District Executive Officer Vs. Abel - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/730788
SubjectLimitation
CourtKerala High Court
Decided OnSep-05-2005
Case NumberW.A. Nos. 1462 of 2000 and 2362 of 2002
Judge Rajeev Gupta, C.J. and; K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
Reported in2006(2)KLT758
ActsKerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 - Sections 7, 7(1), 8, 8(1), 8(2) and 8(5); Limitation Act, 1963 - Sections 5; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908; Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 193, 196 and 228; Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 - Sections 90 and 93; Constitution of India - Article 226
AppellantDistrict Executive Officer
RespondentAbel
Appellant Advocate Paulson C. Varghese, Adv.
Respondent Advocate N. Sukumaran,; S. Shyam, Advs. and;Government Pleader
Cases ReferredL.S. Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and Anr.
Excerpt:
- - 4. learned single judge went into the merits of the case and took the view that liability cast on the writ petitioner as per the final determination orders were bad in law, so also government order rejecting the appeal. this legal position is well settled by the decision of the apex court in sakuru v. we are of the view, in a case where party was not vigilant and had failed to avail of the statutory remedy he is not justified in invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the constitution of india. findings of the civil court as well as that of the authorities are consistent that the writ petitioner was the employer during the relevant period.k.s. radhakrishnan, j.1. whether the government have got the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal beyond sixty days from the date of receipt of the order under section 8(5) of the kerala motor transport workers welfare fund act, 1985 is the question posed for consideration in these cases.2. writ petitioner in o.p. no. 14892 of 1999 was served with the final determination order for the periods 1993-94 and 1994-95 by the district executive officer of the kerala motor transport workers welfare fund board by registered post which was returned with the postal endorsement 'addressee unclaimed'. appeals were preferred before the government on 8.4.1999 after a period of more than four years against the final determination order for the year 1993-94 and after a period of more than three years against the final determination order for the year 1994-95. contention was raised before government that final determination orders were wrongly and falsely returned by the postman to the district executive officer with the endorsement 'addressee unclaimed' and therefore appeals preferred were liable to be entertained. explanation was not acceptable to the appellate authority and the appeals were rejected as time barred.3. petitioner has approached this court challenging the order of the appellate authority dismissing the appeal as time barred and also the final determination orders invoking article 226 of the constitution of india. contention was raised that the final determination orders were not served on the petitioner and that the endorsement made by the postman as 'unclaimed' was not correct. further it was also pointed out that even if there was delay in filing the appeals before the appellate authority, appellate authority has got power to condone the delay under section 5 of the limitation act. contention was also raised that even if the appeals are not maintainable, petitioner is entitled to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the constitution of india.4. learned single judge went into the merits of the case and took the view that liability cast on the writ petitioner as per the final determination orders were bad in law, so also government order rejecting the appeal. it was also ordered that the liability cast on the petitioner as per ext. p7 order shall be recovered only after rectifying the mistake in the schedule to the said order incorporating the name of the employees. district executive officer of the welfare fund board is aggrieved by the judgment and has filed this appeal.5. counsel appearing for the board submitted that learned single judge has committed a grave error in entertaining the writ petition since the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal as time barred. counsel submitted that the question of examining the merits of the case does not arise in a case where petitioner had not availed of the statutory remedy of appeal before the government. on merits also counsel submitted that learned single judge has committed an error in granting the reliefs. counter affidavit has dealt with in detail the steps taken by the district executive officer in serving the -final determination order on the writ petitioner. steps taken by the officer in conducting the enquiry and collecting evidence before the issuance of the final determination order have also been stated in the counter affidavit. further it is also pointed out that the petitioner had filed a suit, o.s. no.407 of 1996 before the sub court, thodupuzha which was dismissed. later writ petitioner appeared before the district executive officer on 24.5.1999 and applied for the issuance of a copy of the final determination orders for the years 1992-93, -1993-94 and 1994-95 and filed an appeal before the labour secretary to government, trivandrum under section 8(5) of the act. appellate authority dismissed the appeal since there was delay in filing the appeal. further it is stated that the appellate authority has no power to condone the delay.6. original petition no. 14892 of 1999 was filed seeking a writ of certiorari to quash ext.pl final determination order under section 8 of the kerala motor transport workers welfare fund act, 1985 and also for other consequential reliefs. district executive officer of the kerala motor transport workers welfare fund board issued a provisional assessment order no. et.619/97-98 dated 14.12,1998 directing the writ petitioner to pay an amount of rs. 45,456/-, petitioner was directed to file his objections on or before 26.11.1998. no objection was preferred. consequently, the final determination order dated 14.12.1998 was issued. petitioner did not take any step