Hari Datta Vs. the District Magistrate and Suprintendent - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- industrial disputes act, 1947. section 2(s): [m.s. shah, sharad d. dave & k.s. jhaveri,jj] workman part time employees held, part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. the ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the legislature in the definition of working journalist in the working journalists and other newspaper employees (conditions of service and miscellaneous provisions) act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior act i.e. industrial disputes act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. the expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. if a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. however, the court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. the control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. it is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. the other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. a full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. if a person falls under the definition of workman under section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the i.d. act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said act. a perusal of section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the i.d. act. however, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. the control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under section 2 (s) of the i.d. act. sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. however, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the i.d. act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. if a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. however, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the court will take these facts into consideration. - section 3, punjab public safety act authorizes the provincial government, the district magistrate or any servant of the crown empowered in this behalf by the former to arrest and detain any persons, if satisfied, that such a course was necessary to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of the public order. it is significant that in addition to the district magistrate, the section clearly contemplates that any other servant of the crown may be authorized in this behalf by the provincial government, notification no, 6654283, dated 27th april 1926 issued by the chief commissioner, ajmer-merwara, confers on the additional district magistrate, ajmer-merwara, all the powers of the district magistrate under section 10 (2), criminal p. therein the additional district magistrate has stated that he was satisfied that it was necessary to arrest the petitioner to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety.orderramabhadran, c.j.1. this is an application in the nature of habeas corpus under section 491, criminal p.c.2. the petitioner, hari datta, was arrested under section. 3, punjab public safety act, as applied to ajmer. merwara, under the orders of the adl ditional district magistrate. he was ordered to be detained in custody for a month. that period has expired and the provincial government acting under section 3 (4), has directed his detention in custody until further orders.3. mr. b. d. sharma for the petitioner urged that the arrest and detention of the petitioner were illegal as the additional district magistrate had no authority to act under section 3, punjab public safety act. it was argued that it was only the provincial government or the district magistrate who could have acted under section 8. reliance was placed on prabhu lal v. emperor a.i.r. (31) 1944 nag. 84 : 45 or. h. 3. 296 wherein it was held that an additional distriot magistrate may have all the powers of the district magistrate, bat that would not make him a district magistrate, in as much as, there can be only one district magistrate. the above ruling was with reference to rule 26, defence of india rules, wherein an order of detention had been passed by the additional district magistrate of raipur. their lordships of the nagpur high court found that under b, 26, only the central and provincial governments had authority to discharge special functions created by the act. the powers of the provincial government had been delegated to the district magistrate and not to the additional district magistrate. they, therefore, held that section 10 (2), criminal p.c. could not come to the help of the additional district magistrate and directed the detenue to be released. here the position is different. section 3, punjab public safety act authorizes the provincial government, the district magistrate or any servant of the crown empowered in this behalf by the former to arrest and detain any persons, if satisfied, that such a course was necessary to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of the public order. it is significant that in addition to the district magistrate, the section clearly contemplates that any other servant of the crown may be authorized in this behalf by the provincial government, notification no, 6654283, dated 27th april 1926 issued by the chief commissioner, ajmer-merwara, confers on the additional district magistrate, ajmer-merwara, all the powers of the district magistrate under section 10 (2), criminal p.c. a later notification no. a/21-18, dated 6th september 1945 further confers on the additional district magistrate all the powers of the district magistrate under any other law for the time being in force, unless specifically provided otherwise by such law.4. as already pointed out, section 8, punjab public safety act contemplates the conferment of powers on officers other than the district magistrate; therefore, i would hold that the additional dietrict magistrate was duly authorized to act under section 3.5. a copy of the order passed by the additional district magistrate on 8th december 1948 directing the arrest of the petitioner has been shown to me. therein the additional district magistrate has stated that he was satisfied that it was necessary to arrest the petitioner to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety. grounds have been given for coming to this conclusion. i am not sitting as a court of appeal, therefore, i am not called upon to express my opinion, whether the grounds were sufficient or not. suffice it to say that the additional district magistrate has acted in accordance with section 8 and therefore the arrest and detention of the petitioner cannot be said to be illegal.6. mr. b. d. sharma next argued that the ajmer-merwara extension of laws act, 1947, was ultra vires of the dominion legislature, since s, 2 thereof, empowers the central government to extend to ajmer-merwara the provisions of any act in force in any other province. mr. sharma's argument was that this amounted to a delegation of legislative powers to the central government. i do not think this argument is valid. all that the central government was empowered was to extend to ajmer merwara a law already in force elsewhere. if any new legislation has to be introduced in ajmer-merwara (not already in force in other provinces) then of course it is only the central legislature that could pass the necessary legislation. if learned counsel's argument is accepted, it would mean that the dominion legislature would have to meet every time it was considered necessary to extend to ajmer-merwara, legislation already in force elsewhere. in my opinion such an inference is unwarranted.7. the result is, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

Ramabhadran, C.J.

