| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/748256 |
| Subject | Civil |
| Court | Gujarat High Court |
| Decided On | Jul-07-2008 |
| Case Number | Special Civil Application No. 1123 of 2000 |
| Judge | D.A. Mehta, J. |
| Reported in | (2009)1GLR79 |
| Acts | Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 - Sections 38 and 41; Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957; Constitution of India - Article 226 |
| Appellant | Ashwinkumar Nee Pankajbhai Gordhanbhai Patel |
| Respondent | State of Gujarat and ors. |
| Appellant Advocate | K.M. Parikh and; Paragi K. Parikh, Advs. |
| Respondent Advocate | H.H. Parikh, A.G.P. for Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 |
| Disposition | Petition dismissed |
D.A. Mehta, J.
1. This petition has been preferred challenging order dated 30-9-1999 passed by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (G.R.T.) whereunder orders made by Deputy Collector on 27-8-1996 and A.L.T. on 15-12-1995 have been confirmed.
2. The petitioner challenges the legality and validity by raising a question as to whether the G.R.T. has rightly exercised revisional jurisdiction as provided under Section 38 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 (the Act). On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that the petitioner is an agriculturist owning agricultural lands of various survey numbers situated at Village Moksi, Taluka Savli, District Vadodara.
3. According to the petitioner, the lands were held by members of Hindu Undivided Family (H.U.F.) of the petitioner. That the petitioner had accordingly filled up the necessary prescribed form. Initially the A.L.T., Vadodara by order dated 8-9-1996 in Ceiling Case No. 131 of 1978 declared 43 Acres and 24 Gunthas of land as excess agricultural land in terms of the provisions of the Act. The litigation travelled right up to G.R.T. Vide order dated 30-10-1992 made by G.R.T. in Revision Application No. 499 of 1990 the G.R.T. rejected the first contention regarding the land belonging to the H.U.F. by observing:
There is no any proof that the land was purchased from the joint family property and that it was an ancestral land.
In relation to the second contention about Canal Certificate issued by the Appropriate Authority regarding the nature of the land, the Tribunal issued certain directions in Paragraph No. 6 of the order dated 30-10-1992.
4. Subsequent thereto A.L.T. passed a fresh order on 30-9-1993 declaring 11 Acres 11 Gunthas as excess agricultural land. The matter was carried in Appeal and after order of remand a fresh order dated 15-12-1995 came to be made by A.L.T. holding that 18 Acres & 26.3/4 Gunthas of land held by the petitioners was irrigated land. The petitioner preferred an Appeal bearing No. 2 of 1986 before Deputy Collector, Vadodara who confirmed the order of A.L.T. vide order dated 27-8-1996. It is these two orders of A.L.T. and the Deputy Collector which have been confirmed by G.R.T. vide impugned order.
5. On behalf of the petitioner, the learned Advocate contended that G.R.T. had committed jurisdictional error when G.R.T. did not consider the fact that earlier order dated 30-10-1992 made by G.R.T. itself had not been complied with by the A.L.T.; that in fact the opportunity which was directed to be granted to the petitioner had not been granted by the A.L.T. or the Appropriate Authority before issuing Canal Certificate. It was submitted that the impugned order of the Tribunal did not in any way indicate how and in what manner the earlier directions of the Tribunal were shown to have been complied with by the respondent authorities. Inviting attention to the third condition stipulated by Section 38 of the Act, it was submitted that the G.R.T. had failed to record the fulfillment of the said three conditions and hence there was an error in law in exercise of jurisdiction by G.R.T. which would permit this Court to intervene in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was therefore urged that the impugned order and the order of the Appellate Authority as well as the A.L.T. be quashed and the matter be remanded to the A.L.T. to comply with the directions made by G.R.T. on 30-10-1992 in the first round of proceedings.
6. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has referred to certain relevant portions of the order made by A.L.T. to point out that the A.L.T. had followed the order made by G.R.T. in the earlier round and no interference was warranted.
7. There is no dispute as to the facts. The only issue is as to whether G.R.T. has committed an error in law so as to term it an error of jurisdiction permitting this Court to interfere. Section 38 of the Act reads as under:
38. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, an application for revision may be made to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the said Act against any order of the Collector on the following grounds only '
(a) that the order of the Collector was contrary to law;
(b) that the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law; or
(c) that there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by this Act, which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice.
On a plain reading it becomes apparent that the three clauses lay down three grounds on which a Revision Application can be made before G.R.T. The Section itself indicates that these are the only grounds on which the order of the Appellate Authority can be challenged before the G.R.T.
8. The powers of G.R.T. are not circumscribed by provisions of Section 38 as can be seen from the provisions of Section 41 of the Act which lay down as to what G.R.T. can do in a Revision Application preferred before it. The said provision reads as under:
41. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in revision under Section 38 may confirm, modify or rescind the order in revision or its execution or may pass such other orders as may seem legal and just in accordance with the provisions of this. Act.
9. Thus the powers of G.R.T. in a Revision Application which is preferred in accordance with requirement of Section 38 of the Act extend to either confirming, or modifying, or rescinding the order in revision or its execution, or G.R.T. may pass such other orders as are legal, just and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the latter part of the provisions itself indicate that though the grounds on which a Revision Application can be filed before G.R.T. are limited G.R.T. is not bound to only pass orders in relation to those grounds, but is entitled to pass such other orders which are legal, just and in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
10. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, that the G.R.T. has to record findings in relation to Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Section 38 of the Act does not merit acceptance on a plain reading of the provisions. The restrictions imposed by the -statute as to the grounds which an applicant may be permitted to urge in a Revision Application cannot be read in provisions of Section 41 of the Act so as to restrict the powers available to G.R.T.
11. Bearing in mind the aforesaid position in law when one reads the impugned order dated 30-9-1999 made by G.R.T., it becomes apparent that as recorded in Para 8 of the impugned order, G.R.T. is conscious of the directions issued in the earlier round of proceedings and has recorded that the A.L.T. is aware of the directions issued by G.R.T. and has complied with the same while passing the final order. It is further recorded by G.R.T. that order of A.L.T. does not indicate that A.L.T. has committed any error in law, or has ignored any evidence, or has not correctly appreciated any evidence, and therefore, it is not possible to interfere in the orders made by A.L.T. and the Appellate Authority because the said orders of the subordinate authorities have been made in accordance with law after careful consideration of facts and evidence.
12. In the aforesaid set of facts and circumstances of the case, it is not possible to accept the case of the petitioner that G.R.T. has committed any jurisdictional error so as to warrant interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, considering the settled parameters which would permit exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
13. Accordingly the petition is rejected. Rule discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.