to file the appeal in time under section 8(5) of the act. later appeal was filed on 20.2.2000 with a petition for condonation of delay of 400 days. petition for condonation of delay was dismissed by the government, so also the appeal. petitioner then preferred the present original petition on 28.3.2000 under article 226 of the constitution of india challenging the final determination order. learned single judge dismissed the writ petition. aggrieved by the same, writ appeal no. 1462 of 2000 has been preferred.7. counsel appearing for the appellant in w.a.no 1462 of 2000 submitted even though his appeal was not entertained by the government due to delay in filing the appeal within the statutory period this court under article 226 of the constitution of india could examine the validity of ext.p1 final determination order. counsel submitted respondents 3 to 7 were not his workers during the period 1997-98. further it is also stated both the stage carriages were kept in the workshop for repairs during the relevant period and therefore respondents 3 to 7 are not entitled to get any amount from the motor transport workers welfare fund during 1997-98. further it is also, contended that no enquiry was conducted before passing the final determination order and no provisional determination order was served on the petitioner as stated in ext.p1.8. learned government pleader on the other hand, contended that the writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of india is not maintainable since petitioner had not availed of the alternate remedy under section 8 (5) of the act. further it was also contended that government have rightly rejected the appeal since the same was filed out of time and that the government have no power to condone the delay in entertaining the appeal.9. a division bench of this court in kerala motor transport w.w.f. board v. government of kerala (2001 (1) klt 608) while interpreting section 8(5) of the motor transport workers welfare fund act, 1985 held that the government is not entitled to entertain any appeal filed under section 8(5) of the act beyond the prescribed period of 60 days. this court took the view, in the absence of any provision expressly conferring power on the appellate authority to entertain an appeal on any count after the period of limitation prescribed under the statute, the appellate authority is not competent to entertain a time-barred appeal and there is no implied power conferred on the appellate authority to condone the delay and entertain the appeal,10. in this connection we may refer to section 8 for easy reference.8. determination of amount duefrom employers.(1) the chief executive officer or any other officer appointed under sub-section (1) of section 7 authorised by him in this behalf may, by order, determine the amount due from any employer under the provisions of this act or of the scheme and for this purpose, may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary.(2) any officer conducting the inquiry under sub-section (1) shall for the purpose of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the code of civil procedure, 1908 (central act 5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely-(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;(c) receiving evidence on affidavit;(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses.(3) any inquiry under this section shall be deemed to be ajudicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the indian penal code (central act 5 of 1860) and for the purposes of section 196 of that code.(4) no order determining the amount due from any employer shall be made under sub-section (1) unless the employer has been given-a reasonable opportunity of being heard.(5) any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (1) may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the government or any other authority as may be specified by the government in this behalf and the decision of the government or of such authority on such appeal shall be final.power is conferred on the chief executive officer under section 8(1) and 8(2) of the act. as per section 8(2) any officer conducting the inquiry under sub-section (1) shall for the purpose of such inquiry, has the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the code of civil procedure, 1908. any inquiry conducted under the said provision is deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 232 of the indian penal code and for the purpose of section 196 of that code section 8(4) provides that no order determining the amount due from any employer shall be made under sub-section (1) unless the employer has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. right of appeal is also conferred on the aggrieved party before the government and a finality has been attached to the order of the government under section 8(5) of the act.11. legislature in its wisdom thought that government be conferred with no power for condonation of delay with the object of not delaying payment of amount due to the employee on its determination by chief executive officer, kerala motor transport workers welfare fund act is a welfare legislation. canon of constructing welfare legislation is distinct from the canon of constructing ordinary law. court cannot countenance any practice to circumvent or defeat the provisions of the welfare legislation. kerala motor transport workers welfare fund act and the scheme framed thereunder are intended to achieve some urgent social demands, that is welfare of motor transport workers. state has got obligation to work out the welfare of the motor transport workers. it is with that objective the scheme has been framed. legislature felt that if any person is aggrieved by the order passed by the chief executive officer he could prefer an appeal within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the order. legislature has not conferred power on the government to entertain any appeal filed beyond the statutory period fixed.12. we may in this connection refer to the judgment of a learned single judge of this court in kunhipokku v. district executive officer (1993 (2) klt short notes page 4). learned single judge felt that having provided an appeal under section 8 against orders determining the amount due from an employer, it will only be appropriate to expressly provide for condonation of the delay in filing appeals for sufficient cause or else, learned single judge felt, a charge of arbitrariness is likely to be raised, that the government refused to entertain the appeals filed beyond time despite the existence of sufficient cause, while in many other cases, they had entertained such appeals. learned single judge felt that it is for the rule making authority to consider this question. in spite of the opinion expressed by the learned single judge, legislature never thought of amending the said provision. legislature in their wisdom felt no power to condone delay be conferred on the government, lest the payment of the amount due to the workers, would be delayed.13. contention was raised that even though statute has not specifically conferred any power on the appellate authority to condone delay, delay could be condoned under section 5 of the limitation act if there ' are sufficient reasons for not filing the'appeal within the statutory time prescribed by the statute. we find it difficult to accept this contention since section 5 of the limitation act would apply only to proceedings in court and not to appeals or applications before the bodies governed by the statutes. this legal position is well settled by the decision of the apex court in sakuru v. tanaji 1985) 3 scc 590. that was a case where apex court was dealing with section 93 of the andhra pradesh (telengana area) tenancy and agricultural lands act, 1950. delay in filing the appeal before the collector under section 90 beyond the period prescribed under section 93 was sought to be condoned. rejecting the contention the apex court held that the collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant under section 90 of the act not being a court, the limitation act, as such has no applicability to the proceedings before him. it was also held that section 93 of the act prescribing the period of limitation applies to application before the collector and the provisions of the limitation act applies relating to the computation of the period of limitation does not have the effect of rendering the provisions of section 5 of the limitation act applicable to proceedings before the collector. we may also refer to a recent decision of the apex court in l.s. synthetics ltd. v. fairgrowth financial services ltd. and anr. : (2004)11scc456 wherein the apex court held as follows:the limitation act, 1963 is applicable only in relation to certain applications and not all applications despite the fact that the words 'other proceedings' were added in the long title of the act in 1963. the provisions of the said act are not applicable to the proceedings before bodies other than courts, such as a quasi-judicial tribunal or even an executive authority. the act primarily applies to the civil proceedings or some special criminal proceedings. even in a tribunal, where the code of civil procedure or code of criminal procedure is applicable, the limitation act, 1963 per se may not be applied to the proceedings before it. even in relation to certain civil proceedings, the limitation act may not have any application. as for example, there is no bar of limitation for initiation of a final decree proceedings or to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under section 151 of the code, of civil procedure or for correction of accidental slip or omission in judgments, orders or decrees; the reason being that these powers can be exercised even suo motu by the court and, thus, no question of any limitation arises. 14. in view of the above mentioned legal position, we are in full agreement with the appellate authority that it had no power to condone the delay and consequently the appeal was rightly rejected as time barred,15. counsel appearing for the respondent in w.a.no.2362, of 2002 however submitted that even though appeal was time barred learned single judge was justified in invoking the jurisdiction or this court under article 226 of the constitution of india in interfering with the final determination order. we find it difficult to accept the said contention. we are of the view, in a case where party was not vigilant and had failed to avail of the statutory remedy he is not justified in invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the constitution of india. finality has been attached to the final determination order and this court shall not come to the rescue of the party who was not vigilant of his rights and has not availed of the statutory remedy available to him. by entertaining the writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of india this court would be permitting a party to bypass the statutory remedy. we are, therefore, of the considered view, this court sitting in article 226 of the constitution of india shall not exercise the discretion in favour of the party who had not availed of the alternate remedy available under the statute.16. learned single judge on facts also was not justified in granting the reliefs prayed for in o.p. no 14892 of 1999. ext.p4 is the revenue recovery notice issued to the petitioner for recovery of the contribution towards motor workers welfare fund in respect of the vehicle kl 14671 for the period 1992-1994. revenue recovery notice was issued on the basis of the final determination order ext.p6. contention was raised by the writ petitioner before the learned single judge that the vehicle was transferred to him only on 20.6.1994. facts would evidently show that during the relevant time petitioner was the employer and the same was not controverted. further, after the final determination order petitioner has filed a suit, o.s. no. 407 of 1996 before the sub court, thodupuzha which was also dismissed. findings of the civil court as well as that of the authorities are consistent that the writ petitioner was the employer during the relevant period. in such circumstances, learned single judge was not justified in interfering with the final determination order by invoking the powers under article 226 of the constitution of india. we therefore allow w.a.no. 2362 of 2002 and set aside the judgment of the learned single judge. w.a.no 1462 of 2000 would stand dismissed.
Judgment:

K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. Whether the Government have got the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal beyond sixty days from the date of receipt of the order under Section 8(5) of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 is the question posed for consideration in these cases.

2. Writ petitioner in O.P. No. 14892 of 1999 was served with the final determination order for the periods 1993-94 and 1994-95 by the District Executive Officer of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board by registered post which was returned with the postal endorsement 'addressee unclaimed'. Appeals were preferred before the Government on 8.4.1999 after a period of more than four years against the final determination order for the year 1993-94 and after a period of more than three years against the final determination order for the year 1994-95. Contention was raised before Government that final determination orders were wrongly and falsely returned by the postman to the District Executive Officer with the endorsement 'addressee unclaimed' and therefore appeals preferred were liable to be entertained. Explanation was not acceptable to the appellate authority and the appeals were rejected as time barred.

3. Petitioner has approached this Court challenging the order of the appellate authority dismissing the appeal as time barred and also the final determination orders invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Contention was raised that the final determination orders were not served on the petitioner and that the endorsement made by the postman as 'unclaimed' was not correct. Further it was also pointed out that even if there was delay in filing the appeals before the appellate authority, appellate authority has got power to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Contention was also raised that even if the appeals are not maintainable, petitioner is entitled to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

4. Learned single Judge went into the merits of the case and took the view that liability cast on the writ petitioner as per the final determination orders were bad in law, so also government order rejecting the appeal. It was also ordered that the liability cast on the petitioner as per Ext. P7 order shall be recovered only after rectifying the mistake in the schedule to the said order incorporating the name of the employees. District Executive Officer of the Welfare Fund Board is aggrieved by the judgment and has filed this appeal.

5. Counsel appearing for the Board submitted that learned single Judge has committed a grave error in entertaining the writ petition since the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal as time barred. Counsel submitted that the question of examining the merits of the case does not arise in a case where petitioner had not availed of the statutory remedy of appeal before the Government. On merits also counsel submitted that learned single Judge has committed an error in granting the reliefs. Counter affidavit has dealt with in detail the steps taken by the District Executive Officer in serving the -final determination order on the writ petitioner. Steps taken by the officer in conducting the enquiry and collecting evidence before the issuance of the final determination order have also been stated in the counter affidavit. Further it is also pointed out that the petitioner had filed a suit, O.S. No.407 of 1996 before the Sub Court, Thodupuzha which was dismissed. Later writ petitioner appeared before the District Executive Officer on 24.5.1999 and applied for the issuance of a copy of the final determination orders for the years 1992-93, -1993-94 and 1994-95 and filed an appeal before the Labour Secretary to Government, Trivandrum under Section 8(5) of the Act. Appellate authority dismissed the appeal since there was delay in filing the appeal. Further it is stated that the appellate authority has no power to condone the delay.

6. Original Petition No. 14892 of 1999 was filed seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.Pl final determination order under Section 8 of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 and also for other consequential reliefs. District Executive officer of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board issued a provisional assessment order No. ET.619/97-98 dated 14.12,1998 directing the writ petitioner to pay an amount of Rs. 45,456/-, Petitioner was directed to file his objections on or before 26.11.1998. No objection was preferred. Consequently, the final determination order dated 14.12.1998 was issued. Petitioner did not take any step to file the appeal in time under Section 8(5) of the Act. Later appeal was filed on 20.2.2000 with a petition for condonation of delay of 400 days. Petition for condonation of delay was dismissed by the Government, so also the appeal. Petitioner then preferred the present original petition on 28.3.2000 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the final determination order. Learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved by the same, Writ Appeal No. 1462 of 2000 has been preferred.

7. Counsel appearing for the appellant in W.A.No 1462 of 2000 submitted even though his appeal was not entertained by the Government due to delay in filing the appeal within the statutory period this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could examine the validity of Ext.P1 final determination order. Counsel submitted respondents 3 to 7 were not his workers during the period 1997-98. Further it is also stated both the stage carriages were kept in the workshop for repairs during the relevant period and therefore respondents 3 to 7 are not entitled to get any amount from the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund during 1997-98. Further it is also, contended that no enquiry was conducted before passing the final determination order and no provisional determination order was served on the petitioner as stated in Ext.P1.

8. Learned Government Pleader on the other hand, contended that the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable since petitioner had not availed of the alternate remedy under Section 8 (5) of the Act. Further it was also contended that Government have rightly rejected the appeal since the same was filed out of time and that the Government have no power to condone the delay in entertaining the appeal.

9. A Division Bench of this Court in Kerala Motor Transport W.W.F. Board v. Government of Kerala (2001 (1) KLT 608) while interpreting Section 8(5) of the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 held that the Government is not entitled to entertain any appeal filed under Section 8(5) of the Act beyond the prescribed period of 60 days. This Court took the view, in the absence of any provision expressly conferring power on the appellate authority to entertain an appeal on any count after the period of limitation prescribed under the statute, the appellate authority is not competent to entertain a time-barred appeal and there is no implied power conferred on the appellate authority to condone the delay and entertain the appeal,

10. In this connection we may refer to Section 8 for easy reference.

8. Determination of amount duefrom employers.

(1) The Chief Executive Officer or any other officer appointed under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 authorised by him in this behalf may, by order, determine the amount due from any employer under the provisions of this Act or of the scheme and for this purpose, may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary.

(2) Any officer conducting the inquiry under Sub-section (1) shall for the purpose of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely-

(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavit;

(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses.

(3) Any inquiry under this section shall be deemed to be ajudicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act 5 of 1860) and for the purposes of Section 196 of that Code.

(4) No order determining the amount due from any employer shall be made under Sub-section (1) unless the employer has been given-a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

(5) Any person aggrieved by an order under Sub-section (1) may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the Government or any other authority as may be specified by the Government in this behalf and the decision of the Government or of such authority on such appeal shall be final.

Power is conferred on the Chief Executive Officer under Section 8(1) and 8(2) of the Act. As per Section 8(2) any officer conducting the inquiry under Sub-section (1) shall for the purpose of such inquiry, has the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Any inquiry conducted under the said provision is deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 232 of the Indian Penal Code and for the purpose of Section 196 of that Code Section 8(4) provides that no order determining the amount due from any employer shall be made under Sub-section (1) unless the employer has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Right of appeal is also conferred on the aggrieved party before the Government and a finality has been attached to the order of the Government under Section 8(5) of the Act.

11. Legislature in its wisdom thought that Government be conferred with no power for condonation of delay with the object of not delaying payment of amount due to the employee on its determination by Chief Executive Officer, Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act is a welfare legislation. Canon of constructing welfare legislation is distinct from the canon of constructing ordinary law. Court cannot countenance any practice to circumvent or defeat the provisions of the welfare legislation. Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act and the scheme framed thereunder are intended to achieve some urgent social demands, that is welfare of motor transport workers. State has got obligation to work out the welfare of the motor transport workers. It is with that objective the scheme has been framed. Legislature felt that if any person is aggrieved by the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer he could prefer an appeal within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the order. Legislature has not conferred power on the Government to entertain any appeal filed beyond the statutory period fixed.