1. This is an application in the nature of habeas corpus Under Section 491, Criminal P.C.

2. The petitioner, Hari Datta, was arrested under Section. 3, Punjab Public Safety Act, as applied to Ajmer. Merwara, under the orders of the Adl ditional District Magistrate. He was ordered to be detained in custody for a month. That period has expired and the Provincial Government acting Under Section 3 (4), has directed his detention in custody until further orders.

3. Mr. B. D. Sharma for the petitioner urged that the arrest and detention of the petitioner were illegal as the Additional District Magistrate had no authority to act Under Section 3, Punjab Public Safety Act. It was argued that it was only the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate who could have acted Under Section 8. Reliance was placed on Prabhu Lal v. Emperor A.I.R. (31) 1944 Nag. 84 : 45 or. h. 3. 296 wherein it was held that an Additional Distriot Magistrate may have all the powers of the District Magistrate, bat that would not make him a District Magistrate, in as much as, there can be only one District Magistrate. The above ruling was with reference to Rule 26, Defence of India Rules, wherein an order of detention had been passed by the Additional District Magistrate of Raipur. Their Lordships of the Nagpur High Court found that under b, 26, only the Central and Provincial Governments had authority to discharge special functions created by the Act. The powers of the Provincial Government had been delegated to the District Magistrate and not to the Additional District Magistrate. They, therefore, held that Section 10 (2), Criminal P.C. could not come to the help of the Additional District Magistrate and directed the detenue to be released. Here the position is different. Section 3, Punjab Public Safety Act authorizes the Provincial Government, the District Magistrate or any servant of the Crown empowered in this behalf by the former to arrest and detain any persons, if satisfied, that Such a course was necessary to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of the public order. It is significant that in addition to the District Magistrate, the section clearly contemplates that any other servant of the Crown may be authorized in this behalf by the Provincial Government, Notification No, 6654283, dated 27th April 1926 issued by the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer-Merwara, confers on the Additional District Magistrate, Ajmer-Merwara, all the powers of the District Magistrate Under Section 10 (2), Criminal P.C. A later Notification no. A/21-18, dated 6th September 1945 further confers on the Additional District Magistrate all the powers of the District Magistrate under any other law for the time being in force, unless specifically provided otherwise by such law.

4. As already pointed out, Section 8, Punjab Public Safety Act contemplates the conferment of powers on officers other than the District Magistrate; therefore, I would hold that the Additional Dietrict Magistrate was duly authorized to Act Under Section 3.

5. A copy of the order passed by the Additional District Magistrate on 8th December 1948 directing the arrest of the petitioner has been shown to me. Therein the Additional District Magistrate has stated that he was satisfied that it was necessary to arrest the petitioner to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety. Grounds have been given for coming to this conclusion. I am not sitting as a Court of appeal, therefore, I am not called upon to express my opinion, whether the grounds were sufficient or not. Suffice it to say that the Additional District Magistrate has acted in accordance with Section 8 and therefore the arrest and detention of the petitioner cannot be said to be illegal.

6. Mr. B. D. Sharma next argued that the Ajmer-Merwara Extension of Laws Act, 1947, was ultra vires of the Dominion Legislature, since S, 2 thereof, empowers the Central Government to extend to Ajmer-Merwara the provisions of any act in force in any other province. Mr. Sharma's argument was that this amounted to a delegation of Legislative powers to the Central Government. I do not think this argument is valid. All that the Central Government was empowered was to extend to Ajmer Merwara a law already in force elsewhere. If any new legislation has to be introduced in Ajmer-Merwara (not already in force in other provinces) then of course it is only the Central Legislature that could pass the necessary legislation. If learned Counsel's argument is accepted, it would mean that the Dominion Legislature would have to meet every time it was considered necessary to extend to Ajmer-Merwara, legislation already in force elsewhere. In my opinion such an inference is unwarranted.

7. The result is, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed.