 'Mt. Ido V. Gainda Singh' AIR 1952 Pepsu 38 (B).',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. Learned Government Advocate on the other hand has urged that the Magistrate could take cognizance even on the negative report of the police officer if it were found that the facts stated therein constituted an offence. It is however conceded by him that the reasons given by the Magistrate are not correct.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The question for determination is whether a magistrate can take cognizance of an offence when the police makes a report under Section 173, Cr. P. C., that the offence is not made out against the accused. It would be proper to reproduce here Section 190 of the Criminal P. C., according to which cognizance of offence may be taken by a magistrate. It runs as follows:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>190 (1), Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;',
	(int) 12 => '<p>(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>5. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that it lays down three ways in which the cognizance of an offence may be taken by a Magistrate. It can be done either on (1) receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence or (2) on a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Learned counsel for the accused has urged that under Clause (b) of the said section, a magistrate may take cognizance only if a report is made by a police officer that the accused has committed an offence. As mentioned above he relies upon the two decisions of the Pepsu High Court referred above. In the first case, the police had made a report that no offence against the accused had been made out.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>The Magistrate, however, recorded the statement of a person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were started. He also recorded some evidence and so it was contended on behalf of the accused that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Learned Advocate General contended before the learned Judges in the High Court that when the police makes a final report in a case to a magistrate, it becomes his duty to apply his mind to the facts and in order to be able to take a correct decision, it may sometimes be necessary for him to hear the person at whose instance the police started the investigation, or even to take evidence. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge and it was observed as follows:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>I cannot accept this contention in its entirety. Section 173 deals with the final report of the Police and it can either amount to a charge or it may contain the recommendation that since no offence having been made out the case should be cancelled. If the report is that an offence had been committed the Magistrate can take cognizance of it under Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 18 => '<p>If on the other hand, the report is that the case is false, Clause (1) (b) of Section 190 does not apply and no cognizance of the offence can be taken by the Magistrate. I agree with the learned Advocate General that the Magistrate has every right to look into the Police Diaries, to carefully scrutinise the investigation and to make up his mind independently of what the Police has said as to whether the recommendation made by them is well founded.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>In fact, I would go further and say that it is the Magistrate's duty to do all this. This means that it is open to the Magistrate to accept the Police recommendation or not. If he accepts it he is to cancel the case, but if he does not all that he can do is to make a note that he does not agree with the police and does not accept their recommendation.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>6. I respectfully agree with the observation in so far as it lays down that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) if the police reports that there is no evidence against the accused and no offence is made out.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>This case, however, does not decide as to what a Magistrate should do if the Police gives out the facts in its report and records a wrong conclusion that no offence is constituted on the basis of those facts. This point arose in the second case of - 'Mt. Ido v. Gainda Sigh', (B). In that case it was remarked by the learned Judge that 'a report by the police for cancellation of the case cannot be said to be a report of facts which constitute an offence.'',
	(int) 22 => '<p>With due respect, it may be observed that this cannot hold good in all circumstances. It is not difficult to conceive of a case in which the Police may give all the facts in its report and arrive at a wrong conclusion of law that no offence is constituted thereby.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion on the basis of the facts mentioned in the said report that an offence is made out, then there is no reason why he should not be able to take cognizance of the case. He is not bound by the opinion of the Police officers on a question of law.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>Therefore, if in any case, there is such a report by the police officer which gives all the facts and on whose basis the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that an offence is constituted, then, in my opinion, he can take cognizance of the offence and such cognizance would be covered by Section 190 (1) (b).',
	(int) 25 => '<p>It may be pointed out that Clause (b) only says that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon a report in writing of such facts which constitute an offence as referred in Clause (a) made by a Police officer. This shows that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on the report of a Police officer if that report contains facts constituting an offence. This view finds support from the case of - 'Basudeo Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1933 Pat 50 (O. In that case it was observed that',
	(int) 26 => '<p>A Magistrate may take cognizance only on a , report of the facts by a Police officer; but the opinion of the Police officer as to whether such facts justify the taking of cognizance under Ordinance 5 is irrelevant.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>I, therefore, agree with the contention of learned. Government Advocate that it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on a police report even though the police wants him to accept its negative report if that report contains facts constituting an offence. Such cases would, however, be very rare.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>So far as the present case is concerned it is obvious that no complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. He could not therefore take cognizance of the offence under Clause (a). The Magistrate has also not indicated if he wanted to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer or in his own knowledge or suspicion and, therefore, Clause (c) also does not apply.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>He has proceeded to take cognizance of the offence on the simple ground that no evidence was recorded before him. This was obviously wrong. It was not necessary for that court to record evidence before accepting the Police report. He should have applied his mind to the report. If he found that any offence could be constituted on the basis of the facts mentioned therein, he could take cognizance of the offence, otherwise he should have accepted it.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>7. The reference is accepted, the file be sent back to the Magistrate concerned with directions to dispose of the Police report in the light of the observations made above.<p>',
	(int) 31 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 32
$i = (int) 31
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Subject	Criminal
Court	Rajasthan High Court
Decided On	Dec-21-1955
Judge	Dave, J.
Reported in	1957CriLJ231
Appellant	Lumbaram
Respondent	The State
Cases Referred	Basudeo Narain v. Emperor

Lumbaram Vs. the State - Court Judgment