12. We may in this connection refer to the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Kunhipokku v. District Executive Officer (1993 (2) KLT Short Notes page 4). Learned single Judge felt that having provided an appeal under Section 8 against orders determining the amount due from an employer, it will only be appropriate to expressly provide for condonation of the delay in filing appeals for sufficient cause or else, learned single Judge felt, a charge of arbitrariness is likely to be raised, that the Government refused to entertain the appeals filed beyond time despite the existence of sufficient cause, while in many other cases, they had entertained such appeals. Learned single Judge felt that it is for the rule making authority to consider this question. In spite of the opinion expressed by the learned single Judge, Legislature never thought of amending the said provision. Legislature in their wisdom felt no power to condone delay be conferred on the Government, lest the payment of the amount due to the workers, would be delayed.

13. Contention was raised that even though statute has not specifically conferred any power on the appellate authority to condone delay, delay could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act if there ' are sufficient reasons for not filing the'appeal within the statutory time prescribed by the statute. We find it difficult to accept this contention since Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply only to proceedings in court and not to appeals or applications before the bodies governed by the statutes. This legal position is well settled by the decision of the apex court in Sakuru v. Tanaji 1985) 3 SCC 590. That was a case where apex court was dealing with Section 93 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. Delay in filing the appeal before the Collector under Section 90 beyond the period prescribed under Section 93 was sought to be condoned. Rejecting the contention the Apex Court held that the Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant under Section 90 of the Act not being a court, the Limitation Act, as such has no applicability to the proceedings before him. It was also held that Section 93 of the Act prescribing the period of limitation applies to application before the Collector and the provisions of the Limitation Act applies relating to the computation of the period of limitation does not have the effect of rendering the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings before the Collector. We may also refer to a recent decision of the Apex Court in L.S. Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and Anr. : (2004)11SCC456 wherein the apex court held as follows:

The Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable only in relation to certain applications and not all applications despite the fact that the words 'other proceedings' were added in the long title of the Act in 1963. The provisions of the said Act are not applicable to the proceedings before bodies other than courts, such as a quasi-judicial tribunal or even an executive authority. The Act primarily applies to the civil proceedings or some special criminal proceedings. Even in a tribunal, where the Code of Civil Procedure or Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable, the Limitation Act, 1963 per se may not be applied to the proceedings before it. Even in relation to certain civil proceedings, the Limitation Act may not have any application. As for example, there is no bar of limitation for initiation of a final decree proceedings or to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under Section 151 of the Code, of Civil Procedure or for correction of accidental slip or omission in judgments, orders or decrees; the reason being that these powers can be exercised even suo motu by the court and, thus, no question of any limitation arises.

14. In view of the above mentioned legal position, we are in full agreement with the appellate authority that it had no power to condone the delay and consequently the appeal was rightly rejected as time barred,

15. Counsel appearing for the respondent in W.A.No.2362, of 2002 however submitted that even though appeal was time barred learned single Judge was justified in invoking the jurisdiction or this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in interfering with the final determination order. We find it difficult to accept the said contention. We are of the view, in a case where party was not vigilant and had failed to avail of the statutory remedy he is not justified in invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Finality has been attached to the final determination order and this Court shall not come to the rescue of the party who was not vigilant of his rights and has not availed of the statutory remedy available to him. By entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court would be permitting a party to bypass the statutory remedy. We are, therefore, of the considered view, this Court sitting in Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not exercise the discretion in favour of the party who had not availed of the alternate remedy available under the statute.

16. Learned single Judge on facts also was not justified in granting the reliefs prayed for in O.P. No 14892 of 1999. Ext.P4 is the revenue recovery notice issued to the petitioner for recovery of the contribution towards motor workers welfare fund in respect of the vehicle KL 14671 for the period 1992-1994. Revenue recovery notice was issued on the basis of the final determination order Ext.P6. Contention was raised by the writ petitioner before the learned single Judge that the vehicle was transferred to him only on 20.6.1994. Facts would evidently show that during the relevant time petitioner was the employer and the same was not controverted. Further, after the final determination order petitioner has filed a suit, O.S. No. 407 of 1996 before the Sub Court, Thodupuzha which was also dismissed. Findings of the civil court as well as that of the authorities are consistent that the writ petitioner was the employer during the relevant period. In such circumstances, learned single Judge was not justified in interfering with the final determination order by invoking the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We therefore allow W.A.No. 2362 of 2002 and set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge. W.A.No 1462 of 2000 would stand dismissed.