Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr. - Court Judgment

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
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		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
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			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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limitation - condonation of delay - sections 5 of limitation act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned. - - both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application no. 2. refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold.....

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
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			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
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		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
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		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
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			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
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			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
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		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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order1. one may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in s. 5 of the limitation act,1963?' the answer is simple and yet disappointing. it is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. the case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?2. respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit no. 176 of 1979, in the court of civil judge (sd), narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. the petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. one mr. makwana, learned.....

Judgment:

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			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
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			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
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		'circuit' => null
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$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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ORDER

1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?

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			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Limitation',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'overruledby' => null,
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
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		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
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		'circuit' => null
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
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3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Limitation',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 1 => 'brij-kishore-s-ghosh-vs-jayantilal-maneklal'
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Limitation',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => '735449',
	(int) 1 => 'brij-kishore-s-ghosh-vs-jayantilal-maneklal'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/735449/brij-kishore-s-ghosh-vs-jayantilal-maneklal'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'

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Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:

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			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
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With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
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7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Limitation',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 1 => 'brij-kishore-s-ghosh-vs-jayantilal-maneklal'
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

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Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 1 => 'brij-kishore-s-ghosh-vs-jayantilal-maneklal'
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => '735449',
	(int) 1 => 'brij-kishore-s-ghosh-vs-jayantilal-maneklal'
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'

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Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Limitation',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 1 => 'brij-kishore-s-ghosh-vs-jayantilal-maneklal'
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Limitation',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 1 => 'brij-kishore-s-ghosh-vs-jayantilal-maneklal'
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$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/735449/brij-kishore-s-ghosh-vs-jayantilal-maneklal'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.

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Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
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			'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Limitation',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1989Guj227; (1989)1GLR58',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Limitation',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => '735449',
	(int) 1 => 'brij-kishore-s-ghosh-vs-jayantilal-maneklal'
)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
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15. Application allowed.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '735449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Gujarat',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Application allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Brij Kishore S Ghosh Vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr - Citation 735449 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '735449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50905/limitation-act-1963-36-of-1963-complete-act">Limitation Act, 1963</a> - Sections 5; Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Abuse Rates Control Act, 1948 - Sections 23(3); <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Sections 115 - Order 9, Rule 13',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. Appln. No. 371 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Brij Kishore S. Ghosh Vs. Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Limitation - condonation of delay - Sections 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - petition filed against rejection of application filed by petitioner for condonation of delay - delay caused in filing application for setting aside execution decree passed against petitioner - it found that delay was caused due to negligence of petitioner's lawyer as he did not inform petitioner about decree - petitioner was nowhere found negligent and irresponsible in his conduct - in view of above petition allowed and delay condoned.


 -  -  Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' F.A. Memon, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' R.N. Shah, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Gujarat',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1988-07-04',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.P. Ravani, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?</p><p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..</p><p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.</p><p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.</p><p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,</p><p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :</p><p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'</p><p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:</p><p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,</p><p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.</p><p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :</p><p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.</p><p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.</p><p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.</p><p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.</p><p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.</p><p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'</p><p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.</p><p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.</p><p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.</p><p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.</p><p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.</p><p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.</p><p>15. Application allowed.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. One may legitimately ask - 'why too many judgments insisting liberal approach while interpreting 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?' The answer is simple and yet disappointing. It is very hard to change the dogmatic approach having its roots in old traditions and irrationality. The case on hand, provide, as an illustration as to how much difficult (almost impossible) it is to change such mental attitude and in still new thinking?',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Respondents-plaintiffs filed regular civil suit No. 176 of 1979, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Narol for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and for reasonable and bona fide requirements. The petitioner defendant appeared in the suit. One Mr. Makwana, learned advocate engaged by the defendant filed joint vakalatnama of himself and that of another advocate Mr. Rathod. After the appearance was filed the matter was being adjourned from time to time. On Sept. 11, 1978 the learned advocates of the defendant were absent. Thereafter on Oct. 16, 1978 in absence of the defendant the arguments of the plaintiffs were heard and the judgment was delivered on Nov. 8, 1978 by which the trial court granted decree for eviction as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed execution application and obtained warrant for possession. According to the defendant only on Mar. 19, 1979 when the Bailiff came for taking possession of the suit premises the defendant came to know about the decree having been passed against him. Therefore, on Mar. 26, 1979 an application to set aside the decree was filed. Since there was delay of three months and, ten days in filing the application, he prayed, for condonation of delay by filing separate application. The plaintiff resisted the application. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out..',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The defendant preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 62 of 1980 in the Court of District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Nerol. The learned District Judge held, as per judgment dt. July 15, 1980, that the appeal was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. However, he held that on merits following the judgment of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid decision and preferred two different revision applications being civil revision application No. 1225 of 1980 (filed by the petitioner-defendant) and civil revision application No. 753 of 1981 (filed by the plaintiffs). Having regard to the provisions of S. 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for the reasons mentioned in the order this Court came to the conclusion that the revision application under S. 29(3) of the Act was competent before the District Court, and remanded the matter to the District Court for deciding the same in accordance with law.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. After the matter was remanded the learned District Judge heard the parties again on same facts and on the same record. The learned District Judge, on merits, came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned, though in miscellaneous civil appeal No. 62 of 1980 decided by him on July 15, 1980 he had in terms held that following the decision of this High Court he would have condoned the delay. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the defendant has preferred this revision application.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. With utmost respect, the learned District Judge has not correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, AIR 1978 SC 537 and by this High Court in the case of Karim Abdulla v. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbai Jama, (1975) 16 Guj LR 835,',
	(int) 5 => '<p>In the case of Sandhya Rani Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of the <a>Limitation Act, 1963</a> should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. In the case of Karim Abdulla (supra), this High Court has also in almost similar terms reiterated the same principle and has stated :',
	(int) 6 => '<p>'The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in S. 5 of the Limitation Act is to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party.'',
	(int) 7 => '<p>6. After referring to the aforesaid decisions, the learned District Judge has observed:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the party, then sufficient cay 10 has to be liberally construed' ,',
	(int) 9 => '<p>With utmost respect, the learned District Judge adopted literal approach and missed the central idea by which the Supreme Court had laid emphasis on substantial justice. As per the decision of the Supreme Court and this High Court, absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the party seeking to condone delay is not a precondition, for interpreting 'sufficient cause' in liberal manner. The underlying principle to be kept in mind is that the ultimate object of the procedural laws is to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. Hence it should be the endeavor of the court to see that the disputes are resolved as far as possible on merits in just, fair and reasonable manner. Victory or defeat on technical grounds should ordinarily be avoided and discouraged. That is the reason why the question to be asked should be - Is there deliberate delay? Is it on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides? Is it on-account of any ulterior motive so that it can reasonably be pointed out that by resorting to delay the litigant was likely to be benefited? To achieve the goal of substantial justice, the word 'sufficient cause' occurring in S. 5 of! the Limitation Act are required to be interpreted liberally.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court indicated that it was justifiably making a liberal approach in matters instituted before it. The Supreme Court lamented the fact that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy and then indicated that such 4 liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that :',
	(int) 11 => '<p>'1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>3. 'Every day's delay must be explained', does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to realize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.'',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. After the remand of the matter one would have expected that the learned District Judge would stick to his earlier decision of condoning the delay as it was so observed by him in his decision dt. July 15, 1980. However, curiously enough on some facts he came to the conclusion that the delay was not required to be condoned. Why? It is difficult to understand and explain the attitude adopted by the learned District Judge. Probably such cases must have come to the notice of the Supreme Court also that appears to be the reason, why the Supreme Court was constrained to observe in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) that the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the heirarchy. The purpose behind the remand was to convey the message to the learned District Judge. Of course the message was implicit. It was assumed that what is implied will be understood. Unfortunately the message was not read properly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>9. The learned District Judge decided the revision application on the basis that he could interfere only if the order under revision was 'perverse or without jurisdiction'. It appears that the learned District Judge was unaware about the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben Popatlal v. Mahendrakumar Parmananddas Popat, (1975) 16 Guj LR 348. Therein, following the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Phiroza Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059, this High Court has held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 29(3) of the Rent Act, the District Court is required to correct the errors of law and it has to satisfy as to whether the decree or order made is 'according to law'. The learned District Judge did not examine the facts of the case on the basis of this settled legal position, but, instead, proceeded to decide the revision application as if it was u/s.. 115 of the C.P.C. This was certainly erroneous. The scope of revision u/s. 29(3) of the Act is certainly wider than the scope of revision u/s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>10. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the case is required to be examined. The case of the petitioner-defendant was that he had engaged advocate shri Makwana. Shri Makwana had transferred the matter to another advocate Shri Rathod. Shri Rathod was not present when the matter was called out. It is true that the aforesaid statement made by the petitioner was inaccurate inasmuch as Shri Makwana and Shri Rathod had jointly filed the vakalatnama, and Shri Makwana had not transferred the matter to Shri Rathod. Learned advocate Shri Makwana had filed affidavit to the effect that he was. sick and he was not able to attend the matter as he was busy in metropolitan Magistrate's Court. Moreover he could not communicate to the petitioner that he had entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Rathod. Thus it was on account of the communication gap between the learned Advocate and the defendant that decree was passed and thereafter delay occurred.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>11.It is trite knowledge that it often happens in lower courts as well as in this High Court that more than one advocate file their appearance jointly. Usually one of them is in charge of the matter. When the learned advocate Shri Makwana filed affidavit and stated that he was in charge of the matter and he was not able to communicate the fact that the matter was entrusted to Shri Rathod, there was no reason to disbelieve his statement. The approach adopted by the trial court and confirmed by the learned District Judge, to say the least, is contrary to the practice prevailing in all the courts including this High Court. At least this High Court ordinarily does not insist that simply because another advocate has also signed the vakalatnama, he shall also be considered in charge of the matter whether the senior advocate is present or not. Only when such ground is advanced as an excuse and with ulterior and oblique motives, the court may not accept the same and insist that the matter be proceeded further. In, the instant case, facts do not disclose that learned advocates appearing for the party remained absent deliberately and with ulterior and oblique motives.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. The lower court took absurd and perverse view of the matter and took exception about the circumstance that another advocate Shri Rathod also had not filed the affidavit. The view taken by the lower courts is certainly not in accordance with the principles of law and one may go to the extent of saying that the same is perverse. Even if stricter standard of limited scope of revision application under S. 115 of the C. P.C. is applied this would be a fit case in which the High Court would be justified in holding that the approach adopted by the lower courts was perverse and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. The case advanced by the petitioner-defendant that he entrusted the matter to advocate Shri Makwana and he had not informed him about the matter having been transferred to another advocate is substantiated by the affidavit of Shri Makwana. Once this is accepted, it follows that the petitioner was never negligent. He was never inactive or indolent. Because there was some lapse on the part of advocates the litigant should not be made to suffer. Therefore in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the lower courts ought to have held that this constituted sufficient, cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the decree.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. In the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Narol, below Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in Civil Revision Application No. 3 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. Civil Application No. 128 of 1979 is allowed and the delay, in filing the application for setting aside the decree is condoned. The trial court is directed to hear and decide the application for setting aside the decree on merits in accordance with law. Till the application for setting aside the decree is decided, execution of the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 176 of 1979 of the Court of Civil Judge (SD) Narol, as to possession only, is stayed. Rule made absolute accordingly.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Application allowed.<p>',
	(int) 25 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 26
$i = (int) 25